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Abstract 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 left a severe impact on Malaysia’s economy and 
banking system. This has forced the Malaysian government to undertake financial 
restructuring initiatives to restore market and public confidence, and to meet the ongoing 
challenges associated with market structure, financial innovation and globalisation. 
Therefore, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) introduced a ten-year Financial Sector Master 
Plan (FSMP) to strengthen domestic banks and the regulatory structure, and to promote the 
banks’ efficiency by stimulating a competitive banking industry through financial 
liberalisation. The crisis for banks in Malaysia and the region has been extensively studied 
in the past (Sufian, 2010). However, empirical studies of the post-crisis period, and the 
implementation of the FSMP, remain limited. Hence, a data set of all banks in Malaysia, 
which covers the period 2000–2011, was employed to examine the effect of the FSMP’s 
initiatives on Malaysian banks’ efficiency between 2000 and 2011. To measure this 
efficiency, this study employs both parametric and nonparametric models: namely, 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). Economic 
functions such as, cost-, standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency were used in a 1-
stage SFA model, which includes control variables (e.g. capital adequacy, asset quality and 
liquidity) and environmental variables (e.g. ownership, size, specialisation, deregulation 
periods and market structure) in the model specifications. In addition, this study employs 
SFA as the main measurement method, while the DEA model was used to cross-check 
consistency (Resti, 1997; Bauer et al., 1998). Both SFA and DEA demonstrated that, in 
most cases, the consistency was moderate.  
The level of cost efficiency of Malaysian banks worsened over the years 2000–2011, with 
average cost efficiency during this period was at 76.5%. Despite the various liberalisation 
measures introduced to the banking industry – particularly during the three phases of the 
FSMP; 2000–2003; 2004–2007; 2008–2011 – cost efficiency trended downward, due to the 
effects of consolidation by domestic banks, deregulation of interest rates, the introduction of 
foreign Islamic banks, and the global credit crisis. Banks in Malaysia were forced to adjust 
their inputs and outputs to the rapid changes in the banking industry, which might have 
made a negative impact on cost efficiency. On the other hand, the banks demonstrated a 
steadily increasing profit efficiency trend, which fluctuated with the introduction of interest 
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rate liberalisation (early second phase of the FSMP (i.e. 2004)) and during the global credit 
crisis (early third phase of the FSMP (i.e. 2008)). The average profit efficiency for 2000–
2011 was 93.3%. The profit efficiency exhibited an increasing trend in the first (2000-2003) 
and second (2004-2007) phases of the FSMP, suggesting that the effect of consolidation by 
domestic banks had resulted in higher market concentration and greater market power 
among the remaining banks. However, the profit efficiency average scores fell in 2004, 
2008 and 2011. This is attributed to the deregulation of interest rates, the deleveraging of the 
inflow of foreign funds, and the rapid increase in policy interest rates. At a more granular 
level, domestic banks were found to be more cost efficient, but marginally less profit 
efficient, when compared to foreign banks. In terms of bank specialisation, conventional 
banks were more cost- and profit-efficient than Islamic banks. With regard to economies of 
scale, the majority of Malaysian banks revealed scale economies, illustrated by a U-shape, 
with medium-sized banks being more scale efficient than small and large banks.  
These results suggest that, to enhance Malaysian banks’ efficiency, the government must 
maintain competitive pressure on the large domestic banks that were consolidated during the 
first phase of the FSMP (2000-2003). Policymakers may want to further open up banking 
markets, improve risk management and governance, encourage financial innovation, and 
support expansion of smaller banks. The implementation of deregulation initiatives during 
periods of uncertainty (e.g. the global credit crisis) have also resulted in decreasing trend of 
cost and profit efficiency. Hence, monitoring initiatives, using tools such as frontier 
measurement is important for regulator’s macro- and micro-prudential surveillance.   
 
Keywords: Cost efficiency, Profit efficiency, Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Malaysian Banks, Financial Liberalisation, Financial Sector Master 
Plan. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Developing countries need efficient intermediation of funds from savers to borrowers to 
enable productive allocation of resources, which then contributes to higher economic 
growth (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Thus, the development of the financial system is 
essential for the general enhancement of productivity and economic growth in developing 
countries. However, financial systems in developing countries generally demonstrate 
excessive government intervention in mobilising and allocating resources, which inhibits 
competition and efficient resource allocation. As a result, many developing countries have 
progressively implemented financial liberalisation and reforms to promote competition and 
efficiency in resource allocation (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003).
1
 Such liberalisation has 
increased competitiveness among banks significantly by inducing them to adjust their 
strategies in key areas (e.g. in the development of new delivery systems and service quality) 
(Casu and Girardone, 2006). A competitive environment also encourages banks to be more 
efficient by reducing operating costs, enhancing overall management, improving risk 
management, and offering new products and services (Denizer et al., 2000). So, higher 
competition can cause banks to reduce their costs and therefore increase their efficiency, 
leading to more efficient allocation of resources and higher economic growth (McKinnon, 
1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1995).
2
 As a consequence, issues regarding banks’ efficiency and 
financial liberalisation in developing countries have become more important for micro- and 
macro-stability of the banking industry (Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1987). 
As mentioned earlier, the banking system seeks to enhance resource allocation and aims to 
improve the efficiency of banks (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2008). However, 
developments in the banking industry may suffer distortions as a result of financial crises. In 
a deep recession, an economy may experience a sharp decline in economic growth. For 
                                                 
1
 The financial liberalisation programme includes, but is not limited to, a deregulation of exchange and interest 
rate controls, reduction in government directed lending, privatisation of government-owned banks, a reduced 
entry barrier for foreign banks and a reduction in the statutory reserve ratio (Caprio et al., 1997). 
2
 For instance, greater market competition in the banking system could reduce market power and therefore 
should reduce the price of financial services, resulting in welfare gains for the public and customers 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). 
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instance, Malaysia was hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98: the Malaysian Ringgit 
fell by 40.0% against the US Dollar; the stock market plunged by over 70.0%; resulting in 
extreme volatility in financial markets; and the country’s sovereign rating being 
downgraded (Jomo and Chin, 2001; Sufian, 2009). The scenario worsened as economic 
activity declined: GDP contracted by 7.5% with weak regional export demand; and 
companies were in distress and unable to service debt and over leveraging. In the banking 
system, the number of non-performing loans (NPLs) increased sharply, which caused capital 
erosion due to over-concentration of risk (mainly in the large corporate sector) (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 1997, 1998). At the same time, the intermediation process was also 
inefficient due to tight liquidity, with loan growth declined sharply (Rajoo, 2008).  
This crisis negatively impacted the banking sector in Malaysia, resulting in many problems, 
such as an increase in NPLs. So, Malaysia initiated a comprehensive crisis management 
arrangement to restore stability, expedite recovery and restart growth without relying on 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance. Due to this early intervention, Malaysia has 
managed a speedy recovery at minimal costs to the government (less than 5% of GDP) 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999, 2000). Realising the vulnerabilities of the financial sector, 
the central bank then introduced a plan outlining the strategic focus, common goals and 
action to be taken through the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP). The FSMP is a 
sequence of measures to accomplish the desired financial sector. It has goals for maintaining 
financial stability and makes 119 recommendations in six broad clusters (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2001b). The FSMP spans over three phases: in the first phase, the focus was on 
building capacity in domestic financial institutions and strengthening the regulatory 
framework.
3
 Subsequently, phase two was a vision to level the playing field for incumbent 
foreign banks, in which some restrictions on foreign banks were removed. Phase three will 
see Malaysia open up its banking industry to foreign players, in line with the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)’s liberalisation program (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001b; Hon et al, 
2011).  
Prior to the Asian financial crisis, the banking system in Malaysia was fragmented with 33 
domestic banking institutions. Banks at that time had little capital and were unable to face 
                                                 
3
 This capacity building is imperative in laying a solid foundation on which financial institutions can 
strengthen and compete effectively amid further liberalisation without accumulation of risk factors that may 
adversely affect financial stability and growth (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001b; Hon et al., 2005). 
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the macro pressures arising from economic vulnerability. The banks also over-relied on 
corporations for their finance, where less attention was given to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and retail consumers, which caused gaps in access to finance. 
Companies relied too heavily on banks for their finance, and the bond capital market was 
not sufficiently developed to support the need for funds of large firms (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 1999b). Before the Asian crisis, banks were lacking in terms of effective risk 
management and corporate governance, leaving them highly fragile. Furthermore, the 
market conditions were very rigid, where rules-based regulation and micro-based 
supervision were implemented in the financial sector. The pricing mechanism of banking 
products and services was also rigid (e.g. government controlled interest rates), which did 
not encourage competition among financial players (Ang and McKibbin, 2007; Said et al., 
2008). In terms of Islamic banking, the prominence of Islamic finance was limited and not 
given full attention with regard to its possibilities and potentials (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). 
In general, the banking industry in Malaysia was distorted by interest rate controls and 
selective credit policies, a lack of competition, and weak supervision by the regulators.  
The FSMP initiatives changed the financial landscape of the banking industry. As of 2011, 
the banking industry was consolidated and rationalised, from 33 domestic financial 
institutions into 10 banking groups (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). Banks were also found to be 
diversifying and improved their efficiency in delivery channels for financial products and 
services by enhancing access to financing, particularly for SMEs and consumers (Hon et al., 
2011). These changes diversified the financial sector, with a deep and liquid debt securities 
market and a better focus on investment banks assisting corporations to get alternative 
finance in the bond market. Banks are now more focused on corporate governance and risk 
management, particularly with the implementation of principles-based regulations, coupled 
with an adequate supervisory and surveillance framework (Abdul Ghani, 2010). Moreover, 
the market structure has improved, with an increased emphasis on market orientation, 
supported by greater regional cooperation, increased competitive pressure from new and 
current foreign banks, and freedom in the pricing of lending and deposits (Tahir et al., 2008). 
Similar to initiatives in other developing countries, the objectives of these reforms and 
liberalisations, via the FSMP, are to promote diversity, efficiency and productivity, and to 
facilitate a competitive banking system by improving resource allocation and building a 
stronger economy (Fry, 1995). As a consequence, banking efficiency received even more 
attention in the aftermath of the financial crisis, with structural reforms and liberalisations, 
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rendering the examination of this banking efficiency an important issue for both the public 
and policymakers (Berger and Mester, 1997).
4
 
1.2 Aims and Motives of Research 
The aims of this research are: first, to carry out an extensive cost- and profit-efficiency 
analysis of Malaysian banks for the years 2000–2011 using frontier approaches and 
examining how changes in the financial services affected efficiency, productivity and the 
market structure of the banking industry in Malaysia. Second, to examine the impact of 
market liberalisation initiatives, via the FSMP, on efficiency and productivity in Malaysian 
banks. And third, to investigate the determinants of efficiency in Malaysian banks, and their 
significance, by examining bank-specific (i.e. inherent risks (e.g. capital adequacy, asset 
quality and liquidity), ownership structure, bank specialisation, and bank size) and market 
environmental (i.e. market concentration, FSMP’s phases and the global credit crisis) 
factors.  
There are very few empirical efficiency studies of Malaysian banking, compared with the 
vast number of such studies in the United States (US) and European banking systems. 
Additionally, this research is motivated by areas that still need to be fully addressed in 
relation to the empirical studies of Malaysian banks. First, this study covers the entire period 
of implementation of the FSMP. Although Hon et al. (2011) attempted to examine the 
plan’s impact, the data set they employed did not span the entire timeline of the FSMP and 
may not reflect the competitive aspects of the banking system as it only compared domestic 
banks. Second, most Malaysian bank studies focus on the banks’ cost efficiencies; a limited 
number of empirical studies look into the profit efficiency function. There are even fewer 
studies that conduct and compare both cost- and profit-efficiency using the same Malaysian 
bank data set. Third, to the author’s knowledge, there are no studies in Malaysia that 
perform a comprehensive consistency analysis between nonparametric and parametric 
methods for cost- and profit-efficiency. Bauer et al. (1998) suggested six consistency 
conditions rather than only concentrating on rank-order correlation for consistency. Fourth, 
                                                 
4
 Improved banking efficiency could result in better resource allocation, which benefits society by 
intermediating greater amounts of funds, providing more products with better prices and service quality for 
customers, improving bank profitability and achieving greater safety and soundness in banking sector (Berger 
and Mester, 1997). Therefore, the study of efficiency could assist banking regulators to design policies by 
evaluating the impacts of financial liberalisation, consolidation and market structure on efficiency.  
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the timeline of data used for most Malaysian banking efficiency studies is usually short (on 
average, between three and eight years) with a smaller sample of banks, which may not 
represent the entire banking system, particularly as frontier measurement encompasses the 
relative measurement concept. Fifth, studies of explanatory factors, or the causes of 
inefficiency, are also lacking, which may result in a failure to explain the factors that affect 
the inefficiency of Malaysian banks. Sixth, at the time of writing this thesis, to the author’s 
knowledge, there are no studies on the efficiency of Malaysian banks that cover the impact 
of the global credit crisis, which occurred during the implementation of the FSMP. Further 
to the areas discussed above, this present research is important for a number of other reasons. 
First, this study addresses a contemporary policy issue in relation to market structure. One 
of the primary objectives of the FSMP is to liberalise and increase market competition in the 
banking sector. Thus, this study examines how banking structure, efficiency and 
productivity change affect bank performance, which will provide evidence for policy 
changes to market competition. This would also assist policymakers to assess the level of 
achievement they have made and anticipate potential risks within the market. Additionally, 
this study also investigates scale economies and scale efficiency, which may help 
policymakers determine the appropriate size of banks and ascertain the most suitable market 
structure for the Malaysian banking market.  
Second, frontier efficiency models could be used to supplement the central banks’ risk 
assessment tools, particularly in identifying the causes of inefficiency. Hence, it is useful for 
regulators and policymakers, such as central banks, to employ frontier efficiency models for 
banking industry assessment, and consequently exercise early interventions and maintain 
market order through their micro- and macro-prudential regulatory policies. 
Third, this study will extend and complement the existing literature of international banking 
efficiency. It will be the first to cover the impact of the FSMP on the Malaysian banking 
industry and will expand the literature on financial liberalisation, particularly within 
developing countries; which is currently dominated by studies of developed nations. 
Fourth, this study is important as it employs a dataset that comprises all commercial and 
Islamic banks (including foreign and domestic-owned) in Malaysia, providing a 
comprehensive overview of the Malaysian banking sector over the period 2000–2011. 
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Moreover, different characteristics of the banks are examined regarding CAMEL ratings 
system, ownership structure (i.e. foreign vs. domestic banks), by specialisation (i.e. Islamic 
vs. conventional banks) and size. 
In particular, this study seeks to address the following questions:  
1. How cost- and profit-efficient are Malaysian banks? What is the general level of cost- 
and profit-efficiency of the Malaysian banking sector and how has it varied over time? 
2. Has the financial liberalisation of the banking sector via the FSMP improved the 
efficiency and productivity of the banking industry in Malaysia? 
3. What is the impact on Malaysian banks’ cost- and profit-efficiency with regard to capital, 
non-performing loans, and liquidity? 
4. Does cost- and profit-efficiency vary across bank ownership (i.e. foreign vs. domestic), 
specialisation (i.e. Islamic vs. conventional) and size (i.e. in terms of asset size)? 
5. What was the impact of the global credit crisis on the cost- and profit-efficiency of 
Malaysian banks? 
6. Do the parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and nonparametric data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) methods provide consistent results? 
7. Are there any economies and diseconomies of scale in the Malaysian banking sector? 
And do the returns of scale differ across bank size? 
8. Has there been any technological change in the Malaysian banking sector? 
1.3 Research Methodology and Data 
In this study, frontier measurement is employed to measure the efficiency of Malaysian 
banks for the years 2000–2011 and to answer the above questions. For better estimation of 
cost- and profit-efficiency, and taking into account the effect of heterogeneity (e.g. 
ownership structure, banks specialisation, inherent risks, and size), this study uses Battese 
and Coelli’s (1995) SFA 1-stage approach, which may have an impact on the efficiencies. In 
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this one-stage approach, a set of control variables (e.g. capital adequacy, asset quality and 
liquidity) and environmental variables (e.g. ownership, specialisation, financial 
liberalisation and size) are included into the specification of cost- and profit-efficiency 
functions. Failure to include these variables in the 1-stage approach can result in biased 
estimation of the parameters of the cost- and profit-frontier and scores (Coelli et al., 2005). 
These different sets of control and environmental variables are tested in several stages using 
statistical testing (i.e. the log-likelihood ratio test), searching for the best fitting model that 
is later utilised for the estimation of efficiency scores in Malaysian banks (discussed later in 
Chapter 5).  
As suggested by Bauer et al. (1998), when more than one technique is used for efficiency 
studies, comparing different techniques for consistency could assist various parties for better 
approximation of efficiency measures, which is useful for policymakers. Therefore, this 
study employs two DEA models for cost- and profit-efficiency and tests their consistency 
with SFA. For consistency testing, following Bauer et al. (1998), a variety of consistency 
tests are applied to assess the robustness of the results derived from these two models (i.e. 
parametric vs. nonparametric).  
This research employs a confidential dataset of the Malaysian banking industry from 2000 
to 2011 from a Malaysian financial organisation. The data comprise of all banks operating 
in Malaysia and also covers the period of implementation of the FSMP, allowing us to test 
the impact of liberalisation on the efficiency of Malaysian banks. The sample is an 
unbalanced panel comprising 32 banks in 2000 followed by 39 banks in 2011 and a total of 
354 observations.
5
 
1.4 Research Outline  
Figure 1.1 presents the structure of the present research and its organisation into seven 
chapters: 
                                                 
5
 This includes all domestic conventional, foreign conventional, domestic Islamic and foreign Islamic banks in 
Malaysia. Investment banks are excluded from this study due to differences in business operations, strategies 
and target customers. 
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Figure ‎1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2: Theory and Measurement of Production Efficiency 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework related to production efficiency and 
discusses two different types of efficiency: absolute and relative. The discussion continues 
with the concept of production function, which is the main underlying principle for 
productive efficiency. As the production function derived from the neoclassical theory of 
the firm, this chapter reviews briefly on traditional neoclassical theory, which views firms as 
rational and having the objective of maximising profits. It seeks to explain how the market 
works, but treats the firm as a black box which transforms resources into goods and services. 
Since neoclassical theory does not take into account the internal structure of firms; 
managerial and behavioural theories highlight the possibility of internal inefficiency in firms’ 
decision-making processes, and rationalise why firms might not always operate efficiently. 
Consequently, this chapter introduces the frontier efficiency measurement, using the 
concept of the optimisation process as its underlying production activity. The main types of 
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concept in frontier efficiency measurement are reviewed: for example, technical, allocative, 
cost, profit and scale efficiencies. This chapter also reviews the parametric and 
nonparametric frontier techniques and functional forms (for parametric models), enabling 
estimation of a firm’s efficiency relative to other firms in the industry. At the end of this 
chapter, the question of which is the best technique between parametric and nonparametric 
models are discussed. 
Chapter 3: Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency 
This chapter reviews the literature on banking efficiency in developed and developing 
countries, and Malaysia. It begins by discussing the significance of the banking sector in 
supporting economic development and growth. The discussion continues by bringing 
attention to the effects of government intervention on the banking industry through 
regulation and liberalisation. A well-balanced regulation of the banking system is strived for 
to stimulate economic growth. Also, discussions on empirical literature of banking 
efficiency is presented, focusing  on different contextual areas such as the effect of 
deregulation, ownership, market structure, size, and risk appetite on the degree of efficiency 
of banks.  
Chapter 4: The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000–2011 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the Malaysian banking sector and outlines the 
deregulation measures implemented by the FSMP, which was introduced to strengthen and 
gradually liberalise the sector. It presents the contextual background required when 
assessing the empirical results obtained during analysis in later chapters. The effect of 
financial liberalisation is analysed using the banks’ balance sheets and income statements 
for the years 2000–2011. Financial ratios and competitive indicators (e.g. Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index and interest spread) are also presented. 
Chapter 5: Methodology and Data 
This chapter outlines the methodology employed to measure the cost- and profit-efficiency 
of the banks. The chapter begins with a discussion of SFA as the main method of study, and 
followed by DEA, and new DEA (NDEA) (as cross-checking methods). As this study 
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involves a set of control and environmental variables, the SFA model’s specifications – with 
different combinations of control and environmental variables – are tested to derive the 
preferred model, prior to measuring the banks’ efficiency scores. For the preferred SFA 
models, three economic efficiencies are estimated to a single data set: cost, standard profit, 
and alternative profit efficiencies. Following Bauer et al. (1998), this chapter introduces five 
consistency conditions to assess the robustness of the efficiency estimates obtained from the 
SFA and DEA models. It also discusses the variables employed in the empirical analysis 
and brief descriptive statistics of the sample data. 
Chapter 6: Empirical Results – Analysis and Discussion 
This chapter empirically analyses the cost- and profit-efficiency of the Malaysian banking 
sector for the years 2000–2011, using the preferred SFA, DEA and NDEA models. Based 
on the parameter estimation, the coefficients and their significance (i.e. t-ratios) are analysed 
to test the hypotheses (e.g. ownership, specialisation and size) developed in earlier chapters. 
One of the main hypotheses is to measure the impact of financial liberalisation via FSMP on 
the efficiency scores of Malaysian banks and their trends from 2000 to 2011. The trends of 
efficiency scores may provide indications of the impact (positive or negative) of 
deregulation measures implemented through the FSMP. This chapter also assesses the 
consistency of result estimation in the SFA and DEA models. It compares distribution 
statistics (e.g. mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis), ranking correlations of 
efficiency scores across different techniques, identification of best-practice and worst-
practice banks across different techniques, stability of efficiency scores over time, and 
ranking correlation between efficiency scores and standard financial ratios. It looks into the 
diversity of efficiency scores among the different characteristics of the banks, based on 
certain characteristics (e.g. foreign banks vs. domestic banks, Islamic banks vs. 
conventional banks, bank size and CAMEL ratings system). This chapter also examines 
scale economies, scale efficiency and technological change in Malaysian banks.  
Chapter 7: Conclusions  
This chapter summarises and concludes the main findings of the study. Policy implications, 
limitations and future research are also presented. 
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Chapter 2 Theory and 
Measurement of Production 
Efficiency 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the theoretical framework 
regarding productive and frontier efficiency. Additionally, the chapter explains various 
approaches used to estimate the efficiency of the firm. In Section 2.2, the basic description 
of productive efficiency is explained and the section provides the key concepts for 
measuring absolute efficiency versus relative efficiency. The section describes neoclassical 
theory, highlighting the firm as an economic agent with the single aim of maximising profit. 
Several alternative types of market structures are reviewed to explain why some firms have 
different objectives and therefore do not exhibit profit maximising behaviour. This section 
provides alternative theories which question the neoclassical theory and the other market 
models that focus more on the internal structure and behaviour of those firms which do not 
maximise profit. Section 2.3 introduces the underlying economic theory of frontier 
efficiency, concentrating on the estimation of productive activity as an optimisation process. 
The section also presents the concepts of technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, scale 
efficiency, and scope efficiency which are used as tools to measure the performance of the 
firm. In Section 2.4, the estimation methods of frontier efficiency are discussed. This part 
focuses on two common methods of estimating frontier efficiency; the parametric and the 
nonparametric approaches, and explains their properties and the differences between them.  
It presents a discussion of various functional forms used in the parametric approach and the 
distinctive features of both parametric and nonparametric approaches are examined and 
critically reviewed. A discussion of key advantages and disadvantages of parametric and 
nonparametric approaches is presented at the end of the section. Figure 2.1 provides a 
summary of the content of this chapter. 
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Figure ‎2.1 Information Flow of Chapter 2 
 
2.2 Production Efficiency and the Theory of the Firm 
Firms need markets to function properly. In his seminal paper entitled ‘The Nature of the 
Firm’, Coase (1937) points out that there is no definite theory to determine the market or the 
boundaries of a firm. The boundaries or markets are described as a place for a variety of 
exchanges, which brings together the suppliers and buyers of a particular product. Markets 
are usually suppressed, and the resource allocation of the firm is accomplished through 
demand and supply. Therefore, market conditions can influence the efficiency of the firm 
through the use of limited resources to produce maximum output (Goddard et al., 2001). 
Baumol and Blinder (1988) defined efficiency as the absence of wasted resources. The 
efficiency of the firm can be described as internal efficiency and as allocative efficiency 
(Shepherd, 1985). Internal efficiency affects the managers of the firm; it therefore focuses 
on the effective management of the firm and how the firm transforms resources (inputs) into 
various outputs. It includes practices such as cost control, and asset and human resource 
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management. On the other hand, allocative efficiency
6
 refers to a general equilibrium 
between production and market demand. Allocative efficiency occurs when marginal costs 
are equal to the price offered by all firms in the market (Goddard et al., 2001). Shepherd 
(1985) and Goddard et al. (2001) state that an optimum level of both internal efficiency and 
allocative efficiency should be achieved in order to attain overall efficiency. 
The efficiency of a firm can be measured using two different approaches: absolute
7
 and 
relative efficiency. Koopmans (1951) defines absolute efficiency as a condition of optimum 
inputs and outputs where technology is unable to increase any output without reducing the 
inputs. That is, when a firm achieves 100 percent efficiency of input and output, it cannot be 
further improved without the balance between inputs and outputs being compromised. 
However, the empirical application of absolute efficiency is not known and has not been 
implemented. Thus, using the work of Koopmans (1951), Farrell (1957) introduces the 
concept of relative efficiency, which measures the performance of a firm relative to the best 
performance firms of a particular market. Relative efficiency (100 percent in comparison to 
other firms) is attained when other firms cannot further improve their efficiency without 
compromising their inputs or outputs (Zhu, 2002). It resembles benchmarking procedures 
where an individual firm’s production is compared with the best-performing firm of the 
industry (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Relative efficiency is widely discussed in the 
literature because of its implications for managerial performance and public policy; the 
results from relative efficiency can provide quantitative evidence, substantiate performance 
differentials that are predicted qualitatively by economic theories and identify sources of 
inefficiencies of the firms (Lovell, 1993; Cummins and Weiss, 1998).   
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the estimation of the relative efficiency of a firm 
has implications for public policy and managerial performance. Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) 
and Lovell (1993) state that performance estimation of firms could assist policy makers to 
formulate appropriate policies for an industry. For instance, firms in an industry can be 
                                                 
6  Goddard et al. (2001) define allocative efficiency as meeting the demands of consumers through the 
production of goods and services. In the context of the present research, allocative efficiency will observe the 
firms’ approaches using the best combination of input and output; relative to their prices and magnitude, rather 
than the allocation of resources due to demand from the market.  
7  Vilfredo Pareto and Tjalling Koopmans introduced this concept, but no empirical application was 
implemented until Farrell (1957) utilised it to arrive at relative efficiency estimation.  
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benchmarked and ranked (from best-performing to worst-performing firms) using the 
estimation of relative efficiency, where the findings from such a measurement can help 
policy makers to analyse and identify ways to encourage inefficient firms to reach best 
practice. By employing the measurement of relative efficiency, policy makers can also 
explore their hypotheses regarding the sources of inefficiency or productivity differential of 
firms in an industry (Lovell, 1993). Once the sources of inefficiency of the firms are 
identified, the policy makers may use these findings to implement appropriate policies to 
improve the performance of the firms, as well as determining the market structure
8
 that best 
serves the public (Molyneux et al., 1996; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Further, the 
economic performance of a country relies on the performance of micro economic units (e.g. 
firms), where well-performing firms can further contribute to economic growth (Lovell, 
1993). 
At the managerial level, the identification of best and worst practice provides necessary 
information and feedback for managers to improve their management practice and 
performance. Berger and Humphrey (1997) state that managers can adopt the internal 
policies, procedures and controls performed by ‘best-practice’ firms and avoid practices 
used by ‘worst-practice’ firms.9 Moreover, better management practice would result in a 
higher level of production efficiency, implying better chances of survival, improved 
profitability, and lower prices for consumers (Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1987; Berger et al., 
1993). 
2.2.1 Economic Theory and Efficiency 
The basic concept of productive efficiency can be described through a production function, 
which is derived from the microeconomic theory of the firm (see Section 2.2.2 Competitive 
Model and Efficiency). The production function is used to describe marginal products and 
                                                 
8
 Goddard et al. (2001) argue that the performance of firms can be influenced by the market structure in which 
they operate. Hence, it is crucial for a policy maker to determine the market structure that suits both the firms 
and the general public. For example, a highly concentrated market with a number of inefficient firms might 
indicate to policy makers that they should reduce any barriers to entry. By doing so, the level of market 
competition is expected to increase.  
9
 That is, management can achieve a higher level of efficiency through enhancing positive determinants and 
through eliminating negative determinants experienced by both ‘best-practice’ and ‘worst-practice’ firms.   
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the law of diminishing returns,
10
 which can be viewed from the purely technical relationship 
between inputs and outputs at any period (Koutsoyiannis, 1975). A production function can 
be defined as the maximum quantity of output produced by given amount of inputs for a 
given technology (Cyert and George, 1969; McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). In other words, a 
production function can be seen as a series of processes of transforming inputs (resources) 
into maximum outputs (goods and services), subject to technological conditions. Thus, an 
efficient firm should be able to maximise output based on given input and technology. 
Following Coelli et al. (2005), the production function of a firm can be expressed as follows: 
        (2.1) 
where   represents output and x              is a vector of inputs. For this production 
function, the decision makers are assumed to have control over the inputs and include them 
in the general structure of the function     . In addition, there are a number of properties 
related to the function        which are (Coelli et al., 2005): 
1. Non-negativity: where the value of      is a finite, non-negative, and real number. 
2. Weak essentiality: where the production of positive output is impossible without the use 
of at least one other input. The function should pass through the origin. 
3. Non-decreasing in  : which means additional units of an input will not decrease output. 
If        then             . If the production function is continuously 
differentiable, the monotonicity property supports non-negative marginal products. 
4. Concave in   : this implies that any linear combination of the vector    and    will 
produce an output not less than the same linear combination of                 . 
                                                 
10
 The marginal product can be defined as the extra amount of output that can be produced when the firm uses 
one additional unit an input. It can be expressed as      
  
  ⁄  , where     is the marginal product 
measured in terms of actual units of output per unit of input;    is additional changes in input; and    is the 
changes in output (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). Additionally, the law of diminishing returns states that if an 
input in the production of a product is increased, while all other inputs are held constant, a point will 
eventually be reached at which additions of input yield progressively smaller, or diminishing unit of output 
(McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). The marginal products and the law of diminishing returns are reflected in one 
of the properties of a production function.      
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Concavity implies that all marginal products are non-increasing when the production 
function can be differentiated. 
Production efficiency is strongly associated with cost and profit elements. The relationships 
among the cost, profit, and production functions can be explained by duality theory.
11
 The 
duality theory is described as the possibility of making appropriate transformations of the 
production function into maximising behaviour (i.e. the profit function) and minimising 
behaviour (i.e. the cost function) of the firm by differentiating a function which 
characterises an optimal solution for production (Weitzman, 1973; Diewert, 1974; Lopez, 
1982; Lusk et al., 2002). Therefore, a firm can create the optimal input and output mix 
based on the objective of the firm either to minimise cost or to maximise profit. For the cost 
function, the key assumption is to minimise cost in a perfectly competitive market where the 
firm has no influence on prices (Coelli et al., 2005). Based on Coelli et al., (2005); the cost 
function can be expressed as: 
          (2.2) 
where   is cost,                is a vector of input prices, and   is the output vector. 
Like the production function, the cost function has its own set of properties that must be 
satisfied (Coelli et al. 2005): 
1. Non-negativity: cost is always non-negative 
2. Non-decreasing in : cost will not be decreased when input prices increase. 
3. Non-decreasing in  : it costs more to produce additional output. 
4. Homogeneity: multiplying all input prices proportionately will cause a proportionate 
increase in costs. 
5. Concave in : this may not be intuitive, but it implies that input demand functions do 
not slope upwards. 
                                                 
11
 Shephard (1953) introduced the theoretical and mathematical foundation of duality. Duality theory can be 
broadly explained as a mathematical technique of translating concepts and theorems into other concepts or 
theorems in a one-to-one manner. 
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Comparably, for the profit function, the firm is assumed to be making a decision to 
maximise profits for a given production technology. The profit function can be expressed as 
follows (Coelli et al., 2005): 
          (2.3) 
where P is profit,   is the output vector and                is a vector of input prices. 
Like the cost function, the profit function should satisfy a number of properties. The 
properties are similar to those of the cost function. These are, non-negativity, non-
decreasing in  , non-decreasing in  , and homogeneity; the only exception is that the profit 
function is convex in w rather than concave, as was demonstrated above for the cost 
function (Coelli et al., 2005).  
In production efficiency, productivity is commonly defined as the relationship between 
inputs and outputs, and can be regarded as a natural performance measure (Coelli et al., 
2005). A productivity increase can be accomplished by a firm using either the minimum 
input to produce a given quantity of output, or by producing greater output from a given 
quantity of the input. Generally, from the production function     , the productivity of a 
firm can be measured using the ratio of outputs to inputs; and efficiency, on the other hand, 
can be measured from the distance between the observed value (or the actual value) and the 
potential value; that is, the maximum value of the production function (a detailed concept of 
technical efficiency is discussed in Section 2.3.1). A firm is considered as technically 
efficient when the output is at its maximum, based on the given inputs and technology. 
According to Sherman and Zhu (2006), the terms ‘productivity’ and ‘efficiency’ have been 
used interchangeably in various contexts. Coelli et al. (2005) demonstrated that these terms 
are not precisely the same; where productivity and technical efficiency can be described 
from the example shown in Figure ‎2.2 using the single input (x) and a single output of 
production (y) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Coelli et al., 2005). 
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Figure ‎2.2 Productivity and Technical Efficiency: A Single Input and a Single Output 
 
Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p. 55) 
where      is the production function, P is the observed value of a firm represented by the 
observed input C and observed output A. D represents the potential value on the production 
function which can be produced at C. B is the potential value on the production function, 
based on the minimum input that can be used to produce output A. Thus, productivity of the 
firm at point P is defined as the ratio of output to input, CP/AP, and technical efficiency can 
be defined as the ratio of the potential input to the actual input (an input-orientated measure), 
or actual output to potential output (an output-orientated measure). The input-orientated 
measure of technical efficiency is equal to AB/AP, while the output-orientated measure of 
technical efficiency is represented by CP/CD, which is always smaller than or equal to 1. 
2.2.2 Competitive Model and Efficiency 
As discussed already, the relationships between inputs and outputs can be demonstrated 
using the production, cost, and profit functions. Based on these relationships, the firm will 
make decisions to produce the maximum output based on the allocated input (or, in the case 
of the cost function, the optimisation behaviour of the firm will be based on minimising cost 
Chapter 2 Theory and Measurement of Production Efficiency 
 
19 
  
to produce a given output). This system derives from neoclassical theory and stems from the 
static equilibrium concept. Neoclassical theory assumes a market with a large number of 
firms whose single objective is to maximise profit (Cyert and Hedrick, 1972). Neoclassical 
theory treats firms as a black-box.
12
 It focuses on the input and output of the firm rather than 
on how the transformation is done.
13
 The theory also describes firms as contenders in a 
perfectly competitive market; they are price takers and rely on freely available information 
to maximise profit (Demsetz, 1997). The main characteristics of perfect competition are as 
follows (Mc Guigan and Moyers, 1989):-   
1. There are a very large number of buyers and sellers, each of whom buys or sells such a 
small proportion of the total industry output that a single buyer or seller’s actions cannot 
have a noticeable impact on the market price. 
2. A homogeneous product is produced by each firm and there is no product differentiation. 
3. There is free entry and exit from the market with minimal barriers to entry and exit. 
4. Buyers and firms have perfect knowledge of prices and information is available freely. 
Should all of the above conditions be satisfied, a market can be in competitive equilibrium 
in which all firms can earn a normal profit and remain in business (McGuigan and Moyer, 
1989). In a perfectly competitive market, market demand and market supply determine the 
equilibrium price and quantity traded. No single buyer or seller can make a significant 
impact on market price, as all economic agents in a competitive market are price takers (i.e. 
each takes market prices as given and beyond their control) (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). 
The firm has no control over prices and can sell as much as it wants at the going market 
price and it faces a horizontal demand curve which reflects the perfect elasticity of demand. 
As mentioned earlier, the main objective of the firm is to maximise profit. Profit 
maximisation is achieved at the point where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost 
                                                 
12
 ‘Black box’ can be described as a process where inputs and outputs (and the relationship between them) are 
known, but the internal structure or working is not fully understood or considered (Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Castelli et al., 2010). 
13
 Demsetz (1997) asserts that the objective of neoclassical theory is to understand price-guided resource 
allocation rather than management-guided resource allocation. This is consistent with Campus (1987), who 
defines neoclassical economics as an approach that pays attention to prices, output, and income distribution 
based on market demand and supply. 
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(MC) (i.e. where an increase in revenue from selling an extra unit is equal to the cost of 
producing that extra unit). Hence, at the point where MR=MC, the firm is considered to 
achieve economic efficiency (Griffith and Wall, 2004). Economic efficiency can be broken 
down into two parts, the productive efficiency and allocative efficiency. A firm is described 
as achieving productive efficiency when it produces a given level of output with the lowest 
cost of production. Additionally, allocative efficiency is realised when price corresponds to 
or equals marginal cost. A deviation of market price from marginal cost can result in 
allocative inefficiency (Griffiths and Wall, 2004). 
In the long run scenario, firms are unable to make abnormal profits. However, in the short 
run it is possible for some firms to earn abnormal profit. The existence of abnormal profit 
will attract new competitors and drive down the market price until all firms earn normal 
profit again in the long run. This shows that the demand curve of a firm is perfectly elastic; 
any movement of price below or above the market price could result in firms going into 
deficits in the long run.
14
 If firms in a perfectly competitive market are inefficient and 
unable to earn normal profits, they are at risk of either being acquired or driven out of the 
market (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). In other words, firms that are unable to allocate 
resources efficiently to produce the maximum level of output might fail to reach the 
efficient frontier, and could be forced out of the market (Machlup, 1967).   
However, past literature suggests that inefficient firms that are not on the estimated 
efficiency frontier can continue to survive in the market due to many factors (this is 
discussed later in the chapter). As mentioned before, neoclassical theory is not designed to 
consider the managerial behaviour of the firm (Machlup, 1967). Its sole purpose is to 
explain the function of the market (Cyert and George, 1969; Demsetz, 1997). For instance, 
Williamson (1981) argues that the optimality concept in neoclassical theory is arbitrary 
because it does not recognise transaction costs
15
 and the rationality of producers. In reality 
                                                 
14
 For example, if a single firm tries to sell its product above the market price, rational buyers will move to 
other sellers. On the other hand, if the firm sells below the market price, the quantity demanded will approach 
infinity and the firm will encounter financial loss.  
15
 Robins (1987) describes transaction cost as the cost associated with an economic exchange which is 
independent of the competitive market price of goods produced. Examples of transaction cost include search 
and information costs, monitoring costs and enforcing contractual performance. Despite being independent of 
the competitive market price, the value of transaction cost is determined by the types of economic exchanges 
conducted. 
Chapter 2 Theory and Measurement of Production Efficiency 
 
21 
  
however, transaction costs (e.g. the cost of information) can influence the economies of the 
production process, and decision making by the producers can sometimes be irrational and 
imperfect. This could also indicate that market competition is imperfect.  
2.2.3 Market Imperfections 
In the previous discussion, the perfect competition model described a large number of firms, 
where no single firm has market power over prices. However, in certain industries, a few 
large firms dominate the market, have control over prices, and earn abnormal profits. Thus, 
several different market structures arise from violations of the perfect competition model’s 
assumptions, and might require an industry with a small number of firms to operate. Such 
markets are imperfectly competitive and the level of imperfect competition relies on several 
conditions: the number and size of the firms, product homogeneity, and the degree of 
independent decision making by individual firms.  
The first market structure to be discussed which is in direct contrast to the perfect 
competition model is monopoly. Monopoly can be characterised as (1) a single firm 
producing a specific commodity, (2) no close substitute products exist, (3) substantial 
barriers to entry exist (through cost advantages, product differentiation, and scale economies) 
and, (4) there are large capital requirements (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). Sraffa (1926) 
accepts the above description of monopoly and argues that competition is being eliminated 
from the market for two basic reasons: barriers to entry and cost advantages from economies 
of scale. Because of the existence of entry barriers, a monopolist has control over price and 
can set price anywhere along its downward sloping demand curve.
16
 As a result, the 
marginal revenue of a monopolist is different from the marginal revenue of the firm in the 
perfectly competitive market (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). In comparison to a perfectly 
competitive market (where firms face a horizontal demand curve and the marginal revenue 
curve is identical to its demand curve (price=MR)), the monopolist faces a downward 
sloping demand curve, which results in a different relationship between marginal revenue 
                                                 
16
 The downward sloping demand curve of the monopolist market is in accordance with the ‘law of demand’, 
in which there is an inverse relationship between price and quantity demanded (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). 
Moreover, the demand curve of the firm is also identical to the industry’s demand curve, because the firm is 
the industry (Koutsoyiannis, 1975). 
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(MR) and price, where MR is less than price (MR<price). The monopolist maximises its 
profits when the two following conditions are met: (1) marginal cost (MC) is equal to MR; 
and (2) the slope of MC is greater than the slope of MR at their point of intersection 
(Koutsoyiannis, 1975). Once these conditions are fulfilled, the monopolist continues to 
maximise profits when the price is higher than its marginal costs. Unlike firms in the 
perfectly competitive market (which is a price taker and only requires a decision on output), 
the monopolist faces decisions regarding both price and output. The monopolist can either 
produce the output at MR=MC and sell at the corresponding price, or it may set its price and 
sell the corresponding output that the market is willing to take (Goddard et al., 2001). 
Nevertheless, the decision-making process (e.g. setting higher prices) for the monopolist is 
simpler than for firms in the perfect competition model. This is due to the existence of entry 
barriers (e.g. a sole producer of products with no close substitutes). In the absence of 
competition, the monopoly could still receive abnormal profits despite being inefficient in 
its resource allocation (Demsetz, 1982, Baumol and Blinder, 1988; Berger and Hannan, 
1997).    
Some market structures are neither perfect nor monopolist, but somewhere in between. 
Chamberlin (1933) introduced two additional market structures monopolistic competition 
and oligopoly. The conditions of monopolistic competition are similar to those of perfect 
competition model. Monopolistic competition can be described as a market with a large 
number of firms, where each one sells a differentiated product, makes their own decisions, 
and enjoys easy entry and exit from the market (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). The most 
distinguishing characteristic for monopolistic competition is the differentiation of the output 
(heterogeneous products) of each firm. Using Sraffa’s (1926) downward sloping demand 
curve, Chamberlin (1933) explains that the demand curve is influenced by product 
differentiation for the pricing policy of the firm, style and services associated with the 
product as well as the firm’s selling strategy. Furthermore, product differentiation allows 
firms to determine the price of the product. For instance, firms in monopolistic competition 
are not price takers (i.e. facing a downward sloping demand curve) and have some degree of 
market power; but with competition of close substitutes offered by other firms, their 
discretion over price is limited (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). Additionally, the demand 
curve is influenced by (1) the pricing and selling strategy of the firm, (2) the pricing, output 
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and selling policies of competitors, and (3) the income, pricing and selling policies of 
product from other industries. Thus, any changes in these things will shift the demand curve 
in monopolistic competition, which in turn could affect the profit maximisation of the firms 
in the industry (Demsetz, 1959).  
The oligopoly model, on the other hand, describes a market with a few large firms which are 
interdependent in price, output, product quality, and terms of sale (McGuigan and Moyer, 
1989). In this market structure, any actions by an individual firm in terms of pricing would 
have a noticeable impact on the sales of other firms in the market. The number of firms in 
the market should be sufficiently small for there to be conscious interdependence. Each firm 
is setting their future according not only to their firm’s policies but to those of their 
competitors as well (Griffiths and Wall, 2004). Mazzeo (2002) posits that due to the small 
number of competing firms, the market structure affects the degree of price competition 
where earnings are based on production choices made by the firms. In other words, the price 
and output of a firm in an oligopolistic market can be determined by consumer preferences, 
product substitutability, and the responses on prices by competitors. Thus, this non-collusive 
oligopoly model is different from other market structures (e.g. perfect competition and 
monopoly) due to the characteristic of assuming a certain degree of interdependence among 
firms in the industry. However, the uncertainty arising from oligopolistic interdependence 
can be avoided by the firms in this market structure through collusive agreements, such as 
cartels (e.g. price fixing) and price leadership (e.g. leading the industry by setting prices). A 
collusive agreement is generally in the form of implicit agreements; it could commonly be 
illegal in most countries if it were announced in the open market (Koutsoyiannis, 1975). An 
outcome of the collusive oligopoly model can be that firms behave like a monopolist, which 
restricts the supply of the industry output at higher prices to enable them to earn abnormal 
profits. That is, collusive firms in oligopoly can exercise market power by fixing their price 
above marginal cost and produce a smaller quantity of output; hence, it is an inefficient 
market structure in terms of resource allocation (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989).  
The preceding discussion briefly describes the four basic structures found in neoclassical 
economic theory: perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly. 
These market structures can be defined based on several conditions: the number and size of 
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the firms, types of products, degree of control over prices, and the extent of entry and exit 
barriers (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). This indicates that the structure of the market can 
influence the performance of firms. The relationship between market structure and firms’ 
performance is normally examined using several hypotheses, such as the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) hypothesis, relative-market-power (RMP) hypothesis, the quiet life 
hypothesis, and the efficient-structure hypothesis. 
2.2.4 Market Structure and Performance of the firm hypotheses 
The market-power-related hypothesis can be explained by the structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, the relative-market-power hypothesis and the quiet life hypothesis. 
These hypotheses describe the impact of market structure on the behaviour and performance 
of the firm. Conversely, the efficient structure hypothesis tends to explain the efficiency of 
the firm (e.g. superior management and advanced technology) which, in turn, influences the 
performance of the firm. Thus, the two different approaches enable views from different 
angles on firms’ performances and the market structure (Berger, 1995). 
The efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis
17
 states that the performance of the firm in a given 
market structure is influence by the efficiency of the managers, rather than by collusive 
behaviour in a more concentrated market. The ES hypothesis suggests that the superior 
efficiency of particular firms can result in greater market concentration, enabling them to 
earn abnormal profits. Thus, the performance of the firm is strongly influenced by their 
specific efficiency (i.e. good management and technology) instead of market concentration 
conditions. The ES hypothesis differs from the market-power-related hypotheses (i.e. the 
SCP hypothesis, the RMP hypothesis and the quiet life hypothesis), in which it views 
efficiency as a factor for a firm to gain market share at the expense of less efficient firms, 
which consequently increases market concentration. Market-power-hypotheses, on the other 
hand, describe the market structure (i.e. market power) as the key factor that influences the 
performance of the firm (Catena, 2000).  
                                                 
17
 Demsetz (1973) introduces the efficient-structure hypothesis: he asserts that market concentration is 
indicated by the differential efficiency of some superior firms instead of the collusive behaviour of a 
concentrated market. These superior firms are assumed to have a large market share that may result in a 
greater market concentration and the earning of supernormal profit (Berger, 1995). 
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Berger (1995) stated that there is a positive statistical relationship between measures of 
market structure (concentration and market share) and profitability. In this regard, the 
positive relationship between profitability and market structure elements can be explained 
by two market power hypotheses, namely the traditional SCP hypothesis and the relative-
market power (RMP) hypothesis. In the structure-conduct-performance
18
 hypothesis, the 
performance of the firm is assessed with respect to the interaction between market structure 
and market conduct. Figure 2.3 illustrates the SCP paradigm, which explains the 
relationship between market structure, market conduct, and market performance (Mason, 
1939; Bain, 1951). This hypothesis implies that firms are allowed to set prices if the market 
is concentrated as result of imperfect competition (Berger, 1995). For instance (in the 
context of banking), banks can set prices (e.g. lowering deposit rates and increasing their 
loan rates) that are less favourable to consumers in a concentrated market due to imperfect 
competition within the market which, in turn, could earn greater profits. Another theory to 
describe market power is the relative-market-power (RMP) hypothesis.
19
 This hypothesis 
explains that only firms with a large market share and differentiated products are able to set 
prices and earn abnormal profits (Shepherd, 1982). The effect of a concentrated market on a 
firm’s performance can be further presented by the quiet life hypothesis. 20  Berger and 
Hannan (1998) argue that managers of the firm may exercise the quiet life in a more 
concentrated market and thus benefit from higher prices and pay less attention to keeping 
costs under control. Berger and Hannan (1998, p. 455) stated: 
“Market structure may influence for one of the several related reasons. First, if high 
levels of market concentration allow firms to charge prices in excess of competitive 
levels, then managers may take part of the benefits of the higher prices not as higher 
                                                 
18
 The structure-conduct-performance paradigm was introduced by Mason (1939) and Bain (1951), who 
describe the relationship between market structure and market performance. They suggest that market structure 
can influence the behaviour and performance of the market. For SCP acronyms, S represents market structure, 
which describes the degree of concentration, market share, market entrance barrier, and market integration. 
Subsequently, C is market conduct and can be described by the behaviour of buyers and sellers, pricing 
policies, investment in research, and advertising strategies. Finally, P represents market performance. This can 
be measured by comparing the profitability and efficiency of firms, and industry’s product quality, and 
technical progress (Waldman and Jensen, 2001)   
19
 The market power hypothesis was developed by Ravenscraft (1980) and Mueller (1983). According to the 
RMP hypothesis, market power (due to product differentiation and barriers to entry) allows firms to capture 
market share, to set higher prices, and earn abnormal profit (Catena, 2000). 
20
 The quiet life hypothesis was developed by Hicks (1953). He asserted that firms with greater market power 
are more risk averse. He further added that firms with greater market power are capable of gaining a 
combination of higher profit with lower risk compared to firms with less market power.  
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profits, but in the form of a “quiet life”, in which they don’t work as hard to keep costs 
under control. The difference between the actual price and the competitive price may 
provide a “cushion” or comfort zone. In the absence of other disciplining mechanism, 
managers may allow unit cost to rise to consume part of this cushion and still allow 
owners to earn economic rents without the full effort of cost minimisation. Second, 
market power may allow managers to pursue objectives other than firm profits or 
managerial leisure. Third, the price cushion provided by market power may simply 
allow inefficient managers or practices to persist without any intention to pursue goals 
other than maximising firm value. The lack of market discipline in concentrated 
markets may simply blunt the economic signals that would normally force changes in 
management to keep costs low, leaving managers in a position for which they do not 
have comparative advantages. Thus, market power may allow managerial 
incompetence to persist without any wilful shirking of work effort, pursuit of other goals, 
or efforts to defend or obtain market power.”  
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Figure ‎2.3 Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
 
Source: Waldman and Jensen (2001, p. 7). The solid arrows show the primary relationships 
of this paradigm, in which market structure influences market conduct and consequently 
determines the market performance. The dashed arrows indicate the feedback effects of 
market performance on market conduct and market structure. Government policies have 
direct influence on market structure, market conduct, and market performance, as shown by 
the dotted arrows. 
The above discussion emphasises the impact of the market structure on firm performance 
using empirical hypotheses, namely the efficient structure hypothesis, structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, the relative-market power hypothesis, and the quiet life hypothesis. 
The importance of this relationship between market structure and firm performance was 
explained in Berger and Hannan (1998), who postulate that the market structure can 
influence the performance of the firm and the behaviour of the managers. They further argue 
that a concentrated market structure could result in a shift of managers’ behaviour to a quiet 
life of pursuing personal objectives; this allows inefficient managers to persist within the 
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firm without any intention to pursue goals other than profit maximisation. Additionally, this 
implies that the managers are unable to act with global rationality (i.e. unlimited information, 
unlimited time at their disposal and an unlimited ability to compare all possible alternative 
actions and choose the one that maximises profit), as postulated by neoclassical theory. In 
reality however, the managers face bounded rationality with limited and(or) distorted 
information, limited time and limited abilities to assess all alternatives to select the best 
approach to maximise firm value (discussed in the next section) (Simon, 1955). Considering 
the above, several managerial and behavioural theories surfaced to challenge the 
neoclassical theory and the market-structure hypotheses; these include agency theory, 
managerial discretion theory, sales revenue maximisation theory, growth maximisation 
theory, the behavioural theory of the firm and X-efficiency; that arises from the complexity 
in managing modern enterprises. Accordingly, these managerial and behavioural theories 
provide the necessary clues as to why some firms survived while not being efficient. These 
theories seek to explain the causes of the inefficiency of firms.  
2.2.5 Causes of Inefficiency of the Firm 
Neoclassical theory assumes that firms are making rational decisions with their single 
objective being to maximise profit. Moreover, the theory suggests that inefficient firms will 
be forced out of the market. However, as mentioned earlier, this has not always been the 
case. Some firms continue to survive despite being inefficient. Neoclassical theory has 
earned criticism for being too unrealistic and narrow for the current economic environment 
(i.e. global rationality and a single objective to maximise profit). For example, neoclassical 
theory assumes that a firm is a single ownership entity (no separation between ownership 
and management). The owner is responsible for making decisions and is assumed to have 
unlimited information, time and ability in making decisions to maximise profit. However, 
past literature shows that firms are unable to achieve their goal in maximising profit due to 
limited knowledge, limited and(or) distorted information and limited ability in decision 
making. There are arguments that firms may not want to pursue a single goal to maximise 
profit, due to having a multitude of goals, of which profit is just one of them (Koutsoyiannis, 
1975). In the modern world, however, the firm is commonly organised by the separation of 
owners and managers (i.e. managers, who have discretion to attain goals other than profit 
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maximisation). Therefore, neoclassical theory is challenged by two different theoretical 
views: institutional economics (i.e. transaction costs, taxes, computational limitations and 
other friction) and behavioural economics (i.e. non-rational and systematically uniformed 
behaviour of the controlling group or agent) (Merton and Bodie, 2004). The introduction of 
managerial theory (i.e. maximisation of the managerial utility) and behavioural theory (i.e. 
satisficing behaviour and bounded rationality),
21
 such as  principal-agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), managerial discretion theory (Williamson, 1964), sales revenue 
maximisation theory (Baumol, 1959), growth maximisation theory (Marris, 1964), the 
behavioural theory of the firm (Simon, 1955; Cyert and March, 1964) and X-efficiency 
(Liebenstein, 1966) seeks to explain the behaviour of the controlling group in pursuing 
objectives other than maximising the firm’s profit. 
The first managerial theory discussed is agency theory, which attempts to solve the 
principal-agent conflicting goals and the difficulties faced by the principal in monitoring 
and verifying the actual tasks performed by the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract between principal (owner) and 
agent (manager). In the contract, the owner hires the manager to perform the operational 
tasks on behalf of the principal by delegating some authority to the manager. To some 
extent because the ownership is divorced from the day-to-day operations of the business 
there is good reason to assume that the manager will not act in the best interest of the owner 
if the manager is a utility maximiser (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This independence of action 
might be due to their superior knowledge of the firm as well as to their ability to disguise 
their actions from the principals; where the managers or agents may not always act towards 
achieving the objectives of the principals (Griffiths and Wall, 2004). However, the 
managers’ discretion in setting the goals is not unlimited. The managers have to ensure that 
a minimum level of profit is reached for a dividend policy that is acceptable to the members 
of the firm (i.e. shareholders), avoid a relative fall in firm value (i.e. reduced share prices in 
                                                 
21
 For example, the basic feature of managerial theory is that the managers will maximise their own utility, 
subject to a minimum profit constraint (which is set at a level adequate to satisfy the owners of the firm) 
necessary for the job security of the high-level managers. On the other hand, the behavioural theory of the firm 
describes the complex nature of the firm, which includes in the theory of the firm the factor of realism. The 
firm is seen to have multiple goals, with different groups connected with its activity in various ways (e.g. 
managers, workers, customers, suppliers, bankers and so on); each has its own goals or demand 
(Koutsoyiannis, 1975; McGuigan and Moyer, 1989; Griffiths and Wall, 2004).  
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the stock exchange and risk of a take-over) and safeguard investments for the satisfactory 
operations of the firm. If these conditions are not satisfied, the managers may be made 
redundant by the owners (Koutsoyiannis, 1975). Thus, this conflict between principal and 
agent could in return reduce the profitability and efficiency of the firm. To overcome this 
principal-agent problem, a firm has to incur an agency cost,
22
 which is established from 
monitoring mechanisms and which sets appropriate incentives to control any deviant 
activities of the agent. Another approach to minimise conflicting objectives between 
principal and agent is through corporate governance solutions, for the managers’ self-
discipline, such as introducing a board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and capital and 
labour market disclosure (Fama, 1980). 
As a result of principal-agent segregation, managers may seek to maximise their own utility 
over the firm’s productivity (Williamson, 1963). Managerial-discretion theory deals with 
the degree of freedom held by the managers in utilising a certain portion of the firm’s 
resources (Mique and Belanger, 1974). Williamson (1963) describes managerial-discretion 
theory as any acts by which managers allocate excessive resources of the firm to maximise 
their own utility instead of maximising the profit of the firm. Nevertheless, a manager’s 
discretion is constrained by the firm’s profit that is expected by the market and shareholders 
(in the form of a paid dividend and the firm’s share price); and if these expectations are not 
fulfilled, the job security of the manager can be at risk (Yarrow, 1976). As mentioned above, 
the managers have discretion in setting policies that maximises their own utility instead of 
the firm’s profit. The manager’s utility can be in the form of salary, power, status, 
professional excellence, and prestige, in which these can be achieved at their discretion. In 
this case, Williamson (1963) iterates that managers do not display neutral behaviour towards 
cost and they have preferences in the expenses of the firm such as staff expenditure, 
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 Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that the agency costs can be separated into monitoring cost, bonding cost, 
and residual loss. The monitoring cost is expenditure incurred from checking the activities of the managers. 
Monitoring cost ranges from the expenses related to Directors’ remuneration, internal and external auditing, 
budget restrictions, compensation policies, and operational rules. On the other hand, bonding cost refers to the 
costs incurred by providing incentives to ensure that the agent will act in the interest of the principal. Those 
incentives come with sacrifices for the manager, who in turn provides a guarantee not to deviate from the 
owners’ objectives. Finally, residual loss is the loss sustained after monitoring and bonding cost. This can be 
described as the losses suffered by the principal as a result of decision making by the agent which decreases 
the principal’s profit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Berger and di Patti, 2006). 
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managerial emoluments (i.e. slack payments
23
) and discretionary investments (using the 
firm’s fund) to satisfy their utility (i.e.            , where U is a manager’s utility, S is 
staff expenditure, including managerial salaries (administrative and selling expenditure), M 
is managerial emoluments, and    is discretionary investment). Moreover, managers may 
exercise their discretion in using funds (to which they have access) to satisfy their own 
needs (e.g. office renovation, private jet hire, or staying in a lavish hotel). But in order for 
managers to continue to enjoy this discretion, they have to ensure that the owners’ needs are 
satisfied by returning acceptable profits (Yarrow, 1976). If unproductive expenses and 
managerial slack
24
 continue to exist, firms will incur unnecessary expenses which can result 
in higher overall inefficiency of the firm (Williamson, 1963).   
Third, instead of profit maximising being the primary goal of the firm (as outlined in the 
neoclassical theory), Baumol (1958) suggested an alternative objective of the firm which is 
to maximise sales revenue. The sales-revenue maximisation theory highlights the objective 
of some firms to maximise sales revenues, subject to the constraint of returning a 
satisfactory level of profit to shareholders as well as retaining profit for expansion or future 
growth (Baumol, 1958; Hawkins, 1970). The sales maximisation goal is reflected in the 
Williamson (1963) managerial-discretion theory, but in a much broader sense; managers 
seek to increase their utility through greater expenses on staffing levels and emoluments, as 
well as investing in projects, all made possible from increased sales revenue. Moreover, 
funds for greater expenditure are easier to accumulate from sales revenue than from profits 
or new external finance (since profits have to be distributed to shareholders and new 
external finance would require greater accountability) (Griffiths and Wall, 2004). In 
addition, Baumol (1958) states that the salaries and other perks of managers are more 
closely related to sales revenue than to profit. For example, the managers’ salaries and 
incentives are simpler to measure through sales revenue. The positive growth in sales 
revenue will strongly reflect the reputation of managers. The managers are more interested 
in measuring sales than profits and are willing to forgo additional profit when the minimum 
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 Slack payments are payments to the factors of production over and above the price required to keep them in 
their present employment (Carter, 1971; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). 
24
 Agency theorists often suggest that managerial slack is a source of an agency problem which results in the 
firm becoming inefficient, risk averse, and lacking in performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). 
For example, managerial slack such as redundant employees, unused capacity, and unneeded capital 
expenditure can affect the input and output of the firm (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). 
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target level is achieved; they reject the opportunity to increase the profit of the firm at the 
expense of sales (Baumol, 1958). Managers prefer a steady profit performance rather than 
impressive profit over a period of time. Thus, to a certain extent, managers are seen as risk 
avoiders who intend to maintain stable performance and are reluctant to pursue promising 
projects that are risky; and such attitudes may prevent a firm’s economic growth 
(Koutsoyiannis, 1975). 
So far, the discussions assumed that the owner’s goal is in conflict with the goal of the 
manager. Marris (1964) however, suggested that both owners and managers can achieve a 
common goal (i.e. via the firm’s growth rate rather than its sales revenue or profit) which is 
reflected in growth-maximisation theory. Growth maximisation theory derives from a model 
of the managerial enterprise, which explains that the maximisation of a firm’s growth rate 
can be achieved through the maximisation of the growth rate of demand for the firm’s 
products and the growth of its supply of capital (i.e.        , where   is balanced 
growth of the firm,    is the growth in demand for the products of the firm, and    is the 
growth of the supply of capital) (Marris, 1964). The objective of growth maximisation is to 
maximise jointly the growth rates of demand and capital, which in turn, this maximises 
managers’ utility as well as the owners’ utility.25 For instance, managers strive for growth in 
the demand for the products and services of the firm to raise their power and status; on the 
other hand, owners seek growth in the capital value of the firm to increase their personal 
wealth (Griffiths and Wall, 2004). Hence, a balanced rate of growth of the firm is required 
to satisfy both parties, subject to the managerial and job-security constraints faced by the 
managers. Marris (1964) incorporate financial policies such as a financial security constraint 
(as part of the job-security constraint factor which can be represented by the leverage, 
liquidity and retention ratios) in the decision making process of the firm. For example, the 
retention ratio policy (i.e. retained profits over total profits) can influence the utility of 
managers and owners. If the profits that are distributed to shareholders are low (a high 
retention ratio), the retained profits can be used for reinvestment and to stimulate the growth 
of the firm; but this will jeopardise managers’ job security where the shareholders may 
                                                 
25
 The manager’s utility can be described as            , where   is the utility of manager,    is rate of 
growth of demand for the products of the firm, and   is a measure of job security, which can be decomposed 
into a managerial constraint and a job security constraint. The owner’s utility can defined as         , 
where    is the utility of the owner, and    is the growth rate of capital. 
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decide to terminate their position due to the fall in share prices and increased potential take-
overs. On the other hand, if the distributed profit is high (a low retention ratio), the firm will 
have less funds for economic growth; and shareholders might be more content and the price 
of the shares will be sufficiently high to deter take-overs. This example implies that despite 
having a solution which maximises the utility of both managers and owners, the conflicts of 
achieving balanced utility between managers (who seek the firm’s growth) and owners (i.e. 
shareholders, who seek higher dividends) can still occur, and can result in greater 
inefficiency in the firm (Griffiths and Wall, 2004).   
Unlike the managerial theories, the behaviour theory of the firm describes the firm as an 
organisation with various groups such as owners, managers, suppliers, customers, workers 
and etc., each of which has their own goal, or set of goals. Hence, the firm is not seen as a 
single-decision unit, as outlined in neoclassical theory but as a multi-goal organisational 
coalition (Cyert and March, 1963). The single goal of the firm is seen as being too remote 
from the complexity of modern firms (particularly large firms), where these firms are 
established as a coalition of different groups which are connected based on different 
activities, and each group within the firm has its own set of goals or demands (e.g. 
production, inventory, sales, market share and profit goals) (Koutsoyiannis, 1975; Griffiths 
and Wall, 2004). Some of the objectives of these coalitions of groups might be in conflict 
with the ultimate goals of the firm. Senior management has to decide the ultimate goals for 
the firm by performing continuous bargaining and setting an aspiration level in resolving the 
inevitable conflicting goals of the groups within the coalition (Cyert and March, 1963) 
which could result in organisational slack.
26
 Therefore, the goals of the firm (as a result of a 
continual process of bargaining) will be in the form of aspiration levels instead of 
maximising process; that is, the behavioural theory seeks to ‘satisfice’27 rather than optimise 
                                                 
26
 Organisational slack is described as the difference between total resources and total payment. For example, 
wages paid in excess of those required to maintain labour and supplies purchased above the average price 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Carter, 1971). Organisational slack can result in increased unnecessary costs and thus 
may reduce the efficiency of the firm. Additionally, the conflicting goals between groups that arise during the 
process of the goal-setting at the top management level can be resolved through using monetary payments, 
side payments (in the form of policy commitments), slack payments, prioritising and sequencing attention 
given to demands and decentralising decision-making. Such means are used to ensure compliance or to satisfy 
individuals in some groups (Cyert and March, 1964; Koutsoyiannis, 1975). 
27
 The word satisfice was introduced by Herbert A. Simon; it is a combination of the words ‘satisfy’ and 
‘suffice’. The word satisfice reflects bounded rational behaviour where firms will try to achieve a satisfactory 
rather than the maximum level of profit (Simon, 1955, 1959).  
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profits, sales, or other magnitudes (Simon, 1955). Simon (1955) introduced the concept of 
bounded rationality
28
 (as opposed to global rationality in neoclassical theory) given the 
limitations in information, time and decision making to support the satisficing behaviour of 
large firms. Consequently, should the top managers attain the goals of the firm (which take 
the form of aspiration levels), the firm’s performance can be considered as satisfactory; that 
is, it is possible for firms to survive in the market by not maximising profit, due to facing 
complex decision-making processes and organisational slack within the firm. 
The final theory discussed is X-efficiency, which provides the rationale for why firms are 
not achieving maximum efficiency in their production process. The concept of X-efficiency 
was first introduced by Leibenstein in 1966. The ‘X’ was initially introduced because 
Leibenstein was unclear on how to describe this concept of inefficiency (Frantz, 1992). 
Leibenstein (1966, 1975, 1979) identifies X-efficiency as one of two main sources of 
inefficiency in the firm (another form of inefficiency mentioned by Leibenstein is allocative 
efficiency).
29
 X-efficiency seeks to evaluate intra-firm behaviour and relationships as well 
as interactions among individuals within the firm, instead of the working of the price system. 
The X-efficiency theory hypothesises that: ‘Neither individuals nor firms work as hard, nor 
do they search for information as effectively as they could’ (Leibenstein, 1966, p.407). For 
this hypothesis, Leibenstein (1979) identified non-maximising behaviour as the key idea of 
X-efficiency, where the level of X-inefficiency is mainly determined by the level of effort of 
individuals in the firms. The degree of X-inefficiency can be measured as the difference 
between the maximum effective utilisation of inputs and the actual utilisation of inputs 
(Leibenstein, 1975). Therefore, X-inefficiency can be attributed to several mechanisms: first, 
the inefficiency of the firm can occur due to a lack of competitive pressure. For instance, 
firms may imitate each other and cooperate, rather than drive for aggressive competition, 
particularly in an uncertain market with competitive interdependence. Second, the 
inefficiency could stem from asymmetric information which mostly favours at least one 
                                                 
28
 Simon (1955) constructed the concept of bounded rationality which is based on the actual decision process 
in the behaviour of human individuals or a group of individuals. Bounded rationality explains that the 
rationality of individuals is restricted by cognitive limitation, relying on limited time and information in 
making complex decisions.    
29
 Leibenstein (1966, 1975 and 1979) found two possible sources of inefficiency, which are losses from 
allocative inefficiency and X-inefficiency. Allocative inefficiency derives from the divergence between price 
and marginal cost such as monopoly, special tariffs, and barriers to competitive output pricing. X-inefficiency 
on the other hand makes reference to non-allocative inefficiencies.  
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party and is not available to others. Third, inefficiency occurs due to a principal-agent 
problem; in view of the imperfect contract between managers and owners, the situation 
allows managers to exercise their discretion regarding the amount and quality of work 
(Leibenstein, 1979; Frantz, 1992). Fourth, not all factors of the production function are 
identified. The most widely employed factors are capital, labour, and land. Nonetheless, 
there could be other input factors that affect the production of goods and services. 
Accordingly, Leibenstein (1979) also provides some direction in identifying X-inefficiency, 
namely via pressures arising from (1) the environment in which the firm operates, (2) the 
internal structure of the firm and, (3) the traditional rules that have been established in the 
firm. From the X-efficiency theory, Leibenstein (1975) criticises the assumption that firms 
have the single goal to maximise profit (as outlined by neoclassical theory), which he 
claimed that firms are unable to maximise profit due to maximisation of managerial utility 
(Demsetz, 1995).  
In summary, neoclassical theory assumes that firms are making rational decisions with their 
single objective to maximise profit that focuses on the input and output of the firm, rather 
than on how the transformation is made. Moreover, neoclassical theory fails to explain why 
some firms survived regardless of not being efficient. Thus, managerial and behavioural 
theories focus on the organisational structure, managerial discretion and the behaviour of 
individuals within the firm to explain the inability of a firm to pursue goals other than profit 
maximisation. This also explains why firms continue to survive despite being inefficient in 
managing their inputs and outputs. 
In relation to this research, the neoclassical, managerial and behavioural theories discussed 
earlier have implications towards the efficiency of Malaysian banks. For example, the 
market structure of the Malaysian banks can be seen as oligopolistic, where the banking 
industry in Malaysia is a concentrated market (as a result of consolidation of domestic banks 
after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis) (Batchelor et al., 2005). Moreover, a few large 
banks have been leading the banking industry in setting the prices of the banking products 
which are more likely to be determined based on their internal cost structure, liquidity, 
profitability and risk appetite. Hence, this demonstrates that market concentration allows 
banks to apply market power to their products and enjoy a quiet life, which is strongly 
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related to banks being inefficient (Berger, 1995). In addition, the governance and 
organisational structure of the Malaysian banks have improved over time (since the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-98), where a chairman of a bank is not allowed to become its chief 
executive officer (CEO) (as stipulated in BNM’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance for 
Licensed Institutions). As a result of the separation between owners and managers, it is 
expected that higher agency costs, greater managerial discretion and the satisficing 
behaviour of senior management will exist within the banks in Malaysia. For instance, a 
CEO may want to increase sales and invest in risky financial products to generate higher 
income and accumulate additional funds, where they can use such funds to satisfy their 
managerial utility. Hence, theories such as agency, managerial-discretion, growth 
maximisation and the behavioural theory of the firm can help to explain why some banks in 
Malaysia are inefficient, particularly where this is due to the separation of ownership from 
the day-to-day operations of the banks.  
2.3 The Measurement of Efficiency of the Firm Using Frontier Efficiency 
The theory of the production function showed that the optimisation process is one of the 
criteria used in determining the efficiency of the firm. Maximum production, maximum 
profit and/or minimum cost are means that are used in the optimisation process (Lovell, 
1993).
30
 This is consistent with the theoretical concept according to which the firm 
optimises inputs and outputs to maximise profit. Additionally, apart from the production 
function the neoclassical, managerial, and behavioural theories that were discussed in the 
previous section explain why firms are operating in an inefficient manner. However, in 
order to determine the degree of inefficiency of the firm, empirical analytical methods such 
as frontier estimation are required to measure inefficiencies based on relative efficiency (as 
mentioned in Section 2.2). This section introduces frontier-analysis approaches that are used 
to measure the degree of efficiency of firms. These approaches derive mainly from the work 
of Farrell (1957), who introduces a foundation for estimating relative efficiency using the 
economic theory of production and its optimisation process. 
                                                 
30
 Lovell (1993) states that optimum productivity can be described in terms of production possibilities and 
behavioural goals of the production unit, where firms aim to have optimum cost, revenue, and/or profit subject 
to applicable constraints on quantities and prices.  
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As discussed earlier, the measurement of efficiency can assist policy makers and other 
interested parties to identify sources of inefficiency and to improve the competitive market 
conditions. The empirical measurement provides qualitative as well as quantitative evidence 
when theories are unable to offer guidance, or they give contradictory signals on the impact 
of some phenomenon on the performance of the firms. It is necessary to quantify 
discrepancies that are envisaged qualitatively by theory, using appropriate measurement 
techniques (Lovell, 1993). Lovell (1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that 
frontier estimation is useful because it: (1) provides information to policy makers regarding 
the policies implemented, (2) identifies causes of inefficiency, (3) ranks firms in the 
industry, and (4) evaluates best-practice and worst-practice firms. Moreover, frontier 
estimation is often regarded as superior to non-frontier methods (i.e. ratio analysis and 
ordinary least squares regression) (Lovell, 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). One of the 
simplest non-frontier methods for measuring the performance of firms is financial-ratio 
analysis. This approach consists of using conventional performance ratios which examine 
the financial ratios of the firm, such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
liquidity ratio, cost-to-income ratio and capital ratio; all of these are commonly utilised by 
regulators, analysts and bank managers. However, financial-ratio analysis is unable to 
control the impact of input prices and output prices as well as other exogenous factors, 
which restrict the performance ratios from approaching a closer estimation to the true 
performance of the firms (Lovell, 1993). That is, the financial ratios are limited in scope due 
to their one-dimensional view of products or processes, in which frontier measurement is 
superior as it involves programming and statistical techniques that consider the interactions 
of the key variables mentioned above (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Barr et al., 2002). 
Consequently, another commonly used non-frontier approach is the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression method, which is used to estimate the production function. OLS is a 
method of estimating the unknown parameters of a function in a linear regression model. A 
line is generated for a linear approximation that minimises the sum of squared vertical 
distances between the observations in the dataset; this measures the average performance of 
the firms (Lovell, 1993). Hence, the result of average performance (via OLS) of the 
production function used to construct production frontier is inconsistent with the economic 
theory of the optimisation process; as it does not demonstrate the minimising or maximising 
behaviour of the firm (Lovell, 1993).   
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In view of the usefulness of frontier estimation and its common use in the literature, the 
discussion in this section begins with the efficiency measurement introduced by Farrell 
(1957). Based on Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951),
31
 Farrell (1957) introduces and 
employs a production function as an empirical method to estimate the productivity frontier. 
Frontier estimation is based on a relative measurement rather than an absolute measurement. 
Coelli et al, (2005) further iterate that frontier estimation focuses on comparing observations 
and evaluating optimal values of inputs and outputs. For example, as mentioned and 
described earlier in Section 2.2.1 and Figure 2.2, firms that are on the estimated frontier are 
said to be efficient. However, other firms that are positioned below the frontier are 
identified as inefficient. The relative measurement of inefficiency is determined by the 
distance between the production frontier (isosurface) and inefficient firms (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). The production frontier efficiency can be categorised into technical 
efficiency, allocative efficiency, scale efficiency, and scope efficiency, which are discussed 
in the following subsections. 
2.3.1 Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
Farrell (1957) suggests that productivity efficiency can be decomposed into technical 
efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). His work brought forward the proposition of 
the empirical treatment of a production function as a ‘frontier’, and proposed that productive 
efficiency consists of both TE and AE. In general, TE is described as the ability of a firm to 
produce maximum output based on a given input, or as using the minimum input for a given 
output. Mester (1997) asserts that a firm is said to be technically inefficient if it is producing 
less than maximum output from a given set of inputs, or is using more than the minimum 
input required for a given level of output. On the other hand, Lovell (1993) defines AE as 
the ability of a firm to combine inputs and outputs in optimal proportions, provided that the 
prices of inputs and outputs are known. Allocative inefficiency can be described as utilising 
an incorrect mix of inputs, given their prices and production technology, which may be 
                                                 
31
 Debreu (1951) proposed the first measure of technical efficiency using a ‘coefficient of resource utilisation’, 
which uses the smallest quantity of inputs to produce a certain level of outputs. Additionally, Koopmans (1951) 
describes a producer as technically efficient when an increase of any output requires an increase of at least one 
input or a reduction in at least one output, and if a reduction in any input requires a reduction of at least one 
output or at least an increase in another input.  
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driven by factors such as the excessive or poor regulations made by policy makers (Mester, 
1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003).  
TE and AE can be analysed from two perspectives, namely input-orientated TE and AE and 
output-orientated TE and AE (Lovell, 1993). For input-orientated efficiency, TE and AE are 
viewed from a cost-minimisation standpoint, addressing a firm’s optimal mix of inputs to 
produce outputs. Conversely, output-orientated TE and AE refer to a revenue maximisation 
viewpoint, measuring the optimal mix of outputs based on given inputs (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000).  
2.3.1.1 Input-orientated Measures of Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
Farrell’s (1957) original study was discussed with reference to the relationship between 
input/input space and its focus on the input-reduction process. This method describes the 
input-orientated measures of TE and AE (Coelli et al., 2005). Farrell (1957) suggests that 
the efficiency of a firm depends on its ability to produce maximum output from a given 
input; and in this context, TE can be explained using the frontier isoquant from the Figure 
2.4. Figure 2.4 shows the isoquant SS’; and under the assumption of constant returns to 
scale and a given level of technology, the firm produces one output (y) and two inputs (x1 
and x2) (y=f(x1, x2)), using the best available technology. The isoquant SS’ is the minimum 
combinations of the two inputs required to produce a given level of output. Every possible 
combination along the isoquant (for example at point Q and Q’) is considered technically 
efficient; any point above or to the right of it can be described as technical inefficient 
because they can still reduce the use of inputs without reducing the output level. For 
example, assuming that a firm is producing at point P using two inputs (x1 and x2) to 
produce a given level of output, the firm is considered technically inefficient because by 
moving from P to Q it can produce the same quantity of output with fewer inputs. Thus, the 
TE of the firm can be measured by the ratio of OQ/OP. TE is represented by an indicator 
which takes a value from zero to 1. For instance, if OQ/OP is closer to 1, it indicates that a 
level of output of the firm for a given input is closer to the most technically efficient point 
for a given combination of inputs. The further the firm moves away from the frontier, the 
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more the performance of the firm deteriorates, which can result in TE moving closer to zero. 
The technical efficiency (TE) equation can be expressed as follows (Coelli et al., 2005): 
 TE=OQ/OP (2.4) 
where TE is technical efficiency, OQ is the potential inputs being used to produce a given 
output, and OP is the actual inputs being used to produce the same level of output that could 
be produced using fewer inputs. 
Figure ‎2.4 Technical and Allocative Efficiency (Input-oriented) 
 
Source: Farrell (1957, p. 254) 
However, TE does not consider the price and the optimal allocation of inputs. Thus, AE was 
introduced by Farrell (1957), and this is estimated based on optimal proportions of inputs 
using known prices. The relative prices of production factors are incorporated in the isocost 
AA’ in Figure 2.4, which is tangential to the isoquant SS’. The isocost AA’ represents the 
ratio of the two input prices and measures the minimum cost to produce a given output. In 
other words, the isocost AA’ shows the various combinations of inputs that require the same 
level of expenditure (i.e. cost). For instance, if the firm’s overall production is efficient (i.e. 
TE and AE), it will occur at Q’ (but not Q), which is the cost efficient point. At point Q’, the 
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SS’ and AA’ slopes are the same and this intersection indicates that the combination of 
inputs and output is fully efficient (where both TE and AE are attained simultaneously). 
Consequently, by moving Q to Q’, the firm could produce the same output at a lower cost 
by adjusting its input levels. At point Q, the firm is considered allocatively inefficient (but 
technically efficient), where the firm made an inefficient choice of a combination of inputs 
at the given prices, and therefore incurred greater cost than it would have done if it had 
produced at point Q’. Thus, AE is measured by the ratio OR/OQ. The distance QR 
represents the potential reduction of production cost that can be made to be considered 
allocatively efficient. Similar to TE, an AE ratio closer to 1 indicates an output combination 
that is closer to the allocatively efficient point for a given level of output. Mathematically, 
AE is given by (Coelli et al., 2005):  
 AE=OR/OQ (2.5) 
where AE is allocative efficiency, OR is the observed combination of input prices that is 
associated with the cost-minimising input at Q’, and OQ represent the observed combination 
of inputs prices that are associated with technical efficiency at point Q. 
As mentioned earlier, the tangency point Q’ represents the point of economic (overall cost) 
efficiency, in which both TE and AE are simultaneously efficient. In Figure 2.4, if firm at 
point P wants to be economically efficient, it must also be technically and allocatively 
efficient at point Q’. Thus at point P, the cost efficiency of the firm is the fraction OR/OP. 
In the case of input-orientation, this ratio (i.e. OR/OP) is termed by Farrell (1957) as the 
overall cost efficiency of the firm, measured by the product of technical efficiency (TE) and 
allocative efficiency (AE) (Coelli et al., 2005).  
 CE= TE x AE = OQ/OP x OR/OQ = OR/OP (2.6) 
where CE is overall cost efficiency, TE is technical efficiency; and AE is the allocative 
efficiency of the firm. 
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2.3.1.2 Output-orientated Measures of Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency 
The idea of Farrell (1957) discussed previously is shown in the input/input space ratio from 
a cost-minimisation perspective. Aigner and Chu (1968) replicated the Farrell (1957) 
approach by estimating a parametric function for the input/output space; this provides a 
revenue-maximisation perspective. The differences between input-orientated efficiency and 
output-orientated efficiency can be described by addressing a couple of questions. Coelli et 
al. (2005) state that cost minimisation or input-orientated efficiency seek to address the 
question of ‘By how much can input quantities be proportionally reduced without changing 
the quantities or output produced?’ Conversely, the revenue maximisation or output-
orientated efficiency is addressed in the question of ‘By how much can output quantities be 
increased without changing the quantities of the inputs?’   
The latter question may be addressed using Figure 2.5, which illustrates a firm with two 
outputs (q1/x and q2/x) and one input (x) and assumed conditions of constant returns to 
scale and a given technology. Following Coelli et al. (2005), ZZ’ is the possibility curve of 
different potential methods of producing two outputs with a given level of input. ZZ’ 
represents the upper boundary of the production possibilities. Point A is inefficient, as the 
combination of the two outputs is inside the production possibility curve ZZ’. Point B 
represents an efficient firm, as it lies on the upper boundary of the production possibility 
curve ZZ’. The ratio of the distance between OA and OB is used to estimate technical 
efficiency (TE). Technical efficiency can be represented with an indicator which takes a 
value from zero to 1. A value of OA/OB closer to 1 indicates that the level of output of the 
firm for a given input is closer to the most technically efficient point for a given 
combination of outputs. If a firm is technically efficient, the ratio of OA/OB should be 1. 
The distance AB indicates the extent to which the two outputs can be proportionally 
increased without requiring extra inputs. Thus, to measure output-orientated technical 
efficiency, it will be the ratio of (Coelli et al., 2005): 
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 TE=OA/OB (2.7) 
where TE is technical efficiency, OA represents the actual production of two outputs using 
one input, and OB represents the potential production of two outputs without requiring extra 
input. 
Figure ‎2.5 Technical and Allocative Efficiency (Output-orientated) 
 
Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p. 255) 
AE is introduced to consider the optimal proportions of output based on prices, which is not 
reflected in TE. AE derives from an output perspective that consists of selecting the mix of 
outputs that maximises revenue with a given quantity of input. In Figure 2.5, the iso-revenue 
line DD’ shows every possible combination of two outputs that generate the same total 
revenue, based on a given input and the available technology. The iso-revenue line DD’ is 
tangential to the production possibility curve ZZ’ when the slopes of both DD’ and ZZ’ 
tangential at point B’. At point B’ the firm is considered to have optimal revenue efficiency 
(RE), in which both TE and AE are attained simultaneously. This point of tangency B’ also 
indicates the maximum revenue efficiency that a firm can achieve. Although B is 
technically efficient, due to its location on the production possibility curve, it is however not 
allocatively efficient, in which could result in AE of less than 1. The distance CB is the 
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distance that can increase the revenue of the firm should it moves from point B to point B’. 
Since the revenue from production at B’ is only a fraction of that at B, the ratio of OB/OC is 
used to measure AE. AE takes a value between zero to 1. The closer AE is to 1 implies that 
the output combination is closer to the allocatively efficient point for a given level of input. 
AE can be written as follows (Coelli et al., 2005): 
 AE= OB/OC (2.8) 
where AE is the allocative efficiency, OB is the observed combination of output prices that 
is associated with technically efficient production at point B, and OC is the observed 
combination of output prices that is associated with revenue efficiency at point B’.  
AE and TE have a revenue-increasing interpretation which is similar to the cost-reduction 
interpretation in the input-orientated measures. To achieve overall revenue efficiency, firms 
should have the optimal mix of outputs to maximise revenue. This can be demonstrated in 
Figure 2.5, where at point B’ both TE and AE are attained simultaneously. Hence, in the 
case of output-orientation, the overall revenue efficiency (RE) is a function of technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency (Coelli et al., 2005).  
 RE= TE x AE = OA/OB x OA/OC = OA/OC (2.9) 
where RE is the overall revenue efficiency, TE is the technical efficiency and AE is the 
allocative efficiency.  
2.3.2 Scale Efficiency  
Section 2.3.1 reviewed the measurement of efficiency based on inputs and outputs, prices 
and production technology. The efficiency of a firm can be classified as technical efficiency, 
allocative efficiency and economic efficiency (i.e. cost and revenue efficiency). A firm may 
be technically efficient, allocatively efficient and economically efficient (i.e. cost, revenue, 
or profit efficient), but not necessarily scale efficient. Economies of scale are normally 
associated with the size of a firm and its cost advantage, which manifests as increased 
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output of products (Clark, 1988). Molyneux et al. (1996) describe economies of scale as a 
rate at which output changes, as all factor quantities are varied; they measure whether firms 
with similar production and managerial technologies are operating at optimal size.  That is, 
economies of scale are measured by the ratio of a proportionate change in output to a given 
proportionate change in all inputs (McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). This is measured by the 
ratio of the percentage change in the inputs relative to the percentage change in the outputs. 
Economies of scale exist when a proportionate increase in output is associated with a less 
than proportionate increase in inputs. On the other hand, diseconomies of scale materialise 
when inputs increase proportionately more than the output does as the latter increases. 
Constant returns to scale refer to the proportional change of output being equal to the 
proportional change in input (Clark, 1988). 
Economies of scale are based on the shape of the average cost curve illustrated in Figure 2.6. 
The figure shows the U-shaped cost curve which represents a cost function exhibiting all 
three of these scale-economy characteristics. For empirical measures of scale economies, 
Clark (1988) suggests that the ratio of the proportion of output in relation to the proportion 
of input determines different types of scale economies. Given the total cost function defined 
by TC=f(Q) where Q is output, the average total cost can be derived as ATC= f(Q)/Q and 
marginal cost is  TC/ Q. The average cost will decline as long as marginal cost lies below 
average cost. Hence, the scale economies (SE) are given as ATC/MC, which is the elasticity 
of cost with respect to output (Altunbas et al., 1996). If the scale economies are equal to 
1(SE=1), it represents constant returns to scale; if the scale economies are less than 1 
(SE<1), this reflects increasing return to scale; and conversely, if the scale economies are 
greater than 1 (SE>1), the firm is considered inefficient and decreasing returns to scale are 
present.  
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Figure ‎2.6 Economies of Scale and Average Cost Curves 
 
Source: Sinkey (1992, p. 306) 
In addition, the firm’s long run average cost describes what is happening to average cost 
when the firm expands, and is at a tangent to the series of short run average cost curves. 
Each short run average cost curve relates to a separate stage or phase of expansion 
(McGuigan and Moyer, 1989). Figure 2.7 shows a series of short-run average cost curves 
(SAC1, SAC2, and SAC3), with each producing different levels of output and a long-run 
average cost curve (LAC). In this figure, the firm will choose the size that yields the lowest 
average cost for their particular level of output. A curve of long-run average cost (LAC) is 
drawn from the series of short-run average cost curves, where each point of the LAC is to a 
point of tangency with a corresponding short-run average cost curves (SAC1, SAC2 and 
SAC3), and it shows the least-cost method of production for any level of output. Scale 
economies appear as the slope of the long-run average cost curve indicating how costs vary 
with output (Humphrey, 1990). A downward sloping LAC suggests economies of scale, due 
to average costs of production declining as output increases. Conversely, an upward sloping 
LAC suggests diseconomies of scale, indicated by higher costs incurred as output increases. 
A firm experiences constant returns to scale at the lowest point of the LAC, where a firm 
achieves its lowest average cost.  
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Figure ‎2.7 Economies of Scale 
 
Source: Humphrey (1990, p. 38) 
Many firms can be technically and allocatively efficient but in terms of productivity they 
may not be equally optimal. This inconsistency is due to scale effects. A firm can improve 
its cost and profit efficiency by producing at constant returns to scale as shown in Figure 2.8; 
the firms operating at points A, B and C are all technically efficient. This is because all of 
them are operating on the production frontier. However, the productivity of each firm differs 
due to the effect of scale. These firms are assumed to use one input (x) and produce one 
output (q). Firm A operates in the increasing returns to scale region of the production 
frontier. Firm A can increase its scale of production by being more productive and moving 
towards firm B. Firm B would be more scale efficient than Firm A, due to a higher ratio of 
output compared to input. Firm B is able to produce more output due to its lower average 
cost. On the other hand, firm C is operating in the decreasing returns to scale part of the 
production frontier. For firm C to become more productive, it has to move towards point B 
by reducing its scale of production. By doing so, it can reduce the its average cost. Point B 
is the ideal region, because it is said to be operating at the most productive size, or 
equivalently, at the technically optimal productive scale (TOPS). This is also the point on 
the production frontier at which a ray from the origin is tangential to the production frontier 
(i.e. the slope of the ray displays a proportional change of output, which has a similar 
proportional change in input, where the ray angle from the origin is 45º). 
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Figure ‎2.8 Effects of Scale Production  
 
Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p. 59) 
An input-orientated measure of scale efficiency for a firm operating with a given input and 
output can be described as the ratio of technical efficiency of constant returns to scale over 
the technical efficiency of variable returns to scale (Coelli et al., 2005). That is, 
 
    
     
     
 (2.10) 
where    is scale efficiency,       is its technical efficiency with constant returns to scale, 
and       is its technical efficiency under variable returns to scale. When     , the firm 
is experiencing increasing returns to scale,      refers to constant returns to scale, 
     , denotes decreasing returns to scale. 
According to Akhavein et al. (1997), scale efficiency can increase a firm’s profit and 
improve cost in several ways. First, scale efficiency improves the cost per unit of output as 
the size of the firm increases. Second, scale efficiency can improve the profit efficiency 
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from a superior combination of inputs.
32
 Third, a firm that is scale efficient could have 
greater market power. Firms with greater market power can set prices and can charge higher 
prices for its products and thus raise profits for the firm. Additionally, De Young (1997) 
states that firms can improve their cost efficiency by moving closer to the cost frontier; 
through economies of scale (or growing larger), firms can reduce their per unit average cost 
and achieve cost savings by spreading their costs over large quantities of output.   
2.3.3 Scope Efficiency 
Another type of efficiency that improves cost and increases profit efficiency is  economies 
of scope.
33
 A firm could experience cost savings and greater profit from joint production of 
multiple products. Economies of scope exist when two or more products can be jointly 
produced by a single firm with a lower cost compared to independent production by many 
firms (Panzar and Willig, 1981; Berger et al., 1987; Clark, 1988; Molyneux et al., 1996). 
Clark (1988) suggests two types of economies of scope, namely global and product-specific. 
Global economies of scope refers to the comparison of costs between joint production and 
by separate production by a number of firms. The economies of scope occurs if the joint 
production cost is less than the total cost of producing each product independently. On the 
other hand, product-specific economies of scale derive from adding different products with 
joint production to produce a different product. It exists when costs are reduced from joint 
production from various product mixes. However, in order to ascertain the best product mix, 
the cost complementarities between various pairs should be estimated.
34
  
                                                 
32
 For example, the profit efficiency of a firm could be improved without improving its cost efficiency through 
mergers and acquisitions. The newly formed firm could enjoy revenue growth greater than the increase in cost.  
33
 Samuelson (1966) defines scope efficiency as joint-ness in production as the capability of a firm to produce 
multiple outputs at a lower cost at a given level of input, rather than a series of separate firms, each of which 
specialises in the production of single output. 
34
 Cost complementarities refer to the extent to which the cost of producing a particular product may vary from 
the output levels of other products. Synergised cost complementarities can result in lower cost. Nonetheless, 
the best mix production combination has first to be determined by the firm.  
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Figure ‎2.9 The Concept of Economies of Scope 
 
Source: Baumol et al. (1988, p. 72) 
Following Baumol et al. (1988), the concept of economies of scope can be explained 
geometrically as seen in Figure 2.9. If the outputs are produced independently, the cost 
functions are TC(Q1) and TC(Q2). However, when the outputs are produced jointly, the 
joint cost for producing is TC(Q1,Q2). The economies of scope exist if the two outputs are 
jointly produced and result in lower cost when compared with the cost of producing the 
same quantity of output independently, that is TC(Q1,Q2) < TC(Q1) + TC(Q2). A measure 
of scope can be expressed by the Equation 2.11.  
 
       
                         
         
 
(2.11) 
where SCOPE is the scope efficiency,         is the total cost in producing output 1 
independently,        is the total cost in producing output 2 independently, and 
          is the total cost to produce outputs 1 and 2 jointly.  If SCOPE>0, it indicates the 
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firm’s overall economies of scope; on the other hand, if the SCOPE<0, it implies 
diseconomies of scope. 
As discussed above, scale and scope efficiencies can increase profit and the cost efficiency 
of the firm. Therefore, a firm is often required to identify the sources that would result in 
economies of scale and scope. The sources of economies of scale and scope can be derived 
from various sources which arise when a firm has extra capacity in its inputs (Clark, 1988). 
A firm can increase its output without proportionately increasing the input in the production 
activity. The excess in input would reduce the output cost per unit when output increases. 
Berger et al. (1987), Clark (1988) and Humphrey (1990) state that the potential sources of 
economies of scale and scope can come from several areas such as better information 
technology, specialised labour, organisational flexibility, and information distribution. For 
example, banks are often required to distribute asymmetric information to borrowers and 
lenders. Hence, information distribution costs can be reduced when the bank expands in size 
(Berger et al., 1987). Information such as the financial result, industry information, and 
economic condition is used by the bank to grant loans. This information is usually reused 
for either the same or different borrowers. Thus, economies of scale arise when information 
is used for different borrowers. On the other hand, economies of scope exist when 
information is used for the same customer for different products (Clark, 1988; Humphrey, 
1990). However, the estimation of economies of scope in the banking sector is difficult, due 
to the insufficiency of cost data for each output (Berger et al., 1987). Hence, this research 
does not analyse the economies of scope of Malaysian banks. 
2.4 The Measurement of Frontier Efficiency 
Frontier analysis provides an empirical and functional measurement of efficiency that is 
better than financial ratios (Farrell, 1957). Financial ratios are nonetheless important, 
although they are being limited in scope due to a one-dimensional view of products or 
processes, and also ignore any interactions, substitutions, and trade-offs between key 
variables (Siems and Barr, 1998).
35
 Therefore, a more inclusive multiple-input and multiple-
                                                 
35
 According to Berger et al. (1993), financial ratios are regarded as misleading indicators of efficiency for 
three reasons: First, financial ratios do not control for product mix or input prices. Second, financial ratios such 
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output framework is required to evaluate the productive efficiency that provides 
benchmarking information. Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Barr et al. (2002) state that 
frontier measurement approaches are superior to financial ratios because they involve 
programming and statistical techniques that remove the differences in input prices and other 
exogenous factors. Nevertheless, frontier analysis relies on accounting measures from 
financial data, which in turn provides ratio information such as prices of input and prices of 
output (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
The frontier-efficiency measures focus on relative instead of absolute estimation and are 
concerned with comparing potential and actual performance (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
They measure efficiency using the observed sample of firms in the industry (Farrell, 1957). 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, firms located on the estimated frontier are said to be efficient, 
while others (those not on the frontier’s isosurface) are inefficient. Efficiency (e.g. technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency) is therefore being measured based on the distance to the 
frontier curve. The measurement of efficiency widely used in the literature can be divided 
into two groups: the parametric and nonparametric approaches (see Figure 2.10). The 
approaches are similar, as they attempt to benchmark the relative performance of the firms 
by estimating their best frontier, but the underlying assumptions of these two approaches are 
very different.  
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), the differences in the underlying assumptions 
between nonparametric and parametric models can be identified in terms of functional 
forms and random noise. The functional form is apparent in the parametric approach as it 
requires functions or restrictive structures for its specification to estimate the best practice 
frontier. On the other hand, the nonparametric approach requires relatively little structure. In 
terms of assumptions regarding random noise, the parametric approach assumes two-
component error terms. The two components are the inefficiency term (managerial 
weakness) and the random error term. Conversely, the nonparametric approach assumes that 
the deviation from best practice is due to managerial error (inefficiency) only. Hence, 
random noise is not identified, due to whole error term being considered as inefficiency.  
                                                                                                                                                     
as cost-to-asset ratio assume that all assets are equally costly to produce. Third, the use of simple ratios would 
not distinguish between X-efficiency gains and scale and scope efficiency.  
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Figure ‎2.10 Conceptual Efficiency Framework 
 
Adapted from Ahmad Mokhtar et al. (2006, p. 5) 
2.4.1 Nonparametric Frontier Approaches 
The nonparametric frontier was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), who 
used linear programming techniques to construct a production frontier and to measure the 
efficiency of the firms relative to their estimated frontier. Thus, this method envelops a data 
set of observations, but makes no accommodation for noise or random error (Lovell, 1993). 
Hence, the nonparametric method assumes (1) no measurement error in constructing the 
frontier, (2) no luck or chance that temporarily gives a production unit better performance, 
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(3) no inaccuracies created by accounting rules that would make measured outputs and 
inputs deviate from economic outputs and inputs; and (4) no sampling error caused by the 
selection of a sample instead of conducting a census of the entire population. Any of these 
errors that appear in an inefficient unit’s data may be reflected as part of inefficiency; the 
approach assumes that random error is zero (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The common 
nonparametric approaches such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull 
(FDH) put relatively little structure on the specification of the best frontier. 
2.4.1.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  
DEA is built upon the work of Farrell (1957). It was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978), who developed an application of mathematical programming to locate a 
frontier based on the observed output and input quantities used by each firm to evaluate 
their efficiency level. DEA is described as a nonparametric approach and not dependent on 
functional forms (Avkiran, 1999; Brown, 2003; Attaulah et al., 2004; Drake et al., 2006). It 
relies on linear programming techniques for constructing a nonparametric envelopment 
(piecewise linear envelopment) to a set of observed outputs and inputs (Berg et al., 1993). 
Figure 2.11 illustrates the concept of DEA with four firms, utilising two inputs (x1/q and 
x2/q) to produce one output (q). Firms C and D are on the efficient frontier, because they 
use the least input combinations to produce output. The curve SS’ connects the points C and 
D which represents the efficient frontier that is enveloping all observable data. Firms A and 
B are considered inefficient. However, firms A and B could reduce the quantity of their 
inputs to produce the same output on the frontier, as shown at points A’ and B’ (Coelli et al., 
2005).  
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Figure ‎2.11 Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
Source: Coelli et al. (2005, p. 165) 
Casu and Girardone (2002) assert that the efficiency scores are generated from the actual 
data of firms under assessment where the score is relative (not an absolute estimate) to other 
firms within the sample. The best performance firms in the sample are utilised as a 
benchmark (i.e. firms that are located on the estimated frontier). The scores can be 
generated by either measuring all inputs used in the production process and determining the 
minimum level of inputs required to produce the same quantity of output or by measuring 
all inputs used in the production process and determining the levels of output that are 
required to be increased, based on the given inputs (depending on minimisation or 
maximisation constraint imposed in the linear programming). Firms with fewer inputs used 
to produce the same output or producing greater outputs based on a given input are 
considered more efficient and generate higher scores (Brown, 2003). The efficiency scores 
do not imply any explicit relationship between inputs and outputs (i.e. no algebraic 
relationship between inputs and outputs) because DEA does not impose any functional 
forms in its nonparametric approach (Ray, 2010).    
There are two common variants to DEA: the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) (CCR) 
model and the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) (BCC) model. Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) introduced the CCR model, which is based on constant return to scale (CRS) 
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when enveloping the observed data to determine the shape of the frontier. The CCR model 
assumes that all firms are operating at an optimal scale. The assumption of CRS is 
particularly inappropriate when firms are experiencing economies and diseconomies of 
scale. Therefore, Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) argue that there are many factors that 
can cause firms to fail to operate at their optimal scale such as regulations, imperfect 
competition, macroeconomic shocks, and internal structural deficiency. The BCC model 
drops the CRS assumption by introducing variable returns to scale (VRS) in an attempt to 
identify simultaneously the most efficient scale for each firm in determining both technical 
efficiency and the envelopment surface. Nevertheless, there are various extensions and new 
concepts of DEA such as the additive model, the slack-based measure, the Russell measure, 
a non-radial model, and a multi-stage model.
36
 Economic efficiencies such as cost and profit 
efficiency had also been extended from the basic DEA model. These are discussed in 
Chapter 5 (Methodology and Data).    
2.4.1.2 Free Disposal Hull (FDH) Analysis 
The FDH is nonparametric frontier model developed by Deprins et al. (1984) and extended 
by Tulkens (1993). FDH is a special case of the DEA model where the points connecting the 
DEA vertices are not included in the frontier. Instead, the FDH production possibility set is 
composed of only the DEA vertices and the free disposal points interior to these vertices 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The FDH approach relaxes the assumption of convexity and 
assumes that there is no linear substitution possible between input or output combinations 
on a piecewise linear frontier. Unlike the convexity shape of the DEA frontier, the FDH has 
a staircase shape. Because the FDH frontier is either congruent with or interior to the DEA 
frontier, it therefore generates larger estimates of the average efficiency score than does 
DEA. The differences between FDH and DEA is that FDH evaluates firms’ efficiency based 
on observed data, while DEA measures efficiency based on firms on the frontier (Tulkens, 
1993). One of the shortcomings of FDH is that the approach is unable to measure economic 
efficiency (e.g. cost and profit efficiency), but only measures technical efficiency (Cook and 
Seiford, 2009). 
                                                 
36
 For more details of the extension of DEA models, see Cook and Seiford (2009). 
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Figure ‎2.12 Free Disposal Hull 
 
Source: Deprins et al. (1984, p. 287) 
To illustrate the FDH concept, Figure 2.12 shows the staircase-shaped frontier based on 
observed data with five production points A, B, C, P and Q. Points A, B and C describe 
efficient firms; P is inefficient as it does not lie on the frontier that tightly envelops the 
observable data. However, firms producing at point P could reduce the quantity of their 
inputs to become efficient (Deprins et al., 1984). Unlike DEA where input slack can be 
compared with the efficient frontier, FDH allows comparisons to be made only on actual 
observations, which makes slack more difficult to estimate when compared to DEA (Borger 
et al., 1998). 
2.4.2 Parametric Frontier Approaches 
In comparison to the nonparametric approach, the parametric approach requires functional 
forms (e.g. Cobb-Douglas, transcendental logarithms and Fourier Flexible) and a 
distribution assumption (e.g. half-normal, truncated normal and gamma) to disentangle 
residual (noise) into random error and inefficiency. The parametric approach can be divided 
into the deterministic and stochastic frontier methods. The deterministic frontier model is 
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normally measured using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to estimate efficiency. 
On the other hand, the stochastic frontier model has been widely employed in the past 
literature due to its ability to distinguish inefficiency from random noise. The stochastic 
frontier approaches that are discussed in this section are the stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA), the thick frontier approach (TFA), and the distribution frontier approach (DFA).  
2.4.2.1 Deterministic Frontier Model 
One of the earlier models for the parametric approaches is the deterministic frontier model. 
This model uses a one-sided error term with non-negative properties in which the whole 
residual is considered as inefficient. The deterministic frontier utilises the OLS and OLS 
variants such as corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) and modified ordinary least 
squares (MOLS). The model can be written as follow: 
                          (2.12) 
where       is the logarithm of costs of the i-th firm,     is the vector of prices of the 
variable inputs of the i-th firm,     is the vector of the output levels of the i-th firm,    
represents the set of parameters to be estimated, and    is the error term of the firm’s 
cost/profit inefficiency and is assumed to be non-negative and greater than zero. 
The level of inefficiency of firms is indicated by the error term   . If    is equal to zero, 
inefficiency does not exist, but if it is greater than zero, inefficiency exists within the firm. 
However, the model has its weakness in that it is found to be inconsistent with the 
theoretical notion of the optimisation process, where the focus of this model had turned into 
data envelopment through the construction of a cost frontier (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
The problem however can be corrected by using the COLS method introduced by Winsten 
(1957). This is done by shifting the intercept downwards (in the case of cost frontier but 
shift upwards for production and profit frontiers) by the highest residuals and ensuring that 
the firm with the lowest cost is utilised as the benchmark with which to estimate other firms’ 
cost frontiers. Nonetheless, this technique is vulnerable to outliers. Thus, Afriat (1972) and 
Richmond (1974) proposed the MOLS method, which assumed that the error term    is a 
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one-sided distribution, similar to the half-normal assumption; where the intercept parameter 
is shifted downwards (for cost frontier) by the mean of the assumed distribution.  
Both COLS and MOLS require the parameters to be first estimated by OLS, and 
subsequently followed by the adjustment of the intercept parameters as mentioned above. 
The main drawback of COLS and MOLS is that they only change the estimation of the 
intercept parameter, making the frontier line parallel to the OLS regression line, which leads 
to having two lines with the same structure. As a result, the frontier does not meet the aim to 
bound the data as closely as possible (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Additionally, neither 
COLS nor MOLS separate inefficiency from the random error    which treats all residuals 
as inefficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). In view of this inherent weakness, stochastic frontiers 
were introduced to overcome the limitations of deterministic frontier models. As mentioned 
earlier, the stochastic frontier models are capable of separating the error term into noise and 
inefficiency, which is discussed in the next section. 
2.4.2.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
In contrast to deterministic models, the stochastic frontier allows for the composite error 
term    to be split into an inefficiency component and a random error (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). SFA was independently introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen 
and Van den Broeck (1977) in the same year. Similarly to the frontier efficiency principle, 
SFA assumes that a firm’s output is influenced by technology and a given input. Thus, the 
production of the firm is influenced by the parametric function of known inputs, output, 
control factors, and random error. The economic functional forms such as cost or profit 
functions are widely used to reflect the optimisation process of the firm. For illustration of 
SFA, the single-equation stochastic cost function model is shown below:  
        (              )        (2.13) 
Where     is the observed total cost of production for the i-th firm at time t.      is a vector 
of outputs,     is an input price vector, and      is a vector of exogenous factors. Following 
Aigner et al. (1997), the assumption of the composed error term is as below: 
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             (2.14) 
where     and     are independently distributed,     represents random error and is assumed 
to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance,   
    is drawn from a one-sided 
distribution that is assumed to capture the effect of inefficiency.     is assumed to be a half-
normal distribution with mean zero and variance   
 . Inefficieny    , can be estimated by 
using the conditional mean of the inefficiency term from the error term. Jondrow et al. 
(1982) proposed that log likelihood for inefficiency is explained in terms of the two 
variance parameters,      
    
 , which capture the variance of composed error term     
and   
  
  ⁄ , which measures the fraction of inefficiency relative to statistical noise. 
SFA avoids problems associated with nonparametric frontiers by explicitly considering the 
stochastic properties of the data and separates the composite error term into inefficiency and 
statistical noise (Kaparakis et al, 1994). The composite error term can be disentangled by 
making distribution assumptions. The most common composite error model is the half 
normal-normal distribution which assumes that a half normal distribution is used to capture 
inefficiency and a standard normal distribution is used for capturing the random error 
(Aigner et al. 1977; Berger 1993; Berger and Mester 1997). Apart from the half-normal 
assumption, there are several alternative assumptions for the composite error, such as 
gamma, exponential, truncated-normal and deterministic kernel distribution (Greene, 1990; 
Berger, 1993; Bos et al. 2009).
37
 The assumption imposed on the composite error term 
prevents inefficiency from generating a negative value (Fries and Taci, 2005). Finally, the 
structured composite error term can trace whether the firm’s inefficiency is derived from 
either measurement problems or managerial deficiency (Fries and Taci, 2005). 
                                                 
37
 Greene (1990) argues that in comparison to a gamma distribution, the half-normal assumption for 
inefficiency is inflexible and imposes an arbitrary restriction in which firms are clustered near full efficiency. 
Stevenson (1980) and Berger and De Young (1997) specified a more general truncated normal distribution and 
found minor but significant improvement compared to the half-normal model. Additionally, Vennet (1998) 
employs both half-normal and exponential distributions in his study, but he found little difference between 
these distributions. 
Chapter 2 Theory and Measurement of Production Efficiency 
 
61 
  
2.4.2.3 Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) 
The thick frontier approach (TFA) was developed to avoid the restrictive assumptions on the 
error term found in SFA. TFA has little structure and generates less information 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). TFA also requires functional specifications such as cost and 
profit functions to estimate the efficiency of the firm. The TFA model compares the 
efficiency of groups of firms, rather than trying to estimate the frontier of production 
functions. In determining the groups, firms are ranked and divided into quartiles based on 
cost per unit of assets. The highest quartile is represented by firms that are presumed to have 
higher efficiency, and at the other end, the lowest quartile is assumed to have firms with 
lower efficiency. A cost function is estimated for both quartiles. The deviations in the error 
terms, and predicted cost between the highest and the lowest quartile of the observations are 
assumed to represent random error and inefficiency, respectively (Berger and Humphrey, 
1992). That is, the estimation of random error and inefficiency in TFA relies on differences 
between the highest and lowest quartiles rather than distribution assumptions. In addition, 
Berger and Humphrey (1991) state that TFA requires less specificity in the maintained 
assumptions; therefore it is less likely to be violated substantially by the data. However, it 
does not generate cost efficiency estimates for each firm; instead, it produces one cost 
efficiency estimate for the highest-cost quartile relative to the lowest-cost quartile. Thus, 
TFA may not provide accurate estimates of the general level of overall cost efficiency, 
which makes it unlikely to be used by managers and policy makers (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). 
2.4.2.4 Distribution Free Approach (DFA) 
The distribution-free approach (DFA) was introduced by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and 
Berger (1993). Similar to TFA, DFA avoids using distributional assumption for the error 
component. Nevertheless, DFA requires a functional form for the construction of the 
efficient frontier similar to SFA, but inefficiency is separated from the random error 
differently. DFA makes no strong assumptions regarding the distribution of inefficiency and 
the random error. Instead, DFA uses stability over time to separate inefficiency from 
random error. It assumes that inefficiency is constant through time and that random error 
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tends to average out over time (Bauer et al., 1998). Hence, DFA is applied to panel but not 
cross-section data. By using a panel data set (i.e. repeated observation of each firm over a 
period of time), the estimation of efficiency is determined as the difference between each 
firm’s residual and the average firm on the frontier (Fries and Taci, 2005). DFA can be 
estimated as follows (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000): 
                                (2.15) 
where       is the logarithm of cost of the i-th firm at time t,      is the vector of output 
levels of the i-th firm at time t,      is the vector of prices of variable inputs of the i-th firm 
at time t,     represents the set of parameters to be estimated,     is the error term of i-th firm 
at t. 
De Young (1997) states that the statistical properties of DFA are intuitive, apply few 
arbitrary assumptions, and are easy to apply. It also avoids possible endogeneity
38
 of prices 
while providing efficiency estimates. DFA also supports economic interpretations that are 
comparable to those from a cost and profit frontier (Adams et al., 1999). However, the 
primary drawback of DFA is the requirement of time-invariant cost efficiency (i.e. constant 
through time and no consideration of technological change) where this assumption becomes 
less plausible as time increases. Hence, it is possible that inefficient firms turn into efficient 
firms as time passes (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
2.5 Functional Forms 
As discussed above, a functional form is required for parametric models, particularly for 
cost and profit efficiency. The functional form is used to estimate the relationship between 
the dependent and explanatory variables. For example, cost is expressed as a function of 
input prices and outputs (i.e. tc=f(w,y), where tc is total cost, w is the input price and y is 
output), and profit is expressed as function of input price and output price (i.e. tp=f(w,q); 
where tp is total profit, w is input prices and q is output prices). Coelli et al. (2005) suggest 
                                                 
38
 A variable is said to be endogenous should there be a correlation between the variable and error term, in 
which arise from several factors such as measurement errors and omitted variables. 
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that several factors are considered when choosing functional forms, namely flexibility, 
linear in parameters, regularity and parsimony
39
. Thus, the estimations from parametric 
models could lead to different results as a consequence of the choice of the functional form. 
The most common functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas, transcendental-logarithm 
(translog), and the Fourier-Flexible functional form are discussed in the following 
subsections. 
2.5.1 Cobb-Douglas Functional Form 
In 1928, Charles Cobb and Paul Douglas published a study on American economic growth 
between 1899 and 1926. The authors considered a simplified view of an economy in which 
output is determined by the amount of labour involved and the capital invested. The Cobb-
Douglas function can be described in the following logarithm form: 
 
          ∑         
 
   
 ∑        
 
   
 (2.16) 
where      is the logarithm of total cost,     is the vector price of input of the i-th firm,     
is the vector price of the i-th output level, and          are the parameters to be estimated, 
representing the cost elasticities of the output and input prices. ∑   
 
      indicates that the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form is homogeneous of degree 1 in input prices. This 
homogeneity restriction in the cost function suggests that an increase in input prices can 
result in a proportional increase in total cost (this homogeneity restriction is consistent with 
the production function’s properties discussed in section 2.2.1.)  
This function is easy to estimate and interpret compared to other functional forms (e.g 
translog and Fourier-Flexible functional forms). However, the primary drawback of the 
                                                 
39
 Coelli et al. (2005) state that, first, a functional form can be divided into first-order and second-order flexible. 
The second-order flexible is normally preferred as it provides second order approximation, which can be used 
in measuring scale economy and changes in technology. Nonetheless, increased flexibility has its drawbacks, 
such as more parameters to estimate, which can contribute to issues such as multicollinearity and reduced 
degrees of freedom (Chambers, 1988). Second, the parameters should be agreeable to the linear regression 
techniques, particularly to measure causality via coefficients of the unknown parameters. Third, the functional 
form should satisfy the economic regularity properties, and fourth, the functional form should be parsimonious. 
That is, the functional form is adequate for the estimation of efficiency (Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak, 1978). 
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Cobb-Douglas function is that it is a first-order approximation; hence a constant value for 
elasticity of scale exists, making it impossible to test different values of economies of scale 
(Coelli et al., 2005).
40
 Consequently, this inflexible property of the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form has caused it to be used rarely to estimate cost and profit efficiency (Coelli, et al., 
2005). 
2.5.2 Translog Functional Form 
One of the most widely employed functional forms is the translog (transcendental 
logarithmic) production function (Berger and Mester 1997; Bauer et al. 1998; Bos and Kool 
2006; Fu and Heffernan 2007). Unlike the Cobb-Douglas cost function (i.e. linear 
homogeneity restrictions are implemented on the first-order approximation), the translog 
functional form provides a second-order approximation and allows economies of scale to 
vary with the output level (Coelli et al., 2005). This specification allows for the necessary 
flexibility when estimating the frontier function (Bos and Kool 2009). The translog function 
imposes few restrictions on the first-order and second-order effects at the same time. It 
provides a second-order logarithmic approximation to an arbitrary continuous 
transformation surface (Coelli et al. 2005; Kaparakis et al. 1994). Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) state that the translog function provides a better fit to the frontier which envelops the 
Cobb-Douglas specification. The general model of the translog cost function can be 
expressed as: 
                                                 
40
 The Cobb-Douglas function assumes that any change in output will result in a change in total cost by a 
constant number   , which indicates the constant elasticity of total cost, as shown by first-order derivatives  
     
     
    ∑        
 
   . Additionally, the time trend is implicitly assumed to be constant in the Cobb-
Douglas functional form which may not reflect the effect of technological advances, which often cause 
economic relationships (production function) to change over time (Coelli et al., 2005).  
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(2.17) 
where       is the logarithm of total cost of i-th firm at time t,        is the logarithm of the 
outputs for the i-th bank at time  ;  ln     is the natural logarithm for the input price vectors 
for i-th bank at time  ; and                          are parameters to be estimated. 
Since the duality theorem requires that the cost function is linearly homogenous in input 
prices, and that parameters of second-order partial derivatives are symmetric, the following 
restrictions have to be imposed on the parameters of the translog function form: 
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    (2.18) 
However, as noted in some studies (for example Berger and Mester 1997), the translog 
function is not free from weaknesses. McAllister and McManus (1993) and Mitchell and 
Onvural (1996) show that there are ill-fitting data in the translog function, particularly in 
measuring scale economies.
41
 They further iterate that the translog functional form may not 
fit well with data that are far from the mean in terms of output size, which can result in a 
specification bias that contributes a false conclusion concerning scale economies (Berger 
and Mester, 1997). Despite its limitations, the translog functions are widely used due to their 
flexibility and their forecasting capability when compared to other functional forms 
(Altunbas and Chakaravarty, 2001).  
                                                 
41
 Translog form uses the Taylor series of expansion method (a mathematical technique used to expand a 
function in a point) that is approximated from a Cobb-Douglas function (Mitchell and Onvural, 1996). The 
expansion point in the translog function is the mean of the variables to be extended (i.e. C, y and w). Hence, 
the translog functional form is a locally flexible form, where the cost function does not fit all the data to the 
greatest possible extent. 
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2.5.3 Fourier Flexible Functional Form 
The Fourier-Flexible (FF) functional form was first proposed by Gallant (1981). It derived 
from two main components: the first is the standard translog function, and the second the 
trigonometric Fourier series. These two components are dependent on each other, where the 
linear combination of sine and cosine of the variables is used to estimate the translog 
functional form. The FF functional form has mathematical and statistical properties with an 
infinite Fourier series capable of representing any function in its entire range. When using 
the FF form, one avoids holding any maintained hypothesis by allowing the data to reveal 
the true cost function through a large value of fitted parameters (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Therefore, FF is independent of arbitrary and restrictive functional forms (Huang and Wang, 
2002).  
As mentioned earlier, the translog function may not fit well with data far from the mean of 
output size. Thus, the FF functional form overcomes this problem with better approximation 
across a broad range of outputs by incorporating additional parameters for the Fourier 
trigonometric terms (Girardone et al., 2004).
42
 However, additional parameters and 
trigonometric terms can give rise to a couple of problems. First, with trigonometric terms, 
for the FF function to hold it requires a larger sample of observations (i.e. higher degree of 
freedom) and, second, the additional parameters can give rise to multicollinearity issues in 
estimating the parameters of the model specification (Chambers, 1988; Coelli et al., 2005, 
Fu and Haffernan, 2007). Huang and Wang (2002) state that the FF form has not attracted 
much attention compared to the translog form in efficiency studies, due to the technical 
difficulties in constructing and estimating it.
43
 They further argue that most of the studies 
utilising the FF form failed to incorporate allocative inefficiency into their statistical model, 
which can increase the potential for specification error. 
                                                 
42
 Wheelock and Wilson (2001) argue that there is an unresolved statistical problem for the FF functional form 
regarding the supplement of the translog function, as to whether to employ either trigonometric terms or 
orthogonal polynomials. Additionally, the number of terms that should be included for estimation is an 
unresolved problem for the FF functional form. 
43
 Nevertheless, Berger and Mester (1997) discovered that few differences are noted between the FF and 
translog functional forms. The improvement in goodness of fit from using the FF functional form appears to be 
small. That is, both functional forms yield a similar average level and dispersion of measured efficiency. These 
functional forms rank the individual firms in almost the same order. 
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2.6 Is There a Best Frontier Approach? 
As seen from the earlier discussion, the measurement of efficiency through frontier 
estimation can be divided into two main techniques: parametric and nonparametric. These 
techniques differ from one another in terms of functional form and random noise (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). The key advantage of a parametric approach is its ability to separate 
random error into inefficiency and noise (Coelli et al., 2005). However, parametric requires 
the specification of functional form and distribution assumptions on random error, which 
could influence the shape of the efficient frontier and the distribution of the residuals. 
Nevertheless, the restriction properties imposed on the functional form might result in 
misspecification errors. Hence, any misspecification of the functional form will result in an 
overestimation or under estimation of the efficiency score measurement (Berger and Mester, 
1997; Ramanathan, 2003). Apart from the functional form utilised in the parametric 
approach, the arbitrary assumption on the distribution probability of the error term could 
also affect the efficiency scores. Greene (1990) found that different assumptions imposed on 
the error term can generate different efficiency scores.
44
 Therefore, the nonparametric 
approach prevents misspecification errors by not placing a priori functional form in the 
measurement of efficiency. However, the nonparametric approach is unable to separate 
residuals (noise) into random errors and inefficiency components, where all deviation from 
the frontier is considered as inefficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). With the random error being 
assumed as managerial inefficiency, any errors in one of the observations that lie on the 
efficient frontier may influence the structure of the frontier (i.e. alter the measured 
efficiency of all the observations that are compared to this observation) and consequently 
result in biased efficiency scores (Coelli et al., 2005). In terms of inefficiency scores, since 
the nonparametric approach assumes the random error as inefficiency, it is expected that 
inefficiency for the nonparametric approach will be greater relative to parametric models 
(Coelli et al., 2005). In the case of the US banking industry, Berger and Mester (1997) 
found that nonparametric approaches have lower efficiency means compared to the 
                                                 
44
 Greene (1990) examines 123 US electric utility companies using the stochastic frontier analysis mainly to 
test the gamma distribution assumption; they compare it against three different types of distribution 
assumptions, namely the half-normal, exponential and truncated normal distribution. From the results, Greene 
found that the different assumptions generate different means of inefficiency scores: gamma 0.1051, half-
normal 0.1234, truncated normal 0.1039, and exponential 0.0989. 
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parametric approaches. Nevertheless, Ferrier and Lovell (1990), on the other hand, reports 
that higher efficiency is exhibited by the DEA (nonparametric approach) compared to the 
SFA translog model (parametric approach) due to DEA being sufficiently flexible to 
envelop the data more closely than the SFA translog, which has a second-order 
approximation flexibility. 
As discussed earlier, both approaches have relative advantages and disadvantages and it is 
difficult to reach agreement on which approach generates better efficiency scores (Bauer et 
al., 1998). Berger and Humphrey (1997) also state that, there is no consensus as to the 
preferred method for determining the best-practice frontier against which relative 
efficiencies are measured. Thus, Bauer et al. (1998) suggest that consensus on which is the 
best single frontier approach to measure efficiencies should not be sought. Instead, they 
recommend a set of consistency conditions as a checking device when two or more 
methodologies are employed.
45
 These consistency conditions are deemed to be useful for 
both regulators and decision makers. The consistency conditions proposed by Bauer et al. 
(1998) are as follows: 
1. The efficiency scores from different approaches should have comparable means, 
standard deviations and other distributional properties. 
2. The different approaches should rank the firms in the same order based, on their 
efficiency scores. 
3. The different approaches should be able to cluster similar firms in both a best-practice 
and worst-practice category. 
4. The efficiency approaches should remain reasonably stable across different time 
intervals. 
5. Efficiency scores from different approaches should reflect the market’s competitive 
conditions. 
                                                 
45
 Resti (1997) suggests that between parametric and nonparametric models, the parametric model should be 
considered as an ‘ideal benchmark’. On the other hand, the nonparametric model should be employed as 
‘empirical observable alternative’, because of its high tolerance towards scant data populations and extreme 
sizes. 
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6. The measured efficiencies from different approaches should be consistent with non-
frontier performance indicators, for example return on assets or a cost to earnings ratio.  
It was suggested by Bauer et al. (1998) that, if all six conditions are met for the different 
methodologies applied, one can be more confident in drawing up regulatory policy 
conclusions based on the results.
46
 
2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the relationship between economic theory and the firm’s internal efficiency 
was discussed using various theoretical ideas presented in the literature. The internal 
efficiency of the firm can be influenced by different market structures. The basic 
underpinning assumption regarding the market has been that of firms which are operating to 
maximise profits. In addition, firms are expected to operate efficiently. If not, they will be 
eliminated from the market. Market theory emphasises that market structures such as 
monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly can be imperfect due to market power, 
particularly in setting their prices above the competitive level. The firms with greater market 
power may exhibit a lower level of efficiency due to not working as hard to maximise 
profits. The market structure theory intends to explain how the market works, rather than the 
internal operation of the firm. Hence, alternative theories such as agency, managerial-
discretion, sales revenue maximisation, growth maximisation, the behavioural theory of firm, 
and X-efficiency are introduced to challenge neoclassical theories. These alternative 
theories are helpful to this chapter, as it presents the rationale why some firms operate 
inefficiently and do not seek to maximise profit.  
Additionally, this chapter provides the methods for estimating the efficiency of the firm. 
The relationship between inputs and outputs within the production function is discussed, 
particularly regarding optimising behaviours, such as minimising cost and maximising 
profits. The relative (not absolute) estimation of efficiency is discussed. From relative 
                                                 
46
 Nevertheless, Bauer et al. (1998) generate mixed evidence and are unable to draw a policy conclusion based 
on the six consistency conditions proposed. For the first three conditions, they found that parametric and 
nonparametric approaches were not mutually consistent. However, within the group of parametric and 
nonparametric approaches, the results displayed greater consistency with each other. Nonetheless, a possible 
consistency is found in the final three conditions. 
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production efficiency, the input and output orientation of production efficiency, technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency were also discussed. The overall (economic) efficiency 
is a measure of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency; and when both technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency are optimised simultaneously, economic efficiency is 
also maximised, which is consistent with the underlying economic theories which assume 
that firms act to maximise profits. Additionally, this chapter emphasised different types of 
efficiency: technical, allocative, scale, and scope efficiencies. This chapter presents various 
approaches to measuring relative efficiency to estimate the best-practice frontier, namely the 
nonparametric (e.g Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH)), and 
parametric approaches (e.g. Deterministic Frontier Models, Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA), Thick Frontier Analysis (TFA), and Distribution Free Approach (DFA)). The 
parametric approach utilises econometric specifications and requires a functional form and 
an assumption about the error term to measure economic (i.e. cost and profit) efficiency. On 
the other hand, the nonparametric approach relies on mathematical linear programming to 
envelop the actual data, where random error or deviation from the frontier is considered as 
inefficiency. The discussion continued with commonly used functional forms employed in 
parametric models, such as the Cobb-Douglas, translog and Fourier-Flexible functional 
forms.  
In the final part of this chapter, a question relating to nonparametric and parametric 
techniques is presented: “Is there a best frontier method?” This question is valid due to the 
differences in methodology and the assumptions of the approaches. An answer to the 
question of which method is the best has been arguably difficult despite the extensive use of 
both nonparametric and parametric approaches in measuring the efficiency levels of the 
banking industry, in which Bauer et al. (1998) argue that there is no consensus within 
banking research findings as to which approach is better in estimating efficiency scores. 
Thus, the above question is addressed by introducing a number of consistency conditions to 
mediate the differences between parametric and nonparametric approaches. 
The next chapter introduces the importance of frontier analysis in the banking industry. The 
Frontier analysis is used by these policy makers as a tool to benchmark the performance of 
an individual bank against the best-practice banks, to identify sources of inefficiency, and to 
Chapter 2 Theory and Measurement of Production Efficiency 
 
71 
  
provide feedback on policies implemented in the industry, such as capital regulation, 
deregulation of interest rates, removal of geographic restrictions on branching, and mergers 
and acquisitions. The next chapter also discusses and reviews previous banking efficiency 
studies in developed, developing countries and Malaysia in relations to various contextual 
issues such as financial liberalisation, ownership, market structure, size and inherent risks.  
72 
 
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies 
of Banking Efficiency 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the relevant theories of firms and estimation of frontier efficiency 
were discussed. Chapter 2 provided brief information on different approaches that are 
commonly used in estimating efficiency of the firms. The importance of frontier efficiency 
was also discussed in the previous chapter, particularly the benefits received by various 
users such as bank managers and policy makers. As policy makers are interested in the 
performance and conduct of certain industries, this chapter highlights relevant information 
on the importance of the banking sector’s efficiency and related discussions on regulation 
and financial liberalisation. Consequently, this chapter also reviews a number of empirical 
studies on banking efficiency in developed countries, developing countries and Malaysia. A 
number of contextual applications of banking efficiency literature are also discussed; 
relating to financial liberalisation, ownership, market structure, size and risks.  
Section 3.2 introduces the importance of banks for economic development and growth. This 
section discusses the role of the bank as an intermediary that accumulates capital to be 
channelled towards productive uses for encouraging economic growth. In Section 3.3, the 
discussion continues on the relevant theories of financial repression and financial 
liberalisation and common approaches taken by the regulators in liberalising their banking 
industry. Section 3.4 discusses empirical studies of banking efficiency in countries with 
varying economic status (developed and developing countries). Banking efficiency studies 
in Malaysia are also discussed; for example in the context of the Asian financial crisis and 
financial liberalisation (e.g. the Financial Sector Master Plan). Based on the above, Figure 
3.1 displays the information flow of Chapter 3 (Empirical Studies of Bank Efficiency). 
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Figure ‎3.1 Information Flow of Chapter 3 
 
3.2 The Role of the Banking Sector in Economic Growth and Development 
A bank is a financial intermediary whose main activity is to provide loans to borrowers and 
collect deposits from savers. In this case, financial intermediation refers to borrowing by the 
deficit units (i.e. borrowers) from banks rather than directly from the surplus units (i.e. 
savers) themselves. That is, financial intermediation is a process that consists of savers 
depositing funds with the financial intermediary (i.e. the banks) who then lend it to 
borrowers (Hellwig, 1991; Matthews and Thompson, 2005; Casu et al., 2006). The utility 
function of borrowers and lenders differs in several ways (e.g. size transformation, maturity 
transformation and risk transformation) (Casu et al., 2006). For instance, borrowers often 
require large quantities of funds and on the other hand, lenders normally have smaller 
amounts of surplus funds; which indicates that the capacity of lenders is generally lower 
than the size required by borrowers. Thus, the banks can bridge the gap and reconcile the 
needs and objectives of both borrowers and lenders by performing the ‘size transformation’ 
function, where the bank pools a number of deposits and parcels them to be lent in larger 
sums (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Matthews and Thompson, 2005; Casu et al., 2006).  
In another example, savers may also want to have access to their funds during an emergency, 
and are wary of being short of liquidity. Since banks normally face a maturity mismatch in 
their assets and liabilities (i.e. they borrow short and lend long), the bank has to carry a 
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‘maturity transformation’ function. In overcoming the savers’ concern, banks can offer 
savers safety and liquidity for their deposited funds; and place risks where they are best 
yielded, such as in loans and investments (Rajan and Zingales, 2001; Matthews and 
Thompson, 2005; Casu et al., 2006). In addition, the bank also faces default and pricing 
risks from funds lent to borrowers. In ensuring that savers’ funds are safe, the bank has to 
perform a ‘risk transformation’ function; this can be done by diversifying investments, 
controlling risks, and screening and monitoring borrowers, as well as holding adequate 
capital and reserves as a buffer against unexpected losses (Beck and Levine, 2004; 
Matthews and Thompson, 2005; Casu et al., 2006).  
Therefore, with a ‘coalition’ of savers and borrowers, the banking institutions help to 
minimise the costs associated with direct lending, particularly on transaction costs and other 
costs derived from information asymmetries
47
 through economies of scale or economies of 
scope in the transaction technology (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). By reducing transaction 
costs and asymmetric information, banks continue to allocate resources to productive uses 
within an uncertain environment (Stoughton, 1993; Merton and Bodie, 1995). As mentioned 
before, the variety of services provided by the banks is in contrast to the direct finance 
system (Hellwig, 1991), where the role of banks has now expanded and become more 
complex by performing additional roles such as brokerage services, trade financing and 
securitisation (Casu et al., 2006).
48
  
Consequently, the banking sector is identified as one of the major contributors to a country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Beck and Levine, 2004; Hassan et al, 2007). The banking 
sector promotes the productivity and output of a country in several ways; for example, the 
banking sector increases the savings rate and capital allocation, improves the liquidity of 
investments, facilitates portfolio diversification, supports the real economy and eases the 
impact of external shocks (Beck and Levine, 2004). Levine (1997) and Zingales and Rajan 
                                                 
47
 Asymmetric information exists in a situation where one party in a transaction has superior information 
compared to another. Asymmetric information normally results in adverse selection and moral hazards. 
Nevertheless, with increasing advances in technology, asymmetric information is on declining trend, where 
users can access relevant information using various communication technologies such as the Internet. 
48
 Levine (1997) grouped these various functions of banks into: (1) savings mobilisation, (2) risk management, 
(3) acquiring information on investment opportunities, (4) monitoring borrowers and corporate control, and (5) 
facilitating transactions of goods and services. 
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(2001) assert that, as intermediary institutions, banks promote economic growth through 
capital accumulation.
49
 The banks accumulate savings to be channelled into productive 
activities such as lending to deserving entrepreneurs to introduce new products, and promote 
technology as a catalyst for economic growth (Schumpeter, 1912; McKinnon, 1973). At the 
same time, banks can benefit from the lower cost of funds from lenders (savers) and transfer 
this low cost to borrowers (e.g. entrepreneurs and innovators) (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973).  
Savers and bank customers require investment information to make decisions. The 
information if collected individually entails a higher cost, a longer time, a lengthier process 
and requires good analytic skills. Hence, the banks can address these problems by collecting 
and processing the investment information; subsequently, the cost is distributed to/among 
customers (Millon and Thakor, 1985; Stoughton, 1993). As an intermediary, the information 
collected by the banks can address the issues of information asymmetries such as adverse 
selection and moral hazard.
50
 The information held by the banks can also be utilised to 
determine lending and investment decisions. Consequently, banks will monitor the 
performance of the projects as well as exercising corporate control (Bencivenga and Smith, 
1991). Banks can also perform portfolio diversification from their scale of operation; in 
which investors/savers are supplied with a wider range of returns that meet their risk 
appetite. Moreover, by diversifying the loan and investment portfolio, the bank can make 
the cost of delegation and monitoring as small as possible and offer close to risk-free 
deposits (Diamond, 1984; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Hence the existence of banks could 
satisfy the marginal utility of savers and stimulate real investment in a country (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1997). Another key activity of the bank is to facilitate economic transactions. 
Banks provide faster and cheaper mechanisms for receiving and making payments, such as 
                                                 
49
 This is consistent with Levine (1997), who states that the banking sector affects economic growth in two 
ways, namely through capital allocation and through technological innovation. The banks will pool all the 
savings for capital accumulation and reallocate savings into different capital-producing technologies. Thus, 
allocating capital to innovations can result in a competitive price of supply, which in return will give rise to 
greater competition in the market structure (Merton and Bodie, 2004).  
50
 Adverse selection refers to a market process of producing an undesirable result due to imperfect information 
between lenders and borrowers. In addition, moral hazard refers to the risk that a party to a transaction has not 
entered into the contract in a good faith. For example, a person may provide misleading information about its 
assets, liabilities or credit capacity to secure a loan or advances from the bank (Boyd et al., 2002). 
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payment systems, remittance services and automated teller machines, to promote 
productivity gains, technological innovation and economic growth (Levine, 1997).  
The discussion above summarises the significant roles of the banking system in promoting 
economic growth. In general, the banking system could lead to a more efficient utilisation of 
funds and improve the availability of funds to higher-risk and innovative ventures in order 
to promote economic growth and development in a country (Casu et al., 2006). Apart from 
mobilising funds, banks are imperative to economic growth by executing monetary policy, 
assessing markets’ emerging risks and providing payment services. The importance of 
banking institutions for economic growth and stability suggests that banking institutions 
should be regulated (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Nevertheless, past literature shows that 
heavy regulation of banking institutions may impair economic growth. Thus, suitable and 
effective liberalisation initiatives are needed to address the financial repression of the 
banking sector. Moreover, financial liberalisation can also result in the higher efficiency of 
banks (Girardone et al., 2004), which, subsequently can result in greater economic growth 
(an increase in GDP) (Hassan et al, 2007; Ferreira, 2012). Therefore, the next section will 
briefly discuss the impact of government intervention on the banking sector. 
3.3 Government Intervention in the Banking Sector 
As mentioned earlier, the financial intermediation of banks provides capital accumulation 
and the allocation of funds to promote economic growth. The banking sector influences the 
social, economic and political landscape of a country in which the government and the 
private sector have substantial roles to play (McKinnon, 1973). McKinnon (1973) argues 
that the government should provide adequate regulation of financial services to support the 
private sector’s operations. The government should also conduct constant reviews of current 
regulation and deregulation in order to achieve the ideal regulation of the market. 
Deregulation or financial liberalisation does not mean all legal restrictions should be 
removed; rather it should result in a comprehensive and stable set of policies and regulations 
that promote market efficiency (Shaw, 1973).  
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According to Bhattacharya et al. (1997), theories of modern banking focus on contractual 
obligations of banks as intermediary institutions, relating to areas such as monitoring 
lending, resolving market imperfections, liability contracts with depositors, and problems in 
coordinating contracts (e.g. illiquidity or bank runs). This indicates that the relationship 
between external parties and banks is important for banking sector stability and could 
influence the performance of the banks. Unregulated banking is prone to financial instability 
and can lead to situations such as depositor panics, domino-like collapse, and asset-price 
spirals (Schooner and Taylor, 2010). Therefore, Benston and Kaufman (1996) assert that 
government-imposed regulations are required due to the existence of potential market 
failures. Moreover, if the banking sector fails, it could result in a detrimental impact on the 
real economy (Levine, 1991). Hence, government intervention through regulation can help 
to ensure that the market works efficiently and/or to adjust market outcomes to achieve 
social objectives (Schooner and Taylor, 2010). Schooner and Taylor (2010) and Gart (1994) 
further suggest that there are four market failures that generally form the basis for regulatory 
intervention: (1) the existence of a monopoly, (2) the existence of externalities, (3) the 
existence of information asymmetries, and (4) protecting public goods. These market 
failures are discussed as follows:  
1. The existence of a monopoly  
The existence of a monopoly might promote the market power of one or a few banks, 
which restricts market competition. These banks are likely to raise prices, restrict supply, 
offer poorer services and restrict innovation (Gart, 1994).  
2. The existence of externalities 
The existence of externalities can arise in a situation where the impact of producing 
goods or services can result in costs or benefits to a third party that are not reflected in 
the price. In other words, the costs/benefits are the consequence of economic activity 
which is subsequently experienced by a third party. Externalities can either be positive 
or negative. For example, positive externalities include the production of a commonly 
accepted medium of exchange and storing of value in that exchange. Negative 
externalities, on the other hand, cover activities such as action to prevent bank runs, to 
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avoid economic distress from bank failure, and to reduce costs for prudent banks 
(Khemani, 1990).  
3. The existence of information asymmetries 
Information asymmetries occur when it is assumed that in a well-functioning market, 
buyers and sellers have all the information needed to evaluate competing products and 
services, and consequently make well-informed decisions. But, in reality, due to 
bounded rationality, information is limited and can be priced, just like any other 
commodity. For example, a party involved in a transaction may deliberately seek to 
mislead another party by giving false information or failing to disclose key facts (Boyd 
et al., 2002).  
4. Protecting Public Goods 
Public goods are described as products that one individual can consume without 
reducing their availability to another individual. Thus, public goods are referred as ‘non-
rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’. Due to the nature of non-rivalry and non-excludability, 
it is difficult for producers to charge for public goods. In the context of banking, 
financial stability is seen as a public good and consequently adequate regulations and a 
safety net (e.g. deposit insurance) are required (Gart, 1994).  
In many developing countries, banking institutions face the prudential regulations and 
restrictions of regulators who are mandated to promote stability, resilience and a sound 
financial system. The soundness of the banks can influence the financial landscape and 
infrastructure as well as macroeconomic performance and monetary policy in many 
developing countries. Thus, regulators are paying increasing attention to monitoring the 
health and efficiency of banking institutions and financial markets, and macroeconomic 
developments that may threaten a country’s financial stability (Bertus et al., 2007). Many 
developing countries rely heavily on prudential regulation to control banks’ excessive risk 
taking, and mitigate moral hazard and bank failure. Such failure is a costly event, which 
increases contagion risk
51
 and can collapse an economic system (Pettway, 1980). In view of 
                                                 
51
 Contagion risk in this context refers to the financial difficulties faced by a bank that spill over to a larger 
number of banks in the financial system or even to the financial system as a whole. 
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this significant effect, the government intervenes in banks’ operations and imposes 
‘financial repression’ 52  through banking regulations, on areas relating to the minimum 
capital requirement, the establishment of new banks, an interest rate ceiling/floor, lending 
direction, standards of risk management, directed lending, the qualifications of directors and 
managers, and organisational governance (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1995; 
Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; Bertus et al., 2007). These regulations and restrictions are 
implemented to protect banking consumers from the consequences of potential bank failures. 
Apart from mitigating bank failures, regulations are employed to prevent monopoly power, 
which can restrict competition and could result in excessive pricing (Schooner and Taylor, 
2010).
53
 Additionally, regulations imposed on banking institutions can also minimise the 
potential economic turmoil from economic shocks and financial crises (Caminal and 
Matutes, 2002).  
Excessive financial repression or regulation can result in inefficient capital allocation, high 
cost of financial intermediation and lower rates of returns to savers, which can impede 
economic growth (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Heavy governmental intervention in 
banking activities is also seen as one of the factors that influences lower efficiency and poor 
performance in banks (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalisation is 
introduced to free certain market activities from financial repression (McKinnon, 1973; 
Shaw, 1973).  
Financial liberalisation refers to the government’s initiatives to reduce regulatory 
restrictions in the financial sector and thus increase the participation of private entities. The 
primary reason behind financial liberalisation is to improve market competition, increase the 
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 The concept of financial repression can be inferred from McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and Fry (1995). 
Financial repression normally refers to controls on interest rates, directed lending to government and 
restrictions on entry into financial industry. Financial repression is deemed as preventing proper capital 
allocation and impairing economic growth. 
53
 However, Stigler (1971) and Barth et al. (2006) state that banking regulation can also be seen as ‘restricting’ 
as well as ‘promoting’. For example, the government can implement a set of policies to promote competition 
in the banking system and concurrently, impose some restrictions preventing large banks from manipulating 
market power to drive smaller banks from the market. In addition, the government can also restrict larger 
banks from exercising excessive pricing, which consequently protects the basic needs of the consumer and the 
public. Therefore, the government needs to perform a balancing act between ‘promotions’ and ‘restriction’ to 
ensure financial stability, soundness and steady economic growth in banking sector (Caminal and Matutes, 
2002).  
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efficiency of banks (i.e. effective resource allocation and output expansion) and improve 
technology and innovation (i.e. Internet banking, payment systems, securitisation and 
financial derivatives) (Hamilton, 1989; Lozano-Vivas, 1997; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). 
Additionally, financial liberalisation is also required for banks to cope with the emergence 
of new challenges in the banking system, such as cross-border banking, a universal banking 
environment, diversified banking activities via fee-based services, competition with 
financial markets, Internet banking, and innovative financial products (e.g. derivative 
products) (Schooner and Taylor, 2010). 
Financial liberalisation requires several preconditions to be successful (Fry, 1995). These 
preconditions are: 
1. Adequate prudential regulation and supervision to support the financial market structure;  
2. A stable monetary policy (a reasonable level of price stability);  
3. Fiscal stability (i.e. avoid excessive government borrowings that can increase 
inflationary expansion and foreign capital inflow);  
4. Highly competitive behaviour in banks, and;  
5. A fair tax system on the banking industry.  
If these conditions are not met, financial liberalisation can result in excessive risk taking by 
banks, high real interest rates, bankruptcies of firms and bank failures (Arestis et al., 2003). 
Apart from the preconditions mentioned above, Dunham and Kelegama (1994) suggest that 
appropriate ‘sequencing’ processes are also required. They suggested three key aspects of 
financial liberalisation (Dunham and Kelegama, 1994):  (1) the speed of implementation, (2) 
the stages involved, and (3) the order of liberalisation initiatives.
54
 In addition, Abiad and 
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 First, In terms of implementation speed, the government has to consider either implementing liberalisation 
on a gradual basis or as a ‘one-shot’ programme. Second, the speed of financial liberalisation depends on the 
political consequences, microeconomic situations, income distributions and protection of the banking industry. 
Second, Financial liberalisation involves several key stages, for example, the removal of protection requires 
robust banking regulation and the strengthening of weaker banks. Third, Financial liberalisation requires an 
appropriate order of liberalisation of varying markets such as commodities, labour and financial markets, to 
attain a fully liberalised financial industry. A proper ‘sequencing’ process can support market order for a 
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Moody (2005) suggest six policy dimensions for implementing financial liberalisation on 
the banking system, namely (1) credit controls, (2) interest rate controls, (3) entry barriers, 
(4) operational restrictions, (5) privatisation and (6) international financial transactions;
55
 
and based on these six broad dimensions, Fry (1995) suggests that several specific 
liberalisation initiatives can be implemented by the government. For example, the initiatives 
include but are not limited to removing the interest rate ceiling on deposits and loans, 
removing barriers to foreign exchange transactions, allowing foreign banks’ entry, 
promoting branch expansion and removing government-directed lending policy. 
Financial liberalisation can result in increased market competition and improved operational 
practice and efficiency of the banks; Molyneux et al. (1996) state that the general public will 
benefit from increased competition in the banking system. Greater market competition can 
result in lower interest costs and a wider choice of banking providers as well as a broader 
range of banking products and services for the general public to enjoy. Common methods of 
achieving increased competition in the banking system via financial liberalisation are: (1) 
the deregulation of interest rates and (2) the removal of entry barriers to foreign banks.  
First, Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argue that a banking system that is undergoing 
financial repression from government-controlled interest rates can discourage savings and 
investments. Similar to product prices, the interest rate performs a rationing function by 
allocating a limited supply of credit to borrowers who demand and compete for it. 
Recognising the importance of banks for intermediation and monetary policy transmission 
functions, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) posit that financial repression can distort 
actual interest rate equilibrium, and may not reflect the demand and supply of funds of the 
market players. They further argue that, if the government-controlled interest rate ceiling 
results in low or negative real interest rates, savings in banking institutions will also decline 
                                                                                                                                                     
smooth transition to a more liberalised market. In other words, liberalisation initiatives should be managed 
rather than adopting a ‘laissez-faire’ or free market approach (Arestis, 2005).  
 
55
 For example, first, the policy relating to credit controls refers to lending directed by the government towards 
several sectors and high capital adequacy requirements. Second, interest rate controls refer to government 
controls on the interest rate’s ceilings, floors or bands. Third, entry barriers are described through licensing 
requirements and limiting the entry of foreign banks. Fourth, operational restrictions can be from the 
perspectives of staffing, branching and advertising. Fifth, privatisation refers to specific privatisation of 
government-owned financial institutions, and sixth, international transactions refer to capital and current 
account inflows (Abiad and Moody, 2005).  
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(as savers and investors will move to alternative products: for example, the stock market, 
property or direct lending), which will subsequently lead to fewer loans being mobilised 
through the banking system (Gart, 1994). Thus, by addressing this issue the government can 
therefore encourage savings and investments and increase market competition by removing 
the government-controlled interest rate and delegating power to the market players 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1995). For example, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) examined the effect of deregulating the interest rate on individual financial systems 
in developing countries and reported that interest rates in these countries shifted towards a 
more competitive market equilibrium (this positive effect exists mainly because the power 
of setting interest rates is given to the market players). They believed that deregulation of 
interest rates is required for a country’s economic growth and development, in which the 
banking system would become more competitive and inefficiency could be removed from 
the banks (Berger and Mester, 2003). Moreover, by removing the government-controlled 
interest rate ceiling, the government could encourage savings, improve monetary policy 
transmissions, enhance product innovativeness, and improve the allocation of resources in 
the banking system, subsequently supporting the real growth of the national economy 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). However, the drawback of removing the interest rate 
ceiling is that it can also result in unhealthy pricing competition, inefficiency in banks, asset 
and liability mismatches, and the possibility of innovative products that are not easily 
understood (e.g. asset-backed securities and derivatives products) (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detrigiache, 1999; Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998). 
Second, financial liberalisation can be made by removing entry barriers against foreign 
banks entering the domestic market. Unite and Sullivan (2003) suggested that the removal 
of restrictions on the entry of foreign parties could be made through (1) allowing foreign-
controlled banks to enter the domestic banking system and (2) promoting and allowing 
foreign ownership of equity in domestic banks. The removal of restrictions on foreign banks 
and foreign ownership in domestic banks could provide a positive impact on the banking 
industry. First, it could reduce the monopoly of certain domestic banks. Second, domestic 
banks could improve their cost management and allocate resources efficiently with the 
introduction of competitive pressure from foreign banks (De Young and Nolle, 1996). And 
third, foreign banks, particularly from developed countries, would bring in and introduce 
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advanced technologies, the latest operational methods, financial innovations and new 
managerial practices. Eventually, this new knowledge would spill over into the domestic 
market, either through competitive observations or the mobilisation of human capital within 
the banking system (Levine, 1996; Goldberg, 2003). De Young and Nolle (1996) suggest 
that, with the removal of entry barriers to foreign banks, domestic banks have to strive 
harder, realising that they are no longer protected by local regulators, which results in an 
increasingly efficient banking system. Despite many positive outcomes, there are also 
several drawbacks that can impact the domestic market with the introduction of foreign 
competitors: (1) a lower franchise value in domestic banks; (2) imbalanced concentration of 
lending sectors by foreign and domestic banks, (3) increased potential instability of the 
domestic banks; and (4) different objectives of foreign banks at odds with domestic market 
priorities (Hellmann et al., 2000; Bayraktar and Wang, 2004).
56
  
An increasingly competitive market structure stemming from financial liberalisation may 
result in the higher efficiency of firms, reduced managerial slack and improved productivity 
(see Chapter 2). For example, Gart (1994) states that the positive impacts of financial 
liberalisation on banks has induce management to reduce their operating expenses by 
making improvements in computer technology and has led management to replace labour 
with automation. With this automation, banking institutions focus more on portfolio 
management and shift from ‘relationship’ banking to ‘risk-pricing’ banking, which can 
improve the time management of banks. Additionally, financial liberalisation also forces the 
banks to seek new ways to increase revenues; managers have to expand and diversify 
business into non-asset-based fee income and may also charge for services that used to be 
free (Gart, 1994, Goldberg, 2003). Nevertheless, financial liberalisation can also lead to an 
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 First, the disadvantages of opening the market to foreign competitors might include a lower franchise value 
in domestic banks, in which domestic banks may have the incentive and appetite to take on higher risks to 
compete with foreign banks. For example, large foreign international banks with greater reputations and 
stronger network linkages would generally have better access to cheaper funds (from retail deposits, the 
interbank market or the global money market) compared to domestic banks. On the other hand, domestic banks 
would have to incur higher costs for funds compared to foreign banks, which could result in a lower franchise 
value. Second, armed with more advanced products and services, foreign banks may practise ‘cherry picking’, 
by selecting the most profitable segments of the market and leaving behind the riskier sectors to be served by 
the domestic banks. Third, the domestic banking market will also face potentially greater instability from 
foreign banks pulling out, particularly when foreign banks face economic turmoil either in the host or in their 
home country. Fourth, the objectives of the domestic banking market may not be achieved due to differences 
in priorities and the business focus of foreign banks, in which their lending pattern tends to ignore domestic 
priorities (Hellmann et al., 2000; Bayraktar and Wang, 2004). 
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adverse impact on banking institutions’ profitability. For instance, the average cost of bank 
retail deposits may increase after the deregulation of the interest rate due to industry 
competition for cheaper funds, which in turn can narrow their profit margins and slow 
growth (Gart, 1994, Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). Consequently, with greater 
freedom in the market and the aim of maximising profits, banks are more likely to invest in 
higher-risk products (e.g. derivative products and high yield notes) (Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 
1998). 
3.4 Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency 
As mentioned in chapter 2, neoclassical theory assumes that all firms have the objective of 
maximising profit. However, several alternative theories and hypotheses of the firm (e.g. 
agency theory, managerial theory, behavioural theory and the relative market power 
hypothesis) argue with this view, as profit maximisation is not reflected in the behaviour of 
firms. These alternative theories provide a background for empirical analysis of potential 
sources of inefficiency, particularly internal bank-specific characteristics (e.g. ownership, 
risk and bank type) and external environmental factors (e.g. market structure, financial 
liberalisation and economic growth). These explanatory factors also become the foundation 
for investigating various contextual topics, which inform and provide feedback on 
government policies. This can be evidenced from Berger and Humphrey (1997), who 
performed a survey of 130 frontier analysis studies in 21 countries. The motivation of their 
study was to find the common themes and issues relating to banking efficiency studies, one 
of which is to inform government policy. Consequently, in terms of economic status, the 
banking efficiency literature is dominated by studies from developed countries such as the 
US and Western Europe. On the other hand, studies of banking efficiency from developing 
and transitional countries, including Malaysia, are limited. Nevertheless, the increasing 
interest in developing countries is attributable to various changes occurring in the banking 
industry over the last two decades, such as the globalisation of financial markets, financial 
liberalisation, market reform, privatisation, financial crisis and technological advancement. 
Hence, banking efficiency studies in developing countries may show different results 
compared to developed countries, providing greater insight into the banking systems of 
developing countries. In view of the dissimilarities in the results from countries of different 
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economic status, the following sections review empirical banking efficiency studies in: 
developed countries, developing countries and Malaysia. These studies were applied in 
various contexts; for example deregulation, ownership, market structure, size and inherent 
risk. 
3.4.1 Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency in Developed Countries 
Earlier studies of banking efficiency concentrated on US banks. However, most of these 
studies focused on the scale and scope of banks’ efficiency, rather than on the efficiency 
frontier estimations. These methods were questioned. Berger and Humphrey (1991) asserted 
that the scale and scope of efficiency is a secondary concern. They further suggested that the 
efficiency frontier should be employed primarily to reflect the banks’ cost and profit-
efficiencies.
57
 As a result, since the early 1990s frontier analysis has increasingly been 
employed to measure the efficiency of banks (see Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Berger, 1991, 
1992; Berger et al., 1993). Frontier analysis is also extensively used to explain the 
progression of the economy, growth in the banking sector, policy implementations, 
competition in the banking market, as well as the specific characteristics of banks. Therefore, 
a number of common themes/areas associated with government policy in developed 
countries are reviewed in this study, such as (1) financial liberalisation/deregulation, (2) 
ownership, (3) market structure, (4) bank size, and (5) inherent risk.
58
   
First, earlier studies of financial liberalisation and the performance of banks were applied 
using US banking data, which recorded several deregulation events that have taken place 
since the early 1980s. The deregulation initiatives in the US include the lifting of the interest 
rate ceiling (i.e. Marquette vs. First of Omaha, Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
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 This is evidenced by Berger et al. (1993), who surveyed the results of previous studies on scale economies 
of the banking industry, and found that the average cost curve has a relatively flat U-shape. Previous studies 
surveyed by Berger et al. (1993) are more interested in investigating the presence of scale economies rather 
than economic efficiency (e.g. cost/profit efficiency), which assumes that all banks are equally efficient. This 
assumption however does not hold, due to differences in the cost structure among banks (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991). 
58
 Earlier, the discussion on market competition explained the need for financial liberalisation, which can give 
impact to the banks’ risk-taking behaviour, the performance of domestic and foreign banks and market 
concentration by big banks. In the context of this research, explanatory factors (e.g. financial liberalisation, 
market concentration, ownership, bank type, size, risks and time) will be employed as control and 
environmental variables; these variables will be discussed in detail in chapter 5 (‘Methodology and Data’).  
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Monetary Control Act of 1980), allowing interstate branching (i.e. Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) and allowing thrifts (term used in US for 
savings banks) to conduct commercial lending and compete in money market mutual funds 
(i.e. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982) (Humphrey, 1993). Hence, 
studies of the relationship between deregulation and bank efficiency in the US that employ 
frontier analysis were on an increasing trend in the 1990s (e.g. Berger and Humphrey, 1991, 
1992; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; and Berger and Mester, 2003). For example, Berger and 
Humphrey (1991) employed a TFA model on 13,951 insured commercial banks in the US 
using one year’s cross-sectional data (1984) to measure and analyse the inefficiencies of all 
US banks.
59
 They found that the inefficiencies of 19.0% occurred in the state banks were 
operational rather than financial. Based on the decomposition made on the cost components, 
the technical inefficiency derives mainly from the overuse of labour and capital (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). They further suggested that the impact of 
deregulation increases market competition and pressures banks to cut costs substantially in a 
very short period of time.  
The immediate impact of deregulation on banks in a short period of time was also evidenced 
in Berger and Humphrey (1992), who use a parametric TFA model to examine the general 
level of efficiency of large US banks reported in the Federal Reserve’s Functional Cost 
Analysis Program for the years 1980, 1984 and 1988. In this study, 1980 is regarded as the 
pre-deregulation period, 1984 as the mid-deregulation period and 1988 as the post-
deregulation period, by which time adjustments to deregulation may or may not have been 
completed. During this period (1980–1988), US banks underwent substantial deregulation, 
which included the lifting of the interest rate ceiling on certain deposits. Banks therefore 
entered into a phase of significant disequilibrium, where they attempted to adjust their 
interest rates pricing according to market changes and increased competition. The efficiency 
for state banks in 1980, 1984 and 1988 were 74.7%, 80.8% and 73.8%, respectively. The 
efficiency of banks showed some improvement in 1984 but worsened in 1988, indicating 
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 In this study, Berger and Humphrey (1991) introduced TFA to examine the impact of deregulation on the 
efficiency of US banks. They argued that TFA has a benefit over SFA due to less specificity in the maintained 
assumptions, which are less likely to be violated by the data. However, TFA may not provide accurate 
estimates of the general level of overall cost efficiency, which makes it unlikely to be used by management 
and policy makers (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
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that the adjustment process to the new regulated interest rate equilibrium have yet been 
completed. Berger and Humphrey (1992) also found that deregulation in the 1980s had little 
impact on technical change or productivity growth due to the slow response by banks in 
minimising costs in response to the deregulation initiatives.  
This suggests that the banks needed time to adjust to deregulation. For example, Humphrey 
and Pulley (1997) utilised data from 683 US banks between 1977 and 1988 using a 
parametric TFA model to analyse the impact of deregulation on the profitability of US 
banks. They found that banks adjusted both their outputs and inputs by modifying the prices 
of loans and deposits (i.e. the price of outputs) as well as input utilisation of labour and 
capital to minimise the negative impact of deregulation, such as increased funding costs. US 
Banks responded to the deregulation of interest rates in the early 1980s by increasing the 
interest rate of core deposits. This reaction by US banks was made to increase the level of 
core deposits, rather than relying on purchased funds as their sources of funds. In order to 
mitigate the higher cost in core deposits, US banks increased fees for deposit services, 
shifting the asset mix towards a floating ratio, and taking greater asset risk in search for 
higher revenues. Based on their observations, banks responded to deregulation in three main 
stages: cost offsetting and reduction, cost shifting, and revenue augmentation.
60
 Their 
findings suggest that the profit efficiency of banks bore a minimal result in the early phase 
of deregulation between 1977 and 1981 at 12.0% and 1.0% for large and small banks, 
respectively. Consequently, profit efficiency improved after 1981 to 45.0% and 39.0% for 
large and small banks respectively. They concluded that adjustment by banks following 
deregulation can take up to four years to complete (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997).  
As mentioned above, increased profit efficiency can be achieved in a few years after the 
introduction of deregulation. Nevertheless, an increase in profit efficiency may not 
necessarily improve cost efficiency. For example, Berger and Mester (2003) examined the 
performance of US banks in terms of profit and cost efficiency for the years 1984, 1991 and 
1997, which are the years of deregulation of interest rates. Berger and Mester (2003) 
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 For example, cost offseting and reduction refers to the activities of banks in charging more for previously 
low-cost or free services to offset higher deposit interest rates and reducing costs such as branch operating 
costs. Consequently, cost shifting refers to banks’ approach in shifting higher funding costs and interest rates 
to borrowers (via floating rate loans). Finally, revenue augmentation refers to expanding assets portfolios with 
riskier assets that have an expectation of higher returns (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). 
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employed three different economic functions namely, cost, standard profit and alternative 
profit on the TFA model. The standard profit function considers revenue and cost effects in 
both outputs and inputs, which reflects the operation of the banks. Profit maximisation can 
also describe the economic objectives of managers, who take into account both revenues 
and costs (Berger et al., 1993). The standard profit function uses input and output prices for 
the estimation of profit efficiency. On the other hand, alternative profit efficiency is 
computed similarly to profit efficiency except that the output is taken as a total amount 
rather than output prices. The concept of alternative profit is helpful when some of the 
underlying assumptions of cost and standard profit functions are not met (e.g. for firms 
operating within an imperfect competitive market structure with inaccurate output prices) 
(Berger and Mester, 1997).
61
 Based on the TFA model using the Fourier Flexible 
specification, they report that between 1991 and 1997, US banks’ cost productivity 
worsened, but profit efficiency increased significantly. The cost inefficiency annual rate fell 
by 0.3% between 1984 and 1991 but increased by 2.7% between 1991 and 1997. On the 
other hand, standard and alternative profit efficiency registered an increase of annual growth 
by 13.7% and 16.5% respectively. To explain this perplexing finding, Berger and Mester 
(2003) argued that, in a more liberalised environment, banks have been more innovative and 
have offered a variety of products and services to customers, intending to maximise banks’ 
revenue. By doing this, banks are also affected by higher costs, but concurrently increase 
revenue in higher proportion. Additionally, Berger and Mester (2003) also include control 
and environmental variables
62
 in a one-stage approach, and investigate explanatory factors 
such as bank size, inherent risks, market power and mergers. This was performed to include 
the effect of heterogeneity of banks. They found first that larger banks demonstrate higher 
revenues but also suffer from higher operational costs. Second, inherent risks are reduced 
when the performance of profit and cost efficiency is increased, due to shifts in the asset 
mix during the economic boom during the mid-1990s. The shifting of asset mixes from 
securities to loans and other off-balance sheet products has resulted in a greater proportion 
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 These three economic efficiency functions are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
62
 There are two types of explanatory factors that affect inefficiency estimation, namely control variables and 
environmental variables. Control variables are introduced into the specification of a stochastic model to test for 
potential biased results on the output measures of the estimation measurement. On the other hand, 
environmental variables are imputed into the model specification to test the sources of efficiency (Battese and 
Coelli, 1995; Puig-Junoy and Ortun, 2002, Coelli et al., 2005). Failure to control for control and environmental 
variables may result in biased estimates of production frontier and inefficiency scores (Sherlund et al., 2002, 
Bos et al., 2009) (This is discussed in detail in chapter 5). 
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of portfolio returns, which in turn increases the profit- and cost-efficiencies of banks. Third, 
market power has little effect on the performance of banks. This also supports the 
conclusion that the market power from the consolidation exercise (i.e. mergers and 
acquisitions) may not lead to higher efficiency (Berger and Mester, 2003). 
In summary, studies of US banking efficiency show that banks can benefit from banking 
deregulation (e.g. through greater competition, a flexible cost structure, increased profits 
and higher productivity and efficiency). Nevertheless, Berger and Humphrey (1997) state 
that banks require time to adjust their cost and profit structures in the early phase of the 
deregulation. At this phase, banks usually have lower efficiency but subsequently improve 
in later stages as market competition increases stemming from financial liberalisation. 
In another developed country, Spain, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) found that 
deregulation has little impact on the cost efficiency of the bank. The cost efficiency of 
Spanish banks did not improve as a result of deregulation. Furthermore, Vivas (1997) 
investigates the impact of deregulation on the profit efficiency of Spanish savings banks 
from 1986 to 1991. The results from the TFA model showed no significant reduction in the 
profit inefficiency of Spanish banks, which were recorded at 46.0% to 42.0% in 1986 and 
1991, respectively. Vivas (1997) also asserted that Spanish savings banks are favourable to 
forgoing their short-term profit for a further expansion in market share.
63
 In Australia, 
Avkiran (2000) examines the changes in productivity in the retail banking sector from a 
sample of ten Australian banks during the deregulation period 1986–1995. He employed the 
Malmquist productivity index
64
 and found that the total productivity rise was on average 3.2% 
per year. During the deregulation period, the decomposition of total productivity change is 
driven more by technological progress than technical efficiency. This can be explained by 
the greater competition faced by Australian banks from building societies, credit unions and 
mortgages originators during the deregulation period. In view of the greater competition, 
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 Vivas (1997) stated that the impact of deregulation on the banking industry could result in a greater level of 
inherent risk such as a higher potential of loan loss provision, when banks are eager to capture a higher market 
share from liberalisation initiatives.  
64
 Malmquist (1953) introduced a quantity index that refers to the amount by which one consumption bundle 
must be radially scaled in order to generate the same utility level provided by some base consumption bundle. 
The Malmquist quantity index has been applied to the measurement of productivity change, and is normally 
employed using nonparametric linear programming techniques (Griefell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996). 
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Australian banks responded to increased competition through such practices as 
securitisation, product innovation, increase fee-based income and new delivery channels. 
For instance, a re-engineering of retail delivery channels was aimed at improving cost 
efficiency and customer services. These self-service technologies have become tools in 
minimising service delivery costs and were particularly promoted in rural areas, which 
reduce banks’ costs (e.g. costs reduced from not setting up branches in rural areas). Avkiran 
(2000) further suggests that government and regulators can provide incentives to banks, for 
example through tax incentives to encourage banks to innovate and at the same time 
improve the degree of efficiency of the banks.  
Girardone et al. (2004) employed data from 1,958 Italian banks from 1993 to 1996 to 
examine the effect of heterogeneity in Italian banks as well as to identify the characteristics 
of efficient banks. Using the SFA model with a two-stage analysis,
65
 they found that the 
inefficiency of Italian banks ranges between 13.0% and 15.0% of their total costs and the 
inefficiency level reduces over time, indicating that deregulation initiatives introduced in 
1992 by the European Union had produced a positive impact in improving the overall cost 
of the Italian banking industry. Additionally, the impact of deregulation by the European 
Union, which aimed to increase competition by removing the entry barriers to European 
banks, is also analysed by Casu and Girardone (2006). They investigated the impact of 
competition on bank efficiency. The result from Panzar and Rosse model
66
 (H-stats) is 
regressed against efficiency estimation and other explanatory variables. Casu and Girardone 
(2006) found that an efficient banking system might not necessarily result in higher 
competition. They argued that the relationship between competition and efficiency is not 
straightforward as increased competition may force banks to be more efficient but higher 
efficiency may not result in higher competition in the EU banking system.  
                                                 
65
 In the two-stage approach, the first stage estimates the scores of the frontier efficiency using traditional 
inputs and outputs. Consequently, the second stage involves the regression of scores from the first stage with 
the explanatory variables (Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Berger and Hannan, 1997; Bonin et al., 2005). Additionally, 
the one-stage approach includes explanatory variables into the estimation of frontier efficiency (Battese and 
Coelli, 1995; Coelli et al., 2005) (This is discussed in detail in chapter 5). 
66
 Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed a test statistics to distinguish competitive market structure (i.e. perfect 
competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly). The H-statistic test is the sum of elasticities 
of total revenue with respect to input prices. An H-statistic result can be interpreted as follows: if H equals 0 or 
is negative it implies oligopoly or monopoly, or if H equals 1, indicates perfect competition, and between 0 
and 1 (0 < H < 1) implies the monopolistic competition. 
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Therefore, studies in deregulation in the developed countries provide mixed findings. While 
some show a negative impact, there are also many studies that found a positive impact on 
the banking system where bank efficiency improves following the introduction of 
deregulation initiatives (see Girardone et al., 2004; Avkiran, 2000). In addition, deregulation 
in developed countries, for example in the EU, has improved the competition structure in 
the banking system, which in turn has increased the efficiency of the banks (see Casu and 
Girardone, 2006). Nonetheless, deregulation may also cause greater risks to the productivity 
of banks and unhealthy market competition; Vivas (1997) reports that banks forgo a certain 
level of profit in order to gain a bigger market share. This has resulted in a higher level of 
inherent risks, which can lower the profit efficiency of the banks. 
Second, empirical studies regarding ownership (e.g. foreign versus domestic banks) and the 
efficiency level of banks are also discussed in developed countries. The introduction of 
foreign banks is expected to increase competitive pressure on domestic banks. Claessens et 
al. (2001) found that foreign banks are superior to domestic banks in developing countries, 
but the opposite is true in developed countries. Both foreign and domestic banks have their 
own competitive advantages when operating in the banking industry. These circumstances 
can be explained by two alternative hypotheses proposed by Berger et al. (2000), namely the 
‘global advantage hypothesis’ 67  and ‘home field advantage hypothesis’. The ‘global 
advantage hypothesis’ refers to the comparative advantages of foreign banks over domestic 
banks, such as superior managerial competency, the lower cost of capital and operations, 
greater risk management skills, advanced technology, enhanced international knowledge, a 
wider range of services, and superior investment expertise. On the other hand, the ‘home 
advantage hypothesis’ refers to the comparative advantages of domestic banks over foreign 
banks in their home country, such as higher-scale economies and greater business 
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 Berger et al. (2000) proposed two types of global advantage hypothesis, namely the general and the limited 
form. These forms are based on the countries of origin of foreign banks. The general form refers to the 
comparative advantage held by foreign banks regardless of their country of origin. On the other hand, the 
limited form suggests that only certain foreign banks from a particular set of countries can outperform 
domestic banks. 
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knowledge (e.g. domestic banks are conversant with local regulations, culture and 
language).
68
  
The results of previous empirical studies concerning the relationship between foreign and 
domestic banks and bank efficiency present mixed findings. The pattern of previous studies’ 
findings however, shows that most foreign banks display higher efficiency than the 
domestic banks in the developing countries, whereas, in developed countries (e.g. the US 
and Europe), domestic banks normally exhibit higher efficiency than foreign banks (see 
DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Mahajan et al., 1996; Sathye, 2001). 
For example, Berger and De Young (2001) employed a parametric DFA model on 7,000 US 
banks, and reported that foreign banks in the US are less efficient than domestic banks, 
suggesting that international barriers such as language, culture, currency and regulatory 
structures exist within the operations of foreign banks, supporting the ‘home advantage 
hypothesis’. Additionally, De Young and Nolle (1996) studied the US market from 1985 to 
1990, utilising 62 foreign banks using the DFA model. They found that in the US banking 
industry, US-owned banks are more efficient than foreign-owned banks. The profit 
efficiency gap between US banks and foreign banks varies between 3.0% and 10.0%.  
Similarly, Berger et al. (2000) examined the efficiency levels of foreign and domestic banks 
in five countries, namely Germany, Spain, France, the UK and the US. They found foreign 
banks display lower cost and profit efficiency than domestic banks in Germany, France and 
the UK. However, in Spain and the US, either cost or profit efficiency is greater in domestic 
banks. In Spain, domestic banks display higher cost efficiency than foreign banks by 2.1% 
but lower profit efficiency by 5.4%. On the other hand, in the US, domestic banks are more 
profit-efficient than foreign banks by 25.1%, but less cost-efficient by 2.9%. This implies 
that in Spain, the Spanish banks have a slight cost advantage over their foreign rivals; but 
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 There are two perspectives of what makes domestic banks more efficient than foreign banks. First, the 
headquarters of foreign banks may face difficulties in monitoring and evaluating the performance of extended 
entities abroad from a distance. Additionally, due to diseconomies of operations, foreign banks face adversities 
in terms of attracting and sustaining retail customers. Second, domestic banks are protected by inherent market 
barriers such as local culture, language, markets and regulations, making it difficult for foreign banks to 
compete (Berger et al., 2000).  
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having lower costs may hurt Spanish banks by earning less revenue.
69
 In the US, higher 
profit by the domestic banks is likely due to extra spending on efforts to produce a variety of 
financial services that generates substantially greater revenues (Berger et al., 2000). 
Third, as mentioned earlier, greater competition in the banking system can result in a higher 
level of efficiency and financial innovation. In chapter 2, relevant hypotheses regarding 
market structure and behaviour were discussed: the structure–conduct–performance 
hypothesis, the relative market power hypothesis, the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis and the efficient 
structure hypothesis. These hypotheses suggest that banks with greater market concentration 
possess the power to set higher prices and exercise market power (Berger, 1995). With 
insufficient levels of competition, the banks’ management might not control the costs of 
their operations to maximise profits. That is, by possessing such market power, this could 
allow managers to pursue goals other than profit maximisation, and subsequently result in 
cost and profit inefficiencies (Williamson, 1963; Berger and Hannan, 1997). For instance, 
Berger and Hannan (1997) investigated the impact of market structure on the efficiency 
level of banks. They analysed US banks survey data from the Federal Reserve for the years 
1980 to 1989. They found that the relationships of X-efficiency and loan rates, deposits, and 
market concentration were statistically significant (5% significance level), registering 
coefficients of 0.18, -0.47 and -0.12, respectively. The negative relationship between 
concentration and X-efficiency supports the existence of a structure–conduct–performance 
hypothesis. The result also suggests that concentration is negatively related with X-
efficiency and indicates that the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis occurs within the market power 
hypothesis where managers enjoy the current state of affairs and work less than they should 
in order to maximise profits. As discussed earlier in chapter 2, there are two types of market 
structure hypothesis: market-related hypotheses (e.g. relative market power hypothesis, 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis and quiet life hypothesis) and efficient structure 
hypothesis. These hypotheses have policy implications. On the other hand, if market 
concentration is attributed to market power, anti-trust policies may be socially beneficial 
which could force the prices towards competitive levels. If market concentration is driven 
by high efficiency (the efficient-structure hypothesis), anti-trust actions might result in 
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 This may be attributed by poor investment coices, poor risk diversification (low risks may result in low 
expected returns), or/and poor service quality (e.g. skimping on expenditures necessary to monitot and service 
customers) (Berger et al., 2000). 
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greater inefficiency, coupled with prices that are less favourable to consumers (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997).   
In past banking literature, size has been analysed extensively and is often argued to be an 
important factor to explain variations in the efficiency of banks. Hence, the fourth 
application to discuss on studies of bank efficiency in developed countries regards bank size. 
The analysis of the relationship between size and bank efficiency provides important 
information for policy makers as well as bank managers to evaluate the optimal scale 
required for the operation of banks (Casu and Girardone, 2002). Past literature suggests that 
large banks have several advantages over small banks, product diversity, larger outreach 
networks, greater technology, superior managerial performance, better cost control, higher 
profitability and greater economies of scale and scope (i.e. from both growth and joint 
production) (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991; Casu and Girardone, 2002; Tsionas et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, large banks face greater bureaucratic problems that are complex to 
manage, which could result in lower efficiency levels (Delis and Papanikalou, 2009). 
The results from past banking efficiency studies in developed countries reveal that the 
relationship between size and efficiency varies. For example, Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) 
employed data from 144 US banks from the Call and Income Report, 1985, to examine the 
technical efficiency and scale-efficiency of US banks. They found that large banks are more 
efficient than small banks. Furthermore, Berger, Hancock and Humphrey (1993) examined 
the efficiency estimate of the profit function and applied it to US commercial banks for the 
period 1984 to 1989. They focused on the standard profit function using the DFA model and 
intermediation approach
70
 to measure the general efficiency level of US banks. They also 
found that large banks are more efficient than medium and small banks. The profit 
inefficiency of large, medium and small banks was 0.4%, 7.1% and 11.6% respectively. 
Likewise, Kaparakis, Miller and Noulas (1994), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996), Clark (1996) 
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 The intermediation approach was proposed by Sealy and Lindley (1977), and perceives banks as financial 
intermediary between savers and borrowers. In this approach banks are assumed to use capital and labour to 
collect, deposit and transform them into loans and investments. Another common approach is the production 
approach, which views banks as producing loans and deposits accounts using capital and labour as inputs. 
Outputs are normally measured by the number of deposit and loan accounts, and by the number and type of 
transactions performed or documents processed (Molyneux et al., 1996) (This is discussed in detail in Chapter 
5).  
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and Hasan and Marton (2003) found that larger banks are more efficient. Tsionas et al. 
(2003) investigated the performance of 19 Greek banks for the period 1993–1998. They 
employed the DEA model and reported that large and small banks were more efficient than 
medium banks, which displayed a cost efficiency of 97.0%, 95.0%, and 94.0%, respectively. 
They suggest that larger banks have the ability to adopt innovative technologies, whereas 
smaller banks use efficient market exploitation to increase their market share. On the other 
hand, Akhigbe and McNulty (2003) used the SFA model on US bank data (1990 to 1996) to 
investigate profit efficiency based on smaller banks in a less competitive market. Based on 
the single frontier evaluation, they found that small banks (74.7%) are more profit-efficient 
than large banks (72.5%). Following the banking deregulation measures introduced by the 
regulators during early 1990s, large banks require major restructuring and cost-cutting 
initiatives more than the small banks. Other studies that found similar results, which suggest 
that smaller banks possessed higher efficiency than large banks, are Elyasiani and Mehdian 
(1995), Clark (1996), Casu and Girardone (2002) and Koetter (2006). 
As mentioned earlier, a higher level of market competition can result in higher risk-taking 
behaviour by the banks. Thus the final contextual application of empirical studies in 
developed countries is on the inherent risks faced by banks. Based on empirical studies of 
banking efficiency in developed countries, the relationship between risk and bank efficiency 
is found to be inverse (Kaparakis et al., 1994; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995; Kwan and 
Eisenbeis, 1996; Berger and De Young, 1997; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). The Basel capital 
adequacy accord
71
 series from Basel I to Basel III (introduced between 1998 and 2011) 
emphasised the need for robust prudential regulations to tackle various risks within the 
banks such as market, credit, operational and liquidity risk. These risks are reflected in 
financial capital via risk-weighted assets and various methodologies. In general, banks with 
greater risk are required to maintain larger stores of financial capital to buffer against 
potential losses. According to Berger and De Young (1997), who investigated US 
commercial banks using the data of the Annual Reports of Conditions and Income between 
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 The Basel capital adequacy accord is a set of agreements set by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), which provides recommendations on banking regulations regarding capital risk, market 
risk, operational risk and liquidity through Basel I, II and III. The purpose of the accords is to ensure that 
financial institutions have enough capital to meet obligations and absorb unexpected losses (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 1999, 2005, 2010). 
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1985 and 1994, from the 1-stage SFA model, the coefficient for non-performing loans was 
negative (–0.06) and significant at 1%. Thus, they found that the relationship between loan 
quality and cost efficiency supports the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis, where an increase in problem 
loans can result in lower cost efficiency (e.g. an increase in problem loans will lead to 
higher expenses in monitoring and managing the bad loans portfolio). Berger and De Young 
(1997) introduced several hypotheses relating to problem loans and their relationship with 
cost efficiency and financial capital. These hypotheses use mnemonics such as ‘bad luck’, 
‘bad management’, ‘skimping’ and ‘moral hazard’. They explained the source of problem 
loans and how they occur. First, ‘bad luck’ indicates problem loans that derive from external 
sources. That is, extra expenses incurred by the banks when loans turn bad and cannot be 
controlled by management. Second, ‘Bad management’ refers to poor handling of the loan 
portfolio and operating expenses, and consequently reflects the low cost efficiency of banks. 
Third, ‘Skimping’ reflects the effort spent on loan origination, which in turn will impact the 
loans’ performance in future. ‘Skimping’ is a trade-off between a loan’s problems and its 
operating costs. For example, banks that focus on earning good long-run profits could 
‘skimp’ by reducing loan screening, which leads to problem loans in the future. And fourth, 
the ‘Moral hazard’ hypothesis explains the problem of the entire banking industry where the 
negative behaviour of a single bank taking excessive risks is considered excusable due to 
the importance of the industry.  
Kaparakis et al. (1994) examined the productive efficiency of 5,548 US banks for the year 
1986 using the SFA model and simultaneously tested the effect of external factors (e.g. state 
population density, state branching regulations, portfolio riskiness) on the cost efficiency 
scores. The average inefficiency of the US banks in their sample is 9.0%. They employed a 
2-stage analysis to test the external factors and found that banks become inefficient when 
they move to a more competitive market, with an increase in operational risks, a high ratio 
of non-performing loans, increased purchased funds, and low equity to capital ratio. 
Likewise, Wheelock and Wilson (1995) used quarterly data of US banks from the Call 
Report from 1984 to 1993. They examined the determinants of bank failure of US banks 
through an estimation of managerial inefficiency using the nonparametric DEA model. They 
reported that banks with lower capital, higher loan loss provisions and a higher loan–deposit 
ratio have a higher risk of failure. Similarly, Altunbas et al. (2000) examined around 130 
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Japanese banks for the period 1993 to 1995 using the SFA model and investigated the 
impact of risk and quality factors on bank costs. The results display a stable inefficiency 
level, between 6.0% and 7.0% from 1993 to 1995. In this study, they included the loan loss 
provisions, financial capital and liquidity ratio to control for output quality and risks. When 
testing the coefficient of the determinants, they found that efficient banks had fewer non-
performing loans, lower liquidity and higher financial capital. As discussed above, there are 
various types of inherent risk that can affect the efficiency level of the banks. For this 
present research, the explanatory factors for inherent risk that will be employed in the 
analysis are capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity.
72
 
This section has provided an overview of empirical studies in banking efficiency from 
developed countries. Most of the earlier studies that pioneered the development of frontier 
efficiency originated from developed economies, such as the US and the EU. The findings 
from these empirical studies have been used by regulators to measure the efficiency of 
banks within developed economies relating to macroeconomic events (e.g. financial 
liberalisation and policy affecting market structure) and the characteristics of banks (e.g. 
ownership, size and inherent risks). Furthermore, the same methodology is also applied to 
banking systems in developing countries. The differences in market condition, regulatory 
structure, language and culture in developing economies may generate different findings to 
those in developed countries. Hence, in the next section, empirical studies of banking 
efficiency in developing countries are discussed. 
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 Inherent risk factors such as capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity will be used as control variables in 
the SFA model. Details of these control variables are discussed in Chapter 5 (‘Methodology and Data’).  
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Table ‎3.1 Efficiency Studies in US and Developed Countries Banking System 
Authors/(Year) Data Approach/Function Method Variables Results 
Elyasiani and 
Mehdian (1990) 
144 US banks from 
the Call and Income 
Report, 1985 
Intermediation/cost Deterministic  Inputs: labour, capital, 
deposits 
Outputs: loans, investments 
Smaller banks are more efficient than large banks 
during the early years of the sample. The gap reduces 
from year 5 onwards. Market conditions affect small 
and large banks differently. Small banks struggled to 
keep up with market changes compared to bigger 
banks. 
Berger, Hancock 
and Humphrey 
(1993) 
US commercial banks 
from the Report 
Condition and 
Income, 1984–1989 
Intermediation/profit DFA Inputs: labour, purchased 
funds 
Outputs: business loans, 
commercial and industrial 
loans, real estate loans, 
instalment loans 
Inefficiencies in the US banking industry are quite 
large. These inefficiencies derived from poor revenues 
rather than excessive costs. Larger banks are more 
efficient than smaller banks. 
Mahajan, Rangan 
and Zardkoohi 
(1996) 
US multinational and 
domestic banks from 
Call Report, 1987–
1990 
Intermediation/cost TFA Inputs: labour, purchased 
deposits, capital 
Outputs: total loans, 
demand deposits, 
government securities 
Domestic banks enjoy a cost advantage over 
multinational banks. There were significant 
diseconomies of scale for all the banks including both 
domestic and multinational banks. The scale 
diseconomies have more impact on domestic banks 
compared to multinational banks. There is no evidence 
that extraordinary size is required to compete in the 
international market. 
De Young and 
Noelle (1996) 
62 US foreign-owned 
banks (US based 
subsidiaries of foreign 
banks), 1985–1990 
Intermediation/cost DFA Inputs: price of labour, 
price of fund, core 
deposits, physical capital 
Outputs: total loans, total 
securities 
They found that in the US banking industry, US-owned 
banks are more efficient than foreign owned banks. 
Foreign owned banks are less efficient due to input 
inefficiency where they have to utilise higher variable 
inputs compared to US-owned banks, particularly due 
to a reliance on expensive financing using purchased 
funds. 
Note: DFA: Distribution Free Analysis, TFA: Thick Frontier Analysis 
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Table 3.1 Efficiency Studies in US and Developed Countries Banking System (Continued) 
Authors/(Year) Data Approach/Function Method Variables Results 
Berger and 
Hannan (1997) 
US banks, Fed’s 
survey of selected 
deposits and other 
accounts, Fed’s survey 
of the term of bank 
lending to business, 
1980–1989  
Intermediation/cost DFA Inputs: labour, physical 
capital 
Outputs: demand deposits, 
retail time and savings 
deposits, real estate loans, 
commercial and industrial 
loans, instalment loans 
Control variables: 
Herfindahl Index, Return 
on Assets (ROA), Return 
on Equity (ROE) 
The average efficiency levels of banks from deposit 
and loan survey were 56.0% and 57.0% respectively. 
Authors performed a two-stage analysis to determine 
the impact of the market structure and from the 
regression, they found that the deposit and loan rates 
together with the coefficients of concentration were 
statistically significant and supported the structure–
conduct–performance hypothesis. Concentration is 
negatively related with efficiency and indicates that the 
‘quiet life’ hypothesis occurs within the market power 
hypothesis. 
Akhavein, Berger 
and Humphrey 
(1997) 
57 bank mergers from 
Call Report, 1980–
1990 
Intermediation/cost 
and profit 
DFA Inputs: price of loans, price 
of securities, price of 
deposits, price of labour 
Outputs: equity capital, 
loans, securities 
Environmental variables: 
pre- and post-mergers 
They found that the mega-mergers in 1980s 
significantly increased the degree of profit efficiency in 
US banks. The average improvement was 16.0% from 
74.0% pre-mergers to 90.0% post-mergers. One 
significant observation made was that most of the 
banks were able to further diversify their portfolio by 
shifting their output mix from securities to loans. 
Berger and 
Mester (1997) 
6,000 US commercial 
banks from 
Consolidator Reports 
of Condition and 
Income 
Intermediation/cost, 
standard profit and 
alternative profit 
DFA and SFA Inputs: labour, purchased 
funds 
Outputs: consumer loans, 
business loans, securities 
Control variables: Non 
Performing Loan (NPL) 
ratio, financial capital 
The standard profit of distribution free analysis using 
both translog and Fourier Functional form registered 
55.0% and 54.0% respectively and for alternative 
profit, both estimations displayed 46.0% and 45.0% for 
translog and Fourier Functional form functions 
respectively. Cost efficiency and market power are 
negatively related but market power and profit 
efficiency are positively related. This simply indicates 
that in less competitive markets, banks can charge 
higher prices but at the same time do not sense the 
pressure to keep costs down.  
Note: SFA: Stochastic Frontier Analysis, DFA: Distribution Free Analysis 
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Table 3.1 Efficiency Studies in US and Developed Countries Banking System (Continued) 
Authors/(Year) Data Approach/Function 
 
Method Variables Results 
Berger and 
Mester (2003) 
US banks from the 
Call and Income 
Report, 1984 and, 
1991–1997 
Intermediation/cost, 
standard profit and 
alternative profit 
TFA Inputs: purchased funds, 
core deposits, labour 
Outputs for alternative 
profit and cost: consumer 
loans, business loans, real 
estate loans, securities 
Outputs for standard profit: 
price of consumer loans, 
price of business loans, 
price of real estate loans, 
price of securities 
Banks’ cost productivity has worsened, but profit 
efficiency has increased significantly. To explain these 
perplexing findings, Berger and Mester (2003) argued 
that over time, banks have been innovative and offer a 
variety of products and services to customers, intending 
to maximise banks’ revenue and in consequence, higher 
costs can be expected when such moves are initiated. 
The wider and additional products and services offered 
might have raised the cost, but at the same time they 
have increased revenues in higher proportion than cost; 
this can result in worsened cost efficiency. 
Allen and Rai 
(1996) 
194 banks from 11 
OECD countries, 
1988–1992 
Intermediation/cost SFA and DFA Inputs: price of labour, 
price of funds, price of 
capital 
Outputs: total loans, 
investment securities 
The DFA overestimates the magnitude of inefficiencies 
relative to SFA. There were significant differences 
between stochastic cost frontier and distribution free 
approaches, which registered at 18.0% and 68.0% 
respectively. 
Bergendahl 
(1998) 
48 banks from 4 
Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden), 
1992–1993 
Production/cost DEA Inputs: personnel cost, cost 
of materials, credit loss 
cost 
Outputs: lending, deposits, 
gross revenue 
The average efficiency of all banks in the Nordic 
countries was 0.74. Based on this study, it was found 
that banks on the frontier have certain qualities in the 
output compared to the others below the frontier curve. 
The qualities are lending cost per unit, term cost per 
unit and gross revenues per unit. 
Altunbas, Evans 
and Molyneux 
(2001) 
German banks in 
1000s, 1989–1996 
Intermediation/cost SFA Inputs: price of labour, 
price of funds, price of 
physical capital 
Outputs: total loans, 
securities, off balance sheet 
items 
Public savings banks and mutual cooperatives were 
slightly more cost- and profit-efficient compared to the 
private banks. Public and mutual banks were slightly 
better due to their ability to source a cheaper cost of 
funds from depositors and investors. Additionally, there 
were no significant differences in the efficiency levels 
of these three groups of banks. 
Note: DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis, SFA: Stochastic Frontier Analysis, DFA: Distribution Free Analysis, TFA: Thick Frontier Analysis 
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Table 3.1 Efficiency Studies in US and Developed Countries Banking System (Continued) 
Authors/(Year) Data Approach/Function 
 
Method Variables Results 
Koetter (2006) 32,322 observations of 
banks data from Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 1993–2003 
Intermediation/cost and 
profit 
SFA Inputs: fixed assets, labour, 
borrowed funds, equity 
Outputs: interbank loans, 
commercial loans, securities 
Control variables: total assets, 
off-balance sheet, market 
concentration, asset risk 
Two new models were introduced to capture the effect of 
heterogeneity in the market. The result reported that the 
alternative inputs showed approximately 5% lower efficiency 
level than the traditional input (traditional model 0.92, model 2 
(market regions), 0.86 and model 3 (large banks within the 
federal market), 0.88). Profit efficiency on the other hand shows 
a similar result at 0.65 for all three models. Banks with a larger 
size, riskier assets, and higher market concentration exhibit 
positions higher than the overall cost frontiers. 
Bos and Kool 
(2006) 
401 small cooperative 
Dutch (Rabo) banks, 
1998–1999 
Intermediation/cost and 
alternative profit 
SFA Inputs: public relation cost, 
price of labour, net housing 
cost, admin cost and write off, 
price of financial capital 
Outputs: retail loans, wholesale 
loans, mortgages, insurance-
brokerage-travel provisions 
Environmental variables: 
bank’s strategic choices, local 
banking market variables 
Exogenous input prices (0.97) are more cost-efficient than 
endogenous input prices (0.91). However, in terms of profit 
efficiency, the result is marginal. Market factors can only explain 
10.0% of efficiency on local banks. Due to a high level of 
homogeneity in the market such as banks operating in the same 
country with a set of similar legal and institutional frameworks, 
the result could not explain the variations in efficiency levels. 
Fiordelisi and Mare 
(2013) 
4200 observations of 
Italian cooperative banks, 
1997–2009 
Intermediation/cost, 
revenue, operating, 
cost-income and interest 
efficiencies 
SFA Inputs: capital adequacy, credit 
orientation, liquidity, asset 
quality 
Outputs: Size, employment 
growth, GDP growth 
Environmental variables: 
Population, concentration, 
NPL, Entrepreneurial, no. of 
ATMs, bank branches, 
criminalities, solidarity   
Results indicated that lower risk is related to higher survival time 
for cooperative banks. This means that prudent and skilful 
managerial abilities could increase the survival time of 
cooperative banks. Additionally, banks with greater efficiency 
have higher chances in facing higher probability of survival. It is 
also observed that the higher capital level could reduce the 
probability of default of a bank, which supports that higher 
capital levels provide greater buffer for loss absorbency and 
reduce banks’ moral hazards. 
Note: SFA: Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
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3.4.2. Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency in Developing/Transition 
Countries 
As discussed earlier, there is growing interest in conducting empirical research regarding 
banking efficiency in developing/transition countries. To date, empirical studies have dealt 
mainly with contextual applications rather than the introduction of new methods or 
approaches of frontier efficiency. Thus, the discussions in the next subsection are attributed 
to the application of frontier efficiency to developing/transition countries, relating to (1) 
financial liberalisation/deregulation, (2) market structure, (3) ownership, (4) size and (5) 
risk.
73
 
First, following the successful implementation of financial liberalisation in developed 
countries, developing countries also initiated deregulation to (1) improve the efficiency of 
their banks, (2) increase market competition, and (3) achieve greater savings mobilisation 
and a better allocation of resources and expansion in real economic growth. For example, 
Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) examined the impact of banking liberalisation on cost and scale 
efficiency using the parametric SFA with a translog specification model on 43 Croatian 
banks from 1994 to 1995. The number of Croatian banks has doubled since the initiation of 
banking liberalisation in 1990. Based on a stochastic frontier approach, the newly 
established Croatian banks (75.0%) are found to have lower cost efficiency than older banks 
(83.0%). The higher cost efficiency of the older banks is a result of measures taken to meet 
the anticipated competitive threat of new banks. Hence, the notion that free entry can result 
in more competition should be treated cautiously, particularly when the banking 
environment is influenced by free-riding opportunities for distressed borrowers, 
unrehabilitated state banks and difficulties faced by new banks in starting operations (Kraft 
and Tirtiroglu, 1998). 
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 Bos et al. (2009) state that the banking industry consists of different players with variations of activities and 
aims. Hence, heterogeneity among banks’ attributes such as equity, bank type, regional location and bank size 
should be considered. Failure to consider these explanatory factors could result in an underestimation of 
frontier efficiency.  
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Hao et al. (2001) investigated the productive efficiency of 19 private nationwide and 
regional South Korean banks for the period 1985 to 1995. They also analysed the 
determinants of efficiency using a two-stage analysis, following the deregulation initiated 
by the Korean government in the early 1980s and 1990s. Based on the results from the 
stochastic frontier model, it was noted that both nationwide and regional banks had 
improved their efficiency score after the commencement of the deregulation in 1991 where 
banks displayed lower bad loan ratios and higher foreign and ‘chaebol’74 equity ownership 
percentages. The average efficiency of these banks was 87.0% in 1985 and increased to 91.0% 
in 1993 following the implementation of financial deregulation. This finding is consistent 
with Gilbert and Wilson (1998) who indicated that the gradual liberalisation of the Korean 
banking industry has contributed to an improvement in the productivity of Korean banks.  
Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2007) investigated cross-country banking efficiency in the 
Arabian banking industry from 1992 to 1990. They examined 82 banks from Jordan, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain using stochastic frontier analysis coupled with three different 
economic functions namely, cost, profit and alternative profit efficiency. The objective of 
their study was to explore the degree of banking efficiency and the impact of financial 
reforms on these countries. Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2007) argue that by implementing a 
different type of efficiency economic function, the results of each method provide some 
informational value. The cost efficiency of Arabian banks registered 95.0% but lower 
alternative profit and standard profit efficiency, displaying 66.0% and 58.0% respectively. 
This shows that Arabian banks can be cost-efficient but not profit-efficient due to the input 
prices (e.g. lower cost of funds for Islamic banks) and banks’ optimisation behaviour. In 
addition, Cook et al. (2001) investigated the deregulation initiatives (i.e. the liberalisation of 
interest rates, reduction of the minimum treasury bills limit, removals of entry restrictions 
on foreign banks) taken by the Tunisian government within the period 1992–1998. The 
result suggested that deregulation made no impact on the efficiency level of the banks.  
Attaullah et al. (2004) compared the technical efficiency of commercial banks in India and 
Pakistan from 1988 to 1998 and the significance of financial liberalisation during the period 
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 ‘Chaebol’ is a form of business conglomerate in South Korea. They are typically global multinationals that 
own a number of international enterprises. 
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of study. This study adopted the DEA model and found that the overall technical efficiency 
of Indian and Pakistani banks improved with the implementation of financial liberalisation. 
Both India and Pakistan registered an increase in overall technical efficiency, from 67.0% 
and 41.1% in 1988 to 82.1% and 57.4% in 1998, respectively. Concurrently, Hardy and 
dePatti’s (2001) findings are also in accordance with those of Attaullah et al. (2004) who 
found that, based on the SFA model for both profit and cost efficiency, the financial reforms 
between 1988 and 1992 in Pakistan resulted in higher cost and profit efficiency during the 
post-deregulation period. Additionally, Sensarma (2006) tested the deregulation effect on 
cost efficiency in Indian banks under different types of ownership from 1986 to 2000. From 
the SFA with translog specification model, cost inefficiencies in Indian banks were on a 
declining trend during the sample period but the rate of decline was slower during the 
implementation of deregulation in 1992, indicating that banks were adjusting to the events 
of deregulation that were taking place. The cost efficiency of public and foreign banks 
improved from 85.0% and 18.0% in 1986 to 94.0% and 31.0% in 2000, respectively. Hence, 
India had achieved the objectives of deregulation, which aimed to improve productivity and 
reduce intermediation costs. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) also examined the impact of 
deregulation and productivity of the banks in India from 1985 to 1996 using the TFP model. 
Unlike Sensarma (2006), Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) found little evidence to support that 
deregulation has resulted in improvements over the years. This can be attributed to the 
extensive over-employment of labour relative to capital during the period of study. 
Drake et al. (2006) examined technical efficiency in the Hong Kong banking system from 
1995 to 2001. They employed the DEA model with an environmental factor being 
incorporated into the two-stage analysis of efficiency. The profit efficiency of Hong Kong 
banks lies between 88.6% and 94.9%. Based on two-stage regression analysis, the authors 
argue that the environmental factors indicated by the macroeconomic and housing markets 
had affected Hong Kong’s banking industry. Drake, Hall and Simper (2006) also asserted 
that the financial deregulation initiated by Hong Kong’s regulators and the Asian financial 
crisis had not impacted the efficiency level of the banks in Hong Kong, unlike in other 
Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Korea.  
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Within South East Asia (SEA) (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand), Williams and Nguyen (2005) examined the relationship between bank efficiency 
and governance and deregulation for the period 1990–2003. From the SFA results, they 
found that privatised banks demonstrate greater (alternative) profit efficiency compared to 
other banks with a different governance structure. The implementation of a privatisation 
programme in SEA countries contributed to greater efficiency in banks. The mean profit 
efficiency of privatised banks is higher than their competitors: for example 77.4% in 
Indonesia, 91.4% in Philippines and 76.9% in Korea. Additionally, Leightner and Lovell 
(1998) analyse the impact of deregulation on commercial banks in Thailand using sample 
data from 1989 to 1994. Leightner and Lovell (1998) claimed that Thai banks reacted to 
financial deregulation in a positive manner because: first, the deregulation phase took place 
during an economic boom; second, the market setting during deregulation was oligopolistic 
(where banks have the opportunity to gain higher profits before competition forces lower 
profitability); third, Thai banks have adequate international expertise to cope with forex 
market liberalisation; and, fourth, the foreign banks brought in international expertise. 
Another common area of financial liberalisation study, in developing and transitional 
countries, relates to the removal of entry barriers for foreign banks and how it affects the 
efficiency of the banks within the domestic market. The results of previous studies on the 
impact of foreign banks vary from country to country. For example, Claessens et al. (2001) 
employed 7,900 bank observations from 80 countries for the years 1988 to 1995. They state 
that the efficiency of foreign banks depends on the economic development of the host 
countries. In developing countries, foreign banks demonstrate greater efficiency compared 
to domestic banks. On the other hand, foreign banks display lower efficiency when 
compared to the larger domestic financial conglomerates in developed countries. They also 
assert that the presence of foreign banks places a competitive pressure on domestic banks to 
improve their services and operations. This is consistent with Unite and Sullivan (2003) 
who reported that the presence of foreign banks has increased competitive pressure on 
domestic banks (in the case of Philippines) and forced domestic banks to improve their 
efficiency levels. On the other hand, Kraft et al. (2006) employed an SFA-translog 
specification model and conducted an investigation in Croatia (a developing/transition 
country) from 1994 to 1995, and they found that intense competition from new entrants did 
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not help to improve the overall efficiency of domestic banks. The result suggests that new 
banks are less efficient than old banks, where the average cost efficiency of new versus old 
banks is 75.0% and 83.0% respectively. 
Therefore, empirical studies on the impact of financial liberalisation towards the efficiency 
of banks in developing/transition countries provide mixed findings; for instance, some 
studies show a positive impact while others show either a negative impact or no impact  at 
all due to liberalisation. The result of financial liberalisation relies on the conditions of the 
industry and types of deregulation measures. A good banking system structure can result in 
the successful implementation of liberalisation whereas, a weak banking system structure 
can lead to instabilities and decreasing efficiency should the government continue to 
implement their financial liberalisation initiatives (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).
75
 
Second, the topic of ownership, which can affect market competition, is also applied in the 
banking industry of developing/transitional countries. In general, foreign banks exhibit 
higher efficiency levels compared to domestic banks in developing countries (Isik and 
Hassan, 2003; Hassan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al, 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; 
Havrylchk, 2006). Most of the findings regarding ownership (i.e. foreign vs. domestic banks) 
are the opposite in developed compared to developing countries. This condition can be 
described by the ‘global advantage hypothesis’ as discussed previously. For example, 
Havrylchk (2006) examined the cost efficiency of the Polish banks from 1997 to 2001 using 
the DEA model and reported that foreign banks (average TE: 73%; average AE: 88.0%) 
displayed greater productivity from both technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency 
(AE) in comparison to domestic banks (average TE: 53.0%; average AE: 69.0%). 
Additionally, Isik and Hassan (2003) found that public and foreign banks in Turkey display 
more cost and technical productive efficiency than private banks. Likewise, Berger et al. 
(2009) employed an SFA-translog specification model on 266 annual observations of 
Chinese banks during the economic reforms from 1994 to 2003. They also found that banks 
with major foreign ownership are more efficient than domestic banks (e.g. private and state-
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 For example, a weak banking structure can be explained by inefficient government structure and processes, 
a weak financial and legal infrastructure and enforcement, and a high level of corruption (Demirgic-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1999). 
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owned domestic banks). The profit and cost efficiency of foreign owned banks is higher at 
69.0% and 91.0% compared to the big four banks
76
, state owned banks and private domestic 
banks, which registered at 23.0% and 89.0%, 48.0% and 91.0%, and 56.0% and 82%, 
respectively. Compared to Berger et al. (2009), Kasman and Yildrim (2006) also found that 
foreign banks exhibit higher profit- and cost-efficiency in commercial banks from eight 
Central and Eastern Europe countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) from 1995 to 2002. From the SFA–Fourier Flexible 
Function model, they argued that foreign banks have the ability to generate higher profits 
from different value-added segments of the market. Furthermore, Hasan and Marton (2003) 
examine the conditions and performance of the Hungarian banking industry during the 
transitional period, from a centralised economy to a market-oriented system, for the years 
1993 to 1998. Using both cost efficiency (CE) and profit efficiency (PE) on a parametric 
SFA model, banks with foreign ownership participation (CE: 73.9%; PE: 68.2%) were 
found to be more efficient than domestic banks (CE: 66.2%; PE: 61.9%) in Hungary. They 
further assert that, to build a stable and increasingly efficient banking industry during the 
transitional period, early reorganisation initiatives, flexible approaches to privatisation, and 
liberal policies towards foreign bank participation are crucial to establishing a more 
competitive banking system (Hassan and Marton, 2003). Therefore, unlike developed 
countries, foreign banks establish a stronger presence in developing countries and 
demonstrate superior knowledge and expertise. Nevertheless, the presence of foreign banks 
supports the development of the local banking sector by introducing ‘best’ international 
practices and know-how that may have a spillover effect on domestic banks (Levine, 1996). 
On the other hand, there is also empirical study within developing countries where foreign 
banks display lower cost efficiency. For instance, Sensarma (2006) found that foreign banks 
exhibit lower efficiency scores compared to domestic banks in India (using data from 1986 
to 2000). The cost efficiency of foreign banks has an average of 26.7% compared to public 
and private banks, with an average of 87.7% and 78.7% respectively. This is attributed to 
the low deposit-to-total liabilities ratio and high personnel cost. Correspondingly, 
Bhattacharya et al. (1997) also found lower efficiency in foreign banks in India for the year 
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 Big four is colloquial name for the four main banks in China. The big four banks in China are (1) Bank of 
China, (2) China Construction Banks, (3) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and (4) Agricultural Bank 
of China.  
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1986 to 1991 due to constraints imposed by Indian regulators towards foreign banks, such as 
high capital requirements and modest priority lending sectors. 
Third, competition between foreign and domestic banks could alter the market structure of 
the banking industry. It is also expected that the competitive structure of the market can 
influence the efficiency levels of banks. For example, Fries and Taci (2005) examined 289 
banks from 15 transition countries from Eastern Europe and analysed the impact of the 
banking industry’s transformation during the post-communism transition from 1994 to 2001. 
From the parametric SFA-translog function model, Fries and Taci (2005) found that strong 
macroeconomic stability, greater competition from foreign banks and the sturdy structural 
development of banking institutions would result in higher cost efficiency in the banks. 
They also found that the majority of foreign-owned private banks exhibit a higher degree of 
cost efficiency than other types of private bank. Fries and Taci (2005) further suggest that to 
increase the efficiency of the Eastern European banking industry, state banks may offer 
significant ownership interests to foreign banks. Similarly, Fu and Heffernan (2007) also 
found that greater competition since the first phase of banking reform (i.e. the deregulation 
of interest rates) has resulted in better efficiency levels in commercial banks in China. 
However, the result of cost efficiency using the SFA model (average CE; 1985–2002: 
40.7%, 1985–1992: 43.5%, 1993–2002: 39.5%) was lower in the second phase of the 
banking reform in China, where from the regression of 2-stage analysis, the relationship 
between cost efficiency and the reform variable is negative (–0.1270) at 5% significance 
level. Despite the banking reform initiatives, they argue that state-owned banks are still 
being pressured to play a special role in China’s economic system, where large loans are 
granted to loss-making state-owned firms. Additionally, bank ownership is also applied in 
the 2-stage regression procedure, which suggests that Chinese banking cost efficiency could 
be improved by converting state banks into joint-stock ownership. Nevertheless, this 2-stage 
analysis is being questioned (this is discussed in detail in chapter 5). For instance Berger 
and Mester (1997) argue that the 2-stage analysis is valid when the additional explanatory 
variables in the second stage are exogenous and are not correlated with inputs and outputs in 
the first stage. However, Fu and Heffernan (2007) employ endogenous variables (e.g. the 
ratio of purchased funds to total assets, the ratio of total loans to total assets, and the ratio of 
total investment to total assets) that are highly correlated with inputs and outputs in the 
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second stage. Thus, the conclusion of correlations and their directions between cost 
efficiency and explanatory variables are somewhat doubtful (Fu and Heffernan, 2007). In 
addition, Isik and Hassan (2002) employed the SFA model to examine both profit and cost 
efficiency on Turkish commercial banks between 1988 and 1996. They found that Turkish 
banks are profit-efficient (average PE: 94.0%) but not cost-efficient (average CE: 86.0%). 
They also argue that there is lack of competition within the market where the number of 
banks is small and the demand for banking products and services is greater than the supply. 
Due to imperfect market competition, Turkish banks are operating at higher cost and obtain 
higher revenues at the same time (which has resulted in lower cost efficiency but higher 
profit efficiency). This can also be explained by the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis, where managers 
do not work as hard as they should to maximise profits. Similarly, the impact of higher 
market concentration can also be observed in the work of Grigorian and Manole (2002), 
who suggest that there is a positive relationship between market concentration and the 
efficiency level of banks from a study conducted using the DEA method on 209 banks from 
seventeen transition countries between 1995 and 1998.  
Fourth, as earlier discussed, competition and concentration are important elements in 
measuring welfare-related public policy towards market structure and conduct in the 
banking industry. Large banks generally have the market power to charge higher prices and 
hence, are more cost and profit efficient than small banks. However, findings on the 
efficiency of banks in developing countries in terms of size display mixed results. Efficient 
banks in developing countries vary in terms of size. For example, Leigthner and Lovell 
(1998) analysed commercial banks in Thailand from 1989 to 1994 during the deregulation 
stage using the DEA model. They found that large banks are more cost efficient than 
medium and small banks. A similar finding is noted in Al-Jarrah and Molyneux (2007) who 
utilised the SFA–Fourier Flexible specification model to examine the international cross-
country banking efficiency of Arabian banking industry from 1992 to 1998. In term of size, 
they also found that larger banks within the Arab countries exhibit higher cost- and profit-
efficiency.  
On the other hand, Kwan (2006) examined the cost efficiency of Hong Kong banks between 
1992 and 1999 using a SFA-translog model. Small banks registered a higher cost efficiency 
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score than large banks at 78.0% and 70.0% respectively. He also stated that larger banks are 
more inefficient as their equity is publicly traded, which results in diverse ownership and 
greater agency cost (for a sound corporate governance). Likewise, Isik and Hassan (2002) 
found that size is negatively associated with cost efficiency. In the case of the Turkish 
banking industry, they assert that small banks can deliver better than large banks due to 
better market discipline, as small banks only compete in the metropolitan areas but not in 
rural areas. Moreover, Bonin et al. (2005) also found an inverse relationship between cost 
efficiency and bank size. Based on the result of a parametric SFA model on 224 banks from 
eleven Eastern European transition countries between 1996 and 2000, they found that small 
banks are more cost and profit efficient than large banks. This finding can be explained by 
the early stage of consolidation schemes in the banking industry in transition countries, 
which caused large banks to exhibit a lower efficiency level
77
. Apart from the above 
findings, Kasman and Yildrim (2006) found no relationship between bank size and cost and 
profit efficiency based on an examination of commercial banks in Central and Eastern 
Europe between 1995 and 2002 using the SFA-Fourier flexible specification model.  
Fifth, as discussed earlier, a more competitive market structure can increase the risk-taking 
behaviour of banks, which consequently influences their efficiency in developing countries. 
For example, Grigorian and Manole (2002) employed 209 banks in seventeen transition 
countries from 1995 to 1998 to examine their efficiency levels and the impact of the policy 
framework on these banks. Based on the results from the DEA model, they found a positive 
association (0.074 at 5% significance level) between capitalisation and efficiency scores, 
suggesting that well-capitalised banks have better potential to achieve a greater efficiency 
level. The implementation of a tighter minimum capital adequacy ratio by the regulators has 
shown a positive impact where commercial banks have displayed better revenue, improved 
financial capacity and robust deposit-taking behaviour. From the analysis of DEA on 
Turkish banks, Isik and Hassan (2003) found that efficient banks have a strong level of 
financial capital to buffer potential losses that may arise from risky assets. On the other 
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 Bonin et al. (2005) assert that regulators of the banking sector in transition countries introduce consolidation 
schemes for smaller banks in order to improve the efficiency of the banks and allow them to compete with 
foreign banks. The regulators presume that small banks in transition countries are too small for international 
standards. However, Bonin et al. (2005) demonstrate through SFA that the presumption mentioned above does 
not hold for newly established consolidated banks in transition countries. 
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hand, cost efficiency is negatively related (–0.026 at 10% significance level) with the rate of 
asset growth indicating that rapid growth can result in outgrowing managerial skills as well 
as scale problems. Additionally, Fries and Taci (2005) examined the impact of bank- and 
country-level characteristics on the cost efficiency of commercial banks in Eastern Europe 
using the SFA approach. They posit that cost-efficient banks can be characterised through a 
higher ratio of capital to total assets and lower loan losses, which are signs of lower inherent 
risk in banking operations. Thus, the above discussion indicates that within the 
developing/transitional countries, lower inherent risk (e.g. high capital levels, low loan 
losses and high liquidity) would normally result in higher efficiency.  
The above discussion explains how frontier efficiency is applied in developing economies. 
As a summary, many of these empirical studies provide mixed findings from policies 
implemented by regulators such as, financial liberalisation, the removal of entry barriers to 
foreign banks, merger and consolidation schemes in the banking industry and market 
concentration and competition. These policies may directly affect banks but no consensus is 
found on the efficiency of banks based on market structure, size and ownership. Nonetheless, 
one consistency in the findings was found in relation to inherent risk. It was observed that 
banks with a lower level of inherent risk would achieve a higher level of efficiency. 
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Table ‎3.2 Efficiency Studies in Transition and Developing Countries Banking System 
Authors/(Year) Data Approach/Function Method Variables Results 
Grigorian and 
Manole (2002) 
209 banks from 17 
transition countries 
from Bankscope, 
1995–1998 
Value add/cost DEA  Inputs: labour, fixed assets, interest 
expenditures 
Outputs: revenues, net loans, liquid 
assets, deposits, net loans, liquid assets 
Correlation variables: GDP, Inflation. 
M2/GDP, equity/assets, concentration, 
new vs. old, foreign ownership, capital 
adequacy, single borrower limit, forex 
exposure limit 
There is a positive association between capitalisation 
and market concentration on the efficiency, where well-
capitalised banks have better potential to achieve a 
greater efficiency level. The implementation of a tighter 
minimum capital adequacy ratio by the regulators has 
shown a positive impact: commercial banks have 
displayed better revenue and improved financial 
capacity and robust deposit-taking behaviour. Countries 
with a stricter policy on foreign exposure limits for 
banks were worse off than countries that liberalised 
their foreign exchange exposure policy. 
Fries and Taci 
(2005) 
289 banks from 15 
transition countries 
from Bankscope 
database, 1994–2001 
Intermediation/cost SFA Inputs: labour, physical capital 
Outputs: loans to non-bank entities, 
loans to other banks, deposits 
Control variables: NPL/Total Loans 
(TL), non-loan assets/Total Assets 
(TA) 
Environmental variables: per capita 
GDP, nominal market interest, assets 
share, ratio of TL/Total Deposits (TD), 
ratio of capital/assets  
Smaller banks show significant scale economies while 
average-sized banks have constant returns to scale. 
Country-level factors that can increase cost efficiency 
level are a lower nominal interest rate, a higher market 
share of foreign-owned banks and a higher 
intermediation ratio. In terms of bank characteristic 
variables, to achieve higher cost efficiency level a bank 
should display higher ratios of capital to total assets and 
lower loan losses, also demonstrating signs of lower 
inherent risk in banking operations. 
Berger, Hassan 
and Zhou (2009) 
38 Chinese banks 
from Bankscope 
database, 1994–2003 
Intermediation/cost 
and standard profit 
SFA Inputs: interest expense to total 
deposits, non-interest expenses to 
fixed assets 
Outputs: total loans, total deposits, 
liquid assets, other earnings assets 
Control variables: asset quality 
Environmental variables: bank 
ownership 
Banks with majority foreign ownership (69.0%) are the 
most profit-efficient compared to banks with domestic 
private (56.0%) and state ownership (‘big four’, 23.0%; 
non-‘big four’, 48.0%), suggesting that a shift of 
resources from state-owned banks to foreign ownership 
would be likely to increase the efficiency of banks, in 
particular the ‘big four’ state owned banks.  
Note: DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis, SFA: Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
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Table 3.2: Efficiency Studies in Transition and Developing Countries Banking System (Continued) 
Authors/(Year) Data Approach/Function Method Variables Results 
Al-Jarrah and 
Molyneux (2007) 
82 banks from 
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain, 
1992–1990 
Intermediation/cost  SFA Inputs: price of deposits, price of 
labour, price of physical capital 
Outputs: total loans, other earning 
assets, off balance sheet items 
Control variables: loan loss reserve 
over total loans, capital adequacy 
ratio, time trends 
Environmental variables: market 
structure, organisational 
characteristics, geographical 
segmentation, bank liquidity 
The cost efficiency of Arabian banks registered 
95.0% and lower profit and standard profit 
efficiency, displaying 66.0% and 58.0% respectively. 
Arabian banks can be cost-efficient but not profit-
efficient due to the output specifications. It was 
found that Islamic banks, larger banks and Bahraini 
banks are more efficient than their counterparts. 
Isik and Hassan 
(2003) 
Turkish banks from 
Banks Association 
of Turkey and 
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, 
1988,1992 and 1996 
Intermediation/cost DEA Inputs: labour, capital, loanable 
funds, price of labour, price of 
capital, price of funds 
Outputs: short-term loans, long-term 
loans, risk adjusted off balance sheet 
items, other earnings assets 
Correlate variables: efficiency 
structure, ownership structure, 
corporate governance structure, 
market structure, risk structure, other 
bank traits 
Public and foreign banks show better cost and 
technical productive efficiency than private banks. 
Efficient banks are characterised with greater 
purchased deposit for financing risky assets and have 
strong financial capital to buffer potential losses 
from the inherently risky assets. Cost efficiency is 
negatively related with rates of asset growth, 
indicating that rapid growth can result in outgrowing 
of managerial skills as well as scale problems. 
Bonin, Hasan and 
Wachtel (2005) 
225 banks from 11 
advanced transition 
countries, 1996–
2000 
Intermediation/cost 
and standard profit 
SFA Inputs: price of capital, price of 
funds 
Outputs: deposits, total loans, total 
liquid assets and investments other 
than loans and liquid assets 
Correlate variables: foreign strategic, 
other majority foreign, government 
owned, international participation, 
log assets 
Participation in foreign ownership contributed to a 
positive impact. Foreign-owned banks are driven 
towards cost efficiency more than profit efficiency. 
Efficiencies are negatively associated with bank size 
as many transition countries have undertaken 
consolidation schemes on their banking industry due 
to the presumption that their banks were too small by 
international standards to be efficient. 
Note: DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis, SFA: Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
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Table 3.2 Efficiency Studies in Transition and Developing Countries Banking System (Continued) 
Authors/(Year) Data Approach/Function 
 
Method Variables Results 
Kwan (2006) Hong Kong banks 
from Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority 
filing, 1992–1999 
Intermediation/cost SFA Inputs: labour, physical capital, 
borrowed money 
Outputs: loans to finance trade, non-
trade-related loans, other earnings 
assets 
Control variables: bank size, deposit-
to-asset ratio, ratio of trade-related 
loans to total assets, ratio of non-trade-
related loans to total assets, ratio of 
loans loss provision to total loans, 
ratio of off balance sheet to total 
assets, loan growth 
Following the Asian financial crisis, inefficiency 
increased slightly as banks were having difficulties in 
adjusting their inputs according to market conditions, in 
which loan demand fell and banks struggled by 
incurring more costs in monitoring and addressing 
worsening loan portfolios. The average cost 
inefficiencies for Hong Kong banks were 32.0%, where 
large and small banks exhibit average cost-inefficiency 
scores of 30.0% and 22.0% respectively. In Hong Kong, 
smaller banks were reported to have greater cost 
efficiency relative to larger banks.  
Kasman and 
Yildrim (2006) 
Commercial banks 
from 8 Central and 
Eastern European 
Countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia), 1995–2002 
Value added/cost and 
alternative profit 
SFA Inputs: price of labour, physical capital 
Outputs: total loans, total deposits, 
other earnings assets 
Environmental variables: population, 
income per capita, capital ratio, 
concentration ratio, intermediation 
ratio, inflation, M2/GDP, market 
capitalisation 
Average cost and profit inefficiency scores were found 
to be at 20.7% and 37.0% respectively. Using the one-
stage analysis, they found no relationship between size 
and cost- and profit efficiency. Foreign banks on 
average displayed lower levels of inefficiencies, where 
the average cost- and profit-inefficiency of foreign 
banks were at 20.0% and 35.0%, whereas domestic 
banks registered higher average cost- and profit-
inefficiency at 21.0% and 38.0% respectively. Foreign 
banks have the ability to generate higher profits via 
high value-added segments of the market and provide 
innovative products and services demanded in the 
market.  
Mobarek and 
Kolonov (2014) 
307 conventional 
banks (CB) and 101 
Islamic banks (IB) 
from 18 Organisation 
of Islamic Countries 
(OIC) banks:  
Intermediation/ cost SFA and 
DEA 
Inputs: deposits, equities, personnel 
expenses and fixed assets 
Outputs: total loans and other earning 
assets 
CBs shows higher cost efficiency compared to the IBs, 
particularly with regards to the analysis of bank size. 
Large CBs shows higher efficiency than large IBs as 
shown by these two methods of frontier estimations. 
Moreover, the result between SFA and DEA also 
exhibits high degree of consistency.   
Note: SFA: Stochastic Frontier Analysis, DEA: Data Envelopment Analysis 
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency  
 
115 
  
3.4.3 Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency in Malaysia 
Empirical studies of Malaysian banks’ efficiency are limited, but on an increasing trend. 
Most such studies were written in the late 2010s and have used frontier efficiency methods 
to measure performance. The studies were applied in several contexts and followed the 
development of the economic and banking sectors. Thus, this section discusses empirical 
studies of banking efficiency in Malaysian banks relating to the Asian financial crisis, the 
banking sector consolidation scheme (i.e. the effect of mergers and acquisitions), financial 
liberalisation initiatives (e.g. the ten-year Financial Sector Master Plan) and market 
competition and structure (i.e. the introduction of new foreign banks from both conventional 
and Islamic banking streams). In addition, a discussion of the limitations of past literature is 
presented at the end of this section.  
Malaysia faced the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which affected the stock market and the 
value of the currency and created banking turmoil. There is a limited number of studies 
examining the impact of the financial crisis on bank efficiency. For example, Suffian (2009) 
employed DEA and the Malmquist Productivity Index to analyse the impact of the Asian 
financial crisis on Malaysian domestic and foreign commercial banks from 1995 to 1998. 
Suffian (2009) reported that over this period foreign and smaller banks in Malaysia 
exhibited a decline in productivity. However, the medium and larger domestic banks 
experienced productivity growth during the period under study. Furthermore, Sufian (2010a) 
also compared the cost efficiency levels of Malaysia and Thailand banks from 1992 to 2003 
to investigate the impact of the Asian financial crisis on these two sectors. Sufian (2010a) 
found that Thai banks (81.6%) display a higher level of cost efficiency compared to 
Malaysian banks (66.3%). The technical efficiency of banks in both countries declined 
abruptly 12 months after the Asian financial crisis, due to extreme measures such as capital 
controls and the reduction of interest rates to revive the economies. Sufian (2010a) also 
suggests that productivity levels are positively related to loan intensity, non-interest income 
and overall profits, and negatively associated with bank size, expense preference behaviour 
and liquidity. 
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Subsequent to the crisis, the initial response by the Malaysian government was to tighten 
fiscal and monetary policy and prevent the exchange rate from depreciating further. The 
government of Malaysia therefore implemented capital controls (i.e. adopting a fixed 
exchange rate regime by pegging the Malaysian Ringgit to US Dollars) and restructuring the 
financial system. The rationalising of the financial system included bank merger initiatives, 
which resulted in a smaller number of banks and increased capital level for the banks. Also, 
the government created a special-purpose-vehicle (SPV) firm to purchase bad loans (Goh et 
al., 2003; Sufian, 2009) (see Chapter 4 for detailed discussion on government measures 
during Asian financial crisis). Thus, there are several studies in Malaysia investigating the 
impact of mergers on bank efficiency. For instance, Khrisnasamy et al. (2004) investigated 
the productivity changes of ten Malaysian domestic anchor banks from 2000 to 2001 using 
the Malmquist Productivity Index. Within this short period of comparison, they reported 
that total factor productivity increased by 5.1% in the eight banks that were found to 
experience technological progress. Additionally, Sufian (2004) employed data of ten 
consolidated Malaysian domestic banks from 1998 to 2003 to analyse the impact of merger 
programs initiated by the Malaysian government using the DEA model. Sufian (2004) found 
that during the merger year, the overall cost efficiency level dropped significantly but then 
recovered, registering higher overall efficiency relative to the pre-merger years. Likewise, 
Ismail and Abdul Rahim (2009) used data from 1995 to 2005 to examine the impact of 
mergers on the productivity and efficiency of domestic commercial banks. They report that 
merger initiatives improved the technical efficiency of banks where pre-merger and post-
merger technical efficiency was at 67.6% and 95.2% respectively. Moreover, Abd-Kadir, 
Selamat and Idros (2010) analysed nine Malaysian commercial banks from 2003 to 2007 to 
measure the post-merger program productivity level of Malaysian banks. They reported that 
average total factor productivity (TFP)
78
 of Malaysian banks after the consolidation program 
increased by 10.1%, due to a change in technical progress rather than in technical efficiency, 
suggesting that mergers and consolidation program of Malaysian banking industry resulted 
in technological innovations and advances, such as e-banking and automated teller machine 
(ATM) networks, rather than operational managerial efficiency. These findings by Abd-
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 Total Factor Productivity can be described as index of “technological progress” which is defined as 
combination of output per unit of labour and capital. TFP index can be written as A = Q/(aL + bK), where Q is 
the aggregate level of output, L is labour input, K is capital input, and a and b refer to weights (Nadiri, 1970). 
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency  
 
117 
  
Kadir et al. (2010) can be supported from the empirical studies of Sufian and Habibullah 
(2009), Sufian (2006) and Radam et al. (2009), who found that the impact of mergers can 
increase the performance of banks. These empirical studies also show that most of the 
growth in productivity is supported by technological advances, instead of managerial 
superiority. By contrast, from the data of ten consolidated domestic banks from 1998 to 
2004, and based on DEA estimation, Mohd Said et al. (2008) found very little difference in 
average efficiency scores between pre- and post-merger, registering 97.713% and 97.712% 
respectively. They claimed that merger activities in Malaysia provided little impact and did 
not enhance the productivity efficiency of Malaysian banks. 
Accordingly, in 2001, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) introduced the FSMP. There is only 
one study that looks at the impact of the FSMP on the efficiency of Malaysian banks. Hon et 
al. (2011) investigated the impact of the ten-year plan on ten Malaysian consolidated banks 
from 2001 to 2005 using the DEA model and reported that the banks exhibited efficiency 
improvement due to the FSMP initiatives. They also suggested that Malaysian banks need to 
increase their efficiencies to between 11.0% and 24.0% to be fully efficient. However, 
deterioration in scale-efficiency was observed, which was caused by the merger programme 
(Hon et al., 2011). The mergers have caused the banks that are too large to be efficient, 
where the managers may not work as hard to maximise profit and enjoying ‘quiet life’ 
(Hicks, 1935). Nevertheless, this study may not fully reflect liberalisation initiatives due to 
the short time period under investigation (i.e. 5 years’ data from 2001 to 2005) and a limited 
number of banks (i.e. ten domestic banks). 
One of the aims of the FSMP was to liberalise the banking industry with the introduction of 
new foreign banks. There are several studies examining the relationship between foreign 
and domestic banks and the efficiency of Malaysian banks. For example, Mohd Tahir et al. 
(2008, 2009 and 2010) produced a series of three empirical studies using data from 22 
Malaysian domestic and foreign banks (nine domestic and thirteen foreign banks) from 
2000 to 2006. In the first study, Mohd Tahir et al. (2008) investigated the cost function 
using the parametric SFA and reported that domestic banks (average CE: 90.9%) are more 
efficient than foreign banks (average CE: 74.4%). The second study (Mohd Tahir et al. 2009) 
utilised the DEA cost function and found that domestic banks (average CE: 88.7%) still 
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registered higher efficiency scores compared to foreign banks (average CE: 73.3%). The 
third in the series of studies involved the investigation of both cost and profit efficiency 
using parametric SFA. This study, (Mohd Tahir et al. 2010) reported that domestic banks 
were more cost-efficient, but lower in terms of alternative profit than foreign banks. The 
alternative profit efficiency of foreign banks (average PE: 76.9%) is greater than that of 
domestic banks (average PE: 63.8%). Moreover, Suhaimi et al. (2010) also found that the 
profit efficiency of foreign banks was higher than that of domestic banks. Sufian (2011) also 
employed the DEA model to examine 36 and 23 Malaysian commercial banks in 1995 and 
2004 respectively, and investigated the impact of the ownership structure on banks’ 
performance. Like Mohd Tahir et al. (2009), he found that foreign banks were less 
productive compared to domestic banks. Sufian (2011) argues that this finding is surprising, 
particularly on technology-advanced banks from developed countries that were unable to 
adapt and overcome the ‘home field’ advantage in the developing economy. Further 
examination suggests that foreign banks originating in Europe are less productive than their 
domestic and other foreign banks from US and Asia, which supports the ‘limited global 
advantage’ hypothesis. In contrast, Matthews and Ismail (2006) examined Malaysian 
domestic and foreign banks from 1994 to 2000 using the DEA. From their result, they found 
the efficiency of foreign banks was greater than that of domestic banks.  
The Islamic banking development is also a key part of many initiatives within the FSMP. 
The key initiatives found during the implementation of FSMP are through (1) the 
conversion of banks in the Islamic banking scheme (IBS), which uses the ‘Islamic window’ 
banking structure,
79
 into full Islamic subsidiaries under the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and (2) 
the introduction of new foreign Islamic banks to foster competition on domestic Islamic 
banks. Therefore, there are several studies that examine the efficiency of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia. For example, Abdul-Majid et al. (2011) analysed the efficiency levels of 
Malaysian banks practising Islamic banking using the parametric SFA with translog 
specification model. The cost efficiency results show that banks with Islamic banking 
operations display 34.0% greater cost efficiency than other banks without Islamic banking 
activities. In addition, Omar et al. (2006) examined the cost efficiency of Malaysian 
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 ‘Islamic window’ refers to the operation of Islamic banking within a conventional bank. The operation of an 
Islamic window requires the bank to establish necessary firewalls to ensure that commingling between Islamic 
and conventional funds does not occur (Sole, 2007).  
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commercial banks from 2000 to 2004, consisting of eleven Malaysian commercial banks 
utilising the nonparametric DEA model. Similarly, they found Islamic banks (domestic 
Islamic banks prior to offering licences to foreign banks) to be less efficient than 
conventional banks. Furthermore, Kamaruddin et al. (2008) employed DEA on twelve 
Malaysian banks (both domestic and foreign banks) with Islamic Banking operation window 
(IBS) and two full-fledged Islamic banks from 1998 to 2004 to analyse the degree of both 
profit- and cost-efficiency in Islamic banks in Malaysia. They reported that the average cost 
efficiency (97.0%) is greater than the average profit efficiency (85.3%) of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia, which implies that Malaysian banks are better in managing cost than profit 
(Kamruddin et al., 2008). Another example of domestic and foreign banks’ efficiencies in 
Malaysia is regarding the area of Islamic banking where Sufian and Habibullah (2010) 
investigated the impact of foreign Islamic and domestic Islamic banks. They employed the 
DEA model on Malaysian foreign and domestic Islamic banks from 2001 to 2008. Sufian 
and Habibullah (2010) found that domestic Islamic banks perform better than their foreign 
bank counterparts, registering at 76.2% and 70.6%, respectively. Within the period under 
study, BNM issued three new Islamic bank licenses to foreign banks. These three de novo
80
 
foreign Islamic banks exhibit lower efficiency compared to established foreign and domestic 
Islamic banks.
81
 
There are also several studies that fall under different contextual topics, which can range 
from inherent risk to market structure. For example, Abd Karim, Chan and Hassan (2010) 
compared the cost efficiency of banks in Malaysia and Singapore and their relationship to 
non-performing loans. Using stochastic frontier analysis, they reported that Singaporean 
banks are relatively more efficient than Malaysian banks registering an average cost 
efficiency of 93.5% and 86.8% respectively. They found a negative relationship between 
cost efficiency and non-performing loans. Dogan and Fausten (2002) investigated cost 
efficiency in 21 Malaysian banks from 1989 to 1998. Using DEA, the results were used to 
estimate the Malmquist Productivity Index and measure the productivity growth of 
Malaysian banks. Dogan and Fausten (2002) found that Malaysian banks’ productivity 
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 For example, the Federal Reserve Bank defines a De Novo bank as a state member bank that has been in 
operation for five years or less. 
81
 De Young and Hassan (1998) assert that De Novo banks in the US will normally show reasonable profits for 
the first three years and require nine years to be on a level playing field with other established banks. 
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declined between 3.3% and 5.6% during the period of study. The deterioration of 
productivity was due to the insulation and protection of the banking industry from foreign 
bank competition. Sufian and Abdul Majid (2007) analysed the cost- and profit-efficiency of 
Malaysian banks listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) from 2002 to 2003 by 
applying DEA. They reported that Malaysian banks exhibited a higher degree of cost 
efficiencies when compared with the level of profit efficiencies. They also found that larger 
banks registered a higher degree of cost, but lower profit efficiencies, than smaller banks.  
As mentioned previously, most of the banking efficiency studies on Malaysian banks were 
published in the late 2010s and applied in several contexts such as financial crises, mergers, 
financial liberalisation, ownership, bank type, and risks (broadly categorised by Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) under ‘inform government policy’). Based on the literature reviewed, 
there are areas that still need to be fully addressed in relation to the efficiency of Malaysian 
banks. First, the impact on the efficiency of Malaysian banks during the implementation of 
liberalisation (i.e. FSMP) has not been investigated. Hon et al. (2011) did attempt to 
examine the impact of the FSMP, but the data set they employed does not span the entire 
timeline of the FSMP and may not fully reflect the competitive aspects of the banking 
system by comparing only domestic banks. Second, the majority of empirical studies on 
Malaysian banks focus mainly on the cost function and a limited number of empirical 
studies looking into profit functions. There are even fewer studies that conduct and compare 
both cost and profit functions using the same data set of Malaysian banks. Third, to the 
author’s knowledge, there are no studies in Malaysia that perform a comprehensive 
consistency analysis between nonparametric and parametric methods. Bauer et al. (1998) 
suggested six consistency conditions rather than only concentrating into rank-order 
correlation for consistency. The result from these consistency tests is useful for policy 
makers in making decisions. Fourth, the timeline of data used for most Malaysian banking 
efficiency studies is usually short (on average, between three and eight years) with a smaller 
number of banks as a sample, which may not represent the entire banking system. Fifth, 
studies on explanatory factors or the determinants of inefficiency are also lacking, which 
may result in a failure to explain the factors that affect the inefficiency of Malaysian banks. 
Sixth, there are few studies on the efficiency of Malaysian banks that cover the impact of 
the global credit crisis occurred during the implementation of FSMP. Therefore, this 
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies of Banking Efficiency  
 
121 
  
research addresses some of the gaps observed from the Malaysian banking efficiency 
studies (discussed in detail in Chapter 5).  
This present research will examine the impact of liberalisation through the ten-year FSMP, 
employing data of all Malaysian banks (foreign – conventional and Islamic banks and 
domestic – conventional and Islamic banks) from 2000 to 2011. In terms of estimation, both 
cost and profit (standard profit and alternative profit) efficiency will be utilised on 
parametric (SFA as main benchmark) and nonparametric (DEA as empirical alternative) 
approaches for consistency assessment. At the same time, the determinants of inefficiency 
using both control and environmental variables will also be tested using the one-stage 
approach on SFA. Consequently, the details for measurement of the efficiency estimation, 
data, model specification and variables such as input, output, control and environmental 
variables will be discussed in chapter 5 (‘Methodology and Data’).  
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the importance of the banking system in influencing the growth 
and development of the economy. In addition, it also provided relevant information 
regarding financial repression and financial liberalisation of the banking industry. How 
frontier efficiency analysis is being used in many different applications was also discussed. 
Based on the reviews made of banking efficiency, there exists extensive research into 
financial liberalisation or deregulation. Empirical studies from developed countries provide 
a strong foundation of frontier efficiency techniques that apply in many banking areas, most 
of which are of interest to regulators/policy makers. There are a limited number of studies 
on banking efficiency in developing countries, but these are increasing. The growing 
interest in developing countries is attributed to various changes occurring in the market 
structure, particularly in relation to financial liberalisation and globalisation. Moreover, 
developing countries have been investigated because of their different market structure, 
compared to developed countries where the banking system is usually less developed and 
subject to more government control.  
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This chapter also reviewed empirical studies of developed countries, developing countries 
and Malaysia regarding the impact of financial liberalisation, market structure, ownership, 
size and inherent risk in the banks. These factors are generally considered as the key 
determinants that correlate with banking efficiency. Based on the discussions in this chapter, 
most of the results from these studies generally exhibited mixed findings. For example, 
some studies found a positive impact results from financial liberalisation, which increases 
the efficiency of the banks, while others report little impact or negative impact on the banks’ 
efficiency level. Similarly, a more competitive banking environment can increase the 
efficiency of banks; however, the results dealing with market structure and concentration 
also vary in both developed and developing countries. From the empirical studies reviewed, 
many studies found that domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks in the 
developed countries. Nonetheless, in the developing/transitional countries, foreign banks 
display greater efficiency than domestic banks. Moreover, there are many studies that 
examine the factors that correlate with the efficiency of banking institutions in developing 
countries, of which many found that efficient banks generally have a greater market share, 
fewer non-performing loans, more capital, and a higher level of liquidity.  
In addition, past empirical studies in Malaysian banking displayed similar trends to those 
above; for example, the impact of financial liberalisation on the efficiency of banks presents 
mixed findings. However, most studies show a positive impact from the introduction of 
financial liberalisation in Malaysia. Additionally, contrasting findings are shown regarding 
bank ownership factors. Unlike the typical findings in other developing countries, 
Malaysian banking exhibits greater efficiency in domestic banks compared to foreign banks, 
which is attributed to more regulatory controls on foreign banks operating in Malaysia. 
The following chapter discusses the structure of the banking system in Malaysia and the 
gradual financial liberalisation initiatives introduced through a ten-year Financial Sector 
Master Plan. Concurrently, the impact of liberalisation will also be measured using the 
financial items derived from the income statements and balance sheets of the banks. 
Additionally, research hypotheses are also formulated using the discussion presented in this 
chapter, chapter 2 (‘Theory and Measurement of Production Efficiency’) and chapter 4 
(‘Malaysian Banking System and Financial Liberalisation’). 
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Chapter 4 The Malaysian 
Banking Sector, 2000–2011 
4.1 Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, an efficient and competitive banking system can 
lead to a higher degree of economic growth, greater product innovation, easier access to 
financial services and improved financial stability (Molyneux et al., 1996). Therefore, 
this chapter explains the liberalisation measures that have been introduced in Malaysia, 
which have aimed to improve the competitive environment and efficiency of its banking 
sector. In addition, it also discusses the institutional mechanism, evolution and structure 
of the Malaysian banking sector. Furthermore, this chapter also provides the necessary 
information to understand the empirical analysis of the efficiency of the Malaysian 
banking sector in subsequent chapters. 
Section 4.2 discusses a brief overview of the Malaysian economy and is followed by 
Section 4.3, which presents an overview of the Malaysian banking system and salient 
measures introduced to liberalise the banking sector. Section 4.4 briefly reviews the 
structure of Malaysian banks, particularly in terms of ownership and specialisation. 
Moreover, this section also provides the attributes of Malaysian banks based on their 
balance sheet and income statement positions, which are affected by the economic and 
liberalisation changes between 2000 and 2011. Section 4.5 presents the performance of 
the Malaysian banks based on the financial ratio analysis. Section 4.6 reviews the 
competitive conditions of the Malaysian banking system. At the end of this chapter, 
Section 4.7 presents the development of hypotheses regarding the impact of financial 
liberalisation on the Malaysian banking sector. Figure 4.1 outlines the visual 
information flow of this` chapter (‘The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000–2011’). 
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Figure ‎4.1 Information Flow of Chapter 4 
 
4.2 Brief Overview of the Malaysian Economy 
Malaysia (formerly Malaya) is a relatively small country located in South East Asia. 
The land area of Malaysia covers approximately 330,000 square kilometres with 
Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia as close neighbours. Malaysia is divided into two 
distinct parts, which are West Malaysia (peninsular) and East Malaysia (Sabah and 
Sarawak in the Borneo Island). Malaysia gained its independence in 1957 after being 
colonised for over 400 years, since the invasion of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511. 
Consequently, the British came to open up Penang in the 19
th
 century. With colonisation 
by the British and other foreign countries, Malaysia has become a multiracial country
82
 
with a population of 28.3 million in 2010, of which around more than 67.4% are Malays 
or Bumiputera (sons of the soil), 24.6% are Chinese, and 7.3% are Indians, and 0.7% 
are from other ethnic groups (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2010).  
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 Under British rule, Chinese and Indians were brought into Malaya to work in tin mining and rubber 
plantation estates, respectively. These two main economic activities were new to the Malays, who were 
not familiar with them (Jomo and Hui, 2003).  
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Malaysia is a small, open economy and susceptible to changes in the global economy. It 
is an upper-middle income economy with a USD 7,900 per capita nominal income 
(World Bank, 2011). The country maintains an open and liberal trading regime, which 
is supported by longer-term adjustment policies. For example, Malaysia implements a 
series of different five-year plans for its economic development, which transformed the 
country from an agricultural and mining-based economy to an economy based on 
manufacturing and services (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b).  
After independence in 1957, Malaysia relied on its agricultural sector; with rubber as its 
main commodity, contributing more than 30.0% of GDP and more than 50.0% of export 
earnings in 1960s. Rubber and tin were the major commodities from which the British 
have benefited the most in the colonial era. Malaysia relies on its New Economic Policy 
(NEP) and its five-year national development plans for economic transformation. 
However, as commodity prices fell in the first half of the 1980s, the country has 
diversified its sources of growth to improve productivity. The country has shifted its 
economic strategy from an agriculture-based sector to its manufacturing sector. To 
materialise this economic strategy, the government of Malaysia implemented 
institutional reforms on the public sector, liberalised restrictive laws and offered fiscal 
incentives to boost business confidence and reduce the cost of operating in Malaysia 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b). This transformation attracted foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the private sector to invest in Malaysia, which would be the main driver for 
Malaysian economic growth (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b).
83
 In addition, Malaysia 
introduced ‘Vision 2020’ in 1990 with an aspiration to become a developed country by 
the year 2020. With such vision, from a producer of raw materials such as tin and 
rubber in the 1970s, Malaysia is progressing to becoming a multi-sector economy. 
Currently, Malaysia can be described as a leading exporter of electrical components and 
appliances, palm oil and natural gas (World Bank, 2011). 
Malaysia’s recent development can be observed from its gross domestic product (GDP); 
Malaysian average annual GDP was 7.2% from 1961 to 1980; and for the years 1981 to 
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 To support this economic reform, the government introduced the Investment Incentive Act 1968 and 
Promotion of Investment Act 1986, which support a range of new tax incentives for the manufacturing 
sector. 
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1996, the Malaysian GDP has increased to an annual average of 7.4%. The strong 
economic growth in 1981–1996 was influenced by large domestic capital accumulation 
and a large influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Athukorala and Menon, 1995, 
Athukorala, 2002). The rapid increase of FDI in the period mentioned above is a result 
of the introduction of the Investment Incentive Act 1968, export incentive provisions, 
economic policy reform, and the establishment of free trade zones (Ang 2008, 2009). 
Moreover, sound macroeconomic management, sustained economic growth, low set-up 
costs, adequate human resources, stable political environment and a well-functioning 
financial system have also attracted large amount of FDI into Malaysia (Ang 2008, 
2009). However, from 1997 to 2003, average annual GDP declined to 3.5% due to the 
impact of Asian financial crisis (Ang, 2007) and then recovered between 2000 and 2008 
in which Malaysia registered an average annual growth in GDP of 5.5%. Consequently, 
the Malaysian GDP for 2009, 2010 and 2011 were at -1.7%, 7.2% and 5.6% 
respectively. The contraction of GDP by 1.7% in 2009 was a result of impact from 
global credit crisis (discussed later in this chapter). In addition, the country’s poverty 
level has also declined from 12.3% in 1984 to 2.3% in 2009 (World Bank, 2011). 
4.3 Overview of the Malaysian Banking System between 2000 and 2011 
Like many other developing and emerging economies, Malaysia’s financial system is a 
bank-based system.
84
 Malaysia inherited a foreign-dominated banking system at the 
time of independence in 1957 after the British colonial administration left Malaysia. 
The Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) (i.e. the Central Bank of Malaysia) was established 
in 1959. At this time there were 18 foreign commercial banks with a total of 99 
branches operating in the country, as opposed to only eight domestic commercial banks 
with in total only 12 branches. The foreign banks held over 90.0% of the share of the 
market in 1957 (Detgriache and Gupta, 2006). The foreign banks (mainly British-owned 
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 A bank-based system is one in which banks take a leading role in mobilising savings, allocating capital, 
monitoring and exercising corporate control and providing portfolio management based on savers’ 
appetite for risk. In contrast, the market-based system refers to a system with the securities market as the 
main driver alongside banks in getting society savings into firms and exerting corporate control (Levine, 
2002). In Malaysia, the banking system remains the main source of finance. Nevertheless, the capital 
market has also gained importance; both the banking and financial market systems continue to play a role 
in providing sources of finance to Malaysian firms (Ibrahim, 2011). 
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banks) established before independence specialised in foreign exchange business, 
finance in foreign trade, rubber plantation and tin mines (Matthews and Ismail, 2006). 
At the stage of initiation, the main focus of BNM was to promote and protect the 
domestic banks. In order to achieve this objective, regulatory restrictions were imposed 
on the establishment of new foreign banks and their branches (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). 
Foreign banks have been prohibited to open new branches since 1971 and the last 
foreign bank allowed to enter the market was the Bank of Nova Scotia in 1973. As a 
result, the number of domestic banks surpassed the number of foreign banks in 1976 
(Ibrahim, 2011, Sufian, 2011).
85
 However, the number of domestic banks declined by 
the end of 2001 following the merger and consolidation exercises encouraged and 
coordinated by the government and BNM after the Asian financial crisis (Matthews and 
Ismail, 2006; Bank Negara Malaysia, 2002, 2011a). 
Banking institutions in Malaysia are regulated by the Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act 1989 (BAFIA 1989) (except for Islamic banks, which are regulated under Islamic 
Banking Act 1983). This Act was introduced primarily due to the failure of a number of 
deposit-taking cooperatives in the 1980s, which consequently threatened the stability 
and integrity of the banking system (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b). Therefore, this Act 
was increasingly necessary to support the growing competition in the banking system 
and to define the boundary banking institutions’ operations. One of the objectives of 
BAFIA (1989) is to provide an integrated supervision of the banking institutions and to 
improve the current laws of banking operations. The Act also includes different related 
institutions such as discount houses, and money and foreign exchange brokers under the 
single supervisory and regulatory regime of the Central Bank (BNM).  
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 By 1994, all foreign bank branches were required to be locally incorporated. A locally incorporated 
foreign bank is a subsidiary (separate entity) owned by a foreign parent bank in the host country and 
required to operate under the regulation of the host country. In contrast to locally incorporated foreign 
banks, foreign bank branches are obliged to follow both home and host country regulation, which relies 
on the parent bank’s capital (Ball and Tschoegl, 1982). Both foreign banks’ structures have implications 
for the competitive structure of the host country’s banking system, which also affects the price and 
quality of banking services. For example, a foreign subsidiary can apply direct competition with domestic 
banks and ring-fence their operation from parent banks. On the other hand, the operation of foreign 
branches is normally underdeveloped, which concentrates on certain segments of business in the host 
country (Cerutti et al., 2007). 
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At the end of 2011 (see Figure 4.2), the structure of the Malaysian financial system 
could be divided into three main sections: financial institutions, non-financial 
institutions and financial markets. Under the banking sector, the main players under the 
jurisdiction of BNM are the commercial banks, Islamic banks, Insurance and Takaful 
companies, and investment banks. However, investment banks in Malaysia are jointly 
supervised by BNM and the Securities Commission (SC) due to the overlapping nature 
of their activities. On the other hand, the main financial markets that affect the banking 
sector in Malaysia are the money and foreign exchange markets.  
Figure ‎4.2 The Structure of the Malaysian Financial System as of December 2011 
 
Adapted from Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011b 
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In Malaysia, the banking system is the largest component, accounting for approximately 
50.0% of the total assets of the Malaysian financial system (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2011a). Malaysian banks have been the largest mobilisers of deposits, enabling them to 
perform intermediation functions and contribute to economic growth (Loke, 2011). The 
banking and financial system accounted for 115.0% of Malaysian gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2011 and has grown by an average annual rate of 7.1% since 2000 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2012a). At the end of 2011, there were 56 banks operating in 
Malaysia including 25 commercial banks, 16 Islamic banks and 15 investment banks 
(see Table 4.1). 
Table ‎4.1 Malaysian Banks as of December 2011 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin – December 2011 
Since independence in 1957, the Malaysian banking system has been regulated by Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM), which was established on 26 January 1959 under the Central 
Bank of Malaya Ordinance, 1958 (CBO). The CBO was revised in 1994 as the Central 
Commercial Banks
1. Affin Bank Berhad 14. Citibank Berhad *
2. Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad 15. Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Berhad *
3. AmBank (M) Berhad 16. HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad *
4. CIMB Bank Berhad 17. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad *
5. Hong Leong Bank Berhad 18. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank Berhad *
6. Malayan Banking Berhad 19. Mizuho Corporate Bank (Malaysia) Berhad *
7. Public Bank Berhad 20. OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad *
8. RHB Bank Berhad 21. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad *
9. Bangkok Bank Berhad * 22. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Malaysia Berhad *
10. Bank of America Malaysia Berhad * 23. The Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad *
11. Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad * 24. The Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad *
12. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad * 25. United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Berhad *
13. BNP Paribas Malaysia Berhad *
Islamic Banks
1. Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 9. Public Islamic Bank Berhad
2. Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 10. RHB Islamic Bank Berhad
3. AmIslamic Bank Berhad 11. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad *
4. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 12. Asian Finance Bank Berhad *
5. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad 13. HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad *
6. CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad 14. Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad *
7. Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 15. OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad *
8. Maybank Islamic Berhad 16. Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad *
Investment Banks
1. Affin Investment Bank Berhad 9. Kenanga Investment Bank Berhad
2. Alliance Investment Bank Berhad 10. Maybank Investment Bank Berhad
3. AmInvestment Bank Berhad 11. MIDF Amanah Investment Bank Berhad
4. CIMB Investment Bank Berhad 12. MIMB Investment Bank Berhad
5. ECM Libra Investment Bank Berhad 13. OSK Investment Bank Berhad
6. Hong Leong Investment Bank Berhad 14. Public Investment Bank Berhad
7. Hwang-DBS Investment Bank Berhad 15. RHB Investment Bank Berhad
8. KAF Investment Bank Berhad
* Foreign-owned banks
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Bank of Malaysia Act, 1958 (CBA, 1958). The CBA defines BNM as the bank that 
governs the monetary and banking structure of the country. In 1989, the Banking and 
Financial Institution Act, 1989 (BAFIA, 1989) was introduced, extending BNM’s 
powers of supervision and regulation of financial and deposit-taking institutions (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 1999b). Then in 2009, the CBA (1958) was repealed with the 
introduction of Central Bank of Malaysia Act, 2009 (CBA, 2009), which came into 
force on 25 November 2009 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009a). In the new CBA, the 
mandates of BNM have been broadened, empowering the Central Bank to: 
1. Formulate and conduct monetary policy; 
2. Issue currency in Malaysia;  
3. Regulate and supervise financial institutions based on laws enforced by BNM; 
4. Provide oversight over money and foreign exchange markets; 
5. Exercise oversight over payment systems; 
6. Promote a sound, progressive and inclusive financial system; 
7. Manage Malaysian foreign reserves; 
8. Promote an exchange rate regime according to the fundamentals of the economy; 
and 
9. Act as a financial adviser, banker and financial agent of the Government. 
The mandates in CBA 2009 are inter-related and complementary. As the issuer of 
currency, BNM has to ensure that the domestic prices remain stable and the benefit of 
economic growth is not eroded (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b). At the same time, 
BNM is required to promote monetary stability by pursuing a monetary policy that 
serves the interests of the country with the primary objective of maintaining price 
stability while giving due regard to developments in the economy. To support price 
stability, a stable financial infrastructure is required to ensure that the monetary policy 
measures implemented are effective. This will allow the smooth functioning of the 
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intermediation process so that domestic savings are mobilised and transmitted to 
investors and savers, thereby contributing to overall growth in investment and output. In 
carrying out its financial stability mandate, BNM has the responsibility and powers to 
minimise the likelihood and impact of adverse developments that may affect financial 
stability including the financial intermediation process, the orderly functioning of the 
foreign exchange and money markets and public confidence in the financial system. 
Concurrently, BNM continues to act as lender of last resort and provide the necessary 
liquidity to contain liquidity shocks (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b, 2009a, 2009b). 
Additionally, recognising the importance of monetary policy for price stability, it is also 
essential that there is coordination with fiscal policy to achieve an optimal mix of both 
policies for price stability. Therefore, BNM continues its role to act as financial adviser, 
banker and financial agent to the government of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2009a). 
The regulations and liberalisation measures introduced by BNM during the years 2000 
to 2011 are based on the economic and banking market conditions (see Figure 4.3). 
Before the introduction of Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) in 2001, Malaysia 
faced the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, which started in Thailand and has been 
rapidly transmitted to Malaysia. The crisis initially started as a currency crisis and 
subsequently affected the stock market, which resulted in a sharp fall of stock indices in 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) (Sufian, 2009). Hence, investors started to 
withdraw their positions in the stock market and dispose of Malaysian Ringgit, which 
consequently resulted in ‘twin crises’ (the currency and banking crises) (Jomo and Chin, 
2001). This eventually escalated into an economic crisis, which affected the corporate 
sector and the domestic economy. At the onset of the Asian financial crisis, Malaysian 
banks’ credit exposure was largely from the corporate sector, the broad property sector 
(including the construction sector) and the purchase of securities. As the ability of the 
corporate sector to service its debt obligations deteriorated, non-performing loans (NPL) 
increased subsequently. This resulted in a deterioration in asset quality and weakened 
banks’ balance sheet position, creating insolvency threats (Rajoo, 2008). Additionally, 
due to declining public confidence, depositors also shifted their funds from smaller 
banks to larger banks; in view that smaller banks experienced heavy withdrawals even 
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though they were solvent. This resulted in liquidity problems in the smaller banks (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 1997). During this period of uncertainty, banks were unable to 
withstand these economic shocks due to poor risk management, weak asset management, 
inadequate internal policies and excessive lending concentrated in large corporates (Ang 
and McKibbin, 2007; Said et al., 2008).86 
Figure ‎4.3 Overview of Malaysian Banking Sector Development, 1997-2011 
 
Note: This figure is prepared using various sources from Bank Negara Malaysia Annual 
Reports (1997-2011), Bank Negara Malaysia Financial Stability and Payment System 
Reports (2006-2011), Financial Sector Master Plan (2001), Financial Sector Blueprint 
(2011), and various published literature on Malaysian general banking, banking 
efficiency, and economic performance. 
                                                 
86
 The weaknesses of the banking system in Malaysia during the Asian financial crisis are outlined by 
Sulaiman and Govindan (2000); first, in getting funds for the private sector the economy is dependent on 
the banking system, which leads to a funding mismatch and undue interest rate risks. Second, collateral is 
used as a basis for granting loans rather than credit assessment, encouraging banks to take excessive risks 
particularly when collateral value deteriorates. Third, substantial inflows of foreign funds are invested in 
share markets and properties, resulting in volatility in asset prices.  
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Subsequent to the crisis, the government provided a generalised guarantee for bank 
depositors in early 1998, followed by an easing of monetary policy (i.e. reducing the 
interest rate) and reducing the reserve requirement of the banks to support the liquidity 
of the banking system (Detragiache and Gupta, 2006; Goh et al., 2003). In addition to 
the above, two policy responses were introduced at this stage; first, the restructuring and 
rationalising of the financial system and second, implementing capital controls, by 
prohibiting the internalisation of Malaysian Ringgit and adopting a fixed exchange rate 
regime, by pegging the Malaysian Ringgit to US Dollars (Goh et al., 2003).
87
 Two 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) entities were established to support the policy measures 
taken and ensure that banks continued to focus on lending activities to support 
economic growth: first, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta), which was 
in charge of buying non-performing loans (NPL) at a discount from banks; and second, 
Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal), which provided new capital in selected 
institutions (see Figure 4.4) (Detragiache and Gupta, 2006; Sufian, 2009; Abdul Majid 
et al., 2011). By 1999, the Malaysian economy rebounded after a sharp downturn in 
1998. The consolidation programme was also completed in 2001 except for a couple of 
banks that merged in 2003 due to unresolved shareholders issues. As a result, the 
number of domestic banks contracted from 23 to 10 banking groups (Abdul Majid et al., 
2011; Hon et al., 2011; Ramlee and Mohd Said, 2009). 
                                                 
87
 First, structural changes were made to rationalise the financial system (where banks are consolidated to 
reduce their number, consequently increasing the level of banks’ capital). The purpose of this initiative 
was to prepare the domestic banks to face competition when the banking sector is liberalised under the 
World Trade Organization’s provisions (Goh et al., 2003; Khrishnasamy et al., 2004). The consolidation 
initiative also broadens the product mix, reduces cost and increases the size of capital and assets of the 
domestic banks to enable them to compete against foreign banks in the local as well as in the international 
market (Tahir et al., 2008). Second, the Malaysian government also adopted a fixed exchange rate regime 
during the Asian financial crisis. This initiative helped Malaysia to insulate the economy from external 
uncertainties. The step taken to peg the Malaysian Ringgit was intended to allow a decline in interest rates 
without affecting the value of Malaysian currency (Detragiache and Gupta, 2006). 
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Figure ‎4.4 Restructuring Plan for the Malaysian Banking Sector 
 
Adapted from Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Reports (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000, 
2001a) 
Based on Figure 4.4, one of the long-term objectives of the banking sector restructuring 
was to provide a future direction for the Malaysian banking system. Therefore, in March 
2001, BNM introduced the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP). The FSMP set the 
medium- and longer-term agenda to build a financial sector that is resilient, efficient 
and competitive, and responsive to changing requirements (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2001a, 2001b). The FSMP played an important role in the liberalisation process of the 
financial system covering the banking sector, the insurance sector, the Islamic banking 
sector, financial development institutions, alternative modes of financing and the 
Labuan International Offshore Financial Centre. The time-frame of the plan spanned ten 
years in three major sequenced phases. The FSMP adopted a gradual approach, 
allowing sufficient time for a sequenced and comprehensive development of the 
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financial sector (see Figure 4.5) (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001b).
88
 There were 119 
recommendations over six sectors with following objectives: 
1. First phase (2000–2003) 89:  to enhance the capacity of domestic banking institutions 
and strengthen financial infrastructure; in this phase, the focus was to strengthen the 
capability and capacity of domestic banks, and building and enhancing the financial 
infrastructure of Malaysian banking industry. At the same time, steps were taken to 
create the necessary infrastructure for a more market-based consumer protection 
framework to foster further competition among banks. The result from this phase is 
to expect the emergence of domestic banks that were stronger, more efficient and 
innovative, and increasingly competitive and resilient (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2001b). 
2. Second phase (2004–2007): to intensify competitive pressure in the domestic 
financial sector; this phase emphasised creating an increasingly levelled playing 
field for incumbent foreign players. Several restrictions for foreign banks were 
removed to add further competition to the banking industry, as well as providing 
wider choices for the consumers. These steps were implemented gradually 
depending on the overall ability of the financial system to absorb these changes 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001b); and 
                                                 
88
 As pointed out by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), financial liberalisation is hypothesised to 
benefit the financial system by increasing the efficiency level of players within the industry by exposing 
them to the competition, which can enhance domestic savings as well as investment. Nonetheless, there 
are studies indicate that severe crises can occur after the ‘big-bang’ implementation of financial 
liberalisation (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999; Weller, 2001). Aware of the adverse 
experiences of the ‘big-bang’ financial reform approach in other countries, BNM has employed a 
gradualist approach in the liberalisation process on its financial system to reduce the risks of destabilising 
implications (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2003; Njie, 2007). 
89
 There were no specific timelines for these three phases of the FSMP. The timelines were subjected to 
achievements of banking sector in meeting specified objectives of these phases. This flexible approach 
allows BNM’s policy measures being implemented during the first phase to continue and overlap during 
second- and third-phase, depending on orderly adjustments made by Malaysian banks to a more 
competitive and increasingly deregulated and liberalised market (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001b). For this 
study, to reflect the policy measures implemented by BNM in these three phases, they are grouped into 
2000-2003, 2004-2007 and 2008-2011. The inclusion of years 2000 and 2011 in the first- and third-phase 
(respectively) is to indicate the implementation of several policy measures of the FSMP being performed 
outside the planned timeline (i.e. 2001-2010). For example, due to unforeseen circumstances, events such 
as global credit crisis in 2007 had delayed some of planned liberalisation initiatives of the third-phase 
FSMP, with them being performed beyond 2010 (e.g. commencement of operation of new foreign banks). 
This delay was however necessary to ensure that the outcome of policy measures is achieved without 
destabilising impacts to the banking sector (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010b, 2011b).  
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3. Third phase (2008–2011): to introduce new foreign competition and assimilation 
into the global arena; in third phase of the FSMP, new foreign banks were permitted 
to provide competitive pressure to incumbent banking institutions, which would also 
serve as an incentive against complacency and to remain competitive. Additionally, 
with intensifying degree of global competition and greater assimilation into the 
global arena, the banking sector was introduced with more liberalisation measures 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001b).
 
 
Figure ‎4.5 The three Phases of the Financial Sector Master Plan, 2001-2010 
 
Adapted from Financial Sector Master Plan 2001 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001b) 
During the consolidation of the banking sector, issues relating to branches and staff 
strength became inevitable in minimising a duplication of resources and maximising 
consolidation benefits. There were not more than 10,000 personnel affected by 
redundancy during this consolidation exercise. In view of that, through the staff training 
fund, reskilling initiatives were introduced to facilitate the smooth transition of the 
workforce into other industries in the economy (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000, 2001a). 
At the same time, several deregulation measures were taken by BNM prior to the 
implementation of the FSMP. For example, in recognising the manpower capabilities, 
expertise and a degree of innovation that give rise to the competitive edge of banking 
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institutions, BNM abolished the guideline on wage moratorium for the banking sector. 
With this liberalisation measure, banks could retain an experienced and high quality 
pool of bankers who were in the industry as well as attracting best talents into the 
industry. Banks were also provided with greater autonomy to determine the salaries and 
wages of their employees; a remuneration committee on the Board of Directors had to 
be established to determine the remuneration package for senior management and key 
personnel (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000).  
In recognising the impact of technology as an enabler to improve efficiency and 
competition of the banks, an alternative delivery channel was required to reach out to 
the customers of banking institutions. Therefore, BNM allowed banking institutions to 
offer a full range of banking products and services over the Internet. The approach taken 
by BNM for this move was in line with the principles of FSMP’s gradual liberalisation 
programme, and domestic banks were given a head start in June 2000. The foreign 
banks, on the other hand, were allowed to provide communicative Internet banking 
services from January 2001 and transactional Internet banking services in January 2002 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000, 2001). This technology driven delivery channel was 
expected to benefit the foreign banks, particularly when branching was restricted by the 
regulator (Khrishnasamy et al., 2004). 
As consolidation and liberalisation of the financial system took place, there was an 
increase in the blurring segregation of distinctions between activities of different groups 
of financial institutions. Hence, in removing this artificial barrier, in 2000, BNM 
allowed banks to freely cross-sell financial products and services of entities within the 
same group, including those belonging to their related non-bank financial institutions 
(Tahir et al., 2008, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000). This provided a more level playing 
field for smaller banking institutions as they were able to tap a larger pool of customers 
using broader marketing channels with greater cost savings, and relying on the expertise 
of larger banking institutions. This would also allow the improvement of banking 
groups operations via centralisation and prevent the duplication of similar operational 
functions (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000). In the same year, to enhance the competition 
and efficiency of banks, the banking sector was granted blanket approval to outsource 
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its non-core operational functions, such as payroll and data entry processes, to third-
party service providers. With this, banks may not have had to invest a significant 
amount of time and funds to undertake such functions, which allowed them to 
concentrate their resources on developing competencies in their core areas of business 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2000). 
Learning from the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, which highlighted that poor credit risk 
management is a source of vulnerability in banking institutions, BNM introduced in 
2001 guidelines on best practices for the Management of Credit Risk, which assisted 
banks towards upgrading the practice of banking institutions with regards to credit 
management and administration. The guidelines introduced four pillars: First, they 
increased the responsibility of the board of directors and management for the credit risk 
management process. Second, they improved the infrastructure for effective credit risk 
management. Third, they developed an integrated risk management process, and fourth, 
they established comprehensive internal controls and audit procedures for credit risk 
management (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001a). Additionally, BNM also initiated an 
improved and up-to-date centralised electronic database of credit information of 
banking institutions’ borrowers known as Central Credit Reference Information System 
(CCRIS). CCRIS would assist banking institutions in their credit assessment and 
monitoring process by conducting background checks and the levels of indebtedness of 
borrowers in the banking system, as well as developing a sound credit culture in the 
banking sector (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001a).  
In 2002, further deregulation was made on new product approval processes. Before the 
introduction of this guideline, banking institutions were required to meet a pre-approval 
requirement prior to introducing new products or activities. This was imposed to protect 
consumers as well ensure the orderly development of the financial market. Recognising 
the importance of regulatory environments that are market-driven, the new guideline 
provided a simpler product notification and approval process, inspired by FSMP’s 
principle of ‘what is not prohibited is allowed’. As a consequence, this has incentivised 
banks to improve research and development for their niche products and services (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2002).  
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As part of the first phase of FSMP (2000-2003) in preparing domestic banks to face 
market liberalisation, the newly-established consolidated banking groups were allowed 
to hold two licences; one, to carry on banking business, and the other, to carry finance 
company business. This is further improved by amending the Banking and Financial 
Institution Act 1989 to allow the merger of commercial banks and finance companies 
within a domestic banking group as a single legal entity. The amendment of the legal 
framework changed the structure of internal operations of domestic banking groups to 
face competition as well as improved efficiency (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2003).  
As the banking sector moved into the second phase of the FSMP (i.e. 2004-2007), the 
liberalisation measures continued, in which BNM initiated substantial changes in the 
conduct of monetary policy. On 23 April 2004, BNM introduced a New Interest Rate 
Framework (NIRF) to strengthen the monetary policy transmission mechanism and 
promote better pricing based on demand in the financial system (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2004). The NIRF is designed for the implementation of monetary policy, which 
consequently facilitates the transmission of a policy rate based on the new Overnight 
Policy Rate (OPR).
90
 This deregulation regarding pricing is one of the key initiatives 
implemented under FSMP for better allocation and distribution of resources in the 
financial system (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004). The implementation of deregulated 
interest rates requires banks to compete, as autonomy in pricing can be an important 
factor for gaining market share based on respective cost structures and economic 
conditions, which in turn can benefit consumers and the banking sector as a whole.  
Another significant milestone to the liberalisation of banking system relates to the 
development of Islamic banking. The planned liberalisation of the Islamic banking 
sector was brought forward from 2007 to 2004 with the issuance of three new Islamic 
banking licences under the Islamic Banking Act 1983 to Islamic financial institutions 
                                                 
90
 The OPR replaced the three-month intervention rate and corresponding overnight interbank rate, and 
was used as an operating target and indicator of the monetary policy stance. Another important aspect of 
the new interest rate framework, it removed both the ceiling on the base lending rates (BLRs) and the 
prescribed lending spreads. Hence, Malaysian banks are allowed to set their own BLRs using their 
respective cost structures, risks and business strategies. This change allowed the transmission of policy 
rates into other market rates and enabled banks to implement more efficient pricing of products and 
services (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004). 
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from the Middle East, namely the Kuwait Finance House, Al Rajhi Banking and 
Investment Corporation and a consortium of Islamic financial institutions represented 
by the Qatar Islamic Bank, RUSD Investment Bank Incorporated and Global 
Investment House (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004).
91
 The introduction of new foreign 
Islamic banks into the Malaysian banking system provided the required competition 
within the market and improved the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia and the South 
East Asia region (Suffian, 2010). These new entrants promoted the exchange of 
knowledge and expertise as well as improving financial linkages between Malaysia and 
the Middle East. Additionally, to further enhance the institutional structure and human 
capital development of the Islamic banking system, there was a review of the Islamic 
Banking Scheme (IBS)
92, which uses the ‘window-based’ institutional structure, with 
the result that both domestic and foreign banks with IBS were encouraged to establish 
their respective Islamic subsidiaries and license them under the Islamic Banking Act 
1983. The primary aim of converting IBS to an Islamic bank subsidiary was to improve 
the strategic focus of Islamic banks, while at the same time continuing to rely on a 
synergy of conventional banking operating infrastructures (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2004). 
The presence of foreign banks, which is supported by extensive research capability from 
their international operations network, has contributed to a significant development of 
the banking sector in Malaysia, particularly through capital investment, the creation of 
employment opportunities and the transfer of skills and technology (Ang, 2008, 2009). 
Thus, another gradual liberalisation measure taken under FSMP initiatives is to 
introduce a more competitive environment for domestic banks. For this, BNM allows 
foreign banks to open up to four additional branches subject to a predetermined ratio of 
additional branches in market centres, urban areas and non-urban areas (Bank Negara 
                                                 
91
 Nevertheless, these new Islamic banks commenced operations in 2006. This initiative is in line with the 
aspiration of FSMP, which is to make Malaysia an international Islamic hub (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2004). 
92
 Under the IBS framework, the conventional banking institutions were allowed to provide Islamic 
banking products and services. This arrangement was called ‘Islamic windows’: in order to operate, the 
commercial banks should have a separate and dedicated Islamic Banking Division within its structure. 
The operation and maintenance of Islamic banking operations as profit and cost entities should be 
separate from conventional banking (i.e. there should be a firewall), although the physical capital and 
staff can be shared with conventional banks. Banks with IBS should disclose separate Islamic financial 
reports with their financial statements (Abdul Majid et al., 2011; Kamaruddin et al., 2008). 
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Malaysia, 2005). With this policy, foreign banks are expected to provide a greater level 
of competition in the banking market, while at the same time to improve their socio-
economic obligations to serve non-urban areas. 
Realising the importance of the capital market within the financial system, BNM and 
Securities Commission (SC) introduced the investment banking framework in March 
2005. The framework aims to broaden the scope of activities of merged entities based 
on the types of licences held prior to consolidation and to share the regulatory burden 
between BNM and SC. Investment banks can be formed via various merger 
permutations. For example, newly-established investment banks can be materialised 
from either the merger of a merchant bank and a stockbroking company within the same 
banking group, or a merger of two stand-alone discount houses with a stockbroking 
company (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). Hence, this investment banking framework 
resulted in a dual regulatory regime, in which the responsibilities of prudential 
regulations and market conduct are placed under the purview of BNM and SC, 
respectively (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). 
The introduction of deposit insurance is identified in the FSMP to provide an adequate 
safety net for the promotion of financial stability, particularly in protecting depositors. 
The Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation (Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia, 
or PIDM) was established in 2005, with the enactment of the Malaysia Deposit 
Insurance Act 2005, which aimed to provide least-cost resolution options when dealing 
with problem banks (Rajoo, 2008). With the implementation of PIDM’s differential 
premium system, sound risk management and a greater degree of efficiency in banks is 
expected from banking institutions (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b). In the same year, 
under the consumer protection framework, BNM established a Credit Counselling and 
Debt Management Agency (Agensi Kaunseling dan Pegurusan Kredit, or AKPK) to 
ensure consumers had sufficient avenues to seek assistance and redress when they faced 
problems with their financial institutions. The agency also helped consumers to seek 
advice on managing credit and equip them with the necessary skills to manage their 
finances (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005).  
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Following the pegging of the Malaysian Ringgit during the Asian financial crisis in 
1998, BNM finally announced the floating of the Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) on 21 July 
2005 through a managed floating exchange rate regime, where the value of ringgit was 
determined by economic fundamentals (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). Malaysia also 
relaxed some of its capital control measures by liberalising a number of foreign 
exchange administration rules, for example by simplification of the reporting 
requirements for exporters, increasing the overnight limit of foreign currency accounts 
for residents, extending loans in Malaysian Ringgit to non-residents and allowing 
residents to enter into forward foreign exchange contracts (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2004). 
In 2006, a transformation exercise within BNM was carried out to streamline both 
regulatory and supervisory functions. Financial stability mandates became necessary to 
ensure the smooth progress of financial development and liberalisation. Hence, a 
dedicated macro-prudential orientation surveillance was further enhanced with the 
setting up of a Financial Surveillance department. The department was entrusted to 
undertake integrated identification of vulnerabilities through appropriate assessment via 
collaborative mechanisms within BNM and with other domestic regulators to emanate 
risks from domestic and international developments for the overall stability and 
functioning of the financial system. The department worked closely with the 
supervision departments to ensure that their risk assessment incorporated both macro-
prudential and micro-prudential standpoints (Abdul Ghani, 2010; Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2006b). 
In order to improve product innovations and the efficiency of the banking sector, in 
2007, BNM introduced a ‘launch-and-file’ system that removed the regulatory 
notification and approval requirements prior to the introduction of new products by 
banking institutions. The deregulation initiative can reduce the time needed to market 
new products, allowing banks to respond faster to the changes in the market. It is 
however applicable only to conventional banks, but not Islamic banks. However, 
investment products that could expose customers to losses exceeding the principal sum 
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invested must undergo the normal process where approvals should be attained from 
BNM (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b).  
As the timeline progressed into the end of second phase of the FSMP (i.e. 2004-2007), 
the Malaysian economy experienced a steady growth (i.e. GDP) averaging close to 6.0% 
from 2005 to 2007. Following the early onset of the global credit crisis, the Malaysian 
financial system was insulated from the global turmoil. In 2007, the downside risks 
from US subprime and credit market events were felt only in increased volatility in 
equity and bond markets, due to the small direct and indirect exposure of financial 
institutions from subprime related instruments, which accounted for about 0.3% of the 
banking system capital base (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b). The continued 
accumulation of a capital buffer during the earlier first two phases of financial 
liberalisation had resulted in improved capacity of the banking sector to withstand 
higher risk levels from greater market volatility and financial shocks (Tan, 2011; Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2007a, 2007b).
93
 
However, Malaysia is an open economy and relies heavily on external trade. The impact 
of the global recession was felt strongly and recorded a heavy decline in exports in the 
second half of 2008. The effect of the decline in the trade flow via the real economy has 
affected outputs, employment opportunities, and private investment and consumption 
activities (Tan, 2011). Malaysia also experienced an increase in prices reflected from 
the higher global inflation rates.
94
 With inflation concerns, the international financial 
markets were also experiencing disruptions mainly due to the collapse of the US 
subprime mortgage market in the middle of 2007, which led to disorder in the financial 
market. The valuation of asset-backed securities (ABS) using subprime markets as 
underlying assets became more complicated as delinquencies increased. As a result, 
several major international financial institutions suffered large write-downs and losses. 
                                                 
93
 Responding to emerging risks during the early period of the crisis, several Malaysian banks pre-
emptively increased their capital positions through rights issues and Tier-1 capital instruments in 
anticipation of a worsened global crisis; this resulted in a stronger capital position for absorbing a 
potential adverse impact (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b).  
94
 For example, in 2007, the global oil prices broke USD 100 per barrel for the first time in history, which 
in return affected other commodity prices. The impact of high food and fuel prices on inflation was also 
felt in emerging economies, such as Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008a). 
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The decline of the capital base and inability of US banks to raise sufficient funds 
indicates that the US banking sector was facing a severe crisis. In September 2008, 
following the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was a freeze in the 
interbank money market, which hindered ‘business as usual’ activities (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2008a). The global financial crisis resulted in widespread effects on an 
unprecedented scale across the world. Given its trade and investment linkages with the 
rest of the world, Malaysia was not spared from the impact of the global crisis (Lee, 
2011). As a result, the Malaysian economy contracted by 1.7% in the full year of 2009 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009a).  
Malaysia responded by initiating some policy actions to maintain confidence in the 
market. On 16 October 2008, the Ministry of Finance and BNM announced a blanket 
Government guarantee through PIDM on all Ringgit and foreign currency deposits 
placed with financial institutions regulated by BNM (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008a). 
The safety net was also further extended to insurance and the takaful
95
 sector to ensure 
adequate access to liquidity. The guarantee was in force until December 2010 (Ibrahim, 
2011). During this period of uncertainty, BNM also encouraged banks to engage pro-
actively with borrowers and provide debt management solutions and advice, such as 
restructuring and rescheduling of financial obligations and controlling new 
delinquencies that could be higher during an economic downturn (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2009b). 
In November 2008, to mitigate the impact of the economic and financial crisis between 
2008 and 2009 on domestic demand and to accommodate monetary policy, BNM via its 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reduced OPR by 25 basis points followed by 
another reduction of 75 and 50 basis points in January 2009 and February 2009, 
respectively. The overnight interbank rate in the money market decreased from 3.50% 
in November 2008 to 2.00% in 25
 
February 2009. In ensuring that policy rates are 
                                                 
95
 Takaful is a type of joint guarantee insurance mechanism based on ‘the law of large numbers’, in which 
a group of societal members pool their financial resources together against certain loss exposures. 
Takaful-branded insurance is based on Shariah (Islamic religious principles/laws, which prohibits riba 
(interest), al-maisir (gambling), and al-gharar (uncertainty) principles), and explains how it is the 
responsibility of individuals to cooperate and protect each other (Maysami and Kwon, 1999; Kwon, 2007). 
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transmitted to retail market rates, the statutory reserve requirements (SRR)
96
 of the 
banks were also reduced from 4.0% to 1.0% (Bank Negara Malaysia 2009a). As 
monetary policy eased between 2008 and 2009, there was uncertainty in the debt market 
due to lower yields; and with the low interest rate offered by the banking sector, it 
became more attractive for corporates to raise funds from banking institutions. 
Therefore, the government announced the establishment of Financial Guarantee 
Institution (Danajamin Nasional Berhad, or Danajamin) that provides credit guarantee 
to selected issuers. The establishment of Danajamin provided credit enhancements to 
bonds issuances, which in return, reduced financing costs, addressed potential maturity 
mismatches and diversified funding sources (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b, 2009a). 
Concurrently, realising that Malaysia was an economy with a high savings rate, BNM 
issued the Merdeka Savings Bond and Sukuk Simpanan Rakyat (Islamic Bond for 
citizen savings), totalling approximately MYR 7.0 billion for savers who depended on 
income from deposits. These household bonds had higher rate of return compared to the 
market interest rate (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009a).  
Learning from the 1997–1998 Asian Financial crisis, this global credit crisis was 
managed by a collective and coordinated response by both BNM and the entire 
government machinery. Therefore, the Malaysian government introduced a couple of 
stimulus packages between 2008 and 2009 to revive the economy. The first stimulus 
package was announced in November 2008 amounting to MYR 7.0 billion to support 
private spending. The second stimulus was announced in March 2009 as the global 
crisis worsened. A total of MYR 60.0 billion was provided in the second stimulus 
package to support economic activity. Although the amount was significantly larger 
than the first stimulus package, only MYR 15.0 billion was used for direct fiscal 
injection. The balance of the second package was used in the form of government 
guarantees, as equity investment by government’s investment company (Khazanah 
                                                 
96
 The statutory reserve requirement (SRR) is commonly employed by central banks as a regulation that 
sets the minimum fraction of customers’ deposits and notes that each commercial bank must hold as 
reserves (not to be lent out). SRR is normally in the form of cash stored physical in a bank vault or 
deposits made with a central bank (e.g. BNM). SRR could also be used as a tool to manage monetary 
policy of a country that influences the country’s borrowing and interest rates, which is done by adjusting 
the amount of funds available for commercial banks to lend out to customers (Weiner, 1992; Furfine, 
2000).  
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Nasional Berhad), private finance initiatives and tax incentives. The total overall 
stimulus packages totalling to 9.6% of GDP were implemented to spur businesses and 
households during the period of uncertainty (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009). The 
accelerated implementation of fiscal stimulus measures, easing of monetary policy, and 
improved access to financing have stabilised the economy, and the Malaysian economy 
recovered in the second half of 2009, particularly after a sharp contraction in the first 
half of 2009 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009a).  
During the period of unsettled global crisis, BNM continued to implement its 
liberalisation agenda in the third phase of FSMP (i.e. 2008-2011). Hence, in 2009, 
BNM announced three broad strategies to further liberalise its financial system by 
granting new issuance of banking licences, an increase in foreign equity limits and 
operation flexibilities in the establishment of new branches of foreign institutions as 
well as expatriates’ employment (Ibrahim, 2011; Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009b). After 
the evaluation process took place, five new commercial banking licences were granted 
in 2010 and one in 2009 to foreign financial institutions with expertise, global networks 
and good business capacity that could facilitate the growth and diversity of the 
Malaysian financial system as well as supporting international trade and investment 
flows (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010b).
97
 At the same time, branching liberalisation 
continued: four foreign banks obtained approval from BNM to operate 12 new branches 
nationwide (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010b).  
In relation to capital regulation, BNM also introduced Basel II for a standardised 
approach (Basel II SA) and the Internal Rating Based approach (Basel II IRB); they 
successfully implemented these new capital regulatory regimes in 2008 and 2010, 
respectively (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b, 2010b).
98
 By implementing this new 
international risk-based capital framework, the Malaysian banking sectors were 
                                                 
97
 The licences were granted to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, BNP Paribas, National Bank of 
Abu Dhabi, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and PT Bank Mandiri 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010b).  
98
 Basel II is the second series of capital regulatory measures of the Basel Accords. Basel II introduced 
operational risk and a new measurement of credit and market risks. It also included embedded governance 
guidelines in managing these risks, which affected the risk-weighted capital ratio (Lastra, 2004; Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005; Herring, 2005; Kupiec, 2007).  
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expected to improve their risk management, data gathering, information disclosure and 
business conduct. 
The Malaysian economy expanded by 7.2% in 2010. The growth was driven by strong 
domestic demand and expansion in private sector activity, as well as strong support by 
public sector programmes on infrastructure and delivery systems (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2010a). Hence, the OPR was adjusted upwards to manage the potential risk of 
financial imbalances.
99
 BNM normalised the OPR by gradually raising it by 25 basis 
points in March, May and July 2010. The SRR also increased by one percentage point at 
the same time intervals from 1% to 4%. Instruments such as Bank Negara Monetary 
Notes were also issued to mop excess liquidity, particularly from large short-term 
capital flows from large deposit inflows from European financial institutions (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2010a).  
A rapid increase in household indebtedness took place after the Asian Financial crisis in 
1997 (due to a shift of loan portfolios from corporates and businesses to households and 
retail segments). Supported by a series of low interest rates faced by the domestic 
banking market, this trend had the potential to become a risk concern. Therefore, a 
series of hikes in interest rates by BNM could have slowed down the rapid growth of 
household loans. However, to ensure the effectiveness of this monetary policy, a macro-
prudential policy was supplemented in November 2010 to deter excessive investment 
and speculative activity in the residential property market at certain locations. Using 
Loan-to-Value (LTV)
100
 measures, borrowers were subjected to an LTV ratio of 70% 
for third and subsequent house financing facilities. To reinforce prudent underwriting 
                                                 
99
 Financial imbalances can be formed in many ways such as unhealthy build-up of leverage, under-
pricing of risks, excessive yield-seeking activities, over-investment in certain markets, asset prices that 
are not fundamentally substance and increased risks to financial stability. Keeping a low interest rate for 
too long may translate into risks that suspend growth (Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2010). 
100
 The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is a financial term that is used to describe the ratio of a loan to the value 
of the asset being financed (e.g. home mortgage). LTV is used by banks as one of the key risk factors 
when assessing the underlying assets that the borrowers intend to purchase. A higher LTV ratio may 
indicate higher risk, in which banks face higher likelihood of absorbing losses due to low amount of 
equity to cover the potential default for loans (Qi and Yang, 2009). LTV measure is also used as macro-
prudential regulation instruments on commercial banks in several countries (e.g. Hong Kong, Korea, 
Malaysia and China) to reduce the risk of bank credit becoming a source of procyclicality risk and to 
strengthen banking sector resilience against asset price volatilities (Wong et al., 2011; Igan and Kang, 
2011).  
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practice, BNM revised the risk weight from 75% to 100%  for LTV exceeding 90%. In 
March 2011, another pre-emptive measure was introduced for credit card debt, where 
BNM tightened the requirement for credit cards for individuals earning monthly gross 
earnings of MYR 3,000 or less, where the number of cards and their credit limit should 
be available according to their debt repayment ability (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010b). 
At the end of the FSMP period, a new 10-year plan was introduced in 2011 called 
Financial Sector Blueprint (FSBP).
101
 FSBP moved away from the sector-based 
approach as adopted in the FSMP by introducing a blueprint that exhibits a more 
integrated financial sector with increased sectoral and cross-border interlinkages (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2011b, 2011c). FSBP specifies the direction to support the 
transformation of the financial landscape in the next decade with the aspiration to 
become a country with a high-value added and high-income economy. In addition, as 
the Competition Act 2012 (CA 2012) came into effect on January 2012 in all sectors in 
Malaysia, BNM and the Malaysian Competition Commission cooperated to ensure that 
smooth implementation would take place within the financial sector. The introduction 
of the Act complemented BNM efforts to improve a consumer protection framework by 
promoting and safeguarding process of competition (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011b).  
  
                                                 
101
 The FSBP is worked out based on four broad areas which are (1) evolving a financial sector that best 
serves the Malaysian economy, (2) enhancing regional and international financial linkages, (3) 
safeguarding the stability of the financial system, and (4) enhancing key enablers that support the 
development of the financial system. There are 69 recommendations to support these strategic outcomes 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011b). 
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Table ‎4.2 Liberalisation Measures in Malaysia, 2000-2011 
Year Salient Liberalisation Measures 
 
2000 Internet banking guidelines for internet banking services introduced, beginning with domestic banks in 
2000, followed by foreign banks in 2001, to commence transactional services in 2002. 
2000 Increase of capital funds for banking institutions, allowing adequate buffers to absorb unexpected 
shocks. 
2000 Banking institutions allowed to outsource their non-core and non-strategic operations to third-party 
providers. 
2000 Wage moratorium for banking sector was lifted and banks allowed to determine the salaries of 
personnel, to attract talent into the industry. 
2000 Banking institutions allowed to cross-sell various products within the financial group. 
2001 Benchmarking project by BNM to assess and evaluate banks and their peers in term of health and niche 
business operations and strategies. 
2001 Best practices introduced for management of credit risks for banking institution references. 
2001 Anti-Money Laundering Act 2001 introduced to combat illegal funds within banks. 
2001 Introduction of Central Credit Reference Information System (CCRIS), which collects data from 
borrowers on real time basis. 
2001 Financial Sector Master Plan introduced to chart the direction of Malaysian financial industry for the 
next 10 years including various liberalisation initiatives. 
2002 Liberalisation of internet payment gateway. Banks were allowed to use other operators. 
2002 Introduction of new product approval guidelines, which can improve the process of generic and plain 
vanilla products without having to follow long list of requirements. 
2003 Amendment to Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 and Bank and Financial Institutions Act 1989 to 
broaden authority of BNM. 
2003 Special relief provided by banking institutions to borrowers in Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome- 
(SARS-)affected Industries. 
2003 Financial Mediation Bureau established to support consumers in redress financial issues. 
2003 ‘Banking Info’ initiated to ensure consumers understand the common financial products and their 
features as well as risk embedded in those products. 
2004 Implementation of Basel II timeline for Malaysian banks, which was to commence in 2008 
(Standardised Approach) and 2010 (Internal Ratings-Based Approach). 
2004 Introduction of New Interest Rate Framework. OPR introduced as policy and indicative interest rate for 
market rate. Banking institutions allowed to set their own interest rate based on cost structure and 
business strategies. 
2004 Liberalisation of Islamic banks pushed forward by granting three new Islamic banking licences to 
foreign financial institutions 
2005 Branching liberalisation for locally incorporated foreign banks subjected to ratio of urban and non-urban 
branch network. 
2005 De-pegging of Malaysian Ringgit with several currency capital controls lifted to support fundamental 
economic activities. 
2006 Transformation of investment banks to which these banks are regulated by both BNM and SC. 
2006 Transformation of Islamic window operation of Islamic banking scheme to Islamic bank subsidiaries. 
2006 Operations of three new Islamic foreign banks, namely Kuwait Finance House, Al Rajhi Bank and Asian 
Finance Bank. 
2006 Credit counselling and debt management agency (AKPK) set up to support consumers in addressing 
issues they have with banking institutions as well as providing financial knowledge and awareness. 
2007 Liberalisation to the foreign exchange administration rules, providing better conditions for real sector 
players in performing transactional activities with foreign counterparts. 
2007 Introduction of launch and file system for new conventional banking products. 
2008 Establishment of Financial Guarantee Institution (Danajamin) to assist corporates in raising funds via 
debt capital market. 
2009 Relaxed monetary policy where OPR reduced by 75 basis points to overcome global crisis and 
introduction of various stimulus packages by the government to support fiscal growth. 
2009 Issuance of new banking licences to foreign bank: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. 
2010 Issuance of five new banking licences to foreign banks: BNP Paribas, National Bank of Abu Dhabi, 
Mizuho Corporate Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp and PT Bank Mandiri. 
2011 Introduction of Financial Sector Blueprint to steer the direction of banking sector for the next 10 years.  
2011 BNM work with competition commission for banking sector upon the introduction of Competition Act 
2012. 
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In summary, the Malaysian banking system has undergone a vast transformation after 
experiencing declines in the economy during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. 
Structural reforms made since the Asian financial crisis have led to changes in the 
financial landscape and at the same time, contributed towards strengthening of 
fundamentals and the resilience of domestic financial systems. A series of systematic 
and sequenced liberalisation (see Table 4.2) was introduced following the Asian 
financial crisis, which resulted in a banking system that was able to withstand economic 
shocks (as observed and evidenced in the impact of the global credit crisis in 2008-2010 
and discussed later in this chapter). 
4.4 The Structure of Malaysian Banks 
The discussions in the previous section focused on the background of Malaysian 
banking system and the liberalisation measures (e.g. FSMP) implemented by the 
Malaysian government and BNM. In this section the discussions are consequently 
continued on the structure of the Malaysian banks according to ownership and 
specialisation. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 (‘Empirical Studies of Banking 
Efficiency’), the structure of banking institutions is useful to explain the variation in 
efficiency of the banks (e.g by specialisation and by ownership structure). Additionally, 
this section outlines the financial position (e.g. balance sheet and income statement) of 
Malaysian banks and the effect of liberalisation measures (e.g. FSMP) between 2000 
and 2011.  
4.4.1 The Ownership of Malaysian Banks 
There are two major types of ownership in Malaysia: foreign banks and domestic banks. 
Foreign banks in Malaysia are subsidiaries owned by foreign parent banks. On the other 
hand, domestic banks can be owned by either Malaysian or foreign entities. However, 
foreign ownership in domestic banks is limited to only 30% of the total equity.  
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As discussed in the previous section, foreign banks held over 90% of the share of the 
banking system in 1957, but this share declined due to branching restrictions and the 
suspension of new banking licences to foreign entities (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b, 
Suffian, 2011). Nevertheless, due to the demands of World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and as part of liberalisation initiatives under the FSMP, BNM issued three new Islamic 
banking licences to foreign banks and six new conventional banking licences between 
2004 and 2010 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004a, 2009a, 2010a). As mentioned earlier, 
these new foreign banks were also required to be locally incorporated. This regulation 
was implemented to ensure that the existence of foreign banks in Malaysia was 
subjected to permanent capital, facing the same prudential requirements as domestic 
banks (Loke, 2011).
102
 As of December 2011, the share of total assets of foreign banks 
was at 24.3% (see Table 4.3). 
Table ‎4.3 Total Assets of Malaysian Banks by Ownership 
Year Total 
Assets 
Domestic 
Banks’ 
Total 
Assets 
Percentage 
of Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks’ 
Total 
Assets 
Percentage 
of Foreign 
Banks 
  (MYR 
millions) 
(MYR 
millions) 
(%) (MYR 
millions) 
(%) 
2000 482,454 360,982 74.82 121,472 25.18 
2001 522,042 390,591 74.82 131,452 25.18 
2002 549,782 412,814 75.09 136,967 24.91 
2003 609,325 449,755 73.81 159,570 26.19 
2004 715,168 530,974 74.24 184,194 25.76 
2005 827,462 627,237 75.80 200,225 24.20 
2006 999,342 774,092 77.46 225,250 22.54 
2007 1,142,305 868,738 76.05 273,567 23.95 
2008 1,239,268 939,359 75.80 299,909 24.20 
2009 1,344,062 1,035,941 77.08 308,121 22.92 
2010 1,457,707 1,124,875 77.17 332,832 22.83 
2011 1,622,197 1,227,503 75.67 394,695 24.33 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Note: As of December 2011, USD 1.0000 was equal to MYR 3.1265 
 
                                                 
102
 By incorporating a local entity bank, its relationship with the parent bank can be ‘ring-fenced’ by 
creating a legal separation between these two entities. By doing this, BNM could ensure that the capital 
and assets of foreign banks in Malaysia would remain in Malaysia and safeguard local depositors by 
giving them the first priority should there be any adverse occurrence in the foreign parent company (Loke, 
2011).   
Chapter 4 The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000 – 2011  
 
152 
 
Based on Table 4.3, the foreign banks’ market share (based on total assets) was 
constantly around 24.0% from 2000 to 2011. Total average annual growth of the total 
assets for the years under study for foreign banks was 11.5%. Figure 4.6 exhibits the 
growth of total assets of domestic and foreign banks for the years 2000 to 2011. 
Between 2000 and 2003, the average annual growth of the total assets was 9.6%. In the 
second phase of the FSMP (between 2004 and 2007), the average growth was 14.5%. 
The sharp increase in the second phase of FSMP was attributed to the introduction of 
the new foreign Islamic banks and deleveraging activities by European Banks. As the 
financial system was undergoing the third phase of FSMP (between 2008 and 2011), the 
average annual growth was moderated to 9.6%. The asset growth for foreign banks 
declined in the third phase of FSMP due to the economic slowdown faced by Malaysia.  
Figure ‎4.6 Total Assets of Domestic and Foreign Banks in Malaysia 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
4.4.2 Malaysian Banks by Specialisation 
The main types of banking institutions that make up the banking system in Malaysia are 
conventional banks, Islamic banks and investment banks. These types of banks can be 
owned either by domestic or foreign parties (see Table 4.1).  
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Commercial banks (conventional and Islamic banks) are the largest component in the 
Malaysian banking system. They provide banking services such as accepting deposits, 
granting loans, and providing trade-finance facilities (Tahir et al., 2008; Abdul Majid et 
al., 2011).
103
 Unlike commercial banks, investment banks are more involved in capital 
market activities and stockbroking as well as providing short-term credit for working 
capital (Sufian, 2011).
104
 However, investment banks are not comparable with 
conventional commercial banks or Islamic banks due to huge differences in their 
business activities. Hence, due to non-homogeneous structures and different business 
activities from commercial and Islamic banks, investment banks are excluded for the 
purpose of this research. 
Islamic banking has grown rapidly all over the world since the establishment of the first 
Islamic bank in Egypt in 1963 by Nasser Social Bank (Batchelor and Wadud, 2004; 
Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).
105
 The oil boom in 1975 further intensified the 
development of Islamic banking due to huge capital inflows to Islamic countries. In 
Malaysia, the development of Islamic banking by the government in 1963 began with 
the establishment of the pilgrimage fund institution (Tabung Haji) to mobilise funds for 
Muslims to perform their pilgrimage to Mecca. Based on this experience, the first 
Islamic bank was established on 1 July 1983 (called Bank Islam) together with the 
introduction of the Islamic Bank Act, which came into force on 7 April 1983. In 
Malaysia, separate Islamic banking regulations exist side by side with those for 
conventional banking (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). Ten years later, in 1993, the Islamic 
                                                 
103
 Domestic banking groups in Malaysia undertake the full range of commercial banking, investment 
banking and Islamic banking activities. Many of these conglomerates also provide insurance protection as 
well as undertake fund management and management of unit trust funds within their groups (Tahir, Abu 
Bakar and Haron, 2008; Lee, 2011). 
104
 In addition to the above, investment banks also play an active role in the short-term money market, 
stockbroking and capital raising activities such as financing, syndicating, corporate financing, 
management advisory services, arranging for the issue and listing of shares as well as managing 
investment portfolios (Sufian, 2011). 
105
 The key features of Islamic banking are the prohibition of interest payment transactions, and the 
prohibition of undertaking of financing anti-social and immoral activities such as gambling, pornography, 
and consumption of alcohol and narcotics. Islamic banks are different from conventional banks because 
Islamic banks have to follow the concept of shariah (an Islamic principle), which employs the principles 
of justice, fair dealings and harmony, coupled with equitable wealth distribution as a basis of conducting 
business (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). For example, the products of Islamic banks are normally supported 
by various underlying assets, whereas the equivalent of loans in conventional banks is termed as 
‘financing’. It commonly involves the buying and selling of assets, and the profits gained for these 
transactions are amortised, equivalent to interest income for conventional banks.  
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Banking Scheme (IBS) was introduced by BNM in Malaysia, the first country to 
implement a dual banking system (i.e. operating both conventional and Islamic banking 
(IBS) under one banking institution) (Batchelor and Wadud, 2004). BNM also 
introduced an Islamic cheque clearing and settlement system, and an interbank money 
market system as well as Government Islamic Bonds and Notes, which operated 
alongside but separately from conventional banks (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). In 2005, 
BNM encouraged commercial banks under IBS to establish their fully-fledged Islamic 
subsidiaries to ensure a more prominent role in promoting the Islamic banking industry 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). As exhibited in Table 4.4, the total assets of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia as at the end of 2011 was at MYR 310.3 billion, which amounted to 
19.1% of the total assets in Malaysian banks. 
Table ‎4.4 Total Assets of Malaysian Banks by Specialisation 
Year Total 
Assets 
Conventional 
Banks’ Total 
Assets 
Percentage of 
Conventional 
banks 
Islamic 
Banks’ 
Total 
Assets 
Percentage 
of Islamic 
Banks 
 (MYR 
millions) 
(MYR millions) (%) (MYR 
millions) 
(%) 
2000 482,454 469,766 97.37 12,688 2.63 
2001 522,042 505,639 96.86 16,403 3.14 
2002 549,782 530,854 96.56 18,927 3.44 
2003 609,325 587,693 96.45 21,632 3.55 
2004 715,168 693,624 96.99 21,544 3.01 
2005 827,462 794,760 96.05 32,702 3.95 
2006 999,342 941,780 94.24 57,562 5.76 
2007 1,142,305 1,050,058 91.92 92,247 8.08 
2008 1,239,268 1,064,375 85.89 174,893 14.11 
2009 1,344,062 1,127,952 83.92 216,110 16.08 
2010 1,457,707 1,205,039 82.67 252,668 17.33 
2011 1,622,197 1,311,832 80.87 310,365 19.13 
Source: Confidential Dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Note: As of December 2011, USD 1.0000 was equal to MYR 3.1265. Prior to 2005, most 
banks with IBS had Islamic assets within their banking structure 
At the end of 2011, there were 16 Islamic banks in Malaysia. Five of them were foreign 
banks and the rest were owned by domestic banks. There were five standalone fully 
fledged banks (two domestic- and three foreign-owned), and the balance of 11 banks 
were Islamic banking subsidiaries within their respective banking groups. As of 2011, 
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the market share held by the Islamic banks was 19.1%, and was on an increasing trend 
since 2000. The average annual growth for Islamic banks between 2000 and 2011 was 
at 36.3%. Following the three different phases of FSMP, the average annual growth for 
years 2000–2003, 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 were registered at 19.7%, 46.9% and 
38.2%, respectively. From Figure 4.7, there were significant increases in the total assets 
of Islamic banks between 2005 and 2008, mainly because of the formation of new 
Islamic banking subsidiaries within their respective banking groups and the 
commencement of operation of new foreign Islamic banks. 
Figure ‎4.7 Total Assets of Conventional and Islamic Banks in Malaysia 
 
Source: Confidential Dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
4.4.3 Assets and Liabilities Structure of Malaysian Banks 
Figure 4.8 exhibits the growth of assets and liabilities of Malaysian banks between 2000 
and 2011. As of 2011, the total assets of Malaysian banks amounted to MYR 1,622.2 
billion. The average annual growth of the total assets for the period 2000–2011 was at 
11.7%. Based on the three phases of FSMP, the average annual growth of total assets 
for the periods 2000–2003, 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 were registered at 8.1%, 17.0% 
and 10.9%, respectively. 
Chapter 4 The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000 – 2011  
 
156 
 
During the first phase of FSMP, the main policy thrust focused on enhancing the 
performance and competitiveness of domestic banks and ensured that they were ready 
to face a more liberalised operating environment (Bank Negara Malaysian, 2001b). The 
domestic banks exhibited steady growth in the years 2000–2003. The average annual 
growth during the first phase of FSMP for total assets, total liabilities and capital were 
at 8.1%, 8.1% and 8.2%, respectively. 
During the initial second phase of FSMP, BNM intensified the implementation of 
gradual liberalisation and increased competitive pressures in the banking sector. It can 
be observed that the growth of assets, liabilities and capital of Malaysian banks were on 
an increasing trend during this period. Growth was driven by the introduction of NIRF 
and the commencement of new foreign Islamic Banks in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
However, at the end of the second phase of FSMP in 2007, the growth of assets, 
liabilities and capital declined due to slower export activities by the real sectors 
(weakened global demand) and the emerging subprime crisis, which affected financial 
markets in US and Europe. 
Figure ‎4.8 Total Assets, Total Liabilities and Capital in Malaysian Banks 
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Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
As the global economy worsened in 2008, the Malaysian banks were cautious in their 
lending strategies. As the timeline moved into the third phase of FSMP (2008–2011), 
the average annual growth for total assets, total liabilities and capital recorded growths 
of 9.2%, 8.8% and 14.3% respectively; which were lower compared to the second phase 
of FSMP. However, the growth of Malaysian banks’ capital trended in a different 
direction. This is because most Malaysian banks undertook pre-emptive measures to 
increase their capital position in order to absorb potential losses from adverse shocks. 
Despite the difficulties in raising capital during economic turmoil, the Malaysian banks 
were successful in raising high quality capital (Tier-1 capital) within a short period of 
time at a reasonable cost (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009b). Consequently, in 2011, the 
assets and liabilities trended upward, which implied a sign of recovery for the banking 
sector. 
As intermediary institutions, banks’ assets and liabilities are influenced by the 
composition of sources and uses of funds (i.e. accumulating and allocating of funds). 
First, the sources of funds for Malaysian banks are represented by (1) deposits from 
customers, (2) amounts owing to other banks (i.e. interbank borrowing/deposit) and (3) 
capital.  
Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10 and Table 4.5 display the structure and annual growth of the 
funding of Malaysian banks. Based on Figure 4.9, the customers’ deposit is the largest 
portion of the sources of funds in Malaysian banks. The average composition of deposit 
accepted during the period under study (2000–2011) is 72.2%. In terms of growth, the 
average annual growth for the periods 2000–2003, 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 are 
registered at 7.7%, 17.9% and 10.0%, respectively. Higher average annual growth in 
deposits is observed in the second period of FSMP. The main reason for the higher 
increase during the period 2004–2006 was mainly due to the improved confidence of 
customers in banking institutions; this was supported by the introduction of new foreign 
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Islamic banks and initiation of deposit insurance (PIDM) (Hon et al., 2011).
106
 
Additionally, growth in the second phase of FSMP expanded the deposits’ product 
range and diversity (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2006b).
107
 
Figure ‎4.9 Percentage of Capital, Amounts Owing to Other Banks and Deposits 
Accepted relative to Liabilities and Capital, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Another important component of the sources of funds is the amounts borrowed from 
other banks. This interbank item exhibited a sudden upsurge of inflow in 2007, driven 
by the early stage of the subprime crisis and financial market turbulence in the US and 
Europe. The banks in US and Europe released their position from these inferior asset-
backed structured products and placed the excess liquidity elsewhere in search of a 
higher yield, such as Malaysia. The increase was more pronounced in foreign banks 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b).
108
 Consequently, as deleveraging activities took place 
to strengthen the parent and head office in US and Europe, the interbank deposits of 
Malaysian banks declined in 2008 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b, 2011b). 
                                                 
106
 With the establishment of PIDM in 2005, depositors were guaranteed up to MYR 60,000 on total 
deposits placed with a single member bank (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b). 
107
 For example, the deposit products have broadened from ‘plain vanilla’ deposits to structured products 
that offer returns based on the performance of the underlying assets and currency movements (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2007b). 
108
 This condition can lead to unsustainable growth in asset prices and financial imbalances. The 
cumulative liquidity surplus in the banking sector may carry the potential risk of higher liquidity demands 
and unexpected withdrawals (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b) 
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The final component of sources of funds is capital. The average percentage of the 
capital against the total sources of funds is approximately 8.6%.
109
 Based on the three 
phases of the FSMP, the average capital ratios were 8.5%, 7.7% and 8.7% for the 
periods 2000–2003, 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 respectively. The reason for the lower 
capital ratio in the second phase of FSMP was the influence of active capital 
management performed by the banks. During this period, the fraction of Tier-1 capital 
declined as higher issuances of Tier-2 subordinated debt capital were observed where 
banks had undertaken to diversify and improve the overall cost of capital as well as 
providing attractive long-term returns to shareholders (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005, 
2006b).
110
 However, in the third phase of the FSMP, the banks pre-emptively responded 
to the global credit crisis by increasing their capital position. The capital position was 
strengthened through rights issues and issuance of Tier-1 capital instruments (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2008b). Moreover, the introduction of a regulatory capital framework, 
namely Basel II (both Standardised Approach and Internal Rating Based Approach) also 
influenced the need for banks to have stronger capital position.
111
 As such, there were 
significant increases of 15.7% and 23.8% of capital in Malaysian banks in 2008 and 
2009 respectively (see Figure 4.10).  
                                                 
109
 However, this ratio does not indicate the regulatory risk-based capital as measured by Basel’s Risk 
Weighted Capital Ratio (RWCR). The average RWCR had consistently exceeded 12.0% over the years 
under study. The capital ratio shown is indicative of the capital available without taking into account any 
risk-weighted factors on assets held by the banks. 
110
 Tier-1 capital is described as core capital, which usually includes equity capital and retained earnings. 
Additionally, Tier-2 capital consists of supplementary capital such as revaluation reserves, hybrid 
instruments and subordinated term debt (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999, 2005).  
111
 Despite the greater capital savings that can be achieved from lower risk-weights of retail loan 
portfolios, the new capital charges from operational risks can diminish and limit the capital savings from 
the implementation of Basel II (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b). 
Chapter 4 The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000 – 2011  
 
160 
 
Figure ‎4.10 Annual Growth of Deposits Accepted, Amounts Owing to Other Banks 
and Capital of Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Chapter 4 The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000-2011 
 
161 
 
Table ‎4.5 Sources of Funds of Malaysian Banks (Liabilities and Capital), 2000–2011 
Description 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Liabilities and Capital (MYR millions) 482,454 522,042 549,782 609,325 715,168 827,462 999,342 1,142,305 1,239,268 1,344,062 1,457,707 1,622,197 
Annual Growth of Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 0 7.58 5.05 9.77 14.80 13.57 17.20 12.52 7.82 7.80 7.80 10.14 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 74.82 74.82 75.09 73.81 74.24 75.80 77.46 76.05 75.80 77.08 77.17 75.67 
Foreign Banks’ Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 25.18 25.18 24.91 26.19 25.76 24.20 22.54 23.95 24.20 22.92 22.83 24.33 
Conventional Banks’ Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 97.37 96.86 96.56 96.45 96.99 96.05 94.24 91.92 85.89 83.92 82.67 80.87 
Islamic Banks’ Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 2.63 3.14 3.44 3.55 3.01 3.95 5.76 8.08 14.11 16.08 17.33 19.13 
Total Deposits from Customers (MYR millions) 337,796 365,314 382,735 422,245 511,116 606,234 734,648 814,947 909,345 1,017,010 1,096,884 1,193,930 
Deposits from Customers as % of Total Liabilities and Capital 70.02 69.98 69.62 69.30 71.47 73.26 73.51 71.34 73.38 75.67 75.25 73.60 
Annual Growth of Total Deposits from Customers  7.53 4.55 9.36 17.39 15.69 17.48 9.85 10.38 10.59 7.28 8.13 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Deposits from Customers (%) 75.59 76.52 76.64 75.22 76.19 77.14 77.98 77.55 76.95 77.98 78.02 76.95 
Foreign Banks’ Total Deposits from Customers (%) 24.41 23.48 23.36 24.78 23.81 22.86 22.02 22.45 23.05 22.02 21.98 23.05 
Conventional Banks’ Total Deposits from Customers (%) 96.87 96.33 95.81 95.65 96.46 95.51 93.61 90.94 84.42 82.81 81.04 79.60 
Islamic Banks’ Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 3.13 3.67 4.19 4.35 3.54 4.49 6.39 9.06 15.58 17.19 18.96 20.40 
Total Amount Due to Banks (MYR millions) 35,951 32,182 34,908 42,085 47,892 55,025 57,281 92,181 75,369 75,639 75,881 111,264 
Amount Due to Banks as % of Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 7.45 6.16 6.35 6.91 6.70 6.65 5.73 8.07 6.08 5.63 5.21 6.86 
Annual Growth of Total Due to Banks (%)  -11.71 7.81 17.05 12.13 12.96 3.94 37.86 -22.31 0.36 0.32 31.80 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Amount Due to Banks (%) 60.68 54.39 56.50 50.53 43.61 54.38 62.85 55.24 62.78 64.42 64.87 57.27 
Foreign Banks’ Total Amount Due to Banks (%) 39.32 45.61 43.50 49.47 56.39 45.62 37.15 44.76 37.22 35.58 35.13 42.73 
Conventional Banks’ Total Amount Due to Banks (%) 99.83 98.07 99.48 99.65 99.25 99.25 96.37 97.09 90.98 83.22 83.31 76.54 
Islamic Banks’ Total Amount Due to Banks (%) 0.17 1.93 0.52 0.35 0.75 0.75 3.63 2.91 9.02 16.78 16.69 23.46 
Total Capital (MYR millions) 41,516 44,159 47,082 52,593 58,992 64,588 75,303 84,006 97,181 120,273 133,033 142,408 
Capital as % of Total Liabilities and Capital (%) 8.61 8.46 8.56 8.63 8.25 7.81 7.54 7.35 7.84 8.95 9.13 8.78 
Annual Growth of Total Capital (%)  5.98 6.21 10.48 10.85 8.66 14.23 10.36 13.56 19.20 9.59 6.58 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Capital (%) 77.35 75.77 76.92 77.85 78.19 78.87 78.83 77.97 76.15 77.95 78.24 77.30 
Foreign Banks’ Total Capital (%) 22.65 24.23 23.08 22.15 21.81 21.13 21.17 22.03 23.85 22.05 21.76 22.70 
Conventional Banks’ Total Capital (%) 96.86 96.98 97.07 97.20 97.18 95.85 94.94 90.86 86.69 85.96 85.03 85.01 
Islamic Banks’ Total Capital (%) 3.14 3.02 2.93 2.80 2.82 4.15 5.06 9.14 13.31 14.04 14.97 14.99 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Note: As of December 2011, USD 1.0000 is equal to MYR 3.1265 
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Second, the uses of funds on the assets side of Malaysian banks are mainly used to (1) 
provide loans and financing to customers, namely households and businesses as well as 
the public sector; (2) hold securities, particularly government papers and bonds; 3) place 
deposits into other banks.  
Loans (also termed as ‘financing’ in Islamic banks) remained the biggest and most 
important component within the assets of banks, with a share of approximately 60.0% 
of total assets (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999b). A closer look at Table 4.6 highlights the 
increasing trend of loans in Malaysian banks during the years under study. The annual 
average growth of the loans for the period 2000–2003, 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 
(based on indicative timeline grouped for three different phases of FSMP) were 
registered at 7.6%, 15.2% and 10.9% respectively. The significant average growth 
during the second phase of FSMP was influenced by the liberalisation of interest rates, 
in which banks were allowed to determine their own BLR as signalled by the BNM’s 
OPR (see Figure 4.11). Thus, the demand for loans increased when lower interest rates 
were offered by the banks (as a consequence of an increasingly competitive 
environment). The increase in loans was also driven by the household sector, 
particularly for the purchase of residential properties and consumer credit, which 
accounted for approximately 57.0% of total loans (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005).
112
 
Consequently, amidst the global subprime crisis and during the third phase of FSMP, 
the average annual growth of loans decreased to 10.9%, implying that banks were more 
cautious in lending and busy managing delinquent loans’ accounts.  
                                                 
112
 After learning from the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and the consolidation of fragmented 
domestic banks, the Malaysian banks shifted their strategy by rebalancing the loans portfolio, aiming to 
capture a higher market share in the retail sector and invest in debt instrument from capital markets for 
exposure to large corporates. The higher growth during the second phase of FSMP was also influenced by 
consumer confidence and was supported by increased private consumption with continued high income 
levels, a stable labour market environment and improved business conditions and productivity (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2006a). This was further augmented by initiatives and measures introduced by the 
government and other regulatory agencies to support the residential property sector such as exemptions 
from the real property gains tax, a 50% exemption from stamp duty for houses below the value of MYR 
250,000, and allowing monthly withdrawals for Employees Provident Funds (EPF) accounts for 
repayment of housing loans (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007a). 
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Figure ‎4.11 Annual Growth of Loans, Investments and Amounts Due from Other 
Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
The second largest class of assets is the amount due from other banks, accounting for an 
average of 16.9% of total assets over the period 2000–2011. Based on Figure 4.12, the 
growth of interbank assets increased significantly in 2007 as there was a persistent 
inflow of funds into Malaysia which posed liquidity challenges to Malaysian banks in 
2007 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b). The sudden influx of foreign funds posed a 
challenge to the banking system, where excess liquidity and short-term maturity was 
matched by placing deposits into other banks. Soon after that, as deleveraging of assets 
took place in US and European banks in 2008, substantial withdrawals from interbank 
assets were observed. In addition, the investment items also displayed a significant 
increase between 2006 and 2008. This was primarily driven by the excess liquidity 
during the onset of the subprime crisis. Between 2007 and 2008, the excess liquidity in 
the banking industry was mopped up by BNM through its money market operations, 
which resulted in a higher investment of BNM instruments in Malaysian banks (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2008b). 
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Figure ‎4.12 Percentage of Loans, Investments and Amounts Due from Other 
Banks Relative to Total Assets, 2000–2011 
 
 Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
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Table ‎4.6 Uses of Funds of Malaysian Banks (Total Assets), 2000–2011 
Description 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Assets (MYR millions) 482,454 522,042 549,782 609,325 715,168 827,462 999,342 1,142,305 1,239,268 1,344,062 1,457,707 1,622,197 
Annual Growth of Total Assets (%)  7.58 5.05 9.77 14.80 13.57 17.20 12.52 7.82 7.80 7.80 10.14 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Assets (%) 74.82 74.82 75.09 73.81 74.24 75.80 77.46 76.05 75.80 77.08 77.17 75.67 
Foreign Banks’ Total Assets (%) 25.18 25.18 24.91 26.19 25.76 24.20 22.54 23.95 24.20 22.92 22.83 24.33 
Conventional Banks’ Total Assets (%) 97.37 96.86 96.56 96.45 96.99 96.05 94.24 91.92 85.89 83.92 82.67 80.87 
Islamic Banks’ Total Assets (%) 2.63 3.14 3.44 3.55 3.01 3.95 5.76 8.08 14.11 16.08 17.33 19.13 
Total Loans (MYR millions) 284,791 324,861 336,882 354,377 413,247 485,635 576,060 622,008 702,519 761,918 862,777 939,759 
Loans as % of Total Assets (%) 59.03 62.23 61.28 58.16 57.78 58.69 57.64 54.45 56.69 56.69 59.19 57.93 
Annual Growth of Total Loans  12.33 3.57 4.94 14.25 14.91 15.70 7.39 11.46 7.80 11.69 8.19 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Loans (%) 75.22 75.22 74.56 73.82 75.49 77.66 79.36 78.22 78.05 79.23 78.95 77.49 
Foreign Banks’ Total Loans (%) 24.78 24.78 25.44 26.18 24.51 22.34 20.64 21.78 21.95 20.77 21.05 22.51 
Conventional Banks’ Total Loans (%) 98.13 97.76 97.56 97.32 97.52 96.87 95.03 92.93 86.06 83.74 82.37 80.55 
Islamic Banks’ Total Loans (%) 1.87 2.24 2.44 2.68 2.48 3.13 4.97 7.07 13.94 16.26 17.63 19.45 
Total Investments (MYR millions) 59,614 67,185 75,139 86,795 84,567 76,804 94,735 125,786 166,310 203,556 221,154 235,547 
Investments as % of Total Assets (%) 12.36 12.87 13.67 14.24 11.82 9.28 9.48 11.01 13.42 15.14 15.17 14.52 
Annual Growth of Total Investments (%)  11.27 10.59 13.43 -2.64 -10.11 18.93 24.69 24.37 18.30 7.96 6.11 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Investments (%) 75.14 73.49 79.43 75.34 73.94 75.61 76.19 73.97 73.96 80.66 81.50 79.02 
Foreign Banks’ Total Investments (%) 24.86 26.51 20.57 24.66 26.06 24.39 23.81 26.03 26.04 19.34 18.50 20.98 
Conventional Banks’ Total Investments (%) 94.92 94.60 93.06 92.76 93.01 91.55 91.11 89.99 85.97 83.80 79.80 79.66 
Islamic Banks’ Total Investments (%) 5.08 5.40 6.94 7.24 6.99 8.45 8.89 10.01 14.03 16.20 20.20 20.34 
Total Amount Due from Banks (MYR millions) 77,463 70,704 73,981 93,815 121,452 149,032 174,598 262,909 222,512 253,203 231,938 268,412 
Amount Due from Banks as % of Total Assets (%) 16.06 13.54 13.46 15.40 16.98 18.01 17.47 23.02 17.96 18.84 15.91 16.55 
Annual Growth of Total Due from Banks (%)  -9.56 4.43 21.14 22.76 18.51 14.64 33.59 -18.16 12.12 -9.17 13.59 
             
Domestic Banks’ Total Amount Due from Banks (%) 68.15 69.18 69.73 70.52 73.81 70.41 70.89 71.22 74.20 68.63 66.79 64.97 
Foreign Banks’ Total Amount Due from Banks (%) 31.85 30.82 30.27 29.48 26.19 29.59 29.11 28.78 25.80 31.37 33.21 35.03 
Conventional Banks’ Total Amount Due from Banks (%) 96.03 94.66 94.91 96.23 97.23 94.10 90.21 88.26 79.36 79.13 78.87 74.71 
Islamic Banks’ Total Amount Due from Banks (%) 3.97 5.34 5.09 3.77 2.77 5.90 9.79 11.74 20.64 20.87 21.13 25.29 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Note: As of December 2011, USD 1.0000 was equal to MYR 3.1265 
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4.4.4 Income Statements Structure of Malaysian Banks  
The previous section reviews the balance sheet position of the Malaysian banks. This 
section, on the other hand, explains the structure of the income statements of the 
Malaysian banks and discusses the liberalisation measures and regulatory initiatives 
introduced by BNM that affected the banking institutions’ income, costs and profits. 
First, total income of the Malaysian banks and its major components are exhibited in 
Table 4.7, Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14. The Malaysian banks primarily depended on 
interest income as a source of income amounting to more than 65.0% of their total 
income during the period 2000–2011.113 The average annual growth rates between 2000 
and 2011 in total income, interest income and non-interest income were 10.6%, 8.9% 
and 16.9% respectively. A steady growth of total income is observed particularly during 
the post-consolidation period from 2000 to 2003. In the second phase of FSMP, with the 
introduction of new liberalisation measures (e.g. a new interest rate framework (NIRF), 
new Islamic foreign banks and safety net institutions (PIDM)), demand from the retail 
sector subsequently increased competition among the banks, as evident from their 
greater lending activities (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2006a).
114
 Also, in the second phase 
of FSMP (2004–2007), the average annual growth of total income was at 19.0%, higher 
than in the first and third phases of FSMP, which displayed 6.6% and 5.3% respectively.  
Consequently, in 2007, as the subprime crisis set in, there was higher volatility in the 
total income of the banks. The annual growth of total income declined slightly due to 
the anticipation of global economic uncertainty. Subsequently, in 2009, the gross 
interest rate margin narrowed as BNM reduced the OPR rapidly in three stages from 
3.25% to 2.00%. As the global economic condition worsened, the income of Malaysian 
                                                 
113
 Nevertheless, for Islamic banks, the profits received from financing and other assets are equivalent to 
interest income, which is encapsulated as interest income to banks for the purpose of this research. 
114
 Partly, the higher interest income in 2006 was also influenced by the BNM’s decision on increasing 
OPR in November 2005, which saw an increase of 40 basis points in the 3-month Kuala Lumpur 
interbank overnight rate (KLIBOR) from 2.80% to 3.20%. In return, this move improved the interest 
income of banks during the year 2006. The strong growth in 2004–2007 shows that the income of 
banking institutions was increasingly diversified, mainly from revenues of financing and related advisory 
activities, provision of remittance and settlement services, portfolio and wealth management and trading 
and investment activities (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b). 
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banks declined further; this was attributed to lower interest income, higher valuation 
losses from trading and investment portfolios, and selective activities of banks in 
attracting and retaining customers’ pool base with strong credit standings (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2008b) (see Figure 4.13). As economic recovery emerges, BNM increased the 
OPR in late 2010, which in return increased the total interest income of banking sector. 
Figure ‎4.13 Growth and Structure of Income of Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Figure ‎4.14 Composition of Income of Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Chapter 4 The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000 – 2011 
 
168 
 
Second, Figure 4.15, Figure 4.16 and also Table 4.7 display the growth and sources of 
expenses of Malaysian banks between 2000 and 2011. The growth of the total expenses 
had increased steadily during the first phase of FSMP. The average annual growth for 
this period (2000–2003) was at 4.6%. Then, during the second phase of FSMP between 
2004 and 2007, there was greater volatility in the growth of total expenses. The average 
annual growth for period 2004–2007 increased by 20.8%. During this period, the 
composition of non-interest expenses was more than the composition of interest 
expenses. This can be explained from the increasing operating expenses incurred by 
banks in an environment of intensified competition due to liberalisation of interest rates, 
an end to the of wage moratorium on bank personnel, and the introduction of new 
foreign players.
115
  
Figure ‎4.15 Growth and Structure of Expenses in Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a financial organisation 
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 With regards to staff expenditure, investment in the acquisition and development of skills is necessary 
when banks are experiencing business expansion and have to retain existing, and attain new, talents 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). The highly competitive labour market in the banking sector has led to 
higher personnel-related expenditure, particularly with the introduction of new foreign Islamic banks 
where specific experience and skills were sought for these new establishments (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2006b). Moreover, amidst intensified competition, there is also a significant increase in operating 
overheads, which implies the aggressive marketing and sales strategies performed by banks in Malaysia 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). Concurrently, the policy interest rate via OPR was also increased by 
BNM, where banks were expected to pay higher interest rates to customers in 2007.  
Chapter 4 The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000 – 2011 
 
169 
 
During the third phase of FSMP (i.e. 2008–2011), the total expenses of Malaysian 
banks were on a decreasing trend. The declining trend of expenses was driven by the 
reduction of OPR in 2008 and 2009. This can be evident from the proportion between 
interest and non-interest expenses where non-interest expenses exhibited a higher 
percentage than interest expenses in 2009 and 2010 (see Figure 4.16). This also suggests 
that Malaysian banks were affected by higher operating costs such as managing 
liquidity surpluses and administering potential loan losses, particularly during this 
period of uncertainty. Additionally, non-performing loans had also increased marginally 
(2008: 3.7%; 2009: 3.8%), reflecting the slowdown in economic condition (as 
evidenced from Malaysia’s GDP, which contracted by 1.7% in 2009) (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2009a). 
Figure ‎4.16 Composition of Expenses in Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Third, the trend of the profit before tax (PBT) for Malaysian banks is also shown in 
Table 4.7, Figure 4.17 and Figure 4.18. The PBT of Malaysian banks has increased 
steadily since 2000. During the period of first FSMP (i.e. 2000–2003), the gap between 
income and expenditure was fairly constant. Most of the products and services offered 
by banks during this period were ‘plain vanilla’ and traditional. The steady growth of 
PBT was attributed to the consolidation of domestic banks, which managed to synergise 
their operations in a short period of time.  
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Whilst liberalisation initiatives escalated in the second phase of FSMP (2004–2007), the 
banking system continued to record stronger profit performance at the early phase, 
underpinned by favourable macroeconomic conditions and financial markets. 
Competition in the lending market, particularly in the retail segment, resulted in higher 
returns from lending interest income. Moreover, greater competitive pressure had forced 
banks to improve their product innovativeness and cross-selling activities. The profit of 
the banks was also influenced by revenues generated from diverse products and services, 
and not limited to lending – such as wealth management-related products (e.g. unit trust 
and bancassurance), remittance services and trade related products (e.g. guarantees and 
commission form issuance of bankers’ acceptance) (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). 
Consequently, the profitability of Malaysian banks declined in 2006 (see Figure 4.17). 
This was influenced by significant losses faced by Bank Islam (one of the domestic full-
fledged Islamic banks), which was experiencing a substantial write-down of large 
financing (or loans, in conventional banking terms). The write-offs led to higher losses 
in Bank Islam amounting to almost 30.0% of the financing portfolio, caused by cross-
border currency advances with large exposure in Bosnia, Indonesia and the Middle East 
via its Labuan offshore branch. Nevertheless, Bank Islam had managed to recapitalise 
its capital position within a year and reduced its NPFs to almost the industry average 
after four years (Rating Agency Malaysia, 2010). 
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Figure ‎4.17 Trends of Profit before Tax, Total Income and Total Expenses of 
Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
In tandem with global economic slowdown, the period 2008–2011 saw greater volatility 
in the profitability of Malaysian banks. As mentioned earlier, Malaysia suffered 
contraction of GDP by 1.7% in 2009. The lower profit of Malaysian banks in 2009 was 
influenced by lower interest income (OPR in 2009 was reduced to 2.0% from 3.5% in 
2008) as well as a slight increase in delinquency level of household and business loans 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009b). Consequently, the profit of Malaysian banks bounced 
back and expanded by 7.2% in 2010. The growth was mainly driven by improved 
domestic demand for private sector activities, attributed to fiscal stimulus by the 
government, improved labour market conditions, a steady increase in household and 
business income, and continued access to credit (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010b).  
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Figure ‎4.18 Annual Growth in Total Income, Total Expenses and Profit before Tax 
in Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
In addition, Figure 4.19 exhibits the trend of interest margin in percentage and MYR 
amount.
116
 The average interest margin for the period under study was recorded at 
45.4%. The interest rate margin was fairly stable during the first and early second phase 
of FSMP, but greater fluctuations were observed as the timeline enters the third phase of 
FSMP, which was influenced by the uncertainty of the global economic crisis. The 
increasing trend of interest margin from 43.7% in 2007 to 53.0% in 2010 was attributed 
by lower interest expense to interest income. The interest expenses of Malaysian banks 
were lower in 2009 and 2010 due to lower interest offered to customers for deposits and 
higher interest rate on loans offered to customers. The lower interest rates on deposits 
were caused by the movement of overnight policy rate (OPR), which may affect banks’ 
BLR. On the other hand, although interest rates for loans are expected to decline (in 
tandem with the movement of OPR), it was however observed that Malaysian banks 
charged higher interest rates that were attributed by higher demand of credit by both 
household and business sectors. The higher demand may also imply that borrowers 
during this period of uncertainty require funds to remain afloat during economic 
downturn and willing to be charged at higher interest rates.  
                                                 
116
 The interest rate margin is measured by a ratio of interest margin over total interest income. The ratio 
indicates the percentage of interest profitability derived from the interest income after deducting the 
interest expenses incurred by the banks. 
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Figure ‎4.19 Trend of Interest Margin in Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
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Table ‎4.7 Income Statement Structure for Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
Description 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Income (MYR millions) 34,545 37,129 38,164 41,767 50,278 57,953 73,357 83,581 96,078 92,147 93,618 101,811 
Annual Growth of Total Income (%)  6.96 2.71 8.63 16.93 13.24 21.00 12.23 13.01 -4.27 1.57 8.05 
             
of which Interest Income (MYR millions) 28,241 29,071 29,240 30,331 34,618 39,023 49,965 58,856 62,825 58,965 62,340 69,392 
Interest Income as % of Total Income (%)1  81.75 78.30 76.62 72.62 68.85 67.34 68.11 70.42 65.39 63.99 66.59 68.16 
Annual Growth of Interest Income (%)  2.86 0.58 3.60 12.38 11.29 21.90 15.11 6.32 -6.55 5.41 10.16 
of which Non-Interest Income (MYR millions) 6,305 8,058 8,924 11,435 15,660 18,930 23,392 24,725 33,252 33,182 31,277 32,418 
Non-Interest Income as % of Total Income (%)2 18.25 21.70 23.38 27.38 31.15 32.66 31.89 29.58 34.61 36.01 33.41 31.84 
Annual Growth of Non-Interest Income (%)   21.76 9.70 21.96 26.98 17.27 19.07 5.39 25.64 -0.21 -6.09 3.52 
Total Expenses (MYR millions) 28,618 32,420 31,840 32,599 38,435 43,871 61,389 68,387 78,133 77,063 71,778 77,551 
Annual Growth of Total Expenses (%)  11.73 -1.82 2.33 15.18 12.39 28.54 10.23 12.47 -1.39 -7.36 7.44 
             
of which Interest Expenses (MYR millions) 16,310 16,756 16,833 17,076 19,521 20,713 27,416 33,163 34,499 29,890 29,301 36,191 
Interest Expenses as % of Total Expenses (%)3  56.99 51.68 52.87 52.38 50.79 47.21 44.66 48.49 44.15 38.79 40.82 46.67 
Annual Growth of Interest Expenses  2.66 0.46 1.42 12.53 5.76 24.45 17.33 3.87 -15.42 -2.01 19.04 
of which Non-Interest Expenses (MYR millions) 12,308 15,664 15,007 15,523 18,914 23,157 33,973 35,223 43,634 47,173 42,477 41,360 
Non-Interest Expenses as % of Total Expenses (%)4 43.01 48.32 47.13 47.62 49.21 52.79 55.34 51.51 55.85 61.21 59.18 53.33 
Annual Growth of Non-Interest Expenses   21.43 -4.38 3.33 17.93 18.32 31.84 3.55 19.28 7.50 -11.06 -2.70 
Profit Before Taxation (MYR millions) 5,927 4,709 6,324 9,168 11,843 14,082 11,968 15,194 17,945 15,084 21,840 24,260 
Annual Growth of Profit before Taxation   -25.87 25.54 31.02 22.59 15.90 -17.67 21.24 15.33 -18.97 30.93 9.98 
             
Interest Margin  11,931 12,315 12,407 13,256 15,097 18,310 22,549 25,693 28,326 29,075 33,039 33,202 
% of Interest Margin (%)5 42.25 42.36 42.43 43.70 43.61 
       
46.92 45.13 43.65 45.09 49.31 53.00 47.85 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation. 
Note: As of December 2011, USD 1.0000 is equal to MYR 3.1265. 
1 Interest income includes interest/profits received from loans/financing and amounts due from other banks. 
2 Non-interest income includes fee-based income, commissions and income from investments. 
3 Interest expenses include interest/profits sharing paid on deposits from customers and amounts due to other banks. 
4 Non-interest expenses include staff expenses, maintenance costs, administration costs and depreciation. 
5 Percentage of interest margin equals interest income minus interest expenses, divided by interest income.  
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4.5 Financial Ratio Analysis of Malaysian Banks 
Financial ratio analysis uses accounting information (rather than production theory using an 
input and output mix) and is employed by various parties (e.g. regulators, analysts, investors 
and bank managers) to measure the performance of the banks. Thus, in this section, two 
different perspectives of financial ratios are analysed, namely profit and cost performance 
analysis.
117
  
First, Figure 4.20 displays the return of assets (ROA) and return of equity (ROE) of 
Malaysian banks between 2000 and 2011.
118
 The ROE declined in 2001 because of the 
consolidation initiatives and rationalisation in domestic banks. This was influenced by the 
higher level of equity as well as the lower income generated by the Malaysian banks, where 
the ROE declined to 10.2% in 2001 from 15.9% in 2000. The greater level of equity in 
Malaysian banks can be explained by the greater rise in the equity of domestic banks 
following the completion of the consolidation exercise in the banking sector. At the same 
time, the consolidation exercise also forced banks to adapt new operations and business 
strategies, where domestic banks were affected by higher operational expenditure such as 
the closing of duplicate branches, the preparation of new branding images and a voluntary 
separation scheme for personnel (redundancy exercise) (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001a). 
Thereafter, the ROE for 2002 and 2011 remained positive, hovering between 12.2% and 
14.1% except in 2006, when ROE was at its lowest point at 6.4%. The lower rate of ROE in 
2006 was influenced by substantial losses through write-offs of large loans (financing) 
experienced by a domestic Islamic bank and the establishment of new Islamic foreign 
banks. Additionally, the new foreign players exhibited negative ROE’s due to losses 
                                                 
117
 The financial ratios are ‘built-in’ ratios that are commonly used in the financial statement analysis. In this 
section, the ratios that measure the ability of banks to generate income are return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE). On the other hand the ratios that represent the capability of banks in managing costs are total 
cost–total revenues, cost–income ratio, staff cost–total assets ratio and Non-performing loans (NPL) ratios. 
However, these financial ratios may not implicate the effect of cost- and profit-efficiency based on the frontier 
analysis.  
118
 First, ROA is defined as or calculated using PBT over total assets, and measures the bank profits relative to 
total assets, implying the ability of available assets in generating profits (Suffian, 2011). Second, ROE is 
measured by dividing PBT with the equity, implying the rate of return of shareholders from the investment. 
Chapter 4 The Malaysian Banking Sector, 2000 – 2011 
 
176 
 
incurred in the first year of operations. Hence, the ROA for 2006 also declined to 0.1%, 
which is lower than other years that maintained ROAs between 0.8% and 1.4%. 
Figure ‎4.20 Trends of Profit Performance Indicators in Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Second, Figure 4.21 exhibits the trends of the cost–income ratio, total cost–total income 
ratio, NPL ratio, and staff cost ratio for the period 2000–2011.119 From Figure 4.21, the 
trend of the cost–income and total cost–total income ratios is almost similar. These two 
ratios increased significantly in the years 2000 and 2006. In 2000, the domestic banks were 
in the process of consolidation following the 1997/98 financial crisis. Income for the 
Malaysian banks declined in the post-crisis period and at the same time, incurred a 
substantial amount of expenses relating to the offering voluntary separation scheme (VSS) 
to reduce the number of staff, the new entity branding, and the repositioning of branches and 
                                                 
119
 There are several ratios used to measure the cost performance measures, namely the cost–income ratio, total 
cost–total income, staff cost to total assets and NPLs over loans. Firstly, the cost–income ratio is measured and 
defined by the US Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council where it can be composed from non-
interest expenses/(non-interest income plus net interest income). It measures the operating expenses used from 
the non-interest income and net interest income received from the business operations. Secondly, the total 
cost–total income ratio informs the user how much income is used to cover the total cost of the banks. Thirdly, 
the NPL–NPF ratio indicates the materialised and potential losses of the banks from loans and financing. It 
also implies that additional expenses may be incurred by banks, particularly in administering and monitoring 
loan and financing losses within their credit portfolio. Finally, the ratio of staff cost over total assets is used to 
assess the manpower expenses incurred by the banks. For all the ratios mentioned above, smaller ratios suggest 
greater cost savings for the banks. 
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personnel. As mentioned earlier, in 2006, the cost–income ratio was significantly greater 
due to significant losses from write-offs of a couple large financing (loans) by a full-fledged 
domestic Islamic bank. The losses materialised in 2006 was due to a weak financing 
structure coupled with the ‘evergreen’ 120  effects from vulnerable restructuring and 
rescheduling arrangements during the last Asian Financial crisis in 1997–1998. 
Figure ‎4.21 Trends of Cost Performance Indicators in Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
From Figure 4.21, the NPL ratio has been on a declining trend since the period of Asian 
financial crisis, indicating a greater cost saving for Malaysian banks. The declining trend in 
the first and second phases of the FSMP was due to the higher reclassification of NPLs to 
performing loans status and complete write-offs (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005). During this 
period, the Malaysian banks’ proportion of loans and financing was shifted to the household 
where credit risks are more widespread and diversified compared to the pre-1997–1998 
condition, in which risks were concentrated on large businesses in vulnerable sectors. 
Furthermore, the introduction of the credit bureau (i.e. CCRIS) enhanced the data collection 
on the financial position of households and businesses at a more granular level, which 
contributed to the declining trend in NPLs (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b). Concurrently, 
                                                 
120
 For example, the ‘evergreen’ effect can be seen in loan facilities such as ‘revolving loan’ or ‘credit card’, 
where the principal amount is required to be paid off within a specified period of time. The loans are routinely 
renewed after maturity, leaving the principal to be remained and repaid over in a long-term period. 
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with the establishment of advisory and debt management services (AKPK), the financial 
literacy of banking customers might have improved, particularly in their management of 
debt involving banks’ credit facilities. In addition, the staff cost ratio remained consistent 
during the period under study. The ratio was slightly higher in 2000 due to the consolidation 
exercise where higher expenses were incurred on staff redundancy. 
4.6 Competition Indicators of the Malaysian Banking Sector 
One of the main objectives of the liberalisation efforts in the banking industry is to promote 
competition. As mentioned earlier, this can be done through various initiatives such as 
allowing foreign banks to compete in the domestic market, allowing foreign investors to 
hold equity in domestic banks and providing autonomy for banks to determine their own 
interest rate (i.e. BLR) on products and services offered. To infer the level of competition of 
the banking industry, the common indices used are Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and 
the spread of interest rates between loan interest and deposit interest (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). HHI can be computed using the sum of the squared market share of all the banks in 
the market and it can be written as: 
 
    ∑      
 
 
   
 
(4.1) 
where HHI is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which is used to infer the level of 
market concentration,    indicates the deposits of the ith bank and   represents the total 
deposits for the banking industry as a whole. HHI can take the value between 0 and 1. The 
market is highly concentrated and has a low level of competition when HHI is approaching 
1 and on the other hand if HHI is approaching 0, it indicates that the market is more 
competitive. As asserted by Molyneux et al. (1996), the number and dispersion of firms in 
the market could influence HHI and thus, it can be determined as a better measure of 
concentration within the market. 
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Figure ‎4.22 Trends of Concentration and Competitive Indicators in Malaysian Banks, 
2000–2011 
 
Source: Confidential dataset from a Malaysian financial organisation 
Based on Figure 4.22, the HHI trend is quite consistent throughout the period under study, 
but slightly higher during the first and second phases of the FSMP (i.e. 2000–2003 and 
2004-2007). The competition level was lower during this period due to restrictions put on 
foreign banks and the gradual liberalisation initiatives undertaken by BNM. In these phases, 
domestic banks were strengthened and given a head start to face greater competition at a 
later stage. Subsequently, it is evidenced that the competitive environment improved in the 
third phase of FSMP (i.e. 2008–2011) after the creation of three new Islamic banks, the 
establishment of Islamic banks’ subsidiaries and an increase in foreign banks’ branches. 
These liberalisation measures introduced by BNM have generally improved the degree of 
competition among Malaysian banks, where the number of entities competing in the 
banking sector has increased (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b).  
Another way to gauge the competition level of the banking industry is by using the spread 
of the interest rate of banks, which can be computed based on the difference between the 
interest rates on loans and the interest rate on deposits. An inverse relationship between 
interest spreads and the competition level is commonly cited where an increasing 
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competitive condition exhibits a lower level of interest spreads and conversely, a higher 
interest spread may indicate a less competitive environment within the banking sector, with 
banks exercising their market power to impose a higher interest rate (Molyneux et al., 1996). 
From Figure 4.22, the lower spread shown in 2004 is a result of the introduction of a new 
interest rate framework, where banking institutions were allowed to price their own products 
based on their own cost structures and market interest rates (e.g. OPR). OPR was increased 
by BNM in late 2005 and mid-2006 in order to contain inflation expectations. The 
increment of OPR influenced banking institutions to adjust their BLR accordingly, which 
resulted in a lower interest spread.
121
 As the subprime crisis surfaced in 2007, there was a 
large influx of foreign capital inflows into Malaysia by overseas investors searching for 
higher yield income. Consequently, banks were competing for these cheaper funds, resulting 
in lower spreads for Malaysian banks. As the global economic crisis worsened and the 
Malaysian economy contracted in 2009, BNM adjusted the OPR by reducing it from 3.25% 
to 2.00% between late 2008 and mid-2009. With this implementation, the interest spread of 
Malaysian banks was also reduced to the floor-rate interest imposed by BNM on fixed 
deposits and lower interest rates on loans granted to customers. The declining interest 
spreads during the third phase of FSMP may also indicate that the Malaysian banks were 
facing a more competitive market structure (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2007b, 2009b).  
4.7 The Development of Research Hypotheses 
From the earlier discussion, this present research aims to examine the efficiency of 
Malaysian banks based on the financial liberalisation (via FSMP) that was being 
implemented in Malaysia in the years 2000 to 2011. One of the objectives of financial 
liberalisation (i.e. FSMP) is to increase market competitiveness in the banking sector. In 
Chapter 2, the discussion of the neoclassical market structures, such as perfect competition, 
monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly, explained that the market structure can 
affect the level of efficiency of the firm. With insufficient competitive pressure in the 
banking industry (market imperfections), the senior managers of the banks may pursue goals 
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 The Malaysian banks were speedier in adjusting the interest rate from the asset side (e.g. loans/financing 
and advances) compared to adjustments made on the liability side (i.e. deposits and capital), which resulted in 
a lower interest spread (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2006). 
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other than maximising profits and they often enjoy a ‘quiet life’ (Berger and Hannan, 1998). 
Thus, a more competitive market structure could provide the required pressure on bank 
managers to improve the efficiency of the banks and continue to survive, or face the risk of 
being forced out of the market (Machlup, 1967).  
In Chapter 3, it was noted that banks’ operations may be highly influenced by regulations 
imposed by the policy makers (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Kumbhakar and Sarkar 
(2003) state that heavy governmental intervention in banking activities is seen as one of the 
factors that influence lower efficiency and poor performance in banks (particularly for 
banks in the developing/transition countries). Thus, an increasingly competitive market 
structure resulting from financial liberalisation may result in the higher efficiency of banks, 
particularly banks in developing countries. Financial liberalisation in the banking industry 
could force the management to adopt strategic management choices in banks to reduce 
operating expenses, improve banking technologies, seek new ways to increase revenues, 
diversify businesses, and reduce inherent risks (Gart, 1994). With the increasingly 
competitive market structure from the implementation of financial liberalisation measures, 
banks may need to optimise the production of output through banking services and products 
based on the optimal use of resources (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). Despite having 
various positive outcomes in implementing financial liberalisation on banks, there are 
several drawbacks. For instance, with more freedom from regulators, banks have a tendency 
to invest in higher-risk products (e.g. asset back securities, derivatives products and high-
yield notes) (Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998). Moreover, they may aspire to increase profitability 
by competing for cheaper funds. This can be done by increasing the interest rate for deposits, 
which in turn can narrow the profit margin of the banks (Gant, 1994). Such behaviour by 
banks could threaten the safety and soundness of the financial industry. 
This chapter (Chapter 4) discussed the financial liberalisation (via FSMP) implemented by 
BNM, which had the objective of improving the competitive structure of the Malaysian 
banking industry. Various deregulation initiatives were introduced in order to attain a more 
competitive market structure. Thus, in this chapter, several measurements such as HHI and 
interest spread trends were used to measure the competitive conditions of the banking 
industry in Malaysia. Based on the competition indicators’ trends in Figure 4.22, the 
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financial liberalisation measures initiated in 2001 have shown improvements during the 
third phase of the FSMP (i.e. 2008-2011). Greater market competition is evidenced from 
declining market concentration (as shown in Figure 4.22; from 0.077 (2000) to 0.068 (2011)) 
in the third phase of the FSMP. Moreover, the interest spread was also trending downward 
(from 3.69% (2000) to 2.14% (2011)). This may indicate an increase in the level of 
competition in the banking market based on simple ratio indicators. Nonetheless, a superior 
measurement such as frontier measurement is needed to examine the level of 
competitiveness and the efficiency performance of the Malaysian banks (see Section 2.3). 
Therefore, a hypothesis on the impact of financial liberalisation and market competitiveness 
on Malaysian banking efficiency is developed based on the discussions made on (1) the 
market and firm theories, and the measurement of production efficiency (Chapter 2), (2) the 
empirical results and findings of past literature on banking efficiency (Chapter 3), and (3) 
banking industry conditions and financial liberalisation initiatives to improve the Malaysian 
banking market structure (Chapter 4). 
In deriving the hypothesis on the relationship between financial liberalisation and bank 
efficiency, past literature suggests that most banking efficiency studies on developing 
countries exhibited a positive impact from liberalisation measures introduced by the policy 
makers (see Chapter 3) (e.g. Gilbert and Wilson, 1998; Attaullah et al., 2004; Sensarma, 
2006). Nevertheless, there are also banking efficiency studies in the developing countries 
that conclude that financial liberalisation does not have a significant impact on the 
efficiency of banks (e.g. Cook et al., 2001; Drake et al., 2006; Kraft et al., 2006). Based on 
past literature, despite mixed findings on the impact of financial liberalisation on the 
efficiency of the banks in developing countries (see Chapter 3), Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) state that the result of financial liberalisation in the banking industry can be 
influenced by the regulatory conditions of the industry and the type of liberalisation 
initiatives being introduced. In other words, factors regarding the institutional structure of 
the banking system could lead to successful financial liberalisation. If the institutional 
structure of banking industry is weak (e.g. it has weak legal structure and enforcement, 
ineffective bureaucracies, high free-riding activities and high corruption), greater instability 
and greater inefficiency could occur immediately after the implementation of financial 
liberalisation (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Therefore, as discussed earlier in 
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this chapter, deregulation measures introduced by BNM in the Malaysian banking industry 
and its impact on the efficiency of the banks can be examined from this hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 Banking efficiency has improved since the implementation of the Financial 
Sector Master Plan (strengthening and liberalisation measures) in the 
Malaysian banking system between 2000 and 2011. 
This particular hypothesis is examined by looking at the trend of the efficiency scores of 
Malaysian banks from 2000 to 2011. By comparing the efficiency scores of Malaysian 
banks over this period, it is expected that the trends will provide an indication of the 
relationship (either positive or negative) between financial liberalisation and the efficiency 
of Malaysian banks. To further support this relationship, dummy variables are assigned in 
the specification of the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) model to account for different 
years in the three different phases (i.e. 2000-2003, 2004-2007 and 2008-2011) of financial 
liberalisation that are initiated through the FSMP by BNM, in which the coefficient and 
significance testing (e.g. the t-test) from the model specification could show the relationship 
and significance of these two factors, particularly in the three different phases of the FSMP. 
Additionally, there are several other hypotheses that can be derived regarding the 
endogenous factors (internal bank-specific factors, such as ownership structure, 
specialisation and size) and exogenous factors (external factors, such as market 
concentration structure), and their impact on the efficiency of Malaysian banks. As outlined 
by Berger and Humphrey (1997), efficiency measurement could be employed in various 
contexts. Hence, this present research also examines several contextual areas regarding 
bank-specific factors and the market structure. For example, in Chapter 2, discussions on the 
theory of the firm and the production function demonstrate that a firm faces a series of 
processes of transforming inputs (resources) into maximum outputs (goods and services), 
subject to technological conditions. Moreover, to transform these inputs into outputs 
efficiently, the firm requires dedicated managerial ability (as a consequence of the 
separation between owner and manager). Modern theories such as managerial theories and 
the behavioural theory of the firm show that managers may have their own utility to satisfy, 
which may result in lower efficiency of the firms (banks). In addition, the effect of 
endogenous and exogenous factors may also influence managers’ decision-making process 
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in transforming inputs into outputs efficiently, based on the technological conditions. In 
view of the discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, this research will also examine the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2 Foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient than domestic banks. 
Hypothesis 3 Conventional banks are more cost (profit) efficient than Islamic banks. 
Hypothesis 4 The impact of the global economic slowdown led to lower cost (profit) 
efficiency of Malaysian banks. 
Hypothesis 5 Large banks are more cost (profit) efficient than small banks. 
Hypothesis 6a A high concentration in the banking sector exhibits lower cost (profit) 
efficiency of Malaysian banks. 
Hypothesis 6b A high market share exhibits higher cost (profit) efficiency of Malaysian 
banks. 
For the above, the variables and rationale that are used to consider the differences among 
Malaysian banks in hypotheses 2 to 6 are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
4.8 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the main attributes of Malaysian banking system between 2000 and 2011 are 
discussed. In essence, the Malaysian banking system consists of commercial banks (both 
conventional and Islamic banks) and investment banks.
122
 Commercial banks dominate the 
banking system in Malaysia, and can be owned by either foreign or domestic parties. The 
banking and financial system accounted for 11.5% of the Malaysian real GDP, which has 
had an average annual growth of 7.1% since 2000. This indicates that the financial role is 
imperative in providing economic growth and development in Malaysia. 
Gradual liberalisation measures were introduced by the Malaysian government and BNM in 
2001 via its 10-year Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP). This master plan was initiated 
after the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998; the crisis reveals the vulnerability of the 
Malaysian banking and financial system. The FSMP consists of three major phases. The 
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 However, as mentioned earlier and for the context of this current research, investment banks are excluded 
from the analysis due to the differences in operations and objectives in comparison to conventional and Islamic 
banks.  
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first phase of FSMP focused on enhancing the capacity of the Malaysian domestic banks 
and strengthening the financial infrastructure. The second phase of FSMP concentrated on 
intensifying competitive pressures on the domestic financial sector. The third phase of 
FSMP introduced new foreign competition and assimilation into the global arena. Within 
these phases of FSMP, various liberalisation initiatives were implemented such as removing 
controls on interest rate, staff remuneration and employment of expatriates, issuance of new 
foreign banking licences (for both conventional and Islamic banks) and establishment of a 
deposit insurance. Additionally, despite the various liberalisation measures introduced, 
Malaysian banks also improved their regulatory and supervision structure by introducing a 
new department within BNM to strengthen financial surveillance at the macro level; this 
department works closely with the supervision departments. Furthermore, in promoting 
financial stability and soundness, BNM adopted Basel II to enhance the risk management 
culture for Malaysian banks, particularly regarding capital management and governance. 
The structure of the Malaysian banking scenario changed after the implementation of the 
FSMP. The implementation of the various liberalisation measures and the macroeconomic 
environment has affected the financial position of the Malaysian banks. The banks were 
stronger in terms of capital and customers outreach due to the consolidation, which prepared 
them to compete with their foreign counterparts. Additionally, with the introduction of New 
Interest Rate Framework (NIRF), the banks have had to compete and determine pricing 
based on their cost structure, risks and demands. Hence, the income sources of banks also 
diversified into fee-based income, rather than concentrating on interest income (composition 
of non-interest income in has increased from 19.3% in 2000 to 31.8% in 2011). The asset 
structure of banks also changed; their loans portfolio is more concentrated on the retail 
market, which reduces the concentration risks of the banks. The banks focus on investment 
rather than loans when it comes to corporate exposure, particularly in bonds from the debt 
market. Liberalisation measures such as the introduction of new foreign banks in 2006 and 
2010/11 provided competitive pressures on domestic banks; the concentration ratio, 
measured by HHI, was on a decreasing trend from 2007 onwards (HHI in 2006 and 2010 
were at 0.09 and 0.07, respectively. At the same time, the interest rate spreads of Malaysian 
banks were also on a downward trend (interest spreads declined from 3.7% in 2000 to 2.1% 
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in 2011), which implies that competitive forces existed within the Malaysian banking sector, 
despite facing economic uncertainties from the global credit crisis. 
The remaining chapters will empirically examine the efficiency of the Malaysian banks 
using the parametric model and nonparametric approaches as a comparison to measure how 
the impact of liberalisation measures (via FSMP) affected the performance and efficiency of 
the banks. Furthermore, conceptual issues relating to the structure of Malaysian banks (e.g. 
ownership, specialisation, inherent risks and market structure) are discussed in the next 
chapter to explore the differences that can occur among banks in terms of efficiency levels. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology and 
Data 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, theoretical discussions were introduced on how market structure could affect 
a firm’s decision-making and level of efficiency. The transformation of inputs into outputs 
(via the production function) and frontier measurements were also briefly discussed. The 
discussion continued in Chapter 3 regarding banks’ role in the economic development of a 
country, and particularly as an intermediary institution that mobilises funds which can be 
allocated efficiently into areas that could generate growth (Levine, 1997). Realising the 
importance of banks to the economy and the general public, governments generally place 
strict regulation on this sector (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). This however, could result 
in banks’ increased inefficiency, particularly when they face limited options to transform 
their liabilities (e.g. deposits and capital) into profitable assets (e.g. investment and loans) 
(Fry, 1995). Thus, liberalisation in the banking sector could help banks to innovate, 
increase competitive market pressure and improve their level of efficiency (Arestis, 2005). 
Chapter 4 focused on such financial liberalisation measures namely, the Financial Sector 
Master Plan (FSMP) which was introduced between 2000 and 2011.
123
 Subsequently, 
parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and nonparametric data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) models are employed to measure and capture the effect of financial liberalisation 
mentioned above.
124
 This is in line with the objective of this research, which is to examine 
the impact of financial liberalisation initiatives introduced by Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) on the cost- and profit-efficiency of Malaysian banks. 
Section 5.2 outlines the SFA and DEA methodologies employed in this study to estimate 
the cost- and profit-efficiency of Malaysian banks. Additionally, this section discusses a 
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 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) introduced the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP), which sets the 
medium- and longer-term agenda of building a financial sector that is resilient, efficient and competitive, and 
responsive to changing requirements (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001a, 2001b). 
124
 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, following Resti (1997), the DEA models are used by way of 
comparison and to test the consistency of the SFA model (Bauer et al., 1998). 
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test of the conditions required to measure the consistency between parametric and 
nonparametric methods. Subsequently, Section 5.3 focuses on the data used in this research, 
which comprises all banks in Malaysia between 2000 and 2011. The description and 
rationale of different variables used in this research are also discussed. Section 5.4 outlines 
the stochastic frontier analysis model’s specification, which includes the functional form 
that is used in the SFA model to measure the cost and profit functions based on the 
variables employed. This section also compares the different models and structural tests 
used in finding the preferred model. Once the preferred model has been identified, it is 
then used to measure the scores of cost- and profit-efficiencies (i.e. standard profit- and 
alternative profit-efficiency). 
Figure ‎5.1 Information Flow for Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 Methodology and Data 
 
189 
 
5.2 Methodology 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, there are two main approaches to measuring the 
efficiency of banks based on frontier estimations: the parametric and the nonparametric 
approaches. Both approaches display similar objectives using relative benchmarks to 
measure the efficiency of firms but the estimation methods and assumptions are 
significantly different. Following discussion of empirical studies of Malaysian banking 
(see Chapter 3), to the author’s knowledge, there are no studies of Malaysian banking that 
perform comprehensive consistency testing (except for rank-order correlations) between 
parametric and nonparametric approaches (see Bauer et al. (1998)). The results of such 
consistency comparisons can help policy makers to be more confident in making policy 
decisions. Following Resti (1997), this study employs a parametric approach (i.e. SFA) to 
estimate the cost- and profit-efficiency levels of Malaysian banks. At the same time, a 
nonparametric approach (i.e. DEA) will be used to test the consistency of the SFA 
estimations. 
Figure 5.2 gives an overview of the common approaches of frontier measurement. In this 
study, for the SFA model, the frontier estimation has focused on cost- and profit-efficiency 
(standard- and alternative profit-efficiency) using the translog functional form (model 
specification) and half-normal assumption (random error distribution). In terms of 
variables, the SFA model will utilise inputs and outputs based on the intermediation 
approach (see Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Concurrently, this research also considers the 
effect of heterogeneity on the efficiency of Malaysian banks. Thus, control and 
environmental variables are employed using the 1-stage approach of the Battese and Coelli 
(1995) model. Additionally, the DEA model is used in this study to examine the 
consistency between two different approaches (i.e. parametric versus nonparametric). In 
view of this, the DEA model employs the same dataset and intermediation approach 
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variables as the SFA model for both cost- and profit-efficiency estimations.
125
 The 
methods employed in this study are discussed further in subsequent sections. 
Figure ‎5.2 Overview of Frontier Efficiency Estimations 
 
Adapted from Mokhtar et al. (2006, p. 5) 
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 However, the effect of heterogeneity is not examined for the DEA model due to differences of estimations. 
For instance, in this study, SFA uses a 1-stage approach, but for DEA to measure the effect of heterogeneity 
it requires a 2-stage approach, which is therefore not directly comparable.  
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5.2.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
SFA is one of the most widely used methods in banking efficiency studies (e.g. Berger, 
1993; Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Allen and Rai, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; Bhattacharya 
et al., 1997; Chang et al., 1998; Bauer et al., 1998; Altunbas et al., 2001; Casu and 
Girardone, 2002; Bonin et al., 2005; Bos and Schmiedel, 2007). SFA was independently 
proposed in 1977 by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). The 
SFA model assumes that in producing a certain level of output, firms face various technical 
inefficiencies and a given combination of input levels. Additionally, the firm’s producion 
is influenced by the sum of a parametric function of known inputs, with unknown 
parameters, and a random error (associated with the measurement error of the level of 
production and inefficiency). SFA requires a functional form, such as cost or profit, with a 
two-component error terms: random error and inefficiency. By way of illustration, the 
single-equation stochastic cost function model is shown below: 
                        (5.1) 
where       is the natural logarithm of output for the i-th bank at time t,        is a vector 
of inputs of the i-th bank at time t,      is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated 
and       is the error term. Following Aigner et al. (1997), the assumption of the composed 
error term is:  
             (5.2) 
where     and     are independently distributed;     represents a random uncontrollable 
error and is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance   
  is drawn 
from a one-sided distribution that is assumed to capture inefficiency.     is assumed to be 
drawn from a half-normal distribution with mean zero and variance   
 .    , can be 
estimated by using the conditional mean of the inefficiency term, given the composed error 
term, as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) and derive the log-likelihood for inefficiency, 
which is expressed in terms of the two variance parameters,      
    
   capturing the 
variance of the composed error term      
 /   
 , which measures the fraction of 
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inefficiency relative to statistical noise. Moreover,     can be used to measure the level of 
inefficiency of banks. For instance, if     is equal to 0, it indicates that there is no 
inefficiency based on the production function imposed. On the other hand, if     is more 
than 0, it indicates that inefficiency is present. In the past, most studies using SFA were 
directed towards inefficiency prediction and this inefficiency is commonly measured using 
technical efficiency (TE). Equation 5.3 exhibits the common output-orientated measure of 
TE using the ratio of observed output to corresponding frontier output, which can be 
written as (Coelli et al., 2005): 
 
     
   
             
 
                 
             
           
(5.3) 
where TE is the technical efficiency of i-th bank at time t,      is the observed output and 
            is the corresponding frontier output. As mentioned earlier, TE has a value 
between 0 and 1, in which TE derives from the output of i-th bank relative to a fully-
efficient bank’s output, located on the estimated frontier curve that utilises the same input 
vector (Coelli et al, 2005).   
5.2.1.1 Cost- and Profit-Efficiency 
Based on earlier discussions in Chapter 3, the bulk of empirical studies of Malaysian banks 
have focused mainly on cost efficiency, while a limited number looked into the efficiency 
of the profit function. There are even fewer studies that compare both cost- and profit-
efficiency using the same Malaysia banks’ data set. Thus, following Berger and Mester 
(1997), this research employs three main economic functional forms under the parametric 
approach, in which efficiency estimates can be derived from the: (1) cost function, (2) 
standard profit function; and (3) alternative profit function. This corresponds with the two 
paramount objectives: cost minimisation and profit maximisation. 
First, cost-efficiency (CE) indicates how close a bank’s cost is to that of a best-practice 
bank, which produces the same outputs using the same technology. The variable costs of 
the cost function rely on: the prices of variable inputs, the amount of variable outputs, 
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fixed netputs (or exogenous factors) (if any), random errors, and inefficiency (Berger and 
Mester 1997). The cost-efficiency of a bank is measured using the observed bank’s total 
cost, relative to the total cost of a bank on the estimated frontier. Hence, the cost function 
is described as: 
                                         (5.4) 
where        is the natural logarithm of the observed bank’s total cost,     is the cost 
frontier’s functional form,     is the vector of input prices,     is the vector of outputs,     
denotes the vector of control variables (if any) and     represents the vector of 
environmental variables (if any). These control     and environmental     variables are 
included in the cost function to capture the heterogeneity effects of cost-efficiency.   is the 
parameters to be estimated. The term             is treated as a composite error term, 
where       is the inefficiency term: a non-negative and one-sided error component that 
follows an asymmetric half-normal distribution.       is the random error term that permits 
the random variation of the frontier across banks and captures the effects of measurement 
error, other statistical noise and random shocks outside the bank’s control. This error term 
is assumed to consist of independently and identically distributed normal random variables, 
with zero mean and variance (Coelli et al., 2005).  
The CE of the i-th bank is the estimated cost needed to produce bank i’s output vector if 
the bank were as efficient as the best-practice bank (on the frontier curve) in the sample 
facing the same inputs and outputs, control, and environmental variables          , 
divided by the actual cost of i-th bank, and adjusted for random error. It can be written as: 
 
     
                             
                                 
 
 
        
 
(5.5) 
where      is the cost-efficiency of the i-th bank. The numerator in equation 5.5 indicates 
the minimum cost that can be incurred by the best practice banks and the denominator in 
equation 5.5 denotes the actual cost incurred by the i-th bank at time t. Hence, cost-
efficiency      is measured against the ratio of minimum cost banks (best-practice banks 
on the frontier) and the actual cost of i-th bank. Cost-efficiency      could also be seen as 
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a proportion of cost that is either being used efficiently or being wasted. For example, if 
     of i-th bank is 0.60, it indicates that i-th bank is 60.0% efficient and 40.0% of its cost 
is being wasted when compared to the best-practice bank. Cost-efficiency ranges between 
0 and 1. Banks with a cost-efficiency of 1 are considered to be best-practice banks within 
the observed data. 
Second, the standard profit-efficiency (SPE) tests measure how close a bank is to achieving 
the maximum possible profit with given input and output prices (control and environmental 
variables, if any). The standard profit functions differ from cost functions by specifying the 
profit variable in place of the cost variable, and takes variable output prices as a given. On 
the other hand, the cost functions hold all output quantities to be statistically fixed at their 
inefficient levels. In standard profit-efficiency, the dependent variable (i.e. total profit) 
takes revenue into account by varying output and input prices. Output prices are employed 
to allow for inefficiencies in output choice when reacting to the prices of the profit 
function (Berger and Mester, 1997). In a log form, the stochastic standard profit function is: 
                                           (5.6) 
where      is the profit before tax of i-th bank at time t, which includes all the interest and 
fee income earned from outputs minus total costs;   is a constant added to every firm’s 
profit so that the natural log is taken of a positive number;     is the vector of output 
prices;    is the vector of input prices,     is the vector of control variables (if any) and     
is the vector of environmental variables (if any).       represents inefficiency that reduces 
profits and       is the random error. 
SPE can be viewed as the ratio of the actual profits of i-th bank to the maximum profits 
that could be earned if the i-th bank was as efficient as the best bank in the sample, net of 
random error. The measurement for standard profit-efficiency of i-th bank, based on the 
ratio of actual profit to maximum profit, can be written as: 
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(5.7) 
where       is standard profit-efficiency, which exhibits the proportion of maximum 
profits that are earned compared to the best-practice banks. If i-th bank’s standard profit-
efficiency ratio is at 0.60, it indicates that the bank is losing 40% of the profits it could be 
earning due to excessive costs, deficient revenues or even both. Similar to cost-efficiency, 
for best-practice banks that maximise profits in given conditions within the observed data, 
the standard profit-efficiency would be equal to 1. However, by contrast, standard profit-
efficiency can be negative if firms throw away more than 100% of their potential profits 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Third, alternative profit-efficiency (APE) employs the same dependent variables as the 
standard profit function and the same independent variables as the cost function. Berger 
and Mester (1997) further suggest that alternative profit-efficiency could provide useful 
information if one or more of the following conditions are met: (1) there are substantial 
unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services, (2) outputs are unable to 
achieve output scale and product mix, (3) output markets are not perfectly competitive, (4) 
output prices are not accurately measured. Alternative profit-efficiency tests measure how 
close a bank comes to earning maximum profit, given its output levels compared to its 
output prices (as in standard profit-efficiency). Hence, rather than compute deviations from 
optimal output as inefficiency, as in the standard profit function, the outputs are held 
constant as in the cost function, while  allowing output prices to vary and affect profits. 
The log form of the alternative profit function can be written as: 
                                           (5.8) 
Equation 5.8 is identical to the standard profit function except that     is replaced by     
(i.e. the vector of outputs) in the function,    , yielding different values for       and      , 
which represents inefficiency and random error respectively. Alternative profit-efficiency 
is a ratio of predicted actual profits to the predicted maximum profits for a best-practice 
bank and can be written as: 
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(5.9) 
Here, the output prices are allowed to vary efficiency values in choosing output quantities 
and do not affect alternative profit-efficiency except through the point of evaluation 
                  , to the extent that the best-practice bank is not operating at the same 
level                    as the i-th bank, owing to the effects mentioned earlier: market 
power and the quality of banking services, for example. Similarly to standard profit-
efficiency, an alternative profit efficiency of 1, indicates best-practice banks within the 
sample are maximising profits (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
There are several important steps involved in estimating the efficiency score of cost, 
standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency when using the SFA model. The first step 
in computing the efficiency score is to estimate the parameters ( ) within the stochastic 
equation. Since stochastic frontier models involve a composite error of          on the 
right side of the equation, it makes the estimation of parameters ( ) complex. If there is no 
composite error term (        ) in the equation, such as           , it will be 
relatively easy to estimate the parameters ( ) by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method. Even with the composite error term ( ) the estimation can still be made, as it is 
unbiased, consistent and efficient among linear estimators.  
However, Greene (2010) found that the estimator of the intercept in the OLS method is 
commonly not consistent. To overcome this limitation, a common method used to estimate 
the parameters ( ) in the stochastic frontier model is to use the maximum-likelihood (ML) 
function, particularly when dealing with non-linear equations. The concept of ML entails a 
particular sample of observations that is likely to be generated by the distribution of other 
samples. In other words, estimation via ML is derived by observing given data and 
provides a means of choosing an asymptotically efficient estimator for a set of parameters 
(Greene, 2002). ML estimators are preferred due to their large sample properties, which are 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed (Coelli et al., 2005).  
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When using the ML to estimate parameters ( ), a strong assumption on the composite error 
(  ) is needed. As mentioned above, the composite error (  ) consists of random error (  ) 
and inefficiency (  ), and it is assumed that    is independent of   , just as other input and 
output variables are independent. It is also assumed that    is normally distributed with 
zero mean and variance   
  (            
  ) and    is non-negative half-normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance   
  (            
  ). This assumption of a 
half-normal model on    is commonly used in stochastic frontier models. Other 
assumptions such as truncated normal, exponential and gamma models are also available to 
facilitate the ML process (Coelli et al., 2005, Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  
Apart from the assumptions on the distribution and independent density functions of    and 
  , the second part of the ML process involves a joint probability function (as a result of  
integrating individual density functions). The joint probability density function (pdf) is also 
known as the likelihood function and expresses the likelihood of observing a sample from 
the unknown parameters of ( ) and   . The likelihood function is maximised via an 
iterative process to estimate the parameters ( ) and is normally in logarithm form (for 
detailed discussion, see Coelli et al 2005, pg. 217, Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, pg.75). 
Maximising the log-likelihood function is often involves taking the first derivatives of the 
unknown parameters and setting them to zero. Since the first derivative of this log-
likelihood function is highly non-linear and normally the parameters cannot be solved, the 
log-likelihood function has to employ iterative optimisation processes, which begin with 
placing the starting values of unknown parameters and are updated iteratively until the log-
likelihood function is converged at maximum value (see Coelli et al., 2005, p. 246 for 
details). In this procedure, the joint pdf of    and    is considered to be one, within the ML 
technique in order to estimate the parameters in the cost, standard and alternative profit 
functions. The log-likelihood function can be written: 
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(5.10) 
where TC is the vector of log-total costs,       is a set of parameters to be estimated, N is 
the number of banks.       
     
  ,                                      and 
     are the standard normal cumulative density function (cdf) of the standard normal 
random variable evaluated at x (Allen and Rai, 1996; Coelli et al., 2005). 
Once the parameters         have been estimated in equation (5.10), the next step is to 
compute the composite error term          . The existence of inefficiency      within 
the composite error should be first determined before computation of inefficiency is carried 
out. In order to test for the presence of inefficiency, the skewness of the joint distribution 
of the composite error (        ) is observed. The domination random error (  ) and 
inefficiency (  ) depend on the skewness of distribution of the composite error     . For 
cost-efficiency frontier, if the distribution is positively skewed (or negatively skewed for 
the profit-efficiency frontier), it indicates that the component-inefficiency      dominates 
the random error (  ), which sums up the composite random error    . Alternatively, 
Battese and Corra (1977) introduced parameter   which measures the deviations of the 
composite random error    . The Parameter   is measured as:  
 
   
  
 
  
    
  
(5.11) 
where   
  is the variance of inefficiency and,   
 is the variance of random error. This  -
parameter lies between 0 and 1. The  -parameter indicates the cause of deviations either by 
inefficiency   or random error   relative to  . If   is approaching 1, it indicates that the 
composite error ( ) is dominated by inefficiency  ; on the other hand, if   is approaching 0, 
then it is noise or random error   dominating the composite error ( ).  
The main objective in the next step is to estimate the mean inefficiency of all banks. The 
mean inefficiency will be used as a basis to compute individual banks’ inefficiency at a 
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later stage. Based on Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), the mean inefficiency of a half-
normal model can be estimated via the equation: 
 
        √
 
 
 
(5.12) 
where      is the expected mean for inefficiency     . To further calculate the average 
cost-efficiency of all banks within the sample, Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) suggest 
that          should be used. Once an estimation of average inefficiency within the 
sample is obtained, the next step is to compute the individual banks’ level of inefficiency. 
To do so, this study follows Jondrow, Lovell, Moterov and Schmidt’s (1982) model, which 
estimates an individual bank’s efficiency using a half-normal case. Their method can 
separate inefficiency   and random error   from the composite error   for individual banks. 
This can be done from the distribution of  , as it contains necessary information on 
inefficiency  . That is, individual banks’ inefficiency can be obtained from the conditional 
distribution of   given  . Based on the half-normal case,126 Jondrow et al. (1982) proposed 
a point estimator for cost-inefficiency that involves the conditional expectation value of   
from the composed error term   , which can be written as: 
 
    |     
  
      
[
        
        
 
   
 
] 
(5.13) 
where      is the expectation operator for point estimator,      is the joint pdf of standard 
normal distribution,     is the cdf,   √        and   
  
     
. The value of   must lie 
between 0 and 1. A value closer to 1 indicates that deviation from the frontier is influenced 
more by cost inefficiency. On the other hand, a value closer to 0 denotes that the deviation 
can be explained by noise.
127
 The estimates of efficiency are unbiased but inconsistent 
                                                 
126
 For this, the half normal distribution assumption is employed on the composite error term (        ). 
For other distribution assumptions (e.g. exponential, gamma and truncated distributions), the log-likelihood 
function differs based on its respective density functions. 
127
 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) explain the effect of   in more details. They mention that when   
approaches 0, it can be that either   
  approaches   or   
  approaches 0 and result in a random error 
component that dominates the one-sided error component in determining    . On the other hand, as   
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because the variations associated with the distribution of estimator    |   , which is 
independent of i and remain non-zero (Greene, 2010).
128
 Thus, the cost-efficiency measure 
from equation 5.13 takes values over the interval (1, ) and a value equal to 1 means fully 
efficient. Given this, the cost-efficiency scores can be obtained from 1/    |    (Coelli et 
al., 2005).  
The next step after estimating the inefficiency levels of individual banks is to test the 
hypotheses concerning parameters ( ). Commonly, if OLS regression is used to measure 
the coefficient, or a small sample is employed in the regression process, t- and F- tests are 
sufficient to test the hypothesis concerning the parameters ( ). However, as most SFA 
operates by using ML estimation, testing the hypothesis of the coefficients is commonly 
done with the z-test due to a normally asymptotic distribution of unconstrained ML 
estimators (Coelli et al., 2005). The t-test ratios can also be used to test the coefficient 
hypothesis by dividing the coefficients and the standard errors from the model generated 
(Qasrawi, 2009). 
In addition, Coelli et al. (2005) mention that testing the absence of inefficiency effects is 
one of the things that stochastic frontier researchers are interested in. Thus, the null 
hypothesis is to reject if there are no inefficiency effects. Common methods used for this 
procedure are the likelihood ratio, the Wald test and the Lagrange multiplier tests (Greene, 
2010). The most frequently employed statistical method to test a hypothesis using ML 
estimation is the likelihood ratio (LR). LR compares the closeness of the of unrestricted 
estimates to the log-likelihood function of restricted estimates (Coelli et al., 2005). That is, 
the test is used to evaluate a simple null hypothesis against a simple alternative hypothesis 
(Greene, 2002). This index is also particularly useful when researchers use several 
different models, with a number of restricted variables, to estimate firms’ efficiency (where 
the LR index is often used to find the preferred model). The LR statistic function can be 
described as (Coelli et al., 2005): 
                                                                                                                                                    
approaches  ,  it can be either that   
  approaches   or that   
  approaches 0, and the one-sided error 
component dominates the random error in the determination of   . 
128
 Greene (2010) iterates that an estimator is consistent if its values approach the true parameter value and if 
its variances become smaller when the sample size increases indefinitely. 
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                   (5.14) 
where      is the value of maximum log-likelihood in the restricted model (OLS model) 
and      is the value of maximum log-likelihood in the unrestricted model (ML estimates 
model). 
The LR statistics are asymptotically equivalent to chi-squared (  )  distributions (Coelli, 
1995). Based on the null hypothesis of the restricted (i.e. OLS) model, it has a limiting chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions being 
tested (Greene, 2010). The degrees of freedom of the chi-squared statistic are equal to the 
reduction in the number of dimensions in the parameter space due to the restrictions being 
imposed (Greene, 2010). For example, if the restrictions in the restricted model is 1, which 
is setting   
   ,  the null hypothesis is often tested by observing the result of LR statistics. 
If the LR statistic exceeds the chosen (1%, 5% or 10%) critical value of chi-squared 
distributions, the null hypothesis is rejected, which implies the existence of inefficiency in 
the unrestricted model. However, if the null hypothesis is accepted, it indicates that the 
model does not generate inefficiency via its stochastic functions. This study employs a 5% 
critical value with 1 degree of freedom, which gives a value of 3.84. 
5.2.1.2 Scale-Efficiency 
As discussed in Chapter 2, scale economies can be described as a ratio of the proportionate 
increase in cost in relation to the proportionate increase in output. Theoretically, given the 
total cost function defined by TC = f(Q) where Q is output, the average cost can be derived 
as ATC = f(Q)/Q and marginal cost (MC) is ∂TC/∂Q. The average cost will decline as long 
as marginal cost lies below average cost. Hence, the scale economies (SE) are given as 
ATC/MC, which is the elasticity of cost with respect to output (Altunbas et al., 1996). In 
this research, following Mester (1996) and Altunbas et al. (2001), the SE can be estimated 
as the mean output, input prices and other control variables for different size quartiles of all 
banks. Therefore the SE can be mathematically computed by differentiating the cost 
function in equation (5.4) with respect to output. This is given as: 
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 (5.15) 
where              is the partial derivative of the logarithm of the cost function with 
respect to logarithm of output i. The sum of individual cost-elasticity measures the 
proportional change in TC due to the proportional change in output when all other factors 
are held constant. The change in output could change the scale of output but not the 
composition of output bundles. A bank is said to have economies of scale if SE < 1, where 
an equal proportionate rise in all outputs results in a less than proportionate rise in total 
costs. If SE>1, the total costs increase is more than proportionate with the increase in 
outputs and the bank is said to face diseconomies of scale. On the other hand, if SE = 1, the 
bank is operating at an optimal level of production and demonstrating constant returns to 
scale. 
5.2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
In order to provide more accurate and useful information for regulatory purposes, it is 
imperative to have reliable methods for measuring efficiency. For this purpose, DEA will 
be employed to cross-check the robustness of the SFA’s results. As seen in the Chapter 2, 
SFA is a useful and powerful tool in determining the efficiency frontier as well as in 
estimating the efficiency levels of respective banks. However, there is a limitation on 
estimation specifications, which may influence the error term and may not be reflective of 
industry’s conditions. Thus, DEA provides a more flexible approach in measuring 
efficiency, as it does not involve an explicit estimation of the cost/profit functions and it 
avoids misspecification risks of the error term associated with the estimation function. 
Nevertheless, DEA is a deterministic model and does not take into account random errors 
in the data. Therefore, although both methods are not fully comparable due to differences 
in estimation of the random error, DEA will still be employed in this study for the purpose 
of policy analysis and decision-making, given that different techniques or methods contain 
different information and may generate different efficiency scores (Eisenbeis et al., 1999; 
Bauer et al., 1998). DEA is a nonparametric approach that employs a linear programming 
method by constructing a piece-wise combination yielding a convex production possibility 
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set that envelope all decision-making units (DMUs) in the sample. Consequently, based on 
the frontier created by efficient DMUs (i.e. banks), the efficiency of other banks is 
calculated relative to the frontier (Coelli et al., 2005). For methodological purposes, the 
mathematical expression is explained in the next section. 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) present a model with an input-orientation that is able 
to deal with many inputs and outputs and assumed constant returns to scale (CRS). The 
input-orientation DEA measures efficiency by maximising the ratio of all outputs to all 
inputs involved within the sample. DEA used observations of the sample to measure 
efficiency. Following Coelli et al. (2005), DEA can be explained by assuming the data of N 
inputs and M outputs for each of I firms. The column vectors     and    represent the input 
and output data for i-th firm where          and           for both input and 
output matrices, respectively, which represent the data for all I firms. 
Coelli et al. (2005) further iterate that DEA could be explained through ratio form where 
maximisation of outputs can be made via computation of the ratio of all outputs over all 
inputs (input-orientated). To illustrate this, the ratio can be shown as (     
     ⁄ , where 
  is an        vector of output weights, and   is a       vector of input weights. The 
optimal weights are attained by solving the following mathematical programming problem: 
                 
    
    ⁄  
                 
   ⁄                          
                              
(5.16) 
The above encompasses finding values for   and   that maximise the efficiency of i-th firm, 
subject to the constraint that all the efficiency measures should be less than or equal to one 
for respective firms. However, the fractional formulation has a problem with an infinite 
number of solutions which can be overcome by imposing the optimal constraint        , 
and then written in the form of (Coelli et al., 2005): 
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(5.17) 
where the notation of   and   is changed to   and   and is used to emphasise that this is a 
different linear programming problem. This linear programming is known as a multiplier 
form. Using the duality in linear programming,
129
 the dual of a maximisation problem can 
derive an envelopment form and be written as (Coelli et al., 2005): 
                 
                       
                                                     
                           
(5.18) 
where     a scalar or efficiency score of the i-th firm, and   is a    vector of the constant, 
which denotes the weights employed to evaluate the performance of i-th firm relative to the 
most efficient firms that sit on the efficiency frontier. When a firm is inefficient, the weight 
    ) implicates the percentage of input reference firms that are required to become 
efficient. According to Farrell (1957), a technically efficient firm would achieve a value of 
1, which is located on the frontier and be satisfied from the value    , which indicates 
the efficiency score of i-th firm. Concurrently, the linear programming should be solved   
times, once for each firm within the sample for a value of    to be obtained for each firm. 
The envelopment form shown above has fewer constraints than the multiplier form, which 
makes it preferable to solve the envelopment form (Coelli et al., 2005). The above linear 
programming has a fine intuitive interpretation where DEA seeks to minimise the 
efficiency score    of the i-th firm and radially contract the input vector   , as much as 
                                                 
129
 The formulation of linear programming model can either be primal or dual. The former normally treats the 
rows and dual treats column as representing the model. Given this, duality describes the changing objective 
from maximising output/input ratio to minimising input usage. The dual for equation 5.17 is minimising 
      , represented by  , and dual for  
      
       is  . Since the results from the two formulations 
(i.e. primal and dual) are equal, though expressed differently, the choice between them is based on 
computational efficiency, or perhaps ease of interpretation. The dual form is more efficient in computation if 
the number of DMUs is large compared to the number of input and output variables. Primal form entails 
constraints represented by the number of DMUs, while in dual form, these constraints are replaced by the 
number of input and output variables (Cooper et al., 2007).  
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possible, whilst remaining within the feasible input set. The observed data points 
represented by all DMUs will determine the piece-wise linear isoquant, which is the inner 
boundary of the data set. In this process, a projection point         , which is a linear 
combination of observed data points (not an explicit functional form) located on the 
efficient frontier, is being produced from a radial contraction of input vector    that also 
limits the projection points belonging to a feasible production set (Coelli et al., 2005). 
Hence, inefficiency is a measure of the difference between vector    and projection point 
        on the efficient frontier. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, CRS assumes all firms are operating at an optimal scale 
where the CRS linear programming is imposed on all observations. However, Coelli et al. 
(2005) argue that imperfect competition, financial constraints and government regulation 
have an impact on firms, causing them not to operate at an optimal scale.
130
 Hence, it is at 
times reasonable to adjust the CRS model to account for variable returns to scale (VRS). 
VRS allows the computation of technical efficiency without confounding the effects of 
scale-efficiencies. Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) who introduced their BCC model, 
state that VRS ensures that a similar size of firms is compared, devoid of the impact of 
scale-efficiencies. VRS adds the convexity constraint ∑    from the CRS linear 
programming equation (5.18) shown above. The linear programming of VRS can be 
written as (Coelli et al., 2005): 
                 
                       
                                           
                               
                            
(5.19) 
where ∑  is an     vector of ones, and by placing the convexity constraint ∑   , it 
ensures different scales of firm are recognised as efficient; consequently, envelopment is 
generated from multiple convex linear combinations of best practice (Coelli et al., 2003). A 
                                                 
130
 In other words, the CRS model relates to the ability of managers to utilise a firm’s given resources, while 
the VRS model refers to exploiting scale economies by operating at a point where the production frontier 
exhibits  CRS (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). 
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convex hull of intersection planes will be formed by using this approach, where the 
envelopment of data points is tighter than the CRS conical hull; this consequently, can 
generate technical efficiency scores that are greater than or equal to the scores obtained 
from the CRS model (Coelli et al., 2005). Additionally, unlike the CRS model, where firms 
can be benchmarked against firms that are substantially larger or vice versa, the VRS 
model would only allow an inefficient firm to be benchmarked against a similar sized firm 
by imposing convexity constraints (Coelli et al., 2005). 
5.2.2.1 Cost- and Profit-Efficiency 
The previous section discussed two variants of the DEA model, which focus on technical 
efficiency. But such measurement does not consider price input and output. Input and 
output prices are required for economic efficiency computation (e.g. cost- and profit-
efficiency). By including input and output prices, the optimal proportionate allocation of 
firms on their input and output can be analysed according to prices. Hence, the DEA model 
can also measure cost- and profit-efficiency to support the firm’s objectives, driven 
primarily by behavioural assumptions such as cost minimisation or profit maximisation 
(Cooper et al., 2007). 
Cost-efficiency involves a minimisation of cost behaviour. Thus, the DEA cost efficiency 
model for this study adopts an input-orientated measure with VRS. The model of cost-
efficiency can be written as (Coelli et al., 2005): 
        
             
  
                  
  
                             
                               
                           
(5.20) 
where    is a       vector of input prices for the i-th firm.    
  (computed by linear 
programming) is the cost minimisation vector of input quantities for the i-th firm, given the 
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input prices     and output level of   . Therefore, the total cost of efficiency of the i-th firm 
is computed as: 
          
 
        (5.21) 
where CE is cost-efficiency,       
 
 is the minimum cost and        is the observed cost. 
From the mathematical factional formula, it can be shown that CE is the ratio of minimum 
cost to observed cost, for i-th firm. In addition, CE is interactive with allocative efficiency 
(AE) and TE where AE = CE/TE. These three efficiencies (CE, AE and TE) can take values 
ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 implies full efficiency. 
Profit-efficiency involves the maximisation of profits for i-th firm. Thus, in this study, 
output-orientated efficiency is employed and the profit model can be written as (Coelli et 
al., 2005): 
       
    
            
 
   
 
   
   
                      
  
                            
      
                                   
                              
(5.22) 
Where    is a vector of output prices for the i-th firm.   
  is the revenue maximising vector 
of output quantities for the i-th bank, given the output prices    and the input level of   ,   
is a       vector of input prices for the i-th firm, and    
  is the cost minimisation vector 
of input quantities for the i-th firm. To compute the profit- efficiency, the fractional 
formula is shown as (Coelli et al., 2005):  
            
 
  
 
     
 
   
      
 
 
 
  (5.23) 
where PE is the profit-efficiency,    
 
    
 
  
 
   is the observed profit and   
 
 
  
  
    
 
 
   is the maximum profit. Therefore, PE is a ratio of observed profit to maximum 
profit for the i-th firm. The value of PE ranges between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 
indicates full efficiency. 
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With the exception of the widely used Berger and Mester’s (1997) parametric alternative 
profit-efficiency, which considers the impact of market power and regulatory effects, only 
two studies were found that estimated alternative profit-efficiency using DEA models (see 
Maudos and Pastor (2003) and Ariff and Can (2008)).
131
 Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) found 
that estimation of profit efficiency using the DEA model is rather limited, based on a 
review of past literature. This may be attributed to the difficulty in collecting reliable 
information for output prices. Due to the lack of studies using alternative profit-efficiency 
for the DEA model, this research focuses on the new cost- and profit-efficiency DEA 
model devised by Tone (2002) which is different to the traditional DEA model. The new 
DEA models consider the impact of market power by relaxing the assumption of 
homogeneous of degree 1 in the input prices (as exhibited by traditional DEA models) 
(Tone, 2002). 
5.2.2.2 New DEA Cost- and Profit-Efficiency 
The traditional cost- and profit-efficiency in equations (5.20) and (5.22) assume that input 
prices are the same across all DMUs. In this scenario, a traditional DEA model might 
assume that the market is performing under perfect competition. However, this may not 
always be the case; input prices might not be identical across all DMUs. Therefore, Tone 
(2002) points out that the cost- and profit-efficiency in equations 5.20 and 5.22 do not take 
into consideration the fact that costs (profits) can be reduced by reducing the inputs 
(outputs) prices. For example, two banks have similar inputs and outputs, but one of them 
faces greater input prices than the other; under the traditional DEA model, the cost 
function is homogeneous of degree 1 in input price and the scaling factor is cancelled in 
the cost-efficiency ratio, which could result in both banks having the same cost-efficiency 
scores, even though they have different levels of input price. This is because traditional 
DEA focuses on the technical aspect (i.e. technical efficiency) of these two banks, and 
does not take into account variations in input prices. Therefore, in overcoming this 
                                                 
131
 The alternative profit-efficiency of the DEA model introduced by Maudos and Pastor (2003) employs a 
solution that corresponds to the revenue R* and input demand x             , which maximises profits 
given the prices of inputs w. This solution uses a linear combination of firms that produce at least as much of 
each of the outputs using a smaller or equal quantity of inputs, and obtain at least as much revenue as i-th 
firm (Maudos and Pastor, 2003; Arif and Can, 2008). 
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drawback, Tone (2002) introduces a new DEA model that is distinct from being 
homogeneous of degree 1 in input price (as in the traditional DEA model). The new DEA 
model deals with different input prices by taking the TC of each unit, which is equal to the 
price of inputs multiplied by the quantity of inputs. Thus under Tone’s (2002), the new 
DEA cost-efficiency model, the cost-efficiency of i-th bank, is determined to be the 
following linear programming problem: 
       ̅           ̅ 
             ̅    ̅  
                             
                              
                           
(5.24) 
where e is a row vector of all elements equal to 1,  ̅    
     
 .  
  is the price of inputs 
and   
  is the quantity of inputs. Tone (2002) assumes that the elements of  ̅  are 
denominated in homogeneous units in monetary terms. Unlike traditional DEA which 
retains the unit cost of i-th bank fixed at  
  and searches for the optimal input mix   
  for 
producing   , the New DEA (NDEA) cost efficiency (CE) searches for the optimal input 
mix   
  for producing    based on the independently current unit price   
  of i-th bank. 
The NDEA CE for the i-th bank can be measured as: 
 
        
  ̅ 
 
  ̅ 
  
(5.25) 
where   ̅ 
  is the minimum cost and   ̅  is the observed cost. For the NDEA profit-
efficiency, the NDEA profit efficiency (PE) of i-th bank can be mathematically described 
as: 
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     ̅  ̅          ̅    ̅  
                 ̅    ̅  
                                 
                                  
                              
(5.26) 
where e is a row vector with elements equal to 1,  ̅     
      
 , where   
  is the price of 
outputs and   
  is the quantity of outputs and  ̅    
     
 , where  
  is the price of inputs 
and   
  is the quantity of inputs. The NDEA PE of the i-th bank can be written as: 
 
        
  ̅    ̅ 
  ̅ 
    ̅ 
  
(5.27) 
where   ̅    ̅  is the observed profit and   ̅ 
    ̅ 
  is the maximum profit. 
5.2.2.3 Scale-Efficiency 
Scale-efficiency can be attained by using a ratio of CRS efficiency to the VRS efficiency. 
When both CRS and VRS efficiencies are available, the scale-efficiency for the i-th firm 
can be computed. The scale-inefficiency of firms occurs when the CE obtained under CRS 
differs from the CE under VRS (Coelli et al., 2005). The scale-efficiency (SCALE) can be 
defined and written as: 
        
     
     
   (5.28) 
where       is the scale-efficiency,       is the cost-efficiency under CRS and       is 
cost-efficiency under VRS. 
5.2.3 Consistency Tests between SFA and DEA Models 
From the discussion in Chapter 2, both SFA and DEA have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. The result of efficiency scores derived from these different frontier 
approaches contains different information (Dong et al., 2014). Until now, there is no 
consensus on a single best frontier approach to measure efficiency. Hence, the discussion 
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about the frontier-efficiency approach that would result in the best estimation should not be 
sought. In view of that, Bauer et al. (1998) introduces a set of consistency condition tests in 
which two or more methods are used, such as parametric and nonparametric models. The 
empirical analysis of this research follows the consistency tests proposed by Bauer et al. 
(1998), which are: 
1. Compare and analyse means, standard deviations and other distributional properties of 
SFA and DEA models. 
2. Rank-order banks’ efficiency scores using both SFA and DEA models (using the pair-
wise Spearman correlation coefficients) and analyse the sequence of banks in the 
ranking. 
3. Cluster efficiency scores of banks into best-practice and worst-practice categories for 
both SFA and DEA models and examine overlapped proportion of banks that appear in 
the top 25% and lowest 25% of banks by efficiency score for each methods. 
4. Test stability across different time intervals and compare stability of efficiency scores 
for both SFA and DEA models. 
5. Compare and examine the correlations of efficiency scores from SFA and DEA models 
with non-frontier performance indicators (e.g. financial ratios) for consistency. 
Bauer et al. (1998) suggest that the first three consistency conditions are introduced to 
measure the degree to which the different approaches are identical. Subsequently, the next 
two conditions are the degree to which the efficiencies estimated by the different 
techniques are consistent with reality. However, neither the effect of heterogeneity nor the 
determinant of cost- and profit-efficiencies for DEA are analysed in this research, owing to 
differences in their approach to accounting for environmental and bank-specific factors. 
For example, the SFA model in this study includes control and environmental variables in 
its 1-stage approach to capture heterogeneity effects (discussed later in this chapter) 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995), whereas the DEA model generally requires a 2-stage approach, 
in which efficiency scores derived from this model are then regressed with control and 
environmental variables to test their significance and relationship (Pit and Lee, 1981). 
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5.3 Data and Variables 
This research employs data from a confidential database of a Malaysian financial 
organisation on the Malaysian banking industry from 2000 to 2011 (please note that 
investment banks are not included in this analysis due to distinct differences in operational 
structures and business models), which also covers the period of implementation of the ten-
year Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) introduced in 2001. The sample includes 32 
banks in 2000 followed by 39 banks in 2011, operating in Malaysia.
132
 The final sample 
consists of 354 observations after a number of missing data and outliers were taken out 
prior to the analysis. These excluded observations are due to the following conditions: (1) 
banks operational for less than 2 years that ceased operations after the merger and 
acquisition exercise in 2000, (2) banks with zero non-performing loans (NPLs),
133
 (3) 
several newly formed Islamic banks’ subsidiaries without a fixed asset value,134 and (4) 
several outliers that exhibited high volatility in independent and dependent variables 
during the cleaning process of panel data. 
In Chapter 3, it was noted that Hon et al. (2011) attempted to examine the impact of the 
FSMP. However, the study did not span the FSMP’s entire timeline (i.e. between 2001 and 
2005) and focused only on domestic banks. Generally, the data timeline used for most 
Malaysian banking efficiency studies are short, on average, spanning three to eight years. 
Additionally, to the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that will cover the period of 
the global credit crisis. Therefore, to overcome these gaps, the period 2000–2011, is 
imperative to this analysis, when measuring the efficiency of Malaysian banks; as it covers 
the events of various liberalisation initiatives under the FSMP, including the interest rate 
deregulation in 2004, the introduction of new foreign banks and the impact of the global 
credit crisis into Malaysia between 2008 and 2010. 
                                                 
132
 This includes all domestic conventional, foreign conventional, domestic Islamic and foreign Islamic banks 
in Malaysia. 
133
 In particular, newly established banks may not have NPL in their books for a certain period of time. The 
NPL ratio is needed in this empirical analysis as control variables represent asset quality. 
134
 These newly formed Islamic bank subsidiaries rely on banking groups’ fixed assets during their early 
years of operation. For this study, fixed asset values are required to compute physical capital variables. 
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5.3.1 Input and Output Variables 
Once the frontier measurement methods (cost- and profit-efficiency using SFA and DEA) 
are decided, the variables for such measurement have to be determined and defined. Dyson 
et al. (2001) state that inputs and outputs should cover the full range of resources used and 
outputs generated, particularly if one wants to evaluate the banking institutions’ efficiency 
in transforming inputs into outputs. To evaluate banking efficiency, using input and output 
variables that do not contribute to the identification of bank efficiency should be avoided. 
Past literature suggests that, based on the definition of a bank approach (e.g. intermediation, 
production, user-cost and asset approaches), common sense and expert judgement can play 
a role in determining the input and output variables. Thus, it is imperative to include 
resources as input and output objectives that are regarded as relating to a bank’s success 
performance as outputs (Avkiran, 1999). Therefore, for the SFA and DEA models, 
variables such as total costs and profits, inputs, outputs, input prices and output prices need 
to be specified. Unlike manufacturing firms, which use physical quantities as their output 
measurement, banks’ outputs are rather complex: their inputs and outputs have to be based 
on the definition of the banks’ operations. As discussed earlier, banks are seen as 
intermediary institutions that link savers and borrowers, and offer other services (such as 
fee transaction-based products and services, payment services, and investments) 
(Molyneux et al., 1996) (see Chapter 3 on the roles of banks). Thus, a proper definition that 
reflects the products of banks and how they are measured could affect the efficiency 
estimations of Malaysian banks (Goddard et al., 2001). 
In the literature, there have been many long-standing arguments on the functions of banks 
and the output of banking institutions (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Grigorian and Manole, 
2002). The inputs and outputs to be employed have to be defined according to banking 
functions and services (Grigorian and Manole, 2002). Two main approaches have received 
the most attention in banking efficiency: the intermediation approach and the production 
approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Goddard et al., 2001).
135
 
                                                 
135
 In addition, there are other models as well, such as the asset approach, the value-added approach and the 
user-cost approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). First, the asset approach refers to banks as financial 
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The production approach considers a bank to be a production unit, which provides 
financial services to its customers. Under the production approach, banks are normally 
treated as firms that employ capital and labour to produce services for both deposit and 
loan account holders. Therefore, the deposit accounts provided to customers should be 
included as one of the outputs of banks. Outputs are measured by the number of account 
services, as opposed to dollar values, and are commonly treated as stock (Aly et al., 1990; 
Fu and Heffernan, 2007). One of the disadvantages of this production approach is that it 
does not count interest expenses as an input: interest generally forms approximately 60.0% 
of the banks’ total costs (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Molyneux et al., 1996; Goddard et al., 
2001). Moreover, data for the number of deposits and loan accounts are difficult to acquire, 
which makes the production approach less favourable for analysis (Aly et al., 1990). 
On the other hand, under the intermediation approach, banks are treated as financial 
intermediaries between borrowers and depositors rather than producers of loan deposit 
services. Sealey and Lindley (1977) state that an individual banks’ decision-making 
process focuses on the production of earning assets, in which ‘loanable funds’ borrowed 
from depositors and serviced by the bank. They further suggest and assume that banks 
collect funds (deposits and purchased funds with the assistance of labour and capital), and 
convert these into loans and other assets.  
Nevertheless, Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Fu and Heffernan (2007) find that both 
approaches are imperfect because they do not fully capture the dual role of financial 
institutions, which includes both the provision of transactions and document processing 
services and the transfer of funds from savers to borrowers. The multi-product nature of 
banking firms is widely recognised, but until now there has been no consensus as to which 
approach is the ‘best’, particularly on how the ‘production flow’ characterising a bank’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
intermediaries between liability holders (i.e. savers) and the beneficiaries of funds. The inputs are deposits, 
and other liabilities and the outputs of the banks are defined as assets and loans (Favero and Pappi, 1995). 
Second, the value-added approach considers that assets and liabilities possess some output characteristics and 
the inputs and outputs of a bank are defined based on their share of value-added, such as loans, demand 
deposits and savings deposits. Other outputs are not utilised and considered unimportant (Bhattacharya et al., 
1997). Third, the user-cost approach can be described as the contribution of inputs or outputs to bank revenue. 
For example, a transaction is defined as an output if the financial return (e.g. ROE and ROA) exceeds the 
opportunity cost of the funds, or is defined as cost (liability) if the financial cost is less than the opportunity 
cost of those funds (Aly et al., 1990).  
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outputs and inputs is defined. The appropriateness of each method (i.e. production and 
intermediation) varies according to the circumstances (Tortosa-Ausina, 2002). As 
suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997), each approach has its advantages, particularly 
in view of differences in the areas within the financial institutions. Of studies evaluating 
the efficiency of branches of banks, Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that the 
production approach should be employed since branch managers typically have little 
influence over bank funding and investment decisions. On the other hand, for evaluating 
entire banks, the intermediation approach is more appropriate because it includes interest 
expenses, which account for between one-half and two-thirds of total costs.  
The intermediation approach has the advantage of being more inclusive and capturing the 
essence of financial intermediaries (Berger et al., 1997). The intermediation approach 
utilises deposits as an input, and is more realistic as an approach, as banks use deposits and 
other funds to generate loans and investments (see Aly et al., 1990; Zaim, 1995; Berger et 
al., 1997; Casu and Girardone, 2002; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Girardone et al., 2004). 
Using deposits as an input is more convincing than the production approach (which treats 
deposits as an output), since they are paid in part by interest payments, and the funds raised 
provide the bank with its basic ‘raw material’: that is, investable funds. In accordance with 
this view, Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) support the idea that banks buy rather than sell 
deposits.  
The unit of bank inputs and outputs, under the intermediation approach, are measured in 
terms of monetary values that might also determine the market share of individual banks. 
Moreover, some services cannot be measured in terms of numbers, such as investment in 
securities. Hence the intermediation approach is very suitable, because it addresses 
questions related to cost minimisation and emphasises the overall costs of banks (Ferrier 
and Lovell, 1990), which include interest expenses on deposits and other purchased funds. 
For the purpose of analysing the efficiency of Malaysian banks, this research employs the 
intermediation approach introduced by Sealey and Lindley (1977), specifying banks as 
intermediary institutions, which collect deposits to produce loans and investments with the 
support of labour and capital. From Table 5.1, the input variables used in this analysis are 
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funds, labour and physical capital; and the outputs are loans, investments and other earning 
assets.
136
 In addition, the control variables used in this research are asset quality, capital 
adequacy, liquidity, and time trends to capture the effect of heterogeneity. Moreover, a 
number of environmental variables are introduced: ownership, specialisation, liberalisation 
phases (based on the FSMP three-stage liberalisation process), global credit crisis period, 
bank size, market concentration and market share. These variables are employed for the 
cost, standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiencies estimations (discussed in detail 
later in this chapter). 
For the estimation of cost-efficiency of SFA, total cost (TC) is employed as the dependent 
variable, which includes interest expenses on deposits and amounts owing to other banks, 
cash and cash equivalents, staff expenses, depreciation, provisions for expenses and other 
expenses related to the operations of banks. On the other hand, for estimating profit-
efficiencies of SFA, the dependent variable total profit (TP) consists of total profit before 
tax, which is equivalent to income and revenues from loans, investments, amounts owed by 
other banks, trading income and other revenues from banking operations, minus total 
costs.
137
 
5.3.1.1 Input Prices, Outputs and Output Prices  
In view of the discussion above, the most common inputs employed from previous bank 
efficiency studies using intermediation the approach are the price of labour, the price of 
physical capital and the price of funds. Hence this research employs three input prices: 
price of funds (W1), price of labour (W2) and price of physical capital (W3). 
From earlier discussions, the role of deposits has been controversial as deposits have both 
input and output characteristics. Deposits could be considered as inputs because interest 
                                                 
136
 For standard profit-efficiency, the outputs to be employed in this study are the price of loans, the price of 
investments and the price of other earning assets. 
137
 As shown in equations 5.6 and 5.8, the dependent variable TP is added with a constant   to every bank’s 
profit so that the natural log is taken as a positive number. This is required due to some banks showing 
negative profits or facing losses. Since the log does not accept negative values, the dependent variable TP is 
transformed using             , where       =   is the minimum value of TP or maximum loss from 
the sample of panel data (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
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expenses should be paid for them (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1990). Hence, the price of funds 
(W1) is used in this research, where banks are deemed to pay interest expenses on 
borrowed funds as well as on deposits placed by bank customers. In banking efficiency 
studies, the price of funds is often expressed as interest expenses incurred by the bank on 
borrowed or purchased funds and deposits over total funds and deposits (see Berger, 1995, 
Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1996, Bauer et al., 1998, Casu and Girardone, 2002, Huang and 
Wang, 2002). 
The price of labour (W2) is commonly used as an input for the intermediation approach 
(see Berger, 1995; Berger and Mester, 1997; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Weill, 2004; Fu 
and Haffernan, 2007). The variable most often used for the price of labour is the average 
expenditure on each employee. The ratio of labour expenses to the number of employees is 
used for most of the previous studies (e.g. Mester, 1993; Kaparakis et al.; 1994; Resti, 
1997; Berger and di Patti, 2003). Some studies also adopt the ratio of labour expenses to 
total assets (e.g. Weill, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2001). Additionally, there are also studies 
that employ only the total amount of labour costs, due to unavailable data on the number of 
employees or other suitable variables to normalise the amount of expenditure (Noulas, 
1997). The drawback of using labour expenses without implying employee numbers is that 
it could result in a bias, particularly with banks that hire quality workers at a higher cost 
(Drake et al., 2006). In cases where data on the number of employees are unavailable or 
incomplete, several variables and assumptions are used to proxy these data. Fu and 
Haffernan (2007) employed growth assumptions based on total asset growth information to 
be applied to the growth in employee numbers. This method was also applied in Rezvanian 
and Mehdian (2002) and Vander and Vennet (2002). The assumption is useful, particularly 
when the data are incomplete or where missing data are replaced with total asset growth 
information. On the other hand, when the number of employee data is significantly missing 
or completely unavailable, total assets are commonly used as a proxy (e.g. Altunbas et al., 
2000, 2001; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Weill, 2004; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Maudos et al., 
2002). Total assets can be a better proxy compared to other financial statement items such 
as loans or deposits because, ideally, they cover the entire banking business as financial 
intermediation. Fries and Taci (2005) asserted from their study that if proxy variables such 
as total assets are not used, the intended study will not be complete due to substantial 
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missing data. It is also worth noting that when comparing a ratio to the total assets with a 
ratio to the number of employees, the result is unlikely to be constant over the period under 
study, which can yield different parameter estimates (Altunbas et al., 2001). Based on the 
discussion above, total assets are found to be a reasonable proxy when employee number 
data is unobtainable (Altunbas et al., 2001). 
For the price of physical capital (W3), the basic indication is based on expenses made on 
physical assets over physical assets such as buildings and equipment. Physical capital is 
considered as an input in the intermediation approach because banks are required to incur 
costs in assets other than labour and funds in producing loans, deposit and securities 
(Mester, 1996; Mahajan et al., 1996). 
For this study, three output quantities and output prices are employed: loans (Y1), 
investments (Y2), other earnings assets (Y3), and price of loans (P1), price of investments 
(P2), and price of other earnings assets (P3). Unlike cost function efficiency, when 
standard profit-efficiency is used, the output variables differ from the cost function outputs. 
The standard profit function specifies variable profits in place of variable costs, and takes 
variable output prices as part of its equation. Profit dependent variables allow for 
consideration of revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs (Berger 
and Mester, 1997). Instead of taking the amount or magnitude of the loans and deposits, 
the prices of loans and deposits were considered. The prices of loans and deposits in 
general are based on income or interest received from loans and deposits over loans and 
deposits (see Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2002). 
In the intermediation approach, banks are assumed to produce loans from the input 
variables. Thus, output loans (Y1) is included, consisting of items such as loans and 
advances, credit cards, hire purchase and overdrafts. 
138
 On the other hand, in estimating 
                                                 
138
 Some of the drawbacks can be seen in Resti (1997), who argues that loans could be a possible source of 
bias due to the fact that they are taken from the financial statements, which conceals heterogeneity in credit 
quality (different levels of credit management and administration). Additionally, loans have different time 
horizons and structures, which require different types of monitoring and cost embedded to it. Nevertheless, 
loans have been used heavily in previous studies, as they are one of the main business activities of banks (e.g. 
Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Akhavein et al., 1997, Resti, 1997; Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 2005; Bos and 
Schmeidel, 2007). 
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the standard profit-efficiency, the price of loans (P1) is used and measured as a percentage 
of interest income derived from loans (Berger and di Patti, 2003). 
The second output in this study is investments (Y2). Investments (Y2) include dealing 
securities, investment securities, government and private debt securities. The price of 
investment (P2) can be measured using the ratio of income from dealing and investment 
securities to investment (Y2) (Drake et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2009). 
139
  
The third output is other earnings assets (Y3), which comprises interbank deposits placed 
in other banks. The interbank deposit placed in other banks generates interest income, 
which can be received either from customers or deposits from other banks. The price of 
other earnings assets (P3) is measured as a percentage of interest income from deposits 
placed in other banks over other earnings assets (Casu and Girardone, 2002). 
                                                 
139
  Investments are considered to be intermediation activities and included as an output, because they 
naturally allocate resources into productive activities, which generates more income for the banks. They 
could represent assets that are drawn when demand for loans increases, or added when such demand declines 
(Allen and Rai, 1996). 
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Table ‎5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Banks’ Inputs and Outputs, 2000–2011 
Variables Descriptions  Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables      
TC Total Cost (MYR million) 
Variable operating costs of deposits, personnel and 
investments 
1,438.86 97.97 17.05 12,413.74 
TP Total Profit (MYR million) 
Variable profits, revenues from loans and investments minus 
total cost 
805.57 52.51 1.00 7,063.54 
Independent variables/output prices      
Y1 Loans (MYR million) Total loans, net of interest in suspense and NPL 15,273.20 19,496.82 19.85 99,506.07 
Y2 Investments (MYR million) 
Dealing securities, investment securities, government and 
private debt securities 
3,393.27 4,349.12 0.05 27,420.31 
Y3 
Other earning assets (MYR 
million) 
Interbank deposits in other banks 4,473.50 5.374.63 25.04 30,884.64 
Independent variables/input prices     
W1 Price of funds (%) Interest expenses on deposits/deposits 2.41 0.81 0.25 10.06 
W2 Price of labour (%) Personnel expenses/total assets 0.64 0.25 0.03 1.85 
W3 
Price of physical capital 
(%) 
Other operating expenses/physical assets 11.50 13.89 0.00 121.02 
Independent variables/output prices     
P1 Price of loans (%) Interest income from loans/average loans 5.80 1.67 0.57 25.66 
P2 Price of investments (%) 
Income from dealing and investment securities/investment 
(dealing, investment, government debt, private debt, shares 
securities) 
3.65 2.03 0.07 15.13 
P3 
Price of other earnings 
assets (%) 
Interest income form interbank deposits/deposits in other 
banks 
5.21 13.5 0.29 175.64 
Notes: All financial values are inflation-adjusted to the base year 2000.  
           As of December 2011, USD 1.0000 is equal to MYR 3.1265 
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5.3.2 Control and Environmental Variables 
Based on the earlier discussions, banks are deemed to allocate resources, such as deposits, 
labour and capital to produce loans, investments and other earning assets. By employing 
only inputs and outputs for the estimation of cost- and profit-efficiency, banks are assumed 
to face similar conditions with no differences found among them (homogeneous). However, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, a bank faces various challenges in transforming inputs into 
outputs, which could be attributed to bank-specific characteristics and/or external 
environmental factors.
140
 Omitting control and environmental variables may lead to some 
efficient elements of banking operations being incorrectly measured in cost- and profit-
inefficiency. As discussed in Chapter 3, studies of explanatory factors or determinants of 
inefficiency in Malaysian banks are found lacking, which may result in a failure to reveal 
those factors. To overcome these limitations, control and environmental variables are 
included in the efficiency analysis of Malaysian banks in this research. 
Figure 5.3 exhibits the common methods of testing heterogeneity factors using 2-stage and 
1-stage approaches. A 2-stage procedure is commonly employed by estimating cost and 
profit frontiers. This is performed by deriving efficiency scores at the first stage and 
regressing them against a set of possible determinants at the second stage (Pitt and Lee, 
1981; Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Berger and Hannan, 1997; Akhigbe 
and McNulty, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005). This procedure, however, has limitations and 
suffers from serious econometric problems. Inefficiencies are assumed to be identically 
distributed in the first stage, and to have a functional relationship with a set of variables in 
the second stage (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Berger and Mester (1997) argue that this 
analysis is suggestive but not necessarily conclusive because the dependent variable in the 
regression (i.e. efficiency) is an estimate: the standard error of this estimate is not accounted 
                                                 
140
 This study incorporates several control and environmental variables that may influence a bank’s cost and 
profit that are useful to policy makers, particularly if bank efficiency results are to be used to inform policy 
analysis (Drake et al., 2006). In addition, these environmental factors that could influence a bank’s 
performance are generally not in managerial control. The objective of control and environmental variables is to 
identify possible sources of inefficiency. This can be done by investigating the relationship between the 
variation in bank efficiencies and the variation in the exogenous environmental variables (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). 
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for in the subsequent regression or correlation analysis. Thus it is possible to determine 
inferences only about correlation, and not about causality. 
An alternative 1-stage estimation procedure may overcome this problem. This is done by 
incorporating environmental factors into the non-stochastic function of the production 
frontier. However, these external factors are assumed to affect either the structure of the 
frontier, through which conventional inputs are processed into outputs, or directly to affect 
technical efficiency. Assuming that external environmental variables have a direct effect on 
the production structure, they are included in the frontier function as control variables 
(Drake et al., 2006). Another way of incorporating environmental variables into a 1-stage 
procedure is to assume that exogenous variables influence technical efficiency, rather than 
the structure of production technology (see also Berg and Kim, 1998; Allen and Rai, 1996; 
Drake et al., 2006; Bos and Schmeidel, 2007). In other words, this 1-stage procedure 
provides an explanation for variations in efficiency, and characterises the production 
environment. Battese and Coelli (1995) propose a model that assumes non-negative cost-
inefficiencies as a function of firm-specific variables, which are independently distributed as 
truncations of normal distributions with constant variance but with means that are a linear 
function of observable variables of a general normal distribution form. Battese and Coelli 
(1995) demonstrated a model that can include both control and environmental variables into 
the stochastic functions. This model derives from the weaknesses found in Battese and 
Coelli’s (1992) time-invariant and varying model, which includes environmental variables 
directly into the model. Battese and Coelli (1995) also assumes the time-varying model is 
helpful in overcoming statistical problems such as the multicollinearity problems associated 
with the translog functional form (Battese and Coelli, 1995).
141
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 The translog functional form is more flexible than other functional forms (e.g. the Cobb–Douglas function), 
and hence, multicollinearity might exist among variables, which can result in parameter estimates. However, 
multicollinearity may not be a severe problem, particularly when the scores from efficiency analysis are 
utilised for forecasting purposes (Coelli et al., 2005; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
142
 If the multicollinearity problem is mainly created by a positive correlation between the second-order terms 
in the translog form of the cost and profit function, maximum likelihood estimates are still unbiased and 
efficient. However, multicollinearity problems can result in the estimated standard error of the coefficients to 
be large and small values of t-ratios, which in turn could lead to results that are biased towards accepting a null 
hypothesis with coefficients that are equal to 0 (for details, see Gujerati, 2003). 
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Figure ‎5.3 Accounting for Environmental Variables in Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 
Adapted from Coelli et al. (2005) 
In this empirical study, as well as input and output variables, control and environmental 
variables are also introduced and considered in the SFA specification to capture the 
heterogeneity effect. The control variables are assumed to have a direct influence on banks’ 
performances that is incorporated directly into the non-stochastic component of the 
production frontier. These control variables are to be fully interactive with outputs and input 
price variables, which consequently could affect the production technology (Coelli et al., 
2005). On the other hand, the environmental variables are treated by incorporating them 
directly into the stochastic component, which influences inefficiency (u) and can affect the 
technical efficiency of the banks (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Based on past banking 
efficiency studies, this present study employs bank-specific factors, such as capital 
adequacy, liquidity and asset-quality as control variables, and exogenous factors, such as 
ownership, specialisation, financial liberalisation phases, the global crisis effect on 
Malaysian banking, bank size, market concentration, and market share as environmental 
variables. 
5.3.2.1 Control Variables 
Control variables, which have the ability to influence a bank’s costs, are often included into 
the SFA model. These variables are treated similarly to input and output variables where 
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they interact with other parameters in the model. The control variables are included in the 
measurement of the cost- and profit-efficiency of the banks to account for their inherent 
risks. Moreover, risk-taking choices by the banks are an important part of the banking 
technology, and can affect the banks’ efficiency (Hughes and Mester, 2008). Failure to 
consider heterogeneity effects may result in biased efficiency scores. For example, some 
banks may be indicated as inefficient although their prudent operations exhibit risk-averse 
behaviour, and on the other hand, some banks could also be efficient, even though their 
quality of outputs is poorer than others (Mester, 1997). Thus, by including heterogeneity 
effects, using control variables in the specification of cost- and profit-efficiency functions 
could result in greater accuracy in efficiency scores. These control variables are 
incorporated into the non-stochastic component of the production functions and fully 
interact with the inputs and outputs to consider the effect of risks in the estimated cost- and 
profit-efficiency (Coelli et al., 2005). In this study, there are four control variables (see 
Table 5.2) that are included in this present research: (1) capital adequacy (C1), (2) asset 
quality (C2), (3) liquidity (C3); and (4) time effects (T). 
First, capital has been one of the common control variables used in measuring banking 
efficiency (e.g. Clark, 1996; Mester 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; Girardone et al., 2004). 
A bank’s insolvency or capital adequacy ratio depends on the financial capital availability to 
absorb potential loan and investment losses. Thus, the capital ratio (defined as capital 
adequacy for this control variable) is a ratio of capital to total assets. Capital ratio provides a 
proxy to regulatory conditions for measuring capital adequacy. In the absence of complete 
data on regulatory capital adequacy ratios (i.e. Basel’s risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR)), 
this analysis uses a capital ratio (i.e. capital to total assets ratio) that reflects the proportion 
of total assets (not risk-weighted) financed by financial capital. While a capital to total 
assets ratio is less risk-sensitive than the regulatory capital adequacy ratio, the changes in 
the capital ratio could still reveal shifts in a bank’s balance sheet’s structure and shifts in in 
the bank’s risk-taking (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). 
In general, the degree of insolvency risk influences the risk premium of a bank’s borrowings. 
The higher the financial capital available to absorb potential losses, the lower the borrowing 
risk premium expected for a bank. Hence, capital has a direct influence on a bank’s 
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borrowing cost and should be considered as an input in its production process, in which 
capital is also one of many sources of loanable funds other than deposits (Berger and Mester, 
1997). Therefore, failure to control for capital could yield a scale bias (Mester 1997). A 
risk-averse bank normally holds higher capital, and if capital is ignored, the efficiency of 
these banks will be mis-measured, even though they behave at an optimal level (Mester, 
1996).
143
 Furthermore, Berger and Mester (1997) state that a well-capitalised firm is more 
efficient than its undercapitalised counterpart. They suggest that the relationship between 
capital and efficiency is positive, and undercapitalised banks with a higher appetite for risk 
normally exhibit lower levels of efficiency. 
Hughes and Mester (1993) argue that the level of a bank’s financial capital (i.e. equity) 
provides an alternative to deposits and other borrowed funds as a source of loanable funds, 
which may have a direct impact on a bank’s borrowing costs and should be considered as an 
input to the bank’s production process. However, owing to the small proportion of financial 
capital in Malaysian banks (averaging between 8.0% and 12.0%) compared to other sources 
of funds (e.g. deposits and borrowed funds), capital in this study is viewed as a measure of 
risk preferences, rather than as part of the banks’ production process. Furthermore, the 
introduction of Basel I in 1988 on international banks’ capital standards emphasised the 
importance of capital in banks’ risk management (Saurina, 2004). This is also in line with 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011), where the capital ratio was employed as a measure of risk, using a 
ratio of capital to total assets.
144
 Santos (1999) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) also argued 
that using the capital ratio as a measure of risk is a better concept of capital adequacy than 
using the book value of equity.
145
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 Raising capital generally results in higher costs relative to deposits. Thus, risk-averse banks prefer equity 
financing and for that, they would appear inefficient if financial capital were omitted from the efficiency 
analysis. On the other hand, unlike expenses incurred on depositors, dividends paid on financial capital are not 
considered as cost (based on an intermediation approach), thus, if capital is not controlled for banks holding a 
greater level of financial capital, they would appear more efficient (Mester, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997).  
144
 For this research, the capital ratio variable (C1) affects a bank’s cost structure due to its direct interactions 
with inputs and outputs in the cost and profit efficiencies’ specifications. 
145
 The capital ratio can be used to compare banks of different sizes. This ratio may also imply the level of 
equity to acquire assets with the aim of increasing the return on equity (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). Moreover, 
regulators have used the capital adequacy ratio as an instrument to protect depositors and promote the stability 
and efficiency of banks: banks are required to hold a certain ratio of capital to assets, as specified in Basel’s 
capital regulatory standards (Santos, 1999, 2001; Diamond and Rajan, 2000).  
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As shown in Chapter 4, the capital ratio of Malaysian banks was steadily constant, 
averaging around 8.0% over the years 2000–2011. The capital ratio of Malaysian banks 
declined slightly in the second phase of the FSMP (2004–2007) owing to active capital 
management by the banks. Instead of issuing Tier-1 capital, Malaysian banks were active in 
issuing Tier-2 subordinated debt capital to diversify the overall cost of capital (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2005, 2006b). However, the degree of capital over total assets increased slightly 
from 7.7% in the second phase of FSMP (2004–2007) to 8.7% in the third phase of FSMP 
(2008–2011). During this period of uncertainty (the global credit crisis), Malaysian banks 
managed to increase their capital position via rights issues and Tier-1 capital at an accepted 
price to buffer for potential losses, something generally unachievable in a time of economic 
turmoil (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b). Hence, the seventh hypothesis for this study is:  
Hypothesis 7 Banks with a lower capital ratio exhibit higher costs and lower profits. 
Second, as mentioned in Chapter 3, one of the functions of a financial intermediary is to 
transform credit risk. Credit risk is commonly measured as an asset quality (C2) in the 
CAMEL framework.
146
 It is also known as the largest risk that banks face as intermediating 
institutions and, owing to its high importance, this type of risk is explicitly measured in the 
computation of RWCR in Basel I and Basel II regulatory standards (Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision, 1989, 2005). In view of that, non-performing loans (NPLs) (as 
proxies of banks’ asset quality) are added to the model to control for the bank’s risk 
structure (see Clark, 1996; Mester, 1996; Berger and Mester 1997).
147
 It is paramount to 
control for NPLs because, when comparing efficiency, banks must have a homogeneous 
output quality; otherwise, unmeasured differences in loan quality may be mistakenly 
measured as inefficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997). By omitting NPLs as a control variable, 
banks with a good quality loan portfolio may appear inefficient because they use more 
labour and physical capital in managing and monitoring loan quality (Mester, 1996; Berger 
and Mester, 1997). 
                                                 
146
 This is termed according to CAMEL bank rating methodology of the Federal Reserve. C stands for capital 
adequacy, A is asset quality, M is management, E is earnings and L stands for liquidity. One of the key 
measures for asset quality is the NPL ratio. 
147
 In the banking sector, NPLs are an indication of asset quality and the management’s capability in 
monitoring the credit portfolio. 
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A high proportion of NPLs against total loans suggests distress in a bank, exposing the 
bank’s capital to risk and potential failure, reflecting the bank management’s quality. Kwan 
and Eisenbeis (1994) established that problem loans are negatively related to efficiency, and 
Berger and De Young (1997) consequently found a link between management quality and 
problem loans, and report that an increase in management quality reduces banks’ problem 
loans, supporting Cebenoyan et al.’s (1993) and Wheelock and Wilson’s (1995) whose 
findings suggest that the relationship between operating inefficiency and failure rates is 
positive. 
Whether or not to include the NPL ratio variable in the bank’s cost, standard and alternative 
profit functions depends on the extent to which these variables are exogenous. Following 
Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger and De Young (1997), NPLs should be exogenous to 
the bank if they are generally caused by negative economic shocks (‘bad luck hypothesis’). 
A ‘bad management hypothesis’ indicates that a bank may incur extra expenses by 
administering bad loans, reflecting bad bank management, and a ‘skimping hypothesis’ 
argues that banks may save costs now by not investing in loan-monitoring expenses but face 
high default loans later. Banks are required to incur extra administrative expenses and 
managerial efforts in overcoming the impact of problem loans in their operations, resulting 
in a potential reduction in cost-efficiency. In this regard, adding NPLs as a control variable 
helps to remove (by statistical means) the costs of dealing with problem loans. Nevertheless, 
in the context of this study, which measures efficiency in an environment characterised by a 
series of events such as economic crisis and deregulation, the NPL variable should remained 
controlled in the bank’s cost, standard and alternative profit functions. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the NPL ratio has been on a declining trend since the Asian 
financial crisis: 13.7% in 2000 declined to 2.9% in 2011. During the global economic crisis 
between 2008 and 2010 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010b), the NPL share increased slightly 
from 3.7% in 2008 to 3.8% in 2009. Various economic stimuli were introduced during this 
period and, supported by a lower interest rate environment, the Malaysian banks were able 
to withstand the external crisis. Thus, the NPL rate has remained below 4.0% since 2008. 
Accordingly, for this study, the control variable for the NPL ratio (defined as asset quality) 
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is a measure of non-performing loans over total loans. Thus, the eighth hypothesis for this 
empirical study is:  
Hypothesis 8 Banks with a higher non-performing loans’ ratio exhibit higher costs 
and lower profits. 
Third, another key control variable to be included in the SFA is the liquidity risk (C3). The 
introduction of the liquidity coverage ratio in the Basel III international banks regulatory 
standards amplifies the importance of liquidity risk in banking operations (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2010). Liquidity risk in this study is measured using the loans over 
deposit ratio. Deposit taking and lending by banks are closely related. Both activities (i.e. 
deposit taking and granting loans) exhibit the liquidity transformation function of banks and 
incur similar costs for converting deposits into loans (Kashyap et al., 2002). Thus, deposits 
and loans can be analysed in tandem through the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio. This ratio is a 
proxy for the degree to which banks are active in traditional forms of financial 
intermediation (i.e. lending). In other words, the LTD ratio captures differences among 
banks in terms of their ability to convert deposits into loans (Claessens and Horen, 2011). 
This ratio measures the ability of the bank to meet its liability obligations, maintain 
adequate liquid assets and collect receivables (e.g. loans and other earning assets). In a 
general sense, lower liquidity ratios suggest a bank has a larger margin of safety and ability 
to cover its short-term obligations. As liquid assets are controlled in outputs, one would 
expect banks with higher liquid assets (all other things being equal) to be more cost efficient.  
Since saving accounts and transaction deposits normally can be withdrawn at any time, 
there is a high liquidity risk for banks. Banks can experience liquidity problems, especially 
when withdrawals exceed available deposits significantly over a short period of time 
(Samad and Hassan 2000). At the same time, when loans exceed the deposit base, banks 
face a funding gap for which they have to seek funds from the financial market. A high 
funding gap implies a high dependence on market funding, which could be more expensive 
than retail funding (de Haan and End, 2013). Goodhart et al. (2013) suggests that capital 
alone is not sufficient to contain the problems during a crisis, in which liquidity adds value 
to the funding measures to mitigate systemic risks. Due to the importance of a bank’s 
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liquidity structure as evidenced from the 2007–2008 global credit crisis, liquidity issues are 
reflected in the development of a regulatory framework (i.e. Basel III), which intends to 
contain the risks during the financial intermediation process of the banking industry. 
Therefore, the liquidity ratio (C3) is included as a control variable for analysing cost- and 
profit-efficiency. 
The average liquidity ratio for Malaysian banks between 2000 and 2011 was at 75.1%. 
Based on three different phases of the FSMP, the liquidity ratio for the first, second and 
third phases of FSMP was at 83.0%, 68.4% and 73.9% respectively. Malaysian banks were 
more liquid in the second phase of the FSMP, which implies that during good times, 
liquidity tends to rise, particularly when market funding is abundantly available to finance 
credit growth (de Haan and End, 2013). This can be evidenced from Chapter 4 where it was 
observed that the deposit from 2003 to 2006, from 69.3% to 73.5% of total capital and 
liabilities (see Figure 4.9). Nevertheless, instead of transforming the deposits into loans, 
Malaysian banks’ deposits were channelled into the interbank market and investments due 
to short-term maturity of deposits received. In the third phase, the deposits of Malaysian 
banks continued to strengthen and recorded 75.7% of total capital and liabilities in 2009. 
One of the reasons found to support strong deposits in Malaysian banks was due to creation 
of the deposit insurance corporation (PIDM) and explicit government guarantee on deposits 
during the stressed conditions of the global credit crisis (see Chapter 4)(Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2008b). In addition, in response to various economic stimuli implemented by the 
Malaysian government, banks continued to play their part as intermediary institutions and 
provide loans to deserving customers, as reflected from higher LTD ratio of 73.9% in the 
third phase of the FSMP. Hence, the ninth hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 9 Banks with greater liquidity exhibit lower costs and higher profits. 
Fourth, a time trend variable (T) is also employed to control changes in technology over the 
time period under study. Time trend is estimated using T1 = 2000, T2 =  2001,…, 
T12 = 2011. Isik and Hassan (2002) point out that it is important to include the time variable 
particularly in the continuously changing business environment where banking technology 
may vary from time to time. A bank may be efficient one year but not the next; this change 
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may be influenced by technology. Altunbas et al. (1999) state that the time trend (T) 
variable is a ‘catch-all’ variable that captures technological factors, which exhibits that 
banks learn by performing organisational changes such as more efficient utilisation of inputs 
and other factors (e.g. adjustments made resulting from changes to environmental 
regulations). Thus, technical change can be estimated from a ratio of changes in total cost to 
changes in technology, as shown from the measurement of partial derivative of the 
estimated cost function, with respect to the time trend. This can be mathematically written 
as      /     (Altunbas et al., 1999). 
Table ‎5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables, 2000–2011 
Variables  Descriptions  Mean 
Std 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
C1 
Capital adequacy 
(%) 
Capital/total assets 10.43 6.38 1.19 36.85 
C2 Asset quality (%)  Non-performing loans/loans 8.00 7.72 0.07 54.23 
C3 Liquidity (%) Loans/deposits 66.79 22.55 0.63 120.34 
T Time trend 
T1 = 2000, T2 = 2001,…, 
T12 = 2011 
6.95 3.51 1.00 12.00 
Table 5.2 shows that the Malaysian banks are heterogeneous in terms of capital adequacy 
asset quality and liquidity. This can be seen from the greater dispersion in the standard 
deviation, in comparison to the sample means. Thus, it is important to include all the control 
variables mentioned above into the measurement of cost- and profit-efficiency and test the 
hypotheses developed. 
5.3.2.2 Environmental Variables 
The inclusion of environmental variables in the cost and profit functions of the SFA models 
could influence the efficiency of banks (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Kasman and Yildrim 
(2006) iterate that market structure, geographical areas and other financial depth variables 
(e.g. banks size, market concentration and market share) are often employed for certain 
attributes of the banking sector when measuring efficiency estimates. By having these 
variables in the study, the different environments in which the banks operate may 
demonstrate significant variations, although they can be relatively homogeneous (Kasman 
and Yildrim, 2006). 
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Environmental variables are used to observe the banking and market conditions of the 
period under study. When accounting for environmental variables that are exogenous, one 
can theoretically explain that the scores generated are a measure of managerial performance 
(Coelli et al., 1999, Abdul Majid et al., 2011). That is, the efficiency scores resulting from 
SFA, using the 1-stage approach is net of the impact of environmental variables on input 
and output variables (Coelli et al., 2005). From Table 5.3, the environmental variables 
employed for this research are ownership structure (Z1), specialisation (Z2), FSMP 
liberalisation phase 2 (Z3), FSMP liberalisation phase 3 (Z4), effect of global financial crisis 
in Malaysia (Z4), bank size (Z6), market concentration (Z7) and market share (Z8). 
First, the ownership structure (Z1) is introduced into the stochastic frontier specification to 
consider the effects of bank-specific factors. As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are two types 
of bank ownership in Malaysia: domestic and foreign. To measure the effect of ownership, 
dummy variables are assigned: 0 for domestic banks and 1 for foreign banks. Foreign banks 
in Malaysia are locally incorporated subsidiaries that are fully owned by international 
foreign banks. On the other hand, domestic banks can either be fully owned by local parties 
or partly owned by foreigners as minority shareholders. As discussed in Chapter 3, banking 
institutions have heterogeneous ownership, corporate controls, market and risk 
characteristics. Relying on different hypotheses and theories, such as the theory of the firm, 
agency theory, managerial theories, the behavioural theory of the firm and market structure 
hypotheses (see Chapter 2), many past studies have investigated whether ownership 
structure or organisational form are related to the differences in frontier-efficiency. These 
theories are implicit in terms of different types of ownership or/and organisational forms 
that could provide stronger incentives to control costs and/or increase profits for better 
efficiency. Therefore there might be differences associated with foreign versus domestic 
ownership (Isik and Hassan, 2003). 
Berger and De Young (2001) state that greater control by parent banks may imply that the 
efficiency of their subsidiaries will be similar to that of their parents in the respective home 
countries. The controlling parent banks can export their quality of managerial skills, policies 
and procedures. A greater level of competition and improved corporate governance 
practices are expected from the knowledge and technology transfers of foreign banks. In 
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other words, foreign banks can improve the quality, pricing and availability of financial 
services, both directly as providers of such enhanced services and indirectly through 
competition with domestic financial institutions (Levine, 1996). The existence of foreign 
banks in developing countries can improve the infrastructure of the financial system (e.g. 
accounting standards, transparency and financial regulation), and at the same time stimulate 
the increased presence of supporting agents such as ratings agencies, auditors and credit 
bureaus (Glaessner and Oks, 1998). 
From Chapter 3, past literature on the comparative efficiency of foreign banks and domestic 
banks shows conflicting conclusions. It has been found that foreign banks are more efficient 
than domestic banks in developing countries, while it is the other way round in developed 
countries (Claessens et al., 2001). Many foreign-owned banks in many developing/transition 
economies now strongly dominate the banking markets (Kasman and Yildrim, 2006).
148
 As 
a result, it has often been argued that majority foreign-owned banks are likely to be more 
efficient than their domestic counterparts (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a; 
Berger et al., 2009). In addition, the alternative global advantage hypothesis argues that 
foreign institutions can be more efficient for a number of reasons (see Berger et al., 2005; 
Berger and Mester, 2003; Buch, 2003; Weill, 2004): (1) Foreign shareholders may 
contribute their superior managerial skills, high-quality human capital, best-practice policies 
and procedures, and sophisticated investment and risk management skills; (2) Foreign banks, 
generally being part of a large banking organisation, face the same scale economies and 
diseconomies as domestic banks; (3) Foreign banks normally serve profitable multinational 
customers; (4) Foreign banks have better access to capital markets, superior ability to 
diversify risks, and the ability to offer some services to multinational clients not easily 
provided by domestically owned banks; (5) Foreign-owned institutions from developed 
countries have access to superior information technologies for collecting and assessing ‘hard’ 
quantitative information; and (6) Foreign-owned banks may benefit from better control by 
private shareholders since these banks are mostly privately owned, resulting in more 
incentive for managers to operate efficiently (Berger et al., 2005; Berger and Mester, 2003; 
Buch, 2003; Weill, 2004). 
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 Foreign banks’ potential advantages include superior managerial skills, high-quality human capital, lower-
cost funds and adequate capital supply. (McCauley and Seth, 1992; Terrell, 1993; Berger et al., 2005).  
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The second environmental variable introduced in this research is the specialisation of banks 
(Z2). For this environmental variable, a dummy variable is assigned for two types of banks: 
0 for conventional banks and 1 for Islamic banks.
149
 Conventional and Islamic banks differ 
in terms of legal principles (traditional principles versus shariah principles), although in 
practice, the operations of the banking models are similar. Islamic banks have been actively 
imitating conventional banks in terms of products and services, but still following shariah 
principles (Beck et al., 2013, Chong and Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010).  
Conventional banks undertake the practice of traditional commercial banking activities, 
such as accepting deposits and providing loans to customers. Thus, conventional banks 
incur interest expenditure and earned income from deposits and loans respectively. On the 
other hand, the key features of Islamic banking are the prohibition of interest payment 
transactions, and of financing anti-social and immoral activities such as gambling, 
pornography, and consumption of alcohol and narcotics. Islamic banks are also different 
from conventional banks, as the former have to follow the concept of shariah (Islamic 
principle), which employs the principles of justice, fair dealing and harmony, coupled with 
equitable wealth distribution as the basis of conducting business (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). 
In this case, Islamic banks are considered to be specialised banks that require specialised 
personnel to produce distinct services, different product mixes, and intense use of inputs. 
Hence, Islamic banks generally face substantially higher costs compared to conventional 
banks (Abdul Majid et al., 2011). Hassan (2005), Kamaruddin et al. (2008), Hamilton et al. 
(2010) and Abdul Majid et al. (2011) found that Islamic banks are less cost efficient than 
conventional banks due to higher costs incurred, particularly by the specialised personnel 
and complex business operations in a regulatory environment that does not support Islamic 
banking. Moreover, Islamic banking products and services are required to be packaged in 
accordance with Shariah principles and laws; hence, the costs associated with these products 
(e.g. personnel, legal, and administration costs) are higher than products and services 
offered by conventional banks. Therefore, hypothesis 3 discussed in Chapter 4 is valid to be 
tested. 
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 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, another type of banking that is not considered in this research is 
investment banks. This is due to the non-homogeneous nature of the sector’s business models, operations and 
structures. Moreover, the financial services offered to customers are significantly different from those 
available in commercial banks. 
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The third and fourth environmental variables relate to the impact of the financial 
liberalisation phases implemented in the FSMP. To include these environmental factors, 
dummy variables are assigned to Z3 and Z4 to control for the liberalisation measures 
introduced in three phases of FSMP for the years 2000–2003, 2004–2007 and 2008–2011, 
respectively. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are three phases of FSMP in which different 
measures of financial liberalisations were introduced to Malaysian banks. In the first phase 
of the FSMP (2000–2003), the focus was more on building the capacity of the domestic 
banks, enhancing the financial infrastructure and introducing the consumer protection 
framework. These initial steps are taken to prepare domestic banks for a greater level of 
competition in the second phase of FSMP. There were several initiatives taken by BNM in 
this phase, such as (1) implementation of an electronic credit bureau database, (2) internet 
banking platform activities for foreign banks, (3) permission for banks to cross-sell products 
within the banking group, (4) simpler product approval processes, (5) introduction of best-
practice management for credit risks, and (6) introduction of ten-year consumer education 
programme (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2001a, 2002, 2003; Khrishnasamy et al., 2004; Tahir et 
al., 2008). 
The FSMP moved into the second phase (2004–2007) with a focus on increasing the degree 
of competition in the Malaysian banking industry. A number of liberalisation measures were 
introduced during this phase (see Chapter 4), for example (1) the introduction of a new 
interest rate framework, in which banks were allowed to set their own lending and deposit 
rates, (2) the approval of banking licences for three new foreign Islamic banks to operate in 
Malaysia, (3) authorisation for existing foreign banks to open additional branches, subject to 
several conditions (e.g. they had to include non-urban areas), (5) the introduction of a 
deposit insurance corporation (PIDM), and (6) the implementation of a ‘launch and file’ 
system for the product approvals process (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 
2007b). To capture the effect of liberalisation during the second phase of the FSMP, a 
dummy variable value of 1 is assigned for years 2004–2007 and 0 for other years. 
Further financial liberalisation was introduced in the third phase of the FSMP (2008–2011) 
to increase the competitive conditions of the Malaysian banking industry. In this phase, 
Malaysia was affected by the global credit crisis and faced various challenges to further 
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liberalise the banking market. Nevertheless, BNM continued its financial liberalisation 
agenda by introducing several initiatives, such as (1) the Basel II regulatory framework, (2) 
six new banking licences for foreign banks, (3) permission for foreign banks to open new 
branches subject to approval, and (4) a financial sector blueprint for another ten-year 
development plan for Malaysian banks (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b, 2009b, 2010b, 
2011b, 2011c). Similar to the second phase of the FSMP, a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
years 2008–2011 is assigned, otherwise 0. 
The fifth environmental variable is the effect of the global credit crisis in Malaysia (Z5). As 
discussed in Chapter 3, to the author’s knowledge, there are no studies examining the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the efficiency of Malaysian banks. Hence, a dummy 
variable is assigned for the years 2008–2010 with a value of 1 and 0 for the other years. 
From Chapter 4, although the credit crisis began in the USA in 2007 (International 
Monetary Fund, 2007), the crisis really affected Malaysia in the second half of 2008. The 
impact of the global recession was felt most strongly and recorded a heavy decline in 
exports in the second half of 2008. The effect of the decline in the trade flow via the real 
economy affected output, employment and private investment and consumption activities 
(Tan, 2011). As a result, the Malaysian economy contracted by 1.7% in the full year of 2009 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009a). Between 2008 and 2009, to mitigate the impact of the 
economic and financial crisis on domestic demand and accommodate monetary policy, 
BNM reduced OPR from 3.50% in November 2008 to 2.00% on 25 February 2009 (Bank 
Negara Malaysia 2009a). The Malaysian government also introduced a couple of stimulus 
packages between 2008 and 2009 to revive the economy. The accelerated implementation of 
fiscal stimulus measures, the easing of monetary policy and improved access to financing 
stabilised the economy, allowing Malaysia to recover in the second half of 2009, 
particularly after a sharp contraction in the first half of 2009 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009a). 
The Malaysian economy expanded by 7.2% in 2010. This growth was driven by strong 
domestic demand and expansion in private sector activity, as well as strong support from 
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public sector programmes on infrastructure and delivery systems (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2010a).
150
  
From the discussion above, the Malaysian economy felt the effect of global crisis in 2008; 
in 2010 however, the Malaysian economy recovered as evidenced by the raising of OPR 
(policy interest rate) by BNM in the second half of 2010. Therefore, for this analysis, the 
years 2008–2010 are considered to be the time that Malaysia was most affected by the 
worldwide credit crisis. 
The sixth environmental variable included in the analysis of efficiency of Malaysian banks 
is the size of banks (Z6) (measured via total assets). From past literature, the total assets 
variable is used to control for bank size (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991; Casu and Girardone, 
2002). Bank size is employed in this study to control for potential scale biases in the 
estimating process. It is also noted that bank size is an important determinant of net interest 
margins and spreads if there are economies of scale in the Malaysian banking sector. In 
other words, one bank may be more efficient than another as a result of the economies of 
scale that arise from size rather than because of better management (Casu and Girardone, 
2002). This can be evidenced from Beck and Hesse (2006), who argue that small banks are 
less able to diversify risks, which could result in a higher risk premium in the interest rates 
at which they can borrow. On the other hand, larger banks may have a greater number of 
professional management teams that could be more cost conscious due to greater pressure 
from owners concerned with profit maximisation (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991).
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Therefore, this research analyses the impact of size on banking efficiency in Malaysian 
banks, which in turn provides useful information for regulators and allows bank managers to 
evaluate the optimal scale at which to conduct their operations. In this analysis, the 
logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for bank size (instead of using a dummy for 
different size categories: i.e. small, medium and big). The advantage of employing this 
method is to capture the effects of scale on cost (profit) efficiency while avoiding 
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 In line with the positive growth in 2010, the OPR was adjusted upwards to manage the potential risk of 
financial imbalances. BNM normalised the OPR by raising it three times from 2.00% in March to 2.75% in 
July 2010 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010a). 
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 Berger et al. (1993) state that larger banks can reduce their costs from the output side, in order to reach their 
optimal mix and scale of outputs. That is, larger banks may reap efficiency benefits from economies of scale 
or/and scope (Casu and Girardone, 2006). 
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misspecification from inappropriate break points when artificially dividing the range of 
banks into different group sizes (Beck and Hesse, 2006). 
The final two environmental variables that are employed in the present research relate to the 
market structure. To capture the effect of the market structure along the lines of the 
structure–conduct–performance paradigm on the efficiency of Malaysian banks, the market 
concentration (i.e. HHI) (Z7) and market share (Z8) variables are used to capture market 
concentration and market share (Molyneux et al., 1996). Based on the discussion in Chapter 
2, an oligopoly market structure suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
concentration and profitability. The degree of concentration, as an indicator of market 
structure, may influence a bank’s profitability and efficiency. The level of concentration in 
the banking sector is usually measured using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), which 
proxies the bank’s market power or the intensity of competition among banks. A higher 
value of HHI would indicate a more concentrated banking market (a lower degree of 
competition).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
market structure and the efficiency of banks: the market power hypothesis and the efficient 
structure hypothesis. The market power hypothesis asserts that only banks with large market 
share and well differentiated products are able to exercise market power and earn 
supernormal profits (Shepherd, 1982; Berger, 1995). In this case, banks may find less 
pressure to control their costs and might thus enjoy the ‘quiet life’ (Berger and Mester, 
1997). Banks may utilise their own market power through size (Berger, 1995); hence a 
market share variable (Z8) is included in this analysis to control for ‘relative market power’ 
hypothesis (Berger, 1995). On the other hand, Demsetz (1973) iterates that the relationship 
between market concentration and efficiency could be positive. A greater market 
concentration may result from superior production efficiency rather than from the ‘quiet life’ 
(Berger, 1995). In other words, relatively efficient banks with lower costs can compete 
aggressively, maximise profits and consequently, gain a bigger market share, which 
supports the efficient structure hypothesis (see Chapter 2). Therefore, from the discussions 
above, two environmental variables (Z7 and Z8) are employed in this research in order to 
examine the relationship between the market structure and cost (profit) efficiency of 
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Malaysian banks: market concentration and market share. Market concentration (HHI) is 
defined as the sum of squared asset market shares of all Malaysian banks. On the other hand, 
market share is calculated as a share of bank deposits in relation to the total deposits of all 
banks (Berger and Mester, 1997). Both the HHI and market share variables are included in 
the specification of cost- and profit-efficiency because the HHI is an aggregate measure that 
only changes over time; while the market share variable differs from bank to bank and over 
time. 
Table ‎5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Environmental Variables, 2000–2011 
Variables  Descriptions  Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
Z1 Ownership Foreign = 1, domestic = 0 
(dummy) 
0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Z2 Specialisation Islamic banks = 1, 
conventional banks = 0 
(dummy) 
0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Z3 Deregulation 
FSMP phase 2  
Dummy for 2004 – 
2007 = 1, otherwise = 0  
0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Z4 Deregulation 
FSMP phase 3 
Dummy for 2008 – 
2011 = 1, otherwise = 0 
0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Z5 Effect of global 
financial crisis on 
Malaysia 
Dummy for 2008 – 
2010 = 1, otherwise = 0 
0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Z6 Bank size (MYR 
million) 
Total assets 32,320.00 41,679.13 721.17 229,504.17 
Z7 Market 
concentration (%) 
Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index (concentration of 
banks’ assets)  
7.79 0.81 6.58 8.73 
Z8 Market share (%) Bank deposits/total banking 
deposits  
3.39 3.98 0.08 19.69 
5.4 Stochastic Frontier Model(s) Specification 
To compute the cost- and profit-efficiency of Malaysian banks, coupled with the 
identification of dependent and independent variables for SFA models, discussed in the 
earlier section, a functional form has to be specified. For this study, a widely used 
transcendental logarithm or translog functional form
152
 is employed for the cost function.
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The estimation of cost-efficiency can be explicitly specified as: 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, the translog function may not fit well with data far from the mean of output size. 
Thus, the FF functional form overcomes this problem with better approximation across a broad range of 
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(5.29) 
where        is the natural logarithm of total cost of i-th bank at time  ;        is the natural 
logarithm of the outputs for the i-th bank at time   where;       and    are loans, 
investments and other earning assets respectively;  ln     is the natural logarithm for the 
input price vectors for i-th bank at time   where;   is the price of funds,    is the price of 
labour and    is the price of physical capital; lnT is the natural logarithm of time trend (T=1 
for 2000, T=2 for 2001, …, T=12 for 2011);        are the natural logarithm of control 
variables imposed for the i-th bank at time   where the control variables consist of capital 
    , asset quality      liquidity      and time (T);     is inefficiency and is assumed to be 
one-sided and independently distributed from    ;     is a random error and assumed to be 
two-sided with normally distributed           
   and independent from    ; 
                    and   are parameters to be estimated.  
                                                                                                                                                     
outputs by incorporating additional parameters for the Fourier trigonometric terms (Girardone et al., 2004). 
However, additional parameters and trigonometric terms can give rise to a couple of problems. First, with 
trigonometric terms, for the FF function to hold it requires a larger sample of observations (i.e. a higher degree 
of freedom) and, second, the additional parameters can give rise to multicollinearity issues in estimating the 
parameters of the model specification (Chambers, 1988; Coelli et al., 2005, Fu and Haffernan, 2007). Given 
that 346 observations were employed for this study, should FF functional form be employed, it could lead the 
loss of a degree of freedom and would result in biased efficiency scores. 
153
 For standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency, the functional form is similar to the cost function 
using the translog functional form. The difference in the standard profit and the alternative profit model 
specification is that the dependent variable becomes total profit (TP) and composite error of            . 
Additionally, the output variables for standard profit-efficiency are output prices (  ) rather than output 
quantities (  ).  
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In Coelli et al. (2005), it is mentioned that cost has to be linearly homogeneous in input 
prices (i.e. an increase in input prices must result in an increase in the total cost variable).  
Therefore, the TC and input price variables are normalised by input price,   . The 
normalisation imposes a theoretical condition that the model is linearly homogeneous (Lang 
and Welzel, 1996). Hence, the following restrictions should be applied to the parameters of 
cost function in equation (5.29); ∑   
 
       ∑    
 
       ∑    
 
       ∑    
 
    
   ∑    
 
     . Furthermore, the second order parameters of the model of standard 
symmetry restrictions           and            are applied to the above cost function. 
Doing so is consistent with the duality theorem when normalisation is imposed on input 
prices and total costs, coupled with restrictions on second order parameters (Lang and 
Welzel, 1996). 
For this study, to estimate the cost and profit frontiers, the control variables       are to be 
included and specified directly into the model, similar to the approach taken with the input 
and output variables. By implementing this approach, the control variables will interact with 
both input prices and output and influence the shape of the frontier, as displayed in equation 
(5.29) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
An additional way to account for exogenous factors on banks’ performance is to include 
environmental variables. Unlike control variables, environmental variables do not affect the 
cost and profit frontiers but influence the degree of cost-inefficiency. Following Battese and 
Coelli (1995), the environmental variables will be included in the stochastic component of 
the cost and profit functions. 
This approach where the environmental variables will influence only the distance of each 
bank from the best-practice cost function, is also called 1-stage analysis. In other words, this 
approach of handling environmental variables will define the inefficiency (  ), which 
includes non-negative random variables and independently distributed as truncations at 0 of 
        
    distribution, and can be written as (Battese and Coelli, 1995): 
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           (5.30) 
where     is the mean inefficiency of cost and profit function that was obtained by 
truncation (at 0) of normal distribution with mean     . The vector     is for environmental 
variables containing numerical values that could influence the inefficiency of i-th bank at 
time  ; and   is the vector comprising coefficients that need to be estimated. In measuring 
the cost- and profit-efficiency, the inefficiency effects are estimated simultaneously with the 
cost- and profit-function, which can be specified as: 
                                                      (5.31) 
where    is ownership,    is bank specialisation,    is dummy variables for the second phase 
of FSMP (years 2004-2007),    is dummy variables for the third phase FSMP (years 2008-
2011),    is dummy variables for global crisis impact on Malaysia,    is natural log asset 
size,    is natural log market concentration and    is natural log market share.
154
 
5.4.1 Performing 1-Stage Analysis  
In measuring the cost- and profit-efficiency of Malaysian banks, three models are estimated: 
the cost-efficiency model, the standard profit-efficiency model and the alternative profit 
model. A 1-stage approach will be employed to derive each cost- and profit-efficiency 
model. In deriving a preferred model, a number of models will be estimated for the 
Malaysian banks and from of these models, only one preferred model will be chosen for 
each cost, standard profit and alternative profit model. 
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 Asset size, market concentration and market share are taking logarithm form and there were no significant 
differences between the results of logged value of Z6, Z7  and Z8 and raw value of Z6, Z7  and Z8. 
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Figure ‎5.4 Stages Performed in Deriving Preferred Model 
 
As shown in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4, there are basically five main stages to be tested in 
choosing the best of each of the cost- and profit-efficiency models. Each stage involving a 
reduced model has its own null hypothesis, which is to test whether the reduced model is 
better than the general model estimated at Stage 1. Stage 1 is a general model, which 
includes all inputs and outputs and all control variables (C1–C3) and all environmental 
variables (Z1–Z8), which will be compared at different stages with different models, 
consisting various combinations of the control and environmental variables. 
In essence, using the null hypothesis at different stages, the reduced models are compared 
against the general model to determine whether the reduced model performs better than the 
general model. The preferred model is selected based on the log-likelihood ratio test 
(discussed later in this chapter). 
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Table ‎5.4 Stages Involved in Searching for Preferred Model 
Stage  Model Inputs Outputs Time Control 
variables 
Environmental 
variables 
A1.0 General W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C1, C2, 
C3 
Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A2.1 Reduced – without C3 W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C1, C2 Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A2.2 Reduced – without C2 W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C1, C3 Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A2.3 Reduced – without C1 W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C2, C3 Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A2.4 Reduced – without 
C2, C3 
W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C1 Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A2.5 Reduced – without 
C1, C3 
W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C2 Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A2.6 Reduced – without 
C1, C2 
W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C3 Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A3.0 Without C1, C2, C3 W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T – Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
A4.0 Without Z1, Z2, Z3, 
Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T C1, C2, 
C3 
– 
A5.0 Without C1, C2, C3 
and Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, 
Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
W1, W2, 
W3 
Y1, Y2, 
Y3 
T – – 
Notes: W1: Price of funds, W2: Price of labour, W3: Price of physical capital, Y1: Loans, Y2: Investments, 
Y3: Other earnings assets, T: time trend, C1: capital ratio, C2: liquidity, C3: asset quality, Z1: ownership 
structure, Z2: specialisation, Z3: deregulation period, phase 2 of FSMP (2004–2007), Z4: deregulation 
period, phase 3 of FSMP (2008–2011), Z5: bank size, Z6: effect of global credit crisis on Malaysia (2008–
2010), Z7: market concentration, Z8: market share 
Table 5.4 exhibits in detail a series of combinations of control and environmental variables 
that are reduced and added to the models in five different stages. In determining the 
preferred model, several validity tests need to be made on these different estimations at 
different stages. These tests are shown in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.
155
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 Tables 5.6 and 5.7 display the results of estimation of different models for standard profit-efficiency (B1.0–
B5.0) and alternative profit-efficiency (C1.0–C5.0), respectively. These models follow the same procedure as 
the cost-efficiency model (A1.0–A5.0) to derive the efficiency estimations. Hence, only summarised 
estimation results of standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.  
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5.4.2 Identifying the Preferred Model 
Stage A1.0: The General Cost Model 
This stage estimates the general cost model using the stochastic frontier approach. The 
specification of this model includes input prices (  ), outputs (  ) and control variables 
(  ). In addition, for the general model, using the Battese and Coelli (1995) 1-stage 
approach in the estimation of cost-efficiency, a set of environmental variables (  ) is 
included in the stochastic component of the cost function. In other words, the cost 
inefficiency (  ) in this model is the function of a set of environmental variables mentioned 
earlier. Hence, to estimate the cost-efficiency of this general model, the specification in the 
equation 5.29 and 5.30 are used. 
After the general model is estimated, the first thing to do is to check for the existence of 
inefficiency.
156
 A systematic way of checking for the existence of inefficiency within the 
random error ( ) is exhibited in Table 5.5, which exhibits an estimated general cost model 
for Malaysian banks. From Table 5.5, the first six columns ((1) to (6)) are used to test the 
existence of inefficiency in the models estimated. Additionally, columns (7) to (10) are used 
to choose the preferred model. Column (1) is the maximum log-likelihood estimate for the 
model. Column (2) is the log-likelihood ratio test or LR test of maximum log-likelihood 
estimate for OLS model and maximum log-likelihood value for stochastic model. The LR 
ratio is the key measure that determines the existence of inefficiency in the composite error. 
For the purpose of testing this hypothesis, the LR test is derived by employing a three-step 
method performed in Coelli (1996). In the first step, the process includes the estimation of 
parameters and log-likelihood value using the OLS estimates. Accordingly, in the second 
step, the skewness of the joint distribution of   and   is examined. This test determines the 
level of domination of inefficiency     or random error     in the total random error   . In 
the third step, the log-likelihood ratio of the stochastic model is computed should there be 
inefficiency     in the random error term   . The LR test can be computed as shown in 
equation 5.14, which indicates the differences in the OLS model against the stochastic 
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 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the existence of inefficiency can be checked from composite error 
term   , which can be disentangled into random error (v) and inefficiency (u). 
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model. If the LR test exceeds the critical value of the chi-squared distribution, which in this 
case is at 5% at 1 degree of freedom, which is at 3.84, the null hypothesis is rejected, which 
implies the presence of inefficiency in the stochastic model (unrestricted model). On the 
other hand, if the LR test is lower than 3.84, the null hypothesis is not rejected, indicating 
that no inefficiency exists and the model could not follow the stochastic path. 
Column (3) is another test to observe the existence of inefficiency. Using the Battese and 
Corra (1977) parameter   to measure the deviations of composite random error   , one is 
able to test the presence of inefficiency in the stochastic model. The parameter    can be 
measured as 
  
 
  
    
  as shown in equation (5.11), where   
  is the variance of inefficiency and, 
  
 is the variance of the random error.   indicates the deviations of random error whether its 
influence by inefficiency     or noise    . If the   parameter is approaching 1, the 
composite error     is dominated by inefficiency   . On the other hand if   is approaching 
0, the composite error     is influenced by noise or random error   . For the validity test of 
the existence of inefficiency, the null hypothesis to be tested is,       , which indicates 
there is no inefficiency     in the composite error    . The alternative hypothesis is 
       , which implies the existence of inefficiency     in the composite error     (see 
Figure 5.7). 
Column (4) indicates the number of restrictions made in the estimation. The number of 
restriction is one (i.e.        where there is no inefficiency     and the estimates only 
consist of random error   . With this one restriction, column (5) shows the value of 1 
degree of freedom at 5%. Column (6) on the other hand determines the presence of 
inefficiency using the parameter   and the LR test. For instance, Table 5.5 displays that the 
LR of the general model exceeds the 5% critical value at 1 degree of freedom, which 
indicates that inefficiency is present in the general model (A1.0) 
Next, reduced models are estimated in several stages (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5), including the 
test of existence of inefficiency in each reduced model as shown in columns (1) to (6). In 
these stages, a number of null and alternative hypotheses are examined regarding the 
estimation of the various reduced models against the general model.  
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Stage A2.0: General Cost Model with Reduced Control Variables (C1, C2, and C3) 
and with Environmental Variables (Z1–Z8) 
At this stage, based on the three control variables (i.e. capital adequacy (C1), asset quality 
(C2) and liquidity (C3)) being introduced in this study, the following models were estimated: 
Model A2.1 General cost model with reduced control variables – without liquidity (C3) but 
with environmental variables (Z1–Z8) 
Model A2.2 General cost model with reduced control variables – without asset quality (C2) 
but with environmental variables (Z1–Z8) 
Model A2.3 General cost model with reduced control variables – without capital adequacy 
(C1) but with environmental variables (Z1–Z8) 
Model A2.4 General cost model with capital adequacy (C1) – without asset quality (C2) 
and liquidity (C3) – and with environmental variables (Z1–Z8) 
Model A2.5 General cost model with asset quality (C2) – without capital adequacy (C1) 
and liquidity (C3) – and with environmental variables (Z1–Z8) 
Model A2.6 General cost model with liquidity (C3) – without capital adequacy (C1) and 
asset quality (C2) – and with environmental variables (Z1–Z8)  
For the models shown above, six null hypotheses are to be tested using LR test: 
H10 The general cost model specification without liquidity (C3) is better statistical 
fit according to the LR test than the general cost model. 
H20 The general cost model specification without asset quality (C2) is better 
statistical fit according to the LR test than the general cost model. 
H30 The general cost model specification without capital adequacy (C3) is better 
statistical fit according to the LR test than the general cost model. 
H40 The general cost model specification without asset quality (C2) and liquidity 
(C3) is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the general cost 
model. 
H50 The general cost model specification without capital adequacy (C1) and 
liquidity (C3) is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the general 
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cost model. 
H60 The general cost model specification without capital adequacy (C1) and asset 
quality (C2) is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the general 
cost model. 
The alternative hypotheses on the other hand can be specified as follows: 
H11 The general cost model is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the 
general cost model specification without liquidity (C3) (A2.1). 
H21 The general cost model is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the 
general cost model specification without asset quality (C2) (A2.2). 
H31 The general cost model is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the 
general cost model specification without capital adequacy (C3) (A2.3). 
H41 The general cost model is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the 
general cost model specification without asset quality (C2) and liquidity (C3) 
(A2.4). 
H51 The general cost model is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the 
general cost model specification without capital adequacy (C1) and liquidity 
(C3) (A2.5). 
H61 The general cost model is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the 
general cost model specification without capital adequacy (C1) and asset 
quality (C2) (A2.6). 
Stage A3.0: General Cost Model without Control Variables (C1–C3) but with 
Environmental Variables (Z1–Z8) 
In this model specification (A3.0), the control variables are excluded (C1–C3) but the 
environmental variables (Z1–Z8) remain to influence the inefficiency (  ) of the banks. 
Model A3.0 General cost model without the control variables – without capital adequacy 
(C1), asset quality (C2) and liquidity (C3) – but with the environmental 
variables (Z1–Z8)  
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For this model, the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
H70 The general cost model specification without the control variables (A3.0) is 
better statistical fit according to the LR test than the general cost model 
(A1.0). 
H71 The general cost model (A1.0) is better statistical fit according to the LR test 
than the general cost model specification without control variables (A3.0). 
Stage A4.0: General Cost Model with Control Variables (C1–C3) but without 
Environmental Variables (Z1–Z8) 
For stage A4.0, the environmental variables are excluded from the specification of the 
general cost-efficiency model. In this case, the Malaysian banks are assumed not to face any 
exogenous factors that could affect the efficiency of Malaysian banks, but variations in the 
banks’ production are controlled using capital adequacy (C1), asset quality (C2) and 
liquidity (C3). Hence, the specification of the model at stage 4.0 is shown as: 
Model A4.0 General cost model with all the control variables (C1–C3) but without the 
environmental variables (Z1–Z8)  
Thus, the null and alternative hypotheses to be examined are: 
H80 The general cost model specification without the environmental variables 
(A4.0) is better statistical fit according to the LR test than the general cost 
model (A1.0). 
H81 The general cost model (A1.0) is better statistical fit according to the LR test 
than the general cost model specification without the environmental variables 
(A 4.0). 
Stage A5.0: General Cost Model without Control Variables (C1–C3) and without 
Environmental Variables (Z1–Z8) 
Stage A5.0 has fewer variables in its specification of cost frontiers, and does not account for 
the effect of heterogeneity. The general cost model without control variables (C1–C3) and 
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environmental variables (Z1–Z8) and is left with only outputs (    ) and input prices (    ). 
For this stage, it is assumed that all Malaysian banks possess the same production 
technology and face the same environmental conditions. Thus the model specification for 
this stage can be shown as: 
Model A5.0 General cost model without any control variables (C1–C3) and without any 
environmental variables (Z1–Z8)  
The null and alternative hypotheses at this stage are: 
H90 The general cost model specification without the control variables or the 
environmental variables (A5.0) is better statistical fit according to the LR test 
than the general cost model (A1.0). 
H91 The general cost model (A1.0) is better statistical fit according to the LR test 
than the general cost model specification without the control variables or the 
environmental variables (A 5.0). 
After testing all the models for the presence of inefficiency, the next stage is to find the 
preferred model based on the null hypotheses developed at each stage. In doing so, the 
process starts from column (7), which shows the LR test value for the reduced model in 
comparison to the general model. Coelli (1996) suggests using the log-likelihood ratio test 
to determine the best model among various competing models estimates. Coelli et al. (2005) 
and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) further suggest that the log-likelihood ratio test provides 
a convenient process for testing the hypothesis of different competing models. The LR test 
is employed by providing a test of whether reduced models offer a better fit than the general 
model. It also provides an indication of whether the parameters of the reduced model are 
significantly different from the parameters of the general model. The LR test for the reduced 
models can be written as: 
                               (5.32) 
where            is the log-likelihood for the reduced model and            is the log-
likelihood for the general model. LR statistic is asymptotically equivalent to the chi-squared 
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(  ) distributions (Coelli, 1995). Based on null hypothesis of the restricted model (i.e. the 
OLS model), it has a limiting chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of restrictions being tested (Greene, 2002).  
The LR test for a reduced model is employed to test the hypothesis at every stage of model 
estimations. The hypothesis is used to determine whether the reduced model is a better fit 
compared to the general model (Coelli, 1996). At every stage of the null hypothesis H0:, the 
model estimation with a lower number of control and environmental variables provides a 
better estimation than the general model. To test this hypothesis, the LR test of a reduced 
model is used. The result of the LR test is then compared against the 5% critical value of    
distribution at the given degrees of freedom. The 5% critical value of    distribution at the 
given degrees of freedom is indicated in column (9) based on the degrees of freedom shown 
in column (8).  
If the value of the LR test exceeds 5%, the critical value of    distribution at the given 
degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis that the reduced model provides a better estimation 
is rejected. Conversely, if the LR test’s value is less than the 5% critical value of    
distribution at the given degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis is not rejected, implying 
that the reduced model provides a better estimation than the general model. Consequently, 
the selected preferred models are those estimated models that fail to reject the null 
hypothesis (shown in column (10)). Should there be several models that fail to reject the 
null hypotheses, the most preferred model would be based on the highest maximum log-
likelihood value (Coelli et al., 2005). 
Table 5.5 lists the stages and processes taken to determine the preferred model. From the 
test results, it was found that the effect of heterogeneity could significantly influence the 
stochastic cost frontier estimation. Therefore, heterogeneity effects should be considered by 
including control and environmental variables. Without control and environmental variables, 
the estimation of cost-efficiency could be mis-specified, which could result in an 
inappropriate estimation of the parameter and cost-efficiency (Coelli et al., 1999). Hence, 
this research does not only focus on the efficiency level but also examines the sources or 
determinants of cost-inefficiencies. From Table 5.5, the preferred cost model is the general 
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model without capital adequacy (C3) (A2.3). The reduced model is found to be a better-
fitting model due to an LR value of less than 5% critical value of    distribution at seven 
degrees of freedom. The result fails to reject the null hypothesis at stage A1.3, which 
implies that the reduced model without capital adequacy (C3) is a better estimation than the 
general model. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report the same procedures at different stages applied to 
the standard profit- and the alternative profit-efficiency models. For the standard profit-
efficiency model, the preferred model is the general model (B1.0): a model consisting of all 
the control variables (C1–C3) and all the environmental variables (Z1–Z8). For the 
alternative profit-efficiency model, the preferred model is C1.0, which is also a general 
model that includes all the control variables (C1-C3) and all the environmental variables 
(Z1–Z8). Following Coelli (1996), reduced models at different stages were tested based on 
null hypotheses, although all the null hypotheses at stages 2.0 to 5.0 (B2.0–A50 and C2.0-
C5.0) were rejected. Greene (2008) argued that when more variables are introduced into the 
functional form (i.e. control variables), less variation is left to be included in the error term. 
Additionally, when exogenous variables enter the mean of u (i.e. environmental variables), 
the estimation of efficiency changes significantly, not only in the score but also in the rank. 
Hence the introduction of heterogeneity factors into the general model (B1.0 and C1.0), 
which affect the profit specifications with more regressors than other models might result in 
a different model fit (Greene, 2008). 
In addition to the above procedures, several model variants were also tested. For example, a 
model without a time trend variable (T) and the Battese and Coelli (1992) time-invariant 
model were also tested in this analysis. A null hypothesis was developed for the model 
without a time trend variable (T) against the general model. From the analysis, the null 
hypothesis was rejected, which demonstrated that the general model is better than a model 
without a time trend variable (T). Additionally, the Battese and Coelli (1992) time-invariant 
model was also analysed to see the impact of assumption on cost- and profit-efficiency 
being constant through time, allowing some degree of flexibility in the distribution of 
inefficiency (u), including using a truncated or half-normal distribution on the stochastic 
component of the production efficiency function (Coelli et al., 2005). Battese and Coelli 
(1995) state that, without the time-varying effect, the Battese and Coelli (1992) model does 
not allow change in the rank ordering of firms over time; for instance, a firm that is ranked 
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i-th at the first period is ranked i-th in all periods in the sample (Coelli et al., 2005). Battese 
and Coelli (1995) argue that the Battese and Coelli (1992) model could not consider firms’ 
efficiency change, and also fails to account for any environmental effects in their model. 
Therefore, the Battese and Coelli (1995) model was introduced to overcome the issues 
arising from the Battese and Coelli (1992) model by explicitly expressing technical 
inefficiency effects in terms of appropriate explanatory variables, where the parameters of 
the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model are then estimated simultaneously, using 
the ML method from panel data (Coelli et al., 2005). However, Battese and Coelli (1995) 
and Battese and Coelli (1992) are not comparable as the methods and statistical tests needed 
to compare them are not available.
157
 Hence, the efficiency scores resulting from a Battese 
and Coelli (1992) analysis of Malaysian banking are not shown in this research. 
                                                 
157
 These two model specifications are non-nested and hence, no set of restrictions can be defined to allow a 
test of one specification versus the other (Coelli et al., 2005). 
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Table ‎5.5 Estimated Cost Frontier Models 
 
Models 
 
(1) 
Log- 
likelihood 
(2) 
Log- 
likelihood 
ratio 
against 
OLS 
model 
(3) 
  
(4) 
Number of 
restrictions 
(5) 
   
critical 
value at 
5% 
(6) 
Presence of 
inefficiency  γ 
≠ 0 
(7) 
Log-
likelihood 
ratio against 
general 
model 
(8) 
Degree of 
freedom 
(9) 
    critical 
value at 
5% 
(10) 
H0 = reduced 
model is better 
than general 
model 
A1.0: General – W1, W2, W3, Y1, Y2, Y3, T, C1, 
C2, C3, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8 
54.62 133.98 0.87 1 3.84 yes         
A2.1: Reduced without liquidity (C3)  28.24 133.54 0.88 1 3.84 Yes 52.75 10 18.31 Reject 
A2.2: Reduced without asset quality (C2)  25.28 161.01 0.99 1 3.84 Yes 58.68 10 18.31 Reject 
A2.3: Reduced without capital (C1)*  46.02 150.65 0.89 1 3.84 Yes 17.19 10 18.31 Fail to Reject 
A2.4: Reduced without asset quality or liquidity (C2 
and C3)  
-19.92 116.50 0.90 1 3.84 Yes 149.08 19 30.14 Reject 
A2.5: Reduced without capital and liquidity (C1 and 
C3)  
16.57 142.26 0.99 1 3.84 Yes 76.09 19 30.14 Reject 
A2.5: Reduced without capital and asset quality (C1 
and C2)  
13.39 163.38 0.99 1 3.84 Yes 82.44 19 30.14 Reject 
A3.0: Without control variables (C1, C2, C3)  -16.95 160.90 0.99 1 3.84 Yes 143.14 27 40.11 Reject 
A4.0: Without environmental variables (Z1–Z8) 7.19 194.01 0.99 1 3.84 Yes 94.86 1 3.84 Reject 
A5.0: Without control variables (C1, C2, C3) or 
environmental variables (Z1–Z8)  
-88.90 208.50 0.99 1 3.84 Yes 287.03 25 37.65 Reject 
Notes: (1) Log-likelihood: The maximum log-likelihood value  from the unknown parameters being estimated based on given data (2) LR against OLS model: LR test based on ratio of log-likelihood of 
stochastic model subtracted from log-likelihood of OLS model and multiplied by (-2). (3) γ: Lies between 0 and 1. Approaching 0, composite error (ε) dominated by random error (v). Approaching 1, 
composite error (ε) influenced by inefficiency (u). (4) Number of restrictions: Restrictions on the composite error where it consists only of random error (v) and no inefficiency (u). One restriction is made 
on     . (5)  
  critical value at 5%: 5% critical value of chi-squared distribution at 1 degree of freedom is 3.84. (6) Presence of inefficiency: If γ≠0; inefficiency exists. If γ=0; there is no inefficiency. (7) 
LR against general model: LR test based on the ratio of log-likelihood of reduced model subtracted from log-likelihood of general model and multiplied by (-2). (8) Degree of freedom: The difference 
between the numbers of parameters of the general model subtracted against the number of parameters of the reduced model. (9)    critical value at 5% , the chi-squared distribution value based on the 
degree of freedom derived from column (8). (10) H0= reduced model better than general model: H0 is failed to be rejected if the LR value is less than the chi-squared distribution at 5% critical value. Reject 
H0 if the LR value exceeds the chi-squared distribution at 5% critical value. Columns (1) to (6) are to test for inefficiency and columns (7) to (10) are for choosing preferred model. * - Preferred cost frontier 
model (A2.3). 
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Table ‎5.6 Estimated Standard Profit Frontier Models 
Models 
 
(1) 
Log- 
likelihood 
(2) 
Log- 
likelihood 
ratio 
against 
OLS 
model 
(3) 
  
(4) 
Number of 
restrictions 
(5) 
   
critic
al 
value 
at 
5% 
(6) 
Presence of 
inefficiency  
γ ≠ 0 
(7) 
Log-
likelihood 
ratio 
against 
general 
model 
(8) 
Degree 
of 
freedom 
(9) 
    
critical 
value at 
5% 
(10) 
H0 = reduced 
model is better 
than general model 
B1.0: General – W1, W2, W3, P1, P2, P3, 
T, C1, C2, C3, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7, 
Z8* 
-332.48 120.68 0.00 1 3.84 yes         
B2.1: Reduced without liquidity (C3)  -352.85 132.82 0.00 1 3.84 Yes 40.74 9 16.92 Reject 
B2.2: Reduced without asset quality (C2)  -354.37 101.03 0.00 1 3.84 Yes 43.78 9 16.92 Reject 
B2.3: Reduced without capital (C1)  -355.68 191.36 0.44 1 3.84 Yes 46.41 9 16.92 Reject 
B2.4: Reduced without asset quality or 
liquidity (C2 and C3)  
-373.25 124.10 0.66 1 3.84 Yes 81.53 17 27.59 Reject 
B2.5: Reduced without capital or liquidity 
(C1 and C3)  
-372.41 218.01 0.48 1 3.84 Yes 79.87 17 27.59 Reject 
B2.5: Reduced without capital or asset quality 
(C1 and C2)  
-372.29 189.15 0.05 1 3.84 Yes 79.62 17 27.59 Reject 
B3.0: Without control variables (C1, C2, C2)  -387.21 215.34 0.47 1 3.84 Yes 109.46 24 36.42 Reject 
B4.0: Without environmental variables (Z1–
Z8)  
-408.20 5.23 0.04 1 3.84 Yes 151.45 1 3.84 Reject 
B5.0: Without control variables (C1, C2, C3) 
or environmental variables(Z1–Z8)  
-504.71 12.23 0.52 1 3.84 Yes 344.46 24 36.42 Reject 
Notes: (1) Log-likelihood: The maximum log-likelihood value  from the unknown parameters being estimated based on given data (2) LR against OLS model: LR test based on ratio of log-likelihood of 
stochastic model subtracted from log-likelihood of OLS model and multiplied by (-2). (3) γ: Lies between 0 and 1. Approaching 0, composite error (ε) dominated by random error (v). Approaching 1, 
composite error (ε) influenced by inefficiency (u). (4) Number of restrictions: Restrictions on the composite error where it consists only of random error (v) and no inefficiency (u). One restriction is made 
on     . (5)  
  critical value at 5%: 5% critical value of chi-squared distribution at 1 degree of freedom is 3.84. (6) Presence of inefficiency: If γ≠0; inefficiency exists. If γ=0; there is no inefficiency. (7) 
LR against general model: LR test based on the ratio of log-likelihood of reduced model subtracted from log-likelihood of general model and multiplied by (-2). (8) Degree of freedom: The difference 
between the numbers of parameters of the general model subtracted against the number of parameters of the reduced model. (9)    critical value at 5% , the chi-squared distribution value based on the degree 
of freedom derived from column (8). (10) H0= reduced model better than general model: H0 is failed to be rejected if the LR value is less than the chi-squared distribution at 5% critical value. Reject H0 if the 
LR value exceeds the chi-squared distribution at 5% critical value. Columns (1) to (6) are to test for inefficiency and columns (7) to (10) are for choosing preferred model. * - Preferred standard profit 
frontier model (B1.0). 
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Table ‎5.7 Estimated Alternative Profit Frontier Models 
Models 
 
(1) 
Log- 
likelihood 
(2) 
Log- 
likelihood 
ratio 
against 
OLS 
model 
(3) 
  
(4) 
Number of 
restrictions 
(5) 
   
critical 
value 
at 5% 
(6) 
Presence of 
inefficiency  
γ ≠ 0 
(7) 
Log-
likelihood 
ratio 
against 
general 
model 
(8) 
Degree 
of 
freedom 
(9) 
    
critica
l value 
at 5% 
(10) 
H0 = reduced 
model is 
better than 
general 
model 
C1.0: General – W1, W2, W3, Y1, Y2, Y3, T, 
C1,C2, C3, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5, Z6, Z7, Z8* 
-139.55 7.65 0.49 1 3.84 yes         
C2.1: Reduced without liquidity (C3)  -207.81 50.47 0.45 1 3.84 Yes 136.51 10 18.31 Reject 
C2.2: Reduced without asset quality (C2) -148.88 10.56 0.48 1 3.84 Yes 18.66 10 18.31 Reject 
C2.3: Reduced without capital (C1)  -163.96 78.38 0.52 1 3.84 Yes 48.82 10 18.31 Reject 
C2.4: Reduced without asset quality or liquidity 
(C2 and C3)  
-220.31 23.12 0.43 1 3.84 Yes 161.51 19 30.14 Reject 
C2.5: Reduced without capital or liquidity (C1 
and C3)  
-220.09 103.54 0.51 1 3.84 Yes 161.08 19 30.14 Reject 
C2.5: Reduced without capital or asset quality 
(C1 and C2) 
-168.09 25.08 0.50 1 3.84 Yes 57.08 19 30.14 Reject 
C3.0: Without control variables (C1, C2, C2)  -230.77 93.77 0.48 1 3.84 Yes 182.43 27 40.11 Reject 
C4.0: Without environmental variables (Z1–Z8)  -151.63 12.08 0.01 1 3.84 Yes 24.15 1 3.84 Reject 
C5.0: Without control variables (C1, C2, C3) or 
environmental variables (Z1–Z8) 
-244.69 65.92 0.01 1 3.84 Yes 210.28 27 40.11 Reject 
Notes: (1) Log-likelihood: The maximum log-likelihood value  from the unknown parameters being estimated based on given data (2) LR against OLS model: LR test based on ratio of log-likelihood of 
stochastic model subtracted from log-likelihood of OLS model and multiplied by (-2). (3) γ: Lies between 0 and 1. Approaching 0, composite error (ε) dominated by random error (v). Approaching 1, 
composite error (ε) influenced by inefficiency (u). (4) Number of restrictions: Restrictions on the composite error where it consists only of random error (v) and no inefficiency (u). One restriction is made 
on     . (5)  
  critical value at 5%: 5% critical value of chi-squared distribution at 1 degree of freedom is 3.84. (6) Presence of inefficiency: If γ≠0; inefficiency exists. If γ=0; there is no inefficiency. 
(7) LR against general model: LR test based on the ratio of log-likelihood of reduced model subtracted from log-likelihood of general model and multiplied by (-2). (8) Degree of freedom: The difference 
between the numbers of parameters of the general model subtracted against the number of parameters of the reduced model. (9)    critical value at 5% , the chi-squared distribution value based on the 
degree of freedom derived from column (8). (10) H0= reduced model better than general model: H0 is failed to be rejected if the LR value is less than the chi-squared distribution at 5% critical value. 
Reject H0 if the LR value exceeds the chi-squared distribution at 5% critical value. Columns (1) to (6) are to test for inefficiency and columns (7) to (10) are for choosing preferred model. * - Preferred 
alternative profit frontier model (C1.0). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the data and variables that were employed for SFA and DEA models. 
There are three types of variables used in the analysis of Malaysian banking efficiency: 
namely, input and output, control, and environmental variables. First, the inputs and outputs 
used in this research are based on commonly used inputs and outputs from past literature 
using the intermediation approach on cost- and profit-efficiency functions; for example, 
price of funds, price of labour, price of physical capital, loans, investments, other earning 
assets, price of loans, price of investments and price of other earning assets. Second, the 
control variables are employed in this analysis to capture the effect of inherent bank-specific 
risks that could have an impact on the cost- and profit-frontier estimations (e.g. asset 
quality, capital adequacy and liquidity risk). Third, environmental variables are introduced 
in this analysis to account for other factors that may affect the levels of inefficiency of the 
Malaysian banks, such as ownership, specialisation, FSMP deregulation phases, global 
credit crisis, size, market concentration, and market share. The empirical analysis of this 
research employs unbalanced panel observations of 32 banks in 2000 followed by 39 banks 
in 2011 (including domestic, foreign, domestic Islamic and foreign Islamic banks),
158
 which 
represent all commercial banks in Malaysia. 
The variables discussed above are employed using the SFA and DEA.
159
 Three common 
economic concepts are utilised using the translog functional form (for SFA) to estimate 
Malaysian banks’ efficiencies: namely, cost-, standard profit-, and alternative profit-
efficiency. Following the Battese and Coelli’s (1995) model (which is a 1-stage analysis 
approach), estimations of cost- and profit-efficiency use a number of model variants with 
different combinations of the control and environmental variables, involving several stages 
to test several null hypotheses for a preferred model. The baseline model is the A1.0, B1.0 
and C1.0, which includes the heterogeneity effects of all control (C1–C3) and 
environmental (Z1–Z8) variables. Consequently, a number of models with reduced 
combinations of control and environmental variables are tested on sample banks on which 
                                                 
158
 Investment banks are excluded from this empirical analysis due to a non-homogeneous business model. 
159
 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, this research follows Resti (1997), which utilises SFA as the main 
estimation tool and DEA as the consistency testing tool (similar to Bauer et al., 1998). 
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the empirical analysis is based. As recommended by Coelli et al. (2005), the preferred 
model for cost, standard profit and alternative profit-efficiencies are chosen using the ML 
estimates and log-likelihood ratio tests. From the log-likelihood tests of different models at 
different stages, for the cost efficiency frontier model, the reduced model (A1.3) without 
capital adequacy (C3), but with all environmental variables (Z1–Z8) was preferred. For 
standard profit efficiency, the general model (B1.0) with all control variables (C1–C3) and 
environmental variables (Z1–Z8) was found to be the preferred model. With regards to the 
alternative profit efficiency, the preferred model is the general model (C1.0) with all control 
variables (C1-C3) but with all environmental variables (Z1–Z8). Additionally, for SFA, the 
SE will also be estimated by differentiating the estimated cost function with respect to 
output. In terms of DEA methodology, both traditional and new DEA (Tone, 2002) models 
are used as cross-checking method for consistency testing. For DEA, scale-efficiency will 
also be estimated. In addition, following Bauer et al. (1998), this chapter proposes five 
conditions for evaluating the potential consistency of the SFA and DEA models. From this 
consistency testing, should all five consistency conditions be met, the results from different 
efficiency frontier approaches could be more useful and reliable for policy makers in 
making decisions. 
In the next chapter, the SFA preferred models will be tested using the properties of cost and 
profit functions in economic theory that were discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, the results 
reviewed in Chapter 3 from various empirical studies of banking efficiency will also be 
compared with the results from this study. The hypotheses developed in Chapters 4 and 5 
will also be tested using the SFA preferred models. Using the cost- and profit-efficiency 
scores of SFA and DEA, the trends from 2000 to 2011 will be analysed to examine to what 
extent the financial liberalisation of the FSMP has affected the degree of efficiency of 
Malaysian banks. Additionally, the next chapter will also examine the cost- and profit-
efficiency scores in term of profiles (e.g. by ownership, by specialisation, by size, and 
CAMEL ratings system), and consistency testing of parametric and nonparametric models 
(Bauer et al., 1998). Scale-efficiency and technological progress in the Malaysian banking 
industry will also be analysed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Empirical Results: 
Analysis and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter (Chapter 5), the methodology employed to measure the efficiency 
of Malaysian banks between 2000 and 2011 was discussed. The preferred cost and profit 
efficiency models for SFA were derived, and these will be used to calculate the efficiency 
scores for the cost and profit frontiers discussed in this chapter. The properties of these 
scores are also analysed here, to ensure that the theoretical conditions discussed in Chapter 2 
are satisfied. The results of past empirical studies, reviewed in Chapter 3, are also compared 
with the results of this study. In addition, the cost- and profit-efficiency results are 
compared to corresponding events (e.g. the deregulation of interest rates, the establishment 
of foreign banks, the global credit crisis) that affected the Malaysian banking industry 
between 2000 and 2011 (see Chapter 4). The hypotheses developed in Chapters 4 and 5 are 
also tested in this chapter. Consequently, this chapter analyses the efficiency scores derived 
using both SFA and DEA, and the trends of the cost and profit efficiency scores that have 
changed over the period under study. From the efficiency scores of SFA and DEA, the 
consistency conditions introduced by Bauer et al. (1998) are also tested in this chapter. The 
scores are then compared, using several main characteristic criteria – such as, the CAMEL 
rating system, ownership, specialisation and size – in which, finally, the scale efficiency and 
technological change of Malaysian banks are also examined.     
This chapter begins with Section 6.2, which examines the coefficients of the SFA preferred 
models for cost, standard profit and alternative profit frontiers. The maximum likelihood 
parameters estimated by the preferred models are also reported in this section. In addition, 
the properties of cost and profit efficiency are analysed using the parameters estimated. In 
Section 6.3, research hypotheses 2 to 9, developed in Chapters 4 and 5, are tested using the 
cost and profit model parameters estimated in Section 6.2. This test indicates the impact of 
heterogeneity factors (i.e. the control and environmental variables) on the cost and profit 
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efficiency scores of Malaysian banks using the one-stage approach (see Chapter 5). Section 
6.4 provides the cost and profit efficiency scores derived from SFA and DEA. The trends of 
Malaysian banks’ efficiency scores between 2000 and 2011 are analysed and examined by 
comparing cost and profit efficiency scores, with corresponding financial liberalisation 
measures introduced by BNM. The analysis looks into how the cost and profit efficiency 
scores respond to the different policy measures implemented by BNM. From this, the 
analysis could provide signals or indications as to whether the policies implemented by 
BNM have resulted in either positive or negative impacts on the level of efficiency of the 
Malaysian banks. In addition, the main research hypothesis 1, discussed in Chapter 4 – 
which hypothesised that the implementation of financial liberalisation could result in greater 
efficiency – is tested. Section 6.5 provides the results of the consistency conditions test, of 
the SFA and DEA’s efficiency scores, using Bauer et al. (1998)’s conditions. Section 6.6 
looks into the different characteristics of the efficiency scores of Malaysian banks, for 
instance based on the CAMEL rating system, the ownership structure, specialisation and 
size. For the CAMEL rating system, the best and worst practice banks – according to the 
CAMEL ratios – are compared with best and worst practice efficiency scores. In terms of 
ownership, the efficiency scores for foreign banks are compared with domestic banks; and 
for specialisation, the efficiency scores for Islamic banks are compared with conventional 
banks. Additionally, banks are clustered into different asset size groups and their efficiency 
scores are compared. Finally, Section 6.7 presents the scale efficiency and technological 
change of Malaysian banks over the period 2000 to 2011. 
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Figure ‎6.1 Information Flow of Chapter 6 
 
6.2 Examining the Coefficients of the Preferred SFA Models 
As discussed in Chapter 5, this study employs SFA as the main methodology to measure 
efficiency, and DEA as a comparative measure of consistency, in Malaysian banks between 
2000 and 2011 (for further details, see Resti (1997) and Bauer et al. (1998)). Using the 
preferred SFA cost, standard profit and alternative profit frontier models (obtained from 
Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7), the maximum likelihood parameters of the above models are 
exhibited in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. The coefficients for the maximum likelihood estimates 
for these models are examined to measure the interactions between the dependent variable 
and inputs, outputs, and control variables. In this study, the total cost, profits, and all the 
continuous explanatory variables, are divided by their respective sample means before 
logarithms are applied.
160
 This normalisation of variables allows the first-order coefficients 
of the translog function to be directly interpreted as estimates of cost and profit elasticities at 
the point of approximation. Therefore, the estimated individual coefficients of the stochastic 
                                                 
160
 Since the mean values of variables are considered as the Taylor series expansion point for the translog 
function, all variables should be divided by their mean in order to locate a correct evaluation point before 
estimating the translog function, which can assist in the estimation of scale elasticities. 
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frontier models, given by the translog functional form, are attributed by many interactions 
between inputs, outputs and control variables, in which they are not directly interpretable 
(unlike the Cobb-Douglas functional form, in which the coefficients have specified meaning) 
(see Chapter 5). In addition, prior to analysing the coefficients of these models, it is worth 
noting that the flexibility of the translog functional form is likely to result in 
multicollinearity among variables involved in the SFA specifications, which may lead to 
inconsistent coefficient estimates in the maximum likelihood model (Coelli, 1996).
161
 
However, multicollinearity may not be a severe problem if the efficiency scores are used for 
forecasting purposes.
162
 
6.2.1 Coefficients of the Preferred Cost Frontier 
Based on Table 5.5 in the previous chapter (Chapter 5), the preferred cost frontier model is 
A2.3, which is the reduced model without capital adequacy (C3) but includes all the 
environmental variables. The t-ratios of the preferred cost model are used to interpret the 
level of significance of the estimated coefficients, based on 1%, 5% and 10% critical values. 
The t-ratio is derived by dividing the estimated coefficients to their corresponding standard 
errors to indicate the level of significance of the coefficient of banks’ inputs and outputs 
(Hamilton et al, 2010). A statistically insignificant coefficient suggests that the coefficient 
may not directly affect the banking cost.  
Table 6.1 shows that the coefficients of the input prices (i.e. price of funds and price of 
labour) are positive and significant at 1% significance level. The estimated coefficients for 
the price of funds    and the price of labour    shows the share of costs attributed from 
funds and employees.
163
  Based on the cost model estimated, the coefficients for prices of 
                                                 
161
 If the multicollinearity problem is mainly created by a strong positive correlation between the second order 
terms in the translog form of the cost and profit functions, maximum likelihood estimates are still unbiased and 
efficient. However, this multicollinearity problem could cause the estimated standard error of the coefficients 
to be large leading to small values for the t-ratios. This, in turn, biases the result towards failure to reject the 
null hypothesis where the coefficients are equal to zero (see Gujarati, 2003 for more details). 
162
 The empirical estimates of the translog cost and profit functions in Tables 6.1, 62 and 6.3 demonstrate 
expected signs (e.g. positive and negative) of the coefficients. A test of multicollinearity using variance 
inflation factor (VIF) also indicate that there is no serious linear relation among explanatory variables.  
163
 As mentioned earlier, the specification of cost efficiency is imposed with homogeneity of degree 1, in 
which the inputs price of funds (w1) and price of labour (w2) are normalised by the price of physical capital 
(w3). Hence, the coefficient of the physical capital is equal to 1 minus the sum of coefficients of price of funds 
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funds (  ), price of labour (  ) and price of physical capital are 0.6720, 0.3711 and -0.0431 
respectively. The coefficient values indicate that an increase of 1% in the price of funds 
(W1), price of labour (W2) and price of physical capital (W3) would result in an increase of 
0.67% and 0.37%, and a reduction of -0.04% in cost respectively (this satisfies property 
number 2 of the cost function (e.g. TC=f(W1,W2,W3), in which overall cost will not 
decrease when the combination of inputs increases (see Chapter 2)). Given the restriction of 
homogeneity of degree 1 in input prices imposed in the cost function, the main contributor 
to the total cost is interest expenses. The coefficient for the price of funds (  ) reflects the 
actual data of the banks, where interest expenses appear to be averaging more than 50% of 
total expenses (see Chapter 4).  
On the other hand, the coefficients of the total combination of outputs are also positive. A 1% 
increase in outputs – loans (Y1), investments (Y2) and other earnings assets (Y3) – could 
increase costs by 1.04% and 0.02%, and reduce costs by 0.02%, respectively (satisfying 
property number 3 of the cost function, where overall costs will increase to produce 
additional combinations of outputs (see Chapter 2)). Since the variables used in the cost 
function are expressed in log forms, the estimates of the coefficients can be interpreted as 
output elasticities or input price elasticities of total costs. The estimation of the cost function 
shows that all three outputs have positive effects on the total costs of the banks, indicating 
that the total cost variable increases with an expansion in production. The sum of the three 
output coefficients is 1.0382, implying that if the production is expanded systematically by 
1%, the total cost of production would increase by a little more than 1%. This may indicate 
that the Malaysian banking industry’s production could be characterised as facing 
diseconomies of scale: further expansion in the industry could result in a more than 
proportional increase in costs. In terms of time (T), the coefficient is negative (-0.04) and 
significant at 5% significance level.  This indicates that a technological change had taken 
place in the industry over the period under study from technical progress, where banks were 
able to produce a given level of output at lower levels of cost.  
                                                                                                                                                     
and price of labour. From this formulation, the coefficient for price of capital is equal to 0.0119 (1-
(0.6409+0.3472)). The effect of imposing restriction using homogeneity of degree 1 on the parameters to being 
equal to unity before estimation (i.e.             also satisfies the property number 4 of the cost 
function, which implies that an increase in input prices will result in proportionate increase in costs.  
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Table ‎6.1 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters for the Preferred Cost Frontier 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  Standard Error t-ratio 
            -0.1917 *** 0.0415 -4.6175 
     
  
  
 
              
                         
  
0.6720 *** 0.0426 8.7068 
     
  
  
 
               
                         
  
0.3711 *** 0.0731 14.2274 
                1.0407  0.0388 0.5344 
                      0.0207  0.0429 -0.5406 
                               -0.0232 *** 0.0644 4.7954 
          
  
  
    
0.3087 *** 0.0544 -6.0310 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  
-0.3280 *** 0.0450 7.7097 
          
  
  
    
0.3471 *** 0.1771 -2.9988 
             
   -0.5311 *** 0.0999 2.3452 
                 0.2342 *** 0.0819 3.1686 
                 0.2596  0.0636 -1.0474 
             
   -0.0666 *** 0.0455 -3.2149 
                 -0.1462 * 0.0541 -1.5049 
             
   -0.0814 ** 0.0756 2.1947 
       
  
  
        
0.1659  0.0324 -0.2921 
       
  
  
        
-0.0095 ** 0.0533 -1.8848 
       
  
  
        
-0.1005 *** 0.0753 -2.8617 
       
  
  
        
-0.2156 * 0.0263 1.4340 
       
  
  
        
0.0377 *** 0.0565 2.4002 
       
  
  
        
0.1357 *** 0.0257 5.4262 
                        0.1396  0.0134 -0.6207 
             
   -0.0083  0.0291 -0.1966 
       
  
  
        
-0.0057  0.0304 0.9533 
       
  
  
        
0.0290 *** 0.0384 2.5026 
                 0.0962 ** 0.0283 -1.9038 
                 -0.0539  0.0175 -1.2068 
    (continued) 
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Table 6.1 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters for the Preferred Cost Frontier 
(Continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  Standard Error t-ratio 
                 -0.0211 *** 0.1776 -4.6591 
                    -0.8275 *** 0.3906 -3.0853 
             
   -1.2051 *** 0.1503 -2.6300 
       
  
  
        
-0.3953 *** 0.1535 2.7350 
       
  
  
        
0.4197 *** 0.2624 3.2351 
                 0.8490 *** 0.1650 -2.4045 
                 -0.3967 *** 0.1079 -3.2602 
                 -0.3517  0.0622 -0.4721 
                 -0.0294 ** 0.0363 -1.9125 
                    -0.0695  0.0405 -1.0833 
            
   -0.0439 *** 0.0392 3.2971 
       
  
  
       
0.1294 ** 0.0382 -2.2944 
       
  
  
       
-0.0876  0.0601 0.9515 
                0.0572  0.0369 0.0992 
                0.0037  0.0322 -1.2363 
                -0.0398 ** 0.0240 -1.7810 
                -0.0427  0.0982 -1.2751 
                -0.1252 * 0.0082 -1.4144 
           -46.3125 *** 15.7471 -2.9410 
                            1.0956 *** 0.2654 4.1286 
                       0.3837 * 0.2636 -1.4556 
                                -0.4013  0.4076 -0.9847 
                                -0.5224  0.9023 -0.5790 
                                0.6225 ** 0.3289 1.8924 
                   2.4994 *** 0.7790 3.2087 
                             3.6821  3.0993 1.1880 
                     -2.9020 *** 0.7898 -3.6742 
Log-likelihood  46.0213 
Log-likelihood ratio against OLS model  150.6543 
Number of observations  354 
Degrees of freedom  310 
t-ratio is defined as ratio of estimated coefficient over standard errors. Degree of freedom is defined by netting off number 
of observations in the sample against the number of estimated coefficients in the maximum likelihood model. ***, **, * is 
the significance level of estimated coefficients in given degrees of freedom. Using t-ratio critical value at significant levels 
of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*) which are at 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282 respectively. 
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6.2.2 Coefficients of the Preferred Standard Profit and Alternative Profit 
Frontiers  
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 display the preferred standard profit and alternative profit parameter 
estimations. For such estimations, the general model (B1.0) (see Table 5.6) is preferred. 
This model includes all the control and environmental variables. The input price of funds 
(W1) standard profit efficiency shows a negative, but insignificant, coefficient (   . An 
increase in price of fund by 1% could reduce the banks’ profits by 0.05%. The negative 
coefficient implies that an increase in the price of funds could result in a reduction in 
profitability. This result is influenced by the deregulation of the interest rate introduced by 
BNM through the New Interest Rate Framework (NIRF) in 2004. The deregulation of 
interest rates allows banks to price their loans and deposits according to market demand and 
cost structure. Similar to Dacanay III (2007) findings on the Philippines banking system, the 
negative elasticities of the price of funds (W1) show that deposits were a cheap source of 
funds. Thus, the banks had difficulty cutting deposit interest rates, particularly when they 
were partly determined by the market.  
Additionally, from the preferred standard profit frontier estimation, the coefficient of the 
price of loans (  ) was also negative and significant. The elasticity for the price of loans (P1) 
(-0.3668) was greater than the elasticity of the price of funds (W1) (-0.054). The changes in 
the price of loans are more sensitive to the standard profit efficiency function compared to 
the price of funds. Similar to findings by Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Malaysian banks 
responded to deregulation of interest rates by adjusting their prices for loans in greater 
proportion than the adjustments made in the price of deposits to gain higher profits.  
In addition, the coefficient for the price of labour (  ) is positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. This implies that higher expenses incurred in relation to labour input 
could result in higher profits. The effect on the price of labour (W2) is greater than on the 
price of funds (W1), indicating that total profits are very sensitive to the price of labour and 
that, on average, an increase of 1% of the price of labour can increase profits by 1.16%. 
With the increasing growth in Islamic banking and increasing complexity of financial 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results: Analysis and Discussion 
 
266 
 
products in Malaysia, a highly skilled and specialised workforce is necessary to support the 
banks. From the restriction of homogeneity of degree 1, the input coefficient for physical 
capital (  ) is -0.11. This indicates that an increase of 1% in the input price of physical 
capital would reduce profits by 0.11%. In this case, it may imply that any expenses incurred 
on infrastructure and capital expenditure could result in lower profitability. The coefficients 
for the price of loans (  ), price of investments (  ) and price of other earning assets (  ) 
are -0.3668, 0.4975 and 0.8693 respectively. The output price of other earning assets is used 
to normalise other price variables in the frontier regression process, the value for this output 
is equal to 0.8693 (1-(-0.3668)-0.4975).
164
 This implies that an increase of 1% of the price 
of other earning assets could result in an increase of profits by 0.87%, reflecting the excess 
liquidity that the Malaysian banking sector faced during the height of the subprime crisis in 
which a large influx of foreign capital occurred in mid-2007 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2007b). With the flight to liquidity in the US and Europe, the volatility of the interbank 
market became significant in terms of pricing, where banks generate greater profit from 
other earning assets, particularly for foreign banks (see Chapter 4).  
The coefficient for the price of loans (  ) is -0.3668, indicating that an increase of 1% in 
price of loans (p1) would reduce the profit by 0.37%. Malaysian banks are sensitive to the 
pricing of loans, where an increase of price might result in lower demand for loans and 
reduce profitability. For the time trend variable (T), the standard profit frontier model 
exhibited a positive coefficient (0.21) and 1% significance. In general, the coefficients 
suggest that over the period under study, the profit efficiency of Malaysian banks has 
improved and the banks have achieved a higher level of profit for any given level of outputs.  
The preferred model for alternative profit efficiency, from 2000 to 2011, is the general 
model, which includes all controls (C1–C3) and environmental variables (Z1–Z8) (see table 
5.7). From Table 6.3, the coefficient for price of funds, price of labour and price of physical 
capital were estimated at 0.2070, 0.7531 and 0.0399 (1.00-0.2070-0.7531) respectively. The 
coefficient for price of funds (  ) is positive and significant at 5% significant level. The 
                                                 
164
 The price of loans (p1) and price of investments (p2) are normalised by price of other earning assets (p3) to 
impose homogeneity of degree 1. The coefficient of other earning assets (p3) is equal to 1 minus sum of 
coefficients of price of loans and the price of investments. Therefore, coefficient of price of other earning 
assets equals 0.21(1- 0.05+ 0.74).   
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next input variable is the price of labour (W2) which is also positive and significant at 1%. 
For the alternative profit model, a 1% increase in the price of labour (W2) would increase 
profits by 0.75%. For the price of physical capital (W3), an increase of 1% will result in 
0.01% increase in profit efficiency. In terms of outputs, an increase in loans (Y1) by 1% 
could increase profits by 1.63%, while a 1% increase of investment (Y2) and other earnings 
assets (Y3) could result in decreased profits by 0.45% and 0.25%. These are indicated by 
coefficient   ,    and    at 1.6343, -0.4512 and -0.2545, respectively.  
For alternative profit efficiency, the output level of loans is highly sensitive to the 
Malaysian banks’ profitability, suggesting that banks with market power may be able to 
exercise a different pricing strategy by charging a higher interest rate on loans (and/or a low 
interest rate for deposits) to customers to generate higher profits (see Table 6.3, positive 
coefficient for loans (Y1) (    (1.63%), implying that an increase by 1% loans can result in 
1.63% increase in profits). This can also be potentially explained by the homogenous 
sample used for this study that consists only of commercial banks which mainly perform an 
intermediary function by transforming customers’ deposits into loans and advances.165 For 
the time trend variable (T), both models exhibited a positive coefficient (0.21 for standard 
profit and 0.07 for alternative profit models) but only significant (at 1%) for the standard 
profit model. In general, the coefficients suggest that, over the period under study, the profit 
efficiency of Malaysian banks improved and achieved a higher level of profit for any given 
level of outputs.  
                                                 
165
 Financial institutions such as investment banks are excluded from this study due to different business 
objectives, customers and operational structure. 
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Table ‎6.2 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred 
Standard Profit 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  
Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
            0.2265 ** 0.1330 1.7030 
     
  
  
 
              
                         
  -0.0554  0.1832 -0.3025 
     
  
  
 
               
                         
  1.1626 *** 0.1771 6.5654 
     
  
  
  
              
                             
  -0.3668 ** 0.1591 -2.3054 
     
  
  
  
                    
                             
  0.4975 *** 0.1272 3.9103 
          
  
  
    -0.1246  0.1872 -0.6656 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  -0.0578  0.1432 -0.4034 
          
  
  
    0.2130 ** 0.1233 1.7281 
          
  
  
    0.2405 * 0.1753 1.3721 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  -0.1686 * 0.1099 -1.5341 
          
  
  
    0.0474  0.1035 0.4583 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  0.3385 ** 0.1866 1.8142 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  -0.0363  0.1332 -0.2722 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  -0.4147 *** 0.1748 -2.3727 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  0.0518  0.1198 0.4324 
                            -0.4082 ** 0.2347 -1.7391 
             
   -0.8480 *** 0.2994 -2.8320 
       
  
  
        -0.3590 ** 0.2015 -1.7816 
       
  
  
        0.2025  0.2019 1.0028 
       
  
  
        0.1021  0.2944 0.3467 
       
  
  
        0.3766 ** 0.2033 1.8527 
                        -0.1781 ** 0.0941 -1.8928 
    (Continued) 
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Table 6.2 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred 
Standard Profit (Continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  
Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
             
   -0.0759 ** 0.0454 -1.6743 
       
  
  
        -0.1050  0.1022 -1.0270 
       
  
  
        0.0685  0.1036 0.6610 
                 0.0103  0.1052 0.0979 
                 0.0838  0.0825 1.0161 
                         0.1016  0.1665 0.6106 
             
   -0.0364  0.1225 -0.2970 
       
  
  
        0.3294 ** 0.1762 1.8696 
       
  
  
        -0.2758 ** 0.1641 -1.6803 
       
  
  
        0.3509 *** 0.1384 2.5364 
       
  
  
        0.0539  0.1218 0.4424 
                 0.4029 *** 0.1032 3.9026 
                 -0.0819  0.2183 -0.3753 
                 0.0794  0.0932 0.8523 
                    0.1005  0.2004 0.5013 
          
   -0.1904  0.2038 -0.9346 
       
  
  
       -0.4172 ** 0.1939 -2.1514 
       
  
  
       0.4227 ** 0.1830 2.3091 
       
  
  
       0.1793  0.1668 1.0746 
       
  
  
       -0.0229  0.1409 -0.1628 
                0.2584 ** 0.1486 1.7391 
                0.0548  0.0919 0.5959 
                -0.3789 ** 0.2085 -1.8176 
           20.5879  17.6689 1.1652 
                            1.1344 *** 0.4615 2.4580 
                       1.4274 *** 0.4117 3.4668 
                                  0.2102  0.5985 0.3512 
    (Continued) 
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Table 6.2 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred 
Standard Profit (Continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  
Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
                                  1.4436  1.1874 1.2158 
                                -0.3631  0.4346 -0.8355 
                   -1.0321  0.8209 -1.2574 
                               2.6529  4.6694 0.5681 
                       -0.1046  0.8043 -0.1301 
Log-likelihood  -332.47 
Log-likelihood ratio against OLS model  -392.82 
Number of observations  354 
Degrees of freedom  340 
Notes: t-ratio is defined as ratio of estimated coefficient over standard errors. Degree of freedom is defined by netting off 
number of observations in the sample against the number of estimated coefficients in the maximum likelihood model. ***, 
**, *  is the significance level of estimated coefficients in given degrees of freedom. Using t-ratio critical value at 
significant levels of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*) which are at 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282 respectively. 
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Table ‎6.3 The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred 
Alternative Profit 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  
Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
            0.3034 *** 0.0769 3.9447 
     
  
  
 
              
                         
  0.2070 ** 0.0958 2.1609 
     
  
  
 
               
                         
  0.7531 *** 0.0986 7.6403 
                1.6343 *** 0.1738 9.4049 
                      -0.4512 *** 0.0933 -4.8367 
                               -0.2545 *** 0.0900 -2.8289 
          
  
  
    0.1063  0.1135 0.9361 
       
  
  
    
  
  
  -0.1137  0.0963 -1.1804 
          
  
  
    0.1544 ** 0.0891 1.7337 
             
   0.2682  0.2884 0.9297 
                 0.1595  0.1495 1.0665 
                 -0.0528  0.1459 -0.3617 
             
   -0.3179 *** 0.1089 -2.9187 
                 -0.0529  0.0803 -0.6589 
             
   0.0445  0.1015 0.4379 
       
  
  
        -0.1578  0.1316 -1.1987 
       
  
  
        -0.0609  0.0578 -1.0535 
       
  
  
        0.0049  0.0983 0.0500 
       
  
  
        -0.0313  0.1303 -0.2406 
       
  
  
        0.1781 *** 0.0532 3.3465 
       
  
  
        0.0777  0.1063 0.7306 
                        0.2898 ** 0.1573 1.8423 
             
   -0.1616  0.2462 -0.6564 
       
  
  
        -0.6483 *** 0.1332 -4.8655 
       
  
  
        0.5486 *** 0.1294 4.2391 
    
(Continued) 
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Table 6.3: The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred 
Alternative Profit (Continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  
Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
                 0.4877 ** 0.2446 1.9935 
                 -0.4303 *** 0.1430 -3.0103 
                 -0.1324  0.1442 -0.9179 
                        0.0031  0.0549 0.0566 
             
   -0.0244  0.0279 -0.8755 
       
  
  
        0.0231  0.0438 0.5279 
       
  
  
        -0.0050  0.0445 -0.1119 
                 -0.0519  0.0620 -0.8371 
                 0.0192  0.0434 0.4425 
                 0.1385 *** 0.0439 3.1566 
                    -3.0914 *** 0.3344 -9.2447 
             
   1.7053 *** 0.5602 3.0444 
       
  
  
        0.2653  0.2151 1.2333 
       
  
  
        -0.0034  0.2218 -0.0151 
                 -0.9347 *** 0.3856 -2.4240 
                 -0.1344  0.2156 -0.6236 
                 0.0951  0.1719 0.5533 
                 0.1982 *** 0.0814 2.4348 
                 -1.4429 *** 0.4352 -3.3156 
                 0.0741  0.0979 0.7561 
                    -0.1549 * 0.0978 -1.5834 
          
   -0.1469 * 0.1088 -1.3507 
       
  
  
       0.1787 ** 0.0807 2.2152 
       
  
  
       -0.1629 ** 0.0801 -2.0339 
                -0.0368  0.1047 -0.3519 
                0.1189 ** 0.0692 1.7197 
                -0.0521  0.0656 -0.7939 
    
(Continued) 
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Table 6.3: The Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimation for the Preferred 
Alternative Profit (Continued) 
Parameters Variables Coefficient  
Standard 
Error 
t-ratio 
                0.0453  0.0947 0.4780 
                -0.0491  0.0497 -0.9879 
                -0.1215  0.1609 -0.7551 
           200.3159  300.0623 0.6676 
                            -0.2366  1.1341 -0.2086 
                       2.4849  3.2430 0.7663 
                                  2.7111  3.4151 0.7939 
                                  11.6769  18.3610 0.6360 
                                -4.0642  3.9827 -1.0205 
                   -9.9378  13.9321 -0.7133 
                               4.7069  16.4860 0.2855 
                       8.5324  13.1460 0.6490 
Log-likelihood  -139.55 
Log-likelihood ratio against OLS model  -143.37266 
Number of observations  354 
Degrees of freedom  300 
Notes: t-ratio is defined as ratio of estimated coefficient over standard errors. Degrees of freedom is defined  by netting off 
number of observations in the sample against the number of estimated coefficients in the maximum likelihood model. ***, 
**, *  is the significance level of estimated coefficients in given degrees of freedom. Using t-ratio critical value at significant 
levels of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*) which are at 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282 respectively. 
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6.3 Testing of Research Hypotheses 
Following the analysis and testing of SFA preferred models and the parameters of the 
estimations, the hypotheses developed in chapters 4 and 5 are discussed in this section, 
using the results derived from the three respective models. The hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 Banking efficiency has improved since the implementation of the Financial 
Sector Master Plan (strengthening and liberalisation measures) in the 
Malaysian banking system between 2000 and 2011. 
Hypothesis 2 Foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient than domestic banks. 
Hypothesis 3 Conventional banks are more cost (profit) efficient than Islamic banks. 
Hypothesis 4 The impact of the global economic slowdown led to lower cost (profit) 
efficiency of Malaysian banks. 
Hypothesis 5 Large banks are more cost (profit) efficient than small banks. 
Hypothesis 6a High concentration in banking sector exhibits lower cost (profit) efficiency of 
Malaysian banks. 
Hypothesis 6b High market share exhibits higher cost (profit) efficiency of Malaysian 
banks. 
Hypothesis 7 Banks with a lower capital ratio exhibit higher costs and lower profits. 
Hypothesis 8 Banks with a higher non-performing loans’ ratio exhibit higher costs and 
lower profits. 
Hypothesis 9 Banks with greater liquidity exhibit lower costs and higher profits. 
From the discussions in chapter 5, and as mentioned in Coelli et al. (2005), exogenous 
variables are used to measure the heterogeneity effect on banks’ costs and profits. These 
variables are known as control and environmental variables. Control variables are assigned 
directly into the frontier regression and interact entirely with the inputs and outputs, which 
influence the cost and profit frontier structure. Based on hypotheses 6, 7 and 8 the control 
variables related to this study are: financial capital (C1), asset quality (C2) and liquidity 
(C3). Since the control variables are assigned directly into the regression, the most 
appropriate method in testing these hypotheses is via the t-ratio test of the estimated 
coefficient of the control variables (Coelli et al., 2005). 
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With regards to hypotheses 2 to 5, similarly to the control variables, inputs and outputs, a t-
ratio test is used to measure the significant level of the respective environmental variables. 
If the coefficient associated with the environmental variable displays a positive relationship 
and is significant, it denotes that the environmental variables’ inefficiency (  ) has increased. 
On the other hand, if the coefficient of the environmental variables is negative and 
significant, it implies that the inefficiency (  ) has decreased. Unlike with the control 
variables, the environmental variables do not interact with the inputs and outputs of the 
frontier estimation and do not affect the structure of the frontier but impact the measurement 
of inefficiency (  ). Thus, the direction of inefficiency (  ) can be determined from the 
coefficient and significance level of the environmental variables involved in this study, 
which at the same time are used to test hypotheses 2 to 5 (Battese and Coelli, 1995). 
6.3.1 Testing of Hypotheses 2 to 5 
In testing hypotheses 2 to 5, the environmental variables are used to determine whether the 
hypotheses can be accepted or rejected. Furthermore, the t-ratio of the respective 
coefficients of the environmental variables is assessed for significance tests. To determine 
the direction of the relationship between inefficiency and the environmental variables, the 
signs of the coefficients are analysed (i.e. either positive or negative).  
Hypothesis 2 Foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient than domestic banks. 
The main environmental variable used to test this hypothesis is ownership (Z1). For cost 
efficiency, the coefficient of (  ) in table 6.1 is positive 1.09 and significant at the 1% 
significance level. Hence, the coefficient and t-ratio of this variable suggests that the foreign 
banks are less cost efficient (i.e. more inefficient) than domestic banks. This finding is 
surprising because the past literature on ownership structure, has in many cases suggested 
that foreign banks are more efficient when compared to domestic banks, particularly in 
emerging / developing countries (Claessen, 2001). This however could be explained by the 
various restrictions established by BNM on locally incorporated foreign banks since the 
independence of Malaysia such as, restrictions in entering the banking sector, limited branch 
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activities and restrictions to operate in several areas of banking (e.g. hire purchase) (see 
Chapter 4).  
From the profit efficiency perspective, the standard profit efficiency and alternative profit 
efficiency exhibit positive and negative coefficients for ownership variables, respectively. 
For standard profit efficiency (Table 6.2), Z1 is significant at 1% significance level; 
however, it is insignificant for the alternative profit efficiency. This significant positive 
coefficient of ownership (  ) (1.13) may indicate that foreign banks are more standard 
profit inefficient compared to domestic banks. Hence, this hypothesis is rejected on the basis 
that foreign banks are expected to gain greater profit efficiency compared to the domestic 
banks. In terms of the alternative profit efficiency model, the coefficient of ownership (  ) 
displays a negative relationship (-0.23) but is insignificant. This could indicate that the 
foreign banks are more profit efficient than domestic banks. For instance, in developing 
countries, foreign banks are known to ‘cherry-pick’ good and quality customers as well as 
having profit oriented behaviour, which could give better returns to the banks; whereas, 
domestic banks can be describe as ‘mass’ financial institutions which serve the public and in 
turn this could leave domestic banks with lower profits (Hassan, 2002). However, the 
hypothesis for alternative profit efficiency is rejected as there is no difference (insignificant 
t-ratio) between foreign and domestic banks (the efficiency scores regarding ownership (i.e. 
domestic and foreign banks) are discussed in detail later in this chapter). 
Hypothesis 3 Conventional banks are more cost (profit) efficient than Islamic banks 
With the dual banking environment in Malaysia arising from the growth of Islamic banks, 
this hypothesis intends to test whether the conventional banks are more cost and profit 
efficient than the Islamic banks. The environmental variable Z2 is used for this purpose and 
a dummy variable is assigned to the Islamic banks. From Table 6.1, the coefficient of 
specialisation (  ) for the cost efficiency model revealed a positive relationship with 
inefficiency (significant at 10%). The Islamic banks are more cost inefficient when 
compared to their conventional counterparts. This could be attributed to the introduction of 
new foreign Islamic bank subsidiaries to enhance the prominence of Islamic banking in 
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Malaysia which might have increased competitive pressure on the industry in the second 
phase of the FSMP (2004–2007).  
The standard and alternative profit efficiency (  ) displays positive coefficients; but only 
standard profit efficiency is significant at 1% significance level. These results suggest that 
Islamic banks are more profit inefficient than conventional banks. The lower profit 
efficiency of the Islamic banks is probably influenced by their briefer period of 
establishment compared to the conventional banks. Except for Bank Islam, which has been 
in operation for more than 20 years, the Islamic bank subsidiaries and foreign Islamic banks 
are at a relatively nascent stage, and have yet to optimally manage their production of 
outputs and inputs (Kamaruddin et al., 2008; Abdul Majid et al., 2011). Additionally, with 
the introduction of foreign Islamic banks in the second phase of the FSMP, the Islamic 
banking concepts from the Middle East were new to Malaysian consumers; at this early 
stage, products with specific shariah ‘jargon’ are not easy for consumers to comprehend. 
Furthermore, Islamic banks require specialised knowledge and skills, which could result in 
lower profit efficiency (Abdul Majid., 2001) (the efficiency scores between Islamic and 
conventional banks are discussed in detail later in this chapter).  
Hypothesis 4 The impact of the global economic slowdown led to lower cost (profit) 
efficiency in Malaysian banks 
This hypothesis relates to the impact of the global economic slowdown due to the credit 
crisis which occurred in the US and Europe namely, the subprime and sovereign debt crises. 
The impact was felt in Malaysia from end of 2008 until early 2010 (see Chapter 4). To 
capture the effect of the global credit crisis on Malaysia, a dummy variable is assigned to 
years 2008, 2009 and 2010. From the cost efficiency parameters estimation, the coefficient 
of variable global crisis (  ) is found to be positive 0.62 and significant at 5% significance 
level. This may well indicate that the global credit crisis resulted in lower cost efficiency in 
Malaysian banks. As discussed in Chapter 4, the global economy deteriorated further in 
2008 and the demand for exports declined, which affected the real sector in Malaysia. 
Malaysian GDP dropped and contracted in 2009 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009). During this 
period of uncertainty, higher costs were incurred by Malaysian banks in managing excess 
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liquidity from the inflow of foreign funds, and preventing loan portfolios from going 
delinquent. For standard profit and alternative profit efficiencies, the coefficients for the 
financial crisis variable (  ) were insignificant and negative -0.36 and -4.06, respectively. 
Thus, the hypothesis is rejected for both standard profit and alternative profit efficiency 
models. The negative coefficients indicate that Malaysian banks show higher profit 
efficiency during the period of the global credit crisis. This could be likely explained from 
the effect of lower interest environment, with a couple of economic stimulus introduced by 
the government of Malaysia. 
Hypothesis 5 Large banks are more cost (profit) efficient than small banks 
This hypothesis relates to asset size variable (Z6) (see Chapter 5). It is hypothesised that 
bigger banks have a positive relationship with cost and profit efficiency. The result 
stemming from the cost frontier estimation indicates that the coefficient of bank size (  ) in 
table 6.1 is positive 2.45 and significant at 1% significance level. Thus, hypothesis 5 is 
rejected due to larger banks being less cost efficient than smaller banks. According to 
Akhigbe and McNulty (2003), in situations where the banking industry faced financial 
liberalisation, large banks were found to be less efficient than small banks. This may be 
because large banks needed to invest in major restructuring and cost-cutting initiatives, 
more so than the small banks. During the first phase of the FSMP (2000–2003), domestic 
banks needed to consolidate and these recently expanded entities suffered higher costs than 
the smaller banks (see Chapter 4) (Suffian, 2004; Bonin et al., 2005). These new 
consolidated banks were also publicly traded and with diverse ownership comes with 
greater agency costs which could result in lower cost efficiency scores (Kwan, 2006). In 
addition, large banks are less efficient than smaller banks because they normally enjoy 
competitive market power, in which their managers do not work as hard to keep costs under 
control and enjoying ‘quiet life’ (Berger and Hannan, 1998).  
The standard profit and alternative profit efficiencies displayed negative (-1.03 and -9.93, 
respectively) and insignificant coefficients for asset size (  ). The directions indicated that 
larger banks faced a lower level of profit efficiency compared to smaller banks; however the 
t-ratios for these coefficients are insignificant. This leads us to reject this hypothesis on 
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standard and alternative profit efficiencies (the efficiency scores regarding bank size are 
discussed in detail later in this chapter).  
 Hypothesis 6a High concentration in banking sector exhibits lower cost (profit) 
efficiency of Malaysian banks 
Hypothesis 6b High market share exhibits higher cost (profit) efficiency of 
Malaysian banks 
Hypotheses 6a and 6b relate to market structure. The variables representing market structure 
are market concentration (Z7) and market share (Z8). Based on the SCP hypothesis, market 
structure can be measured via market concentration, market share, product differentiation, 
barriers to entry and exit, vertical integration and diversification. In view of the hypotheses 
regarding the market structure, two variables are employed to test the impact to cost- and 
profit-efficiency. Berger (1995) argued that there is a positive statistical relationship 
between measures of market structure (concentration and market share) and profitability.  In 
this regard, the positive relationship between profitability and market structure elements can 
be explained by two market power hypotheses: namely, the traditional SCP hypothesis and 
the relative-market power (RMP) hypothesis. In the context of the banking industry, the 
SCP hypothesis says that banks can set prices that are less favourable to consumers in a 
concentrated market, due to imperfect competition within the market. Banks act in a 
monopolistic manner in this imperfect competitive market structure by lowering the deposit 
rates and increasing the loan rates. On the other hand, the RMP hypothesis asserts that only 
firms with a large market share and well-differentiated products can exercise market power 
in pricing these products and earn supernormal profits (Shepherd, 1982).  
For hypothesis 6a, a high market concentration exhibits lower cost/profit efficiency of banks. 
For the cost efficiency estimation, the result has shown a positive coefficient (3.68) but 
insignificant, implying that the higher the concentration of the market, the lower the cost 
efficiency of Malaysian banks. Hence, the null hypothesis 6a for cost efficiency is rejected 
due to insignificant t-ratio value. The standard profit- and alternative profit- efficiency were 
also insignificant and exhibited positive coefficients. Hence, hypothesis 6a, for standard 
profit- and alternative profit-efficiency, is also rejected.  
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Hypothesis 6b relates to the market share of the banks. RMP hypothesis is employed to test 
this hypothesis, in which larger banks are expected to exercise their competitive market 
power through pricing to earn abnormal profits (Shepherd, 1982). The result from Table 6.1 
for cost efficiency shows a negative coefficient (-2.9) of variable market share (  ) and a 
notable 1% significance level. This evidence seems to support the RMP hypothesis under 
which banks with large market share and well-differentiated products exert more market 
power to maximise profits and performance (Shepherd, 1982). On the other hand, the 
standard profit and alternative profit efficiencies display negative and positive coefficients, 
respectively, but are insignificant (see tables 6.2 and 6.3). Hence, hypothesis 6b for the 
standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency are rejected.  
6.3.2 Testing of Hypotheses 7 to 9 
From the earlier discussions, three control variables (capital adequacy (C1), asset quality 
(C2) and liquidity (C3)) are introduced in this study, which relate to hypotheses 7 to 9. 
These hypotheses are related to different types of risks that could affect Malaysian banks’ 
levels of efficiency. Following Battese and Coelli’s (1995) 1-stage model, the control 
variables in this study have a direct influence on the frontier structure (i.e. control variables 
interact directly with input and output variables). Therefore, with an increasing number of 
variables being placed into the model specification, multicollinearity issue may arise 
(Gujarati, 2003). However, as mentioned earlier, multicollinearity problems might not be 
severe if used for forecasting purposes, particularly when the estimation results produce 
expected signs on the coefficients which may also suggest that multicollinearity issues may 
not be a critical issue (Belsley, 1984). Similarly to the other variables, the t-ratio is used to 
test the significance of the variables and the direction of the relationship is determined from 
the coefficient signs. 
Hypothesis 7 Banks with lower financial capital ratio (C1) (low capital 
adequacy) exhibit higher cost and lower profits 
Hypothesis 8 Banks with greater percentage of non-performing loans (C2) (low 
asset quality) exhibit higher cost and lower profits 
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Hypothesis 9 Banks with lower loans to deposit ratio (C3) (high liquidity) exhibit 
lower cost and higher profits 
First, based on the cost efficiency model, the preferred model is the general model without 
capital adequacy (C1) (stage A2.3) (see Table 5.5). Since the preferred cost efficiency 
model (A2.3) has a better fit than the general model (A1.0), hypothesis 7 is rejected. Hence, 
from the preferred cost model (A2.3), only two control variables are to be tested; asset 
quality (C2) and liquidity (C3). For asset quality (C2), the coefficient for variable asset 
quality (  ) was positive (0.1396) but insignificant. The direction of this coefficient is 
aligned to past literature where banks with low asset quality or high NPLs are likely to 
exhibit higher costs (Fu and Haffernan, 2007; Mester, 1997; Pastor, 2010). As shown in 
Chapter 4, the NPL levels of Malaysian banks were low but they faced higher operating 
costs during the global credit crisis. This may suggest that the banks were assigning more 
attention and resources to loan origination, monitoring and other credit judgement activities, 
learning from their experience of economic turmoil in 1997–98 (Girardone et al., 2004). 
Moreover, during the global credit crisis, in the third phase of FSMP, banks were actively 
monitoring and negotiating potential loan delinquencies through reclassification and 
restructuring of loans (Abd. Karim et al., 2010). However, the coefficient (   ) is 
insignificant and may not directly affect the cost structure of banks, which leads to 
hypothesis 8 being rejected. Additionally, the coefficient for liquidity risk (  ) (measured 
using LTD ratio, see Chapter 5) showed a negative relationship (-0.83) and positive at the 1% 
significance level. This suggests that a 1% reduction of liquidity risk would result in an 
increase of 0.83% in cost. From the discussions made in Chapter 5, a higher level of 
liquidity (i.e. lower liquidity risk) in banks could reduce costs. However, conflicting 
findings are observed where a high level of liquidity could result in higher operational costs 
of banks. This can be likely caused by higher price of funds and increasing utilisation of 
resources in managing and matching maturities of assets and liabilities from the excess of 
liquid assets from substantial influx of foreign funds into Malaysian banks in 2007 (see 
Chapter 4). Despite being significant, at 1% significance level, hypothesis 9 is rejected due 
to the opposite sign of coefficient (  ) expected for the cost efficiency model. 
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Second, the preferred model for standard profit efficiency is the general model, which 
includes all the control variables and environmental variables. From the preferred model, 
the coefficients for capital adequacy (  ) and asset quality (  ) are found to be negative (-
0.41) and (-0.18) respectively, and significant at 5% significance level (hypothesis 7 and 8). 
However, the coefficient for liquidity (  ) is insignificant (hypothesis 9). The negative 
coefficient (0.41) of capital adequacy (  ) suggests that an increase in capital would reduce 
profits. The result however, differs from the expectation derived in hypothesis 7; and is 
hence rejected. This could be potentially explained from banks being over-capitalised 
during the consolidation of domestic banks and during the global credit crisis, which took 
place in the first and third phases of the FSMP (see Chapter 4). A higher capital level 
implies that banks face low inherent capital risk. But if banks are over-capitalised, they 
might face higher capital cost with declining profits, due to higher agency costs, as well as 
increased costs in the form of dividends to be paid to shareholders (Kashyap et al., 2010; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2013). For asset quality (C2), the coefficient (  ) shows negative (-0.18) 
and significance at 5%. Hence hypothesis 8 cannot is accepted, because it supports the 
notion that an increase in the NPL ratio could result in declining profits. The coefficient (  ) 
indicates that a 1% increase in NPLs (low asset quality) will result in a 0.18% decline in 
profit efficiency. In terms of liquidity (C3), the coefficient for liquidity is positive and 
insignificant. Therefore, hypothesis 9 for standard profit efficiency is rejected.
166
  
On the third economic function, the preferred model for alternative profit efficiency is also 
the general model, which includes all control and environmental variables (see Table 5.7). 
The coefficient for capital adequacy (   ) is positive (0.28) and significant at 5% 
significance level. Hence, the coefficient and t-ratio of the capital adequacy variable fails to 
reject hypothesis 7. For the case of the alternative profit efficiency function, a lower level of 
capital adequacy could result in lower profitability. According to Mester (1993, 1996), 
efficiency is positively correlated with financial capital. Generally, a greater capital 
adequacy describes a bank which has a larger margin of safety and a greater ability to 
absorb potential risks. Hence, a bank with a strong capital level normally enjoys reliable 
                                                 
166
 Similar to cost efficiency model, banks could have incurred higher cost in managing excess liquidity, which 
consequently reduces profits.   
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access to sufficient sources of funds on favourable terms (Berger, 1995). Moreover, highly 
efficient banks normally have more profits and are able (by holding dividends constant) to 
retain earnings as capital (Girardone et al., 2004). The coefficient for asset quality (  ) 
displays the negative sign and is insignificant. The asset quality for the preferred alternative 
profit efficiency is unable to fully influence the effect on profitability of Malaysian banks. 
Thus, hypothesis 8 is rejected. On the other hand, the coefficient for liquidity (  ) is 
negative and significant at a 1% significance level. Similar to preferred cost efficiency 
model, a high level of liquidity (low LTD ratio) may result in higher profit. Therefore, 
hypothesis 9 is accepted, as high liquidity can lead to higher profits. As evidenced, in 2007 
the liquidity of Malaysian banks increased due to large inflows of foreign funds. Malaysian 
banks probably earn greater income from conversion of excess funds into short-term assets. 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results: Analysis and Discussion 
 
284 
 
Table ‎6.4 Testing of Research Hypotheses 2–9 
Null Hypothesis 
Cost 
Efficiency 
Standard 
Profit 
Efficiency 
Alternative 
Profit 
Efficiency 
Hypothesis 2 
Foreign banks are more cost (profit) efficient 
than domestic banks. 
Reject Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 3 
Conventional banks are more cost (profit) 
efficient than Islamic banks. 
Accept Accept Reject 
Hypothesis 4 
The impact of the global economic slowdown 
led to lower cost (profit) efficiency of 
Malaysian banks. 
Accept Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 5 
Big banks are more cost (profit) efficient than 
small banks. 
Reject Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 6a 
High concentration in banking sector exhibits 
lower cost (profit) efficiency of Malaysian 
banks. 
Reject Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 6b 
High market share exhibits higher cost 
(profit) efficiency of Malaysian banks. 
Accept Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 7 
Banks with a lower capital ratio exhibit 
higher costs and lower profits. 
Reject Reject Accept 
Hypothesis 8 
Banks with a higher non-performing loans’ 
ratio exhibit higher costs and lower profits. 
Reject Accept Reject 
Hypothesis 9 
Banks with greater liquidity exhibit lower 
costs and higher profits. 
Reject Reject Accept 
6.4 Impact of Liberalisation via the FSMP on the Efficiency of Malaysian 
Banks 
The key research hypothesis for this study relates to the impact of gradual liberalisation via 
the FSMP (see chapter 4) where the trend of the cost- and profit-efficiency scores of 
Malaysian banks are evaluated for the period 2000 to 2011. This section shows the cost- and 
profit-efficiency scores and average trends of SFA for the preferred models, from 2000 to 
2011. Additionally, the DEA scores for cost and profit efficiency are also analysed for the 
years 2000–2011. 
6.4.1 SFA Efficiency Scores 
6.4.1.1 SFA Cost Efficiency Scores 
The average cost efficiency scores for the Malaysian banks for the years 2000–2011 are 
shown in Table 6.5. The average cost efficiency score for Malaysian banks between 2000 
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and 2011 is 82.7%. The average cost efficiency scores suggests that Malaysian banks 
wasted around 20.0% of their inputs to produce the same level of outputs of the best 
performing banks. This finding (approximately 20% inefficiency) is consistent with past 
findings in the literature, where SFA was used to derive the cost efficiency function (e.g De 
Young, 1997; Berger and De Young, 2001; Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005).  
Table ‎6.5 Average SFA Cost Efficiency Scores, 2000–2011 
Year Count Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
2000 24 0.8760 0.1519 0.2600 0.9721 
2001 26 0.8614 0.1537 0.2698 0.9787 
2002 24 0.8523 0.1524 0.3253 0.9725 
2003 24 0.8103 0.1528 0.3731 0.9582 
2004 25 0.7596 0.1734 0.2404 0.9270 
2005 26 0.7913 0.1554 0.2088 0.9418 
2006 29 0.7450 0.2095 0.2033 0.9317 
2007 31 0.7648 0.1440 0.2704 0.9402 
2008 36 0.7098 0.1783 0.0509 0.9324 
2009 37 0.7025 0.1877 0.0296 0.9271 
2010 37 0.7065 0.1884 0.0738 0.9478 
2011 35 0.7177 0.2157 0.0848 0.9702 
2000-2003 98 0.8502 0.1523 0.2600 0.9787 
2004-2007 111 0.7647 0.1707 0.2033 0.9418 
2008-2011 145 0.7090 0.1909 0.0296 0.9702 
2000-2011 354 0.7655 0.1834 0.0296 0.9787 
From Figure 6.2, based on the three different phases of the FSMP for the years 2000–2003, 
2004–2007 and 2008-2011, the cost efficiency average scores were 85.0%, 76.5% and 70.9% 
respectively, indicating the overall trend of the cost efficiency for 2000 - 2011 was on a 
downward trend. From previous literature, many studies found that deregulation of the 
banking sector resulted in greater efficiency (e.g Tortosa-Austina, 2003; Cuesta and Orea, 
2002; Leightner and Lovell, 1998). On the other hand, deregulation of the banking sector 
could also result in lower efficiency as evidenced from past studies. For instance, Berger 
and Humphrey (1991) found that financial liberalisation forces banks to cut costs 
substantially in a very short period of time. However, this has not been the case as the banks 
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displayed a lower level of cost efficiency, and a slower response in adjusting to changes to 
minimise their costs (Berger and Humphrey, 1992); and, based on observations by 
Humphrey and Pulley (1997), they suggested that banks’ adjustments following 
deregulation can take up to four years to complete. Additionally, Girardone et al. (2004) 
also state that banks may not be efficient when deregulatory initiatives take place at the 
same time as a macroeconomic downturn.  
Figure ‎6.2 Average SFA Cost Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
The first phase of the FSMP (2000–2003) is regarded as the period of initial reform in the 
Malaysian banking industry. After the financial crisis in 1997–98, the Malaysian 
government took various drastic measures to improve the banking sector (Abdul Majid et al., 
2011). Against the backdrop of this crisis, there were significant structural changes in the 
Malaysian banking sector (Sufian, 2004). For instance, Malaysia did not rely on assistance 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the financial crisis, unlike some other 
Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) member countries. Under the IMF 
programme, insolvent banks were forced to close down, but Malaysia did not take this path 
as the social cost involved - in terms of a dislocation of resources - would have been high. 
Malaysia took a different approach by introducing a consolidation of the banking 
institutions, in which BNM played an intermediary role, solving issues of fairness to all 
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parties involved in the merger (Abd. Kadir et al., 2010).
167
 During this period (i.e. first 
phase of FSMP (2000-2003), cost efficiency scores were trending downward. This could be 
potentially explained by the effect of the consolidation of domestic banks, which resulted in 
declining cost efficiency scores. These domestic banks had to implement various 
rationalisation programmes including; restructuring of duplicated branch networks, 
managing staff redundancy, synchronising technology with the acquiring partner and 
implementation of internet banking services (Sufian, 2004). 
During the FSMP’s second phase (2004–2007), BNM introduced the new interest rate 
framework (NIRF) that aimed to facilitate more efficient pricing of financial products. 
Following the removal of BNM’s intervention rate, Malaysian banks were able to price their 
funding costs and revenues based on their own cost structure and compete for customers 
using their own interest pricing structure.
168
 This deregulation of interest rates was intended 
to increase efficiency, productivity, innovation and profitability in the banking system 
(Leightner and Lovell, 1998; Sensarma, 2006, Berger and Mester, 2003). As a result of the 
deregulation of interest rates, banks have to adjust their inputs and outputs to remain 
competitive.
169
 During this period, there was a slight increase in the cost efficiency scores in 
2005, following the liberalisation of BLR, indicating some increasing level of competition 
in terms of pricing among Malaysian banks. Towards the end of the second phase of the 
FSMP, the cost efficiency scores fell marginally due to a significant loss faced by an Islamic 
bank and the inception of new foreign Islamic banks (see Chapter 4). The overall average 
cost efficiency scores worsened because these new or de-novo foreign Islamic banks 
inherently faced higher operational costs during their early phase of operations (Suffian, 
2010). 
                                                 
167
 This consolidation programme was also in line with the requirement in having stronger domestic banks to 
compete regionally when opening its financial industry to the international players in 2003 under the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) rules (Abd. Kadir et al., 2010; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009). As a result, in 2001, 
the consolidation had successfully merged 54 Malaysian banks and financial institutions into 10 anchor 
banking groups (Dogan and Fausten, 2002; Radam et al., 2009; Ismail and Abdul Rahim, 2009). 
168
 The interest rate deregulation program generally increases competitive pressure in the market and forced 
banks to reduce their cost (Mester, 1993). 
169
 In terms of adjustments made to inputs and outputs, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) found that during the 
deregulation of interest rate, banks tend to respond in three ways. First, to offset higher deposit interest cost 
with higher explicit and implicit for small deposits. Second, to transfer the higher funding cost to borrowers. 
And third, to invest in risky assets to obtain higher yield.  
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In the third phase of the FSMP (2008–2011), Malaysian banks were not significantly 
affected during the initial stages of the subprime crisis in the US. Malaysian banks were 
prudent in their investments, particularly relating to derivatives products originated in the 
US and Europe (only a small portion of these instruments were held by them) (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2007b). However, in mid-2008, as the global economy deteriorated, the demand 
for Malaysian exports declined, which affected the real sector. Malaysian GDP had 
consequently contracted by 1.7% in 2009 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009b). Consequently, 
the NPLs of banks increased slightly in 2009, reflecting the contraction experienced by the 
economy (see Chapter 4). The downward trend of the cost efficiency scores during the third 
phase of FSMP was also driven by greater operating costs by Malaysian banks in managing 
potentially delinquent loans (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009b).  
At the same time (i.e. during the third phase of FSMP (2008-2011), BNM reduced its policy 
interest rate (overnight policy rate or OPR) from 3.5% to 2.0% in November 2008 to 
February 2009 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009). The policy reduction in interest rates 
required banks to drastically adjust their input prices and outputs according to the indicative 
market interest rate (i.e. the OPR). Similar to Berger and Humphrey (1992), a slower 
response in adjusting to market changes, had resulted in Malaysian banks experiencing 
lower cost efficiency during the third phase of the FSMP (2008-2011). In addition, Basel II 
was also implemented between 2008 and 2010 (both Standard Approach and Internal 
Ratings Based Approach) and Malaysian banks invested heavily in technology, physical 
assets, external consultants and specialised labour to comply with the new capital regulation 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008b, 2010b). 
From Table 6.1, the variables (Z3) and (Z4) represent the impact of liberalisation made on 
two different phases of the FSMP. Based on the years 2004 to 2008, the variable Z3 showed 
a negative coefficient (-0.40), but insignificant. Consequently, the dummy variable Z4 
(second phase FSMP, 2008–2011) displayed the similar result to Z3 which has negative 
coefficient (-0.52), and insignificant. This leads us to reject hypothesis 1 (i.e. t-ratios being 
statistically insignificant), in which the cost efficiency of Malaysian banks have not 
improved following the implementation of financial liberalisation. 
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6.4.1.2 SFA Standard Profit- and Alternative Profit-Efficiency Scores 
The average standard profit and alternative profit efficiency scores of the Malaysian banks 
from 2000 to 2011 were 62.2% and 93.3%, respectively (see Table 6.6). Based on the 
average of standard profit efficiency scores, banks’ profit levels could be increased by 
approximately 40.0% with the same level of output prices. The average standard profit 
efficiency scores for the three different phases of FSMP are 66.3% (2000-2003), 65.9% 
(2004-2007) and 56.7% (2008-2011). On the other hand, the alternative profit efficiency 
scores for the first (2000–2003), second (2004–2007) and third (2008–2011) phases of the 
FSMP are higher than average standard profit efficiency scores at 93.2%, 96.3% and 91.2%, 
respectively.  
Figure ‎6.3 Average SFA Standard Profit and Alternative Profit Efficiencies Scores of 
Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
Figure 6.3 shows an increasing trend in the alternative profit efficiency scores but 
decreasing standard profit efficiency in the first phase of the FSMP (2000-2003), following 
consolidation of the domestic banks. This could be explained due to the effect of imperfect 
market. During this period, significant efforts were directed towards the ongoing 
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transformation of the domestic banking system into one with the capacity and agility to 
withstand shocks and survive increased financial market volatility (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2005). When domestic banks merged, the fragmented market shares held independently by 
each institution were consolidated, which resulted in a larger market share for these banks, 
which then enjoyed the advantages of economies of scale.
170
 In terms of profit efficiency 
models, Akhavein et al. (1997) assert that bank mergers increase profits in three major ways. 
First, they improve cost efficiency by reducing costs per unit in the production mix of inputs 
and outputs. Second, bank mergers increase profits through profit efficiency improvements: 
profits come to be seen as a superior combination of inputs and outputs;
171
 finally, bank 
mergers improve profits due to market power – the power to set prices.172  
During the second phase of the FSMP (2004–2007), the deregulation of interest rates (i.e. 
NIRF), introduced by BNM in 2004, resulted in a slight increase in standard profit- and 
alternative profit-efficiency in the following year (i.e. 2005). Banks responded to NIRF by 
adjusting their loan and deposit prices. This can be evidenced by the interest margin trend 
after deregulation of the interest rates, in which interest profit margins increased from 43.6% 
to 46.9% between 2004 and 2005 (see Table 4.19), indicating some level of market power 
was exercised by some banks in setting prices. From Figure 6.3, standard profit- and 
alternative profit-efficiency scores demonstrate different trends when responding to 
deregulation initiatives introduced in the second phase of the FSMP. The average score for 
alternative profit efficiency scores increased from 93.2% in the first phase to 96.3% in the 
second. On the other hand, standard profit efficiency’s average score worsened from 66.3% 
to 65.9% in the first and second phases of FSMP, respectively. The differences between 
these two profit efficiency concepts can be explained by Berger and Mester (1997) (see 
Chapter 5), who argued that the differences could be viewed from the underlying 
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 For instance, bank mergers can bring new technology and management skills for greater efficiency. Piloff 
(1996) suggests that greater performance after mergers could be obtained in several ways. First, there will be a 
transfer of management skills coming from the superior firm and can contribute or provide complimentary 
skills in the acquired firms. Second, the mergers can improve the financial performance by eliminating the 
redundant facilities and human resources; and third, there will be a consolidation of technology, skills and 
resources when firms merged.  
171
 Profit efficiency is a more inclusive compared to cost efficiency as it involves both revenue and cost. A 
new merged entity could improve their profit efficiency without improving their cost efficiency, particularly 
when the outputs associated with the merger increases revenue more than the cost (Akhavein et al., 1997). 
172
 By increasing the market share, the new merged institution can charge higher prices for its goods and 
services which, in return, could increase profitability from the customer surplus without even improving the 
efficiency (Piloff, 1996; Akhavein et al., 1997). 
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assumption of each model with respect to market power and unmeasured product quality.
 173
  
This may also suggest that the competition among Malaysian banks was imperfect (i.e. 
oligopoly market structure). For example, the lower average alternative profit efficiency 
score in 2004 (during the introduction of new interest rate framework (NIRF)) implies that 
some banks with higher market share experienced higher profits by exercising market power 
in setting input and/or outputs prices to maximise profits. However, as competitors have 
good knowledge of market demand; and learning from their mistakes, they soon reacted by 
changing their input or/and outputs prices (i.e. price interdependence), which led to an 
increasing trend of the average alternative profit efficiency from 2005 to 2007. 
Towards the end of the second phase, Malaysian banks progressively faced greater 
competition from foreign banks and new Islamic bank subsidiaries. However, these banks 
were unable to provide the necessary competitive pressure during their early stage of 
operations. In late 2007, Malaysian banks experienced large inflows of foreign funds due to 
the subprime and sovereign debt crises that occurred in the US and Europe. This led to an 
abundance of liquidity flowing into the Malaysian banking system, which resulted in higher 
funding costs. With difficulties in searching for appropriate assets to match these liquidities, 
banks faced lower revenues and, as a result, lower profit efficiency scores. Hence, a sharp 
decline in standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency was observed in 2008. As 
Malaysian banks began to experience the effect of the global economic crisis of late 2008, 
the OPR was reduced from 3.5% to 2%, as part of a series of measures taken by BNM to 
lessen the cost of borrowing and assist consumers in weathering the challenging business 
and economic environment (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009a). In this environment, banks 
were required to adjust their input prices, outputs and output prices according to the changes 
in policy interest rate (i.e. the OPR), resulting in a gradual increase of both standard profit- 
and alternative profit-efficiency in 2009 and 2010. As the timeline moved towards the end 
of the third phase of the FSMP, the Malaysian GDP improved and both profit efficiencies 
                                                 
173
 According to Berger and Mester (1997) and Maudos and Pastor (2003), the differences between alternative 
profit- and standard profit-efficiency can be explained with reference to market power, scale and scope 
economies, unmeasured quality of banking services, and inaccurate measurement of output prices (see Chapter 
5). Alternative profit efficiency assumes that banks have some degree of market power in determining the 
output prices; therefore these output prices are not explicitly specified and are assumed to be endogenous in 
output variables. However, for standard profit efficiency, perfect competition is assumed and banks have no 
impact in determining the output prices. Hence, output prices are explicitly specified for in the profit function 
(Berger and Mester, 1997).   
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displayed a declining trend in 2011. These results were influenced by the rapid increase in 
the OPR over three consecutive quarters, which caused complexities for banks in managing 
their input prices, output prices and outputs. The pass through monetary policy transmission 
of interest rate may also indicate that Malaysian banks were more responsive in an 
environment of declining interest rates (i.e. changes in the OPR in 2008) rather than 
increasing interest rate (i.e. changes in the OPR in 2011) (see Figure 6.3).
174
  
Based on two variables, (Z3) and (Z4), that reflected the gradual liberalisation in Malaysia 
(i.e. the three phases), the coefficients (  ) and (  ) of standard profit efficiency exhibit a 
positive relationship of 0.2102 and 1.4436, respectively, but were insignificant. For the 
alternative profit efficiency model, the result showed a similar result to standard profit 
efficiency, which had positive coefficients on (  ) and (  ) of 2.7111 and 11.6769 
respectively, but were insignificant. The results stemming from these coefficients may 
suggest that the liberalisation measures introduced in Malaysia by BNM were unable to 
improve the scores of standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency. This occurrence is 
attributed to two factors: de-novo (new) foreign Islamic banks and the global credit crisis. 
First, the introduction of new foreign Islamic banks during the second phase of the FSMP 
(2004–2007) did not result in an improvement in profit efficiency as these banks were 
unable to generate adequate profits due to their significantly higher operational and capital 
expenditures, incurred during early operation. Second, the impact of the global economic 
turmoil on Malaysia was stronger than the liberalisation initiatives introduced by BNM, 
causing the efficiency scores to decline during the third phase of FSMP (2008–2011).  
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  Lim (2001) asserts that banks generally value their borrowing customers and pass on decreases in loan 
rates faster than they pass on increases. In term of deposits banks possess greater rigidity in the passing on of 
increases to deposit rates compared to the passing on of decreases. 
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Table ‎6.6 Average SFA Standard Profit- and Alternative Profit-Efficiency 
 Standard Profit Efficiency Alternative Profit Efficiency 
Year Count Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Count Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
2000 24 0.6903 0.2175 0.2304 0.9443 24 0.9069 0.0948 0.6504 0.9882 
2001 26 0.6485 0.2268 0.1871 0.9438 26 0.9206 0.0796 0.7141 0.9894 
2002 24 0.6386 0.2536 0.1243 0.9472 24 0.9381 0.0755 0.7115 0.9923 
2003 24 0.6770 0.2415 0.1841 0.9481 24 0.9626 0.0466 0.7870 0.9956 
2004 25 0.6630 0.2523 0.0351 0.9437 25 0.9344 0.0750 0.6358 0.9924 
2005 26 0.6669 0.2286 0.2207 0.9510 26 0.9590 0.0479 0.7883 0.9960 
2006 29 0.6526 0.2368 0.1164 0.9475 29 0.9673 0.0451 0.8379 0.9983 
2007 31 0.6544 0.2615 0.0659 0.9513 31 0.9841 0.0202 0.9152 0.9991 
2008 36 0.5720 0.2942 0.0179 0.9342 36 0.8991 0.1307 0.4856 0.9953 
2009 37 0.5691 0.2947 0.0814 0.9431 37 0.9423 0.0645 0.7683 0.9978 
2010 37 0.5865 0.2893 0.0555 0.9480 37 0.9605 0.0445 0.8440 0.9994 
2011 35 0.5386 0.2997 0.0624 0.9361 35 0.8421 0.1786 0.2756 0.9945 
2000–
2003 
98 0.6633 0.2323 0.1243 0.9481 98 0.9318 0.0779 0.6504 0.9956 
2004–
2007 
111 0.6588 0.2423 0.0351 0.9513 111 0.9626 0.0519 0.6358 0.9991 
2008–
2011 
145 0.5669 0.2919 0.0179 0.9480 145 0.9121 0.1236 0.2756 0.9994 
2000–
2011 
354 0.6224 0.2646 0.0179 0.9513 354 0.9334 0.0959 0.2756 0.9994 
6.4.2 DEA Efficiency Scores 
In this study, DEA is used to compare against the results generated by the SFA (Resti, 1997). 
Bauer et al. (1998) argues that there is no agreement between the parametric (i.e. Stochastic 
Frontier analysis, Thick Frontier analysis and Distribution Free analysis) and non-
parametric methods (i.e. Data Envelopment analysis and Free Disposal Hull analysis) of 
what constitute the best estimates for efficiency scores. They further argued that these two 
approaches (parametric versus non-parametric) can be utilised to test each other’s 
consistency. However, it should be noted that the scores produced by SFA may be different 
to those obtained from DEA due to variations in methods, the variables employed and 
assumptions regarding the random error. The next section discusses trends of DEA and 
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NDEA efficiency scores, from both the cost and profit efficiency perspectives. The findings 
obtained from DEA and NDEA could be utilised to support the findings of SFA in relation 
to the implementation of financial liberalisation on Malaysian banking institutions. 
6.4.2.1 DEA and NDEA Cost Efficiency Scores 
The average cost efficiency scores under DEA cost efficiency (CE) for 2000 - 2011 were 
found to be 87.1%. Based on the three different periods of gradual liberalisation introduced 
by BNM via its FSMP, the average CE scores were at 88.7%, 85.2% and 87.6% for the 
phases one (2000–2003), two (2004–2007) and three (2008–2011) of the FSMP respectively. 
For NDEA, the average CE for 2000 - 2011 was 73.9%. The first, second and third phases 
of the FSMP averaged CE were 74.3%, 77.9% and 70.7%, respectively.  
Figure ‎6.4 Average DEA and NDEA Cost Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks, 2000–
2011 
 
From figure 6.4 and Table 6.7, due to differences in methodology, the trend of DEA CE and 
NDEA CE are different from what is shown by the CE scores of SFA. The differences in 
trends between DEA CE and NDEA CE indicate that there are differences in input prices 
which created lower efficiency scores in NDEA, although the inputs and outputs of the two 
different DMUs are similar. This may suggest that there is opportunity for banks to improve 
in terms of input prices (which may also reflect market power by several big banks) when 
compared to the best practice DMUs (Tone, 2002).  
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Table ‎6.7  Average DEA and NDEA Cost Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks, 2000–
2011 
 DEA Cost Efficiency NDEA Cost Efficiency 
Year 
Co
unt 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Count Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
2000 24 0.8600 0.0841 0.6924 1.0000 24 0.6661 0.1439 0.4184 1.0000 
2001 26 0.8832 0.0858 0.6992 1.0000 26 0.6791 0.1640 0.3854 1.0000 
2002 24 0.9075 0.0728 0.7591 1.0000 24 0.7831 0.1350 0.4970 1.0000 
2003 24 0.8959 0.1052 0.5036 1.0000 24 0.8489 0.1754 0.3954 1.0000 
2004 25 0.8631 0.1029 0.5614 1.0000 25 0.8737 0.1351 0.6367 1.0000 
2005 26 0.8330 0.1504 0.3210 1.0000 26 0.7716 0.1841 0.2956 1.0000 
2006 29 0.8453 0.0938 0.6392 1.0000 29 0.7386 0.1540 0.4129 1.0000 
2007 31 0.8667 0.1202 0.4610 1.0000 31 0.7476 0.2051 0.4065 1.0000 
2008 36 0.8563 0.1747 0.2353 1.0000 36 0.5475 0.3490 0.0277 1.0000 
2009 37 0.8806 0.1016 0.6062 1.0000 37 0.7104 0.2224 0.1524 1.0000 
2010 37 0.8933 0.0917 0.6309 1.0000 37 0.7208 0.2166 0.4016 1.0000 
2011 35 0.8724 0.1090 0.5047 1.0000 35 0.8530 0.1689 0.4448 1.0000 
2000–2003 98 0.8866 0.0881 0.5036 1.0000 98 0.7430 0.1709 0.3854 1.0000 
2004–2007 111 0.8524 0.1175 0.3210 1.0000 111 0.7793 0.1788 0.2956 1.0000 
2008–2011 145 0.8758 0.1228 0.2353 1.0000 145 0.7070 0.2684 0.0277 1.0000 
2000–2011 354 0.8715 0.1130 0.2353 1.0000 354 0.7396 0.2198 0.0277 1.0000 
6.4.2.2 DEA and NDEA Profit Efficiency Scores 
The DEA results of profit efficiency scores of the DEA and NDEA models are presented in 
Figure 6.5 and Table 6.8 for the year 2000 to 2011. For DEA profit efficiency (PE) model, 
the average PE score for the period under study is 76.8%. On a more granular level, the 
average profit efficiency for the sub periods of the FSMP were 77.9%, 73.2% and 78.8%, 
respectively (i.e. first phase (2000–2003), second phase (2004–2007) and third phase 
(2008–2011) of the FSMP). The DEA average PE scores for these three periods show that 
the profit efficiency of Malaysian banks was on a decreasing trend in the second phase of 
FSMP (2004-2007), but rebounded in the third phase of FSMP (2008-2011). This can be 
explained by the impact of NIRF and new competition of foreign banks. Additionally, the 
NDEA average PE score for the years 2000–2011 registered at 67.7%. For the first-, second-, 
and third-phase FSMP, the average NDEA PE scores are 73.8%, 69.6% and 62.2% 
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respectively. A closer look at the trends of both SFA standard profit efficiency (SPE) and 
alternative profit efficiency (APE), and DEA- and NDEA PE suggest that the results from 
respective approaches are not identical but somewhat exhibit an overall similar trend.  
Figure ‎6.5 Average DEA and NDEA Profit Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks, 
2000–2011 
 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results: Analysis and Discussion 
 
297 
 
Table ‎6.8 Average DEA and NDEA Profit Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks, 2000–
2011 
 DEA Profit Efficiency NDEA Profit Efficiency 
Year Count Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Count Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
2000 24 0.7218 0.2221 0.0392 1.0000 24 0.6778 0.2418 0.1480 1.0000 
2001 26 0.7679 0.2178 0.0478 1.0000 26 0.7264 0.2110 0.2990 1.0000 
2002 24 0.8100 0.2030 0.1151 1.0000 24 0.7433 0.2002 0.2643 1.0000 
2003 24 0.8190 0.2079 0.0309 1.0000 24 0.8059 0.2199 0.2773 1.0000 
2004 25 0.7222 0.2295 0.0630 1.0000 25 0.7132 0.2167 0.2036 1.0000 
2005 26 0.7133 0.2162 0.0171 1.0000 26 0.6554 0.2180 0.2636 1.0000 
2006 29 0.7242 0.2488 0.0252 1.0000 29 0.6932 0.2541 0.1100 1.0000 
2007 31 0.7625 0.2603 0.0592 1.0000 31 0.7182 0.2762 0.1434 1.0000 
2008 36 0.7588 0.2699 0.0173 1.0000 36 0.6126 0.3092 0.0529 1.0000 
2009 37 0.7944 0.2028 0.1720 1.0000 37 0.7454 0.2757 0.2289 1.0000 
2010 37 0.8166 0.1811 0.2915 1.0000 37 0.6373 0.3047 0.0243 1.0000 
2011 35 0.7837 0.2183 0.0184 1.0000 35 0.4858 0.5070 0.0000 1.0000 
2000–
2003 98 0.7794 0.2131 0.0309 1.0000 98 0.7381 0.2200 0.1480 1.0000 
2004–
2007 111 0.7319 0.2382 0.0171 1.0000 111 0.6958 0.2427 0.1100 1.0000 
2008–
2011 145 0.7886 0.2188 0.0173 1.0000 145 0.6222 0.3669 0.0000 1.0000 
2000–
2011 354 0.7683 0.2243 0.0171 1.0000 354 0.6774 0.2983 0.0000 1.0000 
In summary, different models introduced in this section produced non-identical efficiency 
scores (consistency among different models is tested and discussed later in this chapter). 
Nevertheless, the trends of these efficiency scores reflect the economic as well as banking 
industry events through the years 2000–2011. For instance, in the first phase of the FSMP 
(2000–2003), the efficiency scores of SFA CE were generally on a decreasing trend, 
implying that consolidation of banks may have adverse effects, particularly in the 
rationalisation of newly merged entity regarding operations, human resources and business 
strategies (Napier, 1989; Formbrun and Shanley, 1990). On the other hand, the SFA 
alternative profit efficiency shows an increasing trend, implying that the effect of market 
power from consolidation of domestic banks leads to higher profit efficiency. In this case, 
banks were found to be more innovative and have offered a variety of products and services 
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to customers to maximise profit. By doing so, banks faced higher costs but at the same time 
increased revenue in higher proportion (see Berger and Mester, 2003). 
During the second phase of the FSMP (2004–2007), BNM deregulated its interest rate in 
2004 and new foreign banks commenced operations in 2006–07. Most of these models 
shows decreasing trends during the early phase of the implementation of the deregulation of 
interest rate (i.e. NIRF) but bounced back in the later stage of the second FSMP. However, a 
model such as SFA APE that considers the impact of market power exhibits an increasing 
trend after the liberalisation of interest rates, which implies that larger banks may exercise 
their market power through interest rate pricing during the implementation of NIRF. In the 
third phase of the FSMP (2008–2011), parametric and nonparametric models generally 
displayed a downward trend of efficiency scores, which explains the impact of the global 
credit crisis and introduction of new foreign banks.  
In general, it is observed that there were differences in the distributional properties of the 
efficiency scores of different models employed in this study. The differences may result 
from the differences in the various assumptions on which the methods are based (Weill, 
2006). However, these differences are not necessarily a problem for the use of the efficiency 
scores: if different frontier methods can generate a similar rank order of efficiency, then the 
regulator can draw some level of reasonable policy conclusion based on the analysis of the 
efficiency scores.
175
 Thus, it is of interest to know whether these approaches generate a 
consistent ranking of banking efficiency over the period of study. 
6.5 Consistency Condition Tests of SFA and DEA  
As discussed earlier, SFA and DEA have their own advantages and disadvantages. For 
instance, the advantage of SFA is that it takes into account the effect of noise in the data. To 
do this, SFA requires specification of functional forms on inputs and outputs for cost and 
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 In order to understand the relationship of SFA and DEA, this study follows Bauer et al. (1998) in 
comparing and testing the robustness of the efficiency scores from SFA and DEA. Five consistency checks 
were implemented which relate to comparable means, ranking of banks, identification of best and worst 
performance banks, stability over the period under study, and comparison of the financial ratios or non-frontier 
measures (Dong et al., 2014). 
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profit efficiencies, and relies on distributional assumptions to disentangle the random errors 
and inefficiency terms. However, should these specifications and assumptions be 
misspecified, they could result in biased estimates. Therefore, DEA could avoid these 
specification errors by enveloping the observed data points rather than rely on a priori 
assumptions for the efficiency frontier structure. However, DEA does not allow for random 
errors (e.g. all errors are considered to be inefficiency) and sensitive to outliers. Since both 
methodologies have different techniques and their own advantages and disadvantages, the 
nonparametric methods (i.e. DEA and NDEA) are applied as complementary models to the 
preferred SFA model (Resti, 1997).  
In this study, as mentioned in Chapter 5, two DEA models (i.e. DEA and NDEA) are used 
to derive the cost- and profit-efficiency estimates using the variable returns to scale (VRS). 
VRS are chosen instead of constant returns to scale (CRS) to consider the effect of 
imperfect competition and constraints on finance that may prevent Malaysian banks from 
operating at optimal scale.
176
 Following Bauer et al. (1998), consistency condition tests can 
be conducted to seek for evidence on the consistency of two different frontier estimations. 
However, past literature failed to reconcile what constitutes the best method for frontier 
estimation, in particular between frontier and non-frontier methodology. Hence, consistency 
testing can be used to evaluate the impact of the regulatory efforts introduced. For this, 
Bauer et al. (1998) proposed a set of consistency tests for both parametric and non-
parametric measures (see chapter 2).
177
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 In addition, rather than performing one common frontier for all years, the efficiency frontiers for DEA are 
estimated based on the three different phases of FSMP (i.e. 2000–2003, 2003–2007 and 2008–2011). This 
method was introduced in the past literature (e.g. De Young and Hasan, 1998; Isik et al., 2004). Common 
frontier assumes similar technologies in all years, while clustering frontiers based on FSMP phases do not 
assume the same technology in different liberalisation phases. This reflects the series of liberalisation 
measures implemented by BNM, which may have significant impact on banking technology. Moreover, the 
differences between these two approaches (i.e. common frontier for all years and clustered frontiers based on 
FSMP phases) are not significant in terms of efficiency scores. 
177
 Although the consistency conditions were introduced to reconcile differences between these two 
approaches, nonetheless, Bauer et al. (1998) found that different approaches within the group of respective 
methods (i.e. SFA versus TFA or DEA versus DFH) could generate high consistency, but, for different 
approaches of different groups of methods (i.e. SFA versus DEA), the tests had exhibited low consistency. 
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6.5.1 Comparison of Efficiency Distributions 
Table 6.9 provides a number of important descriptive statistics stemming from the cost and 
profit efficiency scores of DEA, NDEA and SFA. Based on Table 6.9, the results indicate 
that the means of SFA and DEA are moderately close. For cost efficiency, in general, SFA 
and DEA models produce comparable means (between approximately 73.9% and 87.2%). 
However, the higher cost efficiency scores for DEA (87.2%) compared to SFA (76.5%) is 
unusual. It is unusual because DEA generally assumes that the deviation from the best 
practice is due to managerial inefficiency and does not consider random noise. Hence, DEA 
inefficiency models are expected to exhibit a higher level of inefficiency than SFA. 
Nevertheless, this finding is similar to Ferrier and Lovell (1990), who suggest that 
contradictory results can be explained from the ability of the DEA frontier to envelop the 
data more closely than the translog cost frontier. The evidence showing that DEA envelope 
data more closely than SFA can be observed from the standard deviation and kurtosis, 
which displays lower standard deviation and higher kurtosis of 0.11 and 6.66 for DEA CE, 
compared to 0.18 and 2.27 for SFA CE, respectively. On the other hand, NDEA CE (74.0%) 
scores are lower than DEA CE (87.2%), perhaps due to the impact of imperfect competition 
and regulatory changes, in which banks still have room to improve in terms of input prices 
(Tone, 2002). Nevertheless, the cost efficiency of all the models shows negative skewness, 
which indicates that the distribution of the cost efficiency scores is skewed to the left, with 
cost efficiency scores concentrated on the right of means, which is consistent to Bauer et al., 
(1998) and Delis et al., (2009).  
For profit efficiency, it is observed that DEA PE (76.8%) exhibit a greater mean compared 
to the SFA SPE (62.6%). Nonetheless, a higher mean is exhibited by SFA APE (93.3%) due 
to imperfect competition of the market, where larger banks exercised market power to 
maximise profits (Berger and Mester, 1997).
178
 The SFA APE also shows higher average 
profit efficiency scores compared to DEA PE and NDEA PE, which suggests that the DEA 
does not consider functional form for its estimation of inefficiency and results in lower 
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 Due to price interdependence of oligopoly market of Malaysian banking industry, the competitors had 
adjusted their pricing of inputs at a given level of outputs nearer to the best practice banks to maximise profits. 
Hence, the kurtosis (11.80) and standard deviation (0.09) of SFA APE exhibits a greater concentration of 
profit efficiency scores at the peak of the negatively skewed distribution. 
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kurtosis and standard deviation that is more sensitive to outliers. In addition, the NDEA PE 
(67.7%) is lower than DEA PE (76.8%), which suggests that inefficient banks that deviate 
from best practice have more opportunity to improve in terms of input and output prices 
(Tone, 2002). 
Table ‎6.9 Descriptive Statistics of Efficiency Scores of SFA, DEA and NDEA 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
SFA Cost Efficiency 0.7655 0.1834 0.0296 0.9787 -1.4647 2.2718 
DEA Cost Efficiency 0.8715 0.1130 0.2353 1.0000 -1.9435 6.6603 
NDEA Cost Efficiency  0.7396 0.2198 0.0277 1.0000 -0.6592 0.0730 
SFA Standard Profit Efficiency 0.6224 0.2646 0.0179 0.9513 -0.6148 -0.9044 
SFA Alternative Profit Efficiency 0.9334 0.0959 0.2756 0.9994 -3.0174 11.8003 
DEA Profit Efficiency 0.7683 0.2243 0.0171 1.0000 -1.3735 1.9732 
NDEA Profit Efficiency 0.6774 0.2983 0.0000 1.0000 -0.5869 -0.5359 
Notes: Skewness refers to the extent to which a distribution is not symmetrical. For a normal distribution, the 
sample skewness score is asymptotically distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of 6/n where n is the 
sample size. The standardised skewness score reported in the table is (sample skewness score x √ )/√ . 
Similarly, the standardised kurtosis score shown in the table is (sample skewness score x 3 x √ )/√  . 
6.5.2 Correlations of Efficiency Rankings 
The next test of consistency is the rank order correlations of the efficiency scores from both 
the SFA and DEA models. For this test, if different approaches show similar results in terms 
of the ranking of the banks, it could be easier for the regulator or policymakers in drawing 
conclusions based on the efficiency scores (Bauer et al., 1998). Although the distributional 
characteristics of the efficiency scores differ between different approaches, it is still possible 
that these methods produce similar rankings of banks in term of efficiency scores. In 
ranking the banks, the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient was used and the result 
derived from this statistical method is then tested for both SFA and DEA to measure the 
closeness of rankings among different models.
179
 For cost efficiency models (see Table 
6.10), the rank-order correlations between SFA CE and DEA CE, and NDEA CE are low at 
0.0027 and 0.0630, respectively. The above result was expected and could be explained by 
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 The Spearman rank-order correlation provides a measure of association between two or more variables 
based on the rank order. The rank-order correlation does not measure the linear association between variables 
(Anderson et al., 1987). 
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different techniques of estimations between SFA and DEA. On the other hand, the rank-
order correlation between DEA CE and NDEA CE is at 0.2688 and significant at 5% 
significance level. The higher rank-order correlation between DEA CE and NDEA CE was 
also expected, as many studies in the past have found that efficiency ranking tends to be 
correlated higher within the group of benchmarking techniques (e.g. Bauer et al, 1998; 
Huang and Wang, 2002).  
For the Profit Efficiency models, the rank-order correlation between SFA SPE and SFA 
APE is 0.70 and significant at 5% significance level. This may suggest that in most cases, 
SFA PE and SFA APE rank banks in the same order.
180
 For DEA models, the rank order 
correlation between DEA PE and NDEA PE is around 0.18 and significant at 5% 
significance level. The lower rank-order correlations may indicate that, although both the 
methods employ the same linear programming techniques, the differences in the treatment 
of inputs, outputs, and input prices and output prices may generate significantly different 
results, particularly when the market is imperfect (Tone, 2002). Between SFA and DEA 
profit efficiencies, the rank order correlations between SFA and DEA methods ranges 
between 0.24 and 0.28 and significant at 5% significance level. 
Table 6.10 indicates another view regarding the optimisation behaviour towards cost and 
profit discussed in Chapter 2. The low correlations between cost and profit efficiencies 
suggest that banks with high cost efficiency may not achieve the same for profits due to 
differences in behaviour and management approaches towards costs and profits. For 
example, the rank order correlation between SFA CE and SFA PE and SFA APE is at 
0.02484 and 0.0012 respectively, suggesting that a cost efficient bank may not be profit 
efficient. Delis (2009) and Berger and Mester (1997) argued that a cost efficient bank may 
not be profit efficient, because of the attitudes taken by the management towards cost and 
profit optimisation, in which banks may concentrate on either controlling cost or generating 
greater profits.  
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 These two models were performed using the same technique but having different variables. Moreover, 
many previous studies in the past found that the efficiency ranking tended to be highly correlated within the 
group of benchmarking techniques (e.g. Bauer et al., 1998 and Huang and Wang, 2002). 
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Table ‎6.10 Spearman Rank-Order Correlation between SFA, DEA and NDEA 
efficiency Scores 
 SFA CE DEA CE NDEA 
CE 
SFA 
SPE 
SFA 
APE 
DEA PE NDEA 
PE 
SFA CE 1.0000       
DEA CE 0.0027 1.0000      
NDEA CE 0.0630 0.2688* 1.0000     
SFA SPE 0.2484* 0.2721* 0.3572* 1.0000    
SFA APE 0.0012 0.2838* 0.2520* 0.6961* 1.0000   
DEA PE 0.0166 0.8470* 0.2679* 0.2787* 0.2396* 1.0000  
NDEA PE 0.0033 0.1271* 0.3955* 0.2419* 0.1838* 0.1867* 1.0000 
Notes: * Correlation coefficient statistically significantly different from zero at 5% significance level. 
SFA CE refers to stochastic frontier analysis cost efficiency, DEA CE refers to data envelopment cost 
efficiency and NDE CE refers to new data envelopment cost efficiency. SFA SPE refers to stochastic 
frontier analysis standard profit efficiency, SFA APE refers to stochastic frontier analysis alternative 
profit efficiency, DEA PE refers to data envelopment profit efficiency and NDE PE refers to new data 
envelopment profit efficiency. 
6.5.3 Identification of Best-Practice and Worst-Practice Banks 
Although the consistency in the rank-order correlation provides some information, 
additional methods for assessing cost efficiency may still be useful (e.g. for regulatory 
purposes). Thus, another consistency condition introduced by Bauer et al., (1998) is the 
consistency of best- and worst-efficiency banks’ groupings. For this test, banks’ efficiency 
scores are ranked and divided into four quartiles. The first- and fourth-quartile represent 
best- and worst-performing banks respectively. Banks in these quartiles are identified for 
different models (SFA, DEA and NDEA) and the overlapped banks are then proportioned in 
both the top 25% and the lowest 25% efficiency scores (Spong et al., 1995).  
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 display the corresponding best- and worst-performing banks of cost- 
and profit-efficiency respectively. The upper triangular matrix in both tables exhibit the 
proportion of overlapping banks for each pair of the frontier efficiency approaches of the 
top 25%. On the other hand, the lower triangular matrix shows the proportion of 
overlapping banks of pairs of different approaches of frontier efficiency of the 25% lowest 
efficiency banks. In general, the efficiency scores of overlapping banks’ ratios are better for 
the same family frontier efficiency techniques. For example, based on the 25% top 
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performers for SFA CE, 21.4% were identified as being in the top 25% of both DEA CE and 
NDEA CE. Similarly, of the banks identified in the 25% worst performers of SFA CE, 30.3% 
and 19.1% were also correspondingly identified as 25% worst practice banks for DEA CE 
and NDEA CE. For DEA CE and NDEA CE, the proportion of overlapping banks between 
best- and worst-practice banks is 42.7% and 21.4%, respectively.  
On the other hand, for profit efficiency, both SFA and DEA methods show higher 
proportion of overlapping banks within the same techniques (SFA SPE vs. SFA APE (i.e. 
best-practice (58.4%) and worst-practice (55.1%)), DEA PE vs. NDEA PE (i.e. best-practice 
(39.3%) and worst practice (43.8%)). However, lower proportions (ranging between 31.5% 
and 46.0%) are observed when cross techniques are paired (parametric vs. nonparametric).  
The results from this test could provide valuable insights for regulators when gauging their 
policy implications, particularly when identifying problematic banks (Bauer et al., 1997). 
From the test of identification of best- and worst-practice banks, the profit efficiency models 
are found to be more consistent in identifying best and worst practices, than cost efficiency 
models. Generally, this consistency test is able to moderately identify banks based on 
determined ‘best’ and ‘worst’ quartiles. In other words, regulatory policies targeted at 
efficient and/or inefficient banks may hit different targets, depending upon which frontier 
techniques are used to determine the policy. 
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Table ‎6.11 Correspondence of Best Practice and Worst Practice of Cost Efficiency 
across Techniques 
 SFA CE DEA CE NDEA CE 
SFA CE  0.2135 0.2135 
DEA CE 0.3034  0.4270 
NDEA CE 0.1910 0.2135  
Notes: The upper right triangle displays 25% of best-practice efficiency scores. The lower left triangle 
exhibits 25% of worst-practice efficiency scores. SFA CE refers to stochastic frontier analysis cost efficiency, 
DEA CE refers to data envelopment cost efficiency and NDE CE refers to new data envelopment cost 
efficiency. 
Table ‎6.12  Correspondence of Best Practice and Worst Practice of Profit Efficiency 
across Techniques 
 SFA SPE SFA APE DEA PE NDEA PE 
SFA SPE  0.5843 0.3146 0.3483 
SFA APE 0.5506  0.3483 0.3596 
DEA PE 0.4270 0.3708  0.3933 
NDEA PE 0.4607 0.3933 0.4382  
Notes: The upper right triangle displays 25% of best efficiency scores. The lower left triangle exhibits 25% of 
worst efficiency scores. SFA SPE refers to stochastic frontier analysis standard profit efficiency, SFA APE 
refers to stochastic frontier analysis alternative profit efficiency, DEA PE refers to data envelopment profit 
efficiency and NDE PE refers to new data envelopment profit efficiency. 
6.5.4 Stability of Efficiency Scores over Time 
Another consistency measure that is useful, from the regulatory perspective relates to 
stability over time. The stability over time measure enables policymakers to be informed 
regarding the reasonableness of the efficiency scores generated over a period of time, where 
the ranking of efficiency scores should not vary greatly from one year to the next.
181
 In 
order to test the stability of efficiency scores over time, the Spearman rank-order 
correlations were computed for each SFA and DEA efficiency models between each pair of 
years to examine the year-to-year stability of the efficiency measures over a period of time. 
For the full sample, there were 66 correlations of k-year-apart efficiencies, where k = 1, 2, 
3, …, 11, are computed in each case. The columns in Table 6.13 display the Spearman rank 
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 It is possible for some banks to experiencing improvements or deterioration in performance in following 
year. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that within a year an efficient bank will experience significant deterioration or 
improvement (Bauer et al., 1998). 
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order correlation coefficient for each pair k-year-apart which is used to examine the stability 
of efficiency scores over the period under study (2000–2011).  
From Table 6.13, it is observed that the average correlations of the efficiency scores are 
relatively less volatile for 1- and 2-years. This result suggests that a bank’s efficiency 
ranking does not show high volatility within a one- or two-year period. After this period (i.e. 
1-year and 2-year apart), most of the models exhibit a decline in the correlation coefficients 
as the number of years between the efficiency scores grows. At some point, several methods 
– such as, SFA CE, DEA CE, DEA PE and NDEA PE – display insignificant correlations 
between eight to 11 years apart, resulting in some of average correlations nearing to zero 
(e.g. DEA CE on 9-year and 10-year apart at 2.6% and 0.51%, respectively). Nevertheless, 
it could be noted that most of the models are relatively stable in the short term, but apart 
from SFA SPE, the efficiency scores exhibit greater instability over a longer period of time.  
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Table ‎6.13 Stability of Efficiency Scores – The Correlations of k-Year-Apart 
Efficiencies 
 
1-Year 
Apart 
2-Year 
Apart 
3-Year 
Apart 
4-Year 
Apart 
5-Year 
Apart 
6-Year 
Apart 
7-Year 
Apart 
8-Year 
Apart 
9-Year 
Apart 
10-
Year 
Apart 
11-
Year 
Apart 
SFA 
CE 0.6531* 0.5223* 0.4628* 0.3735* 0.3059* 0.2828 0.2334* 0.1891 0.1527 0.1557 -0.0316 
DEA 
CE 0.6320* 0.3955* 0.3740* 0.2646* 0.2124* 0.1907* 0.0870 -0.0475 0.0260 0.0051 -0.3096 
NDEA 
CE 0.4249* 0.2898* 0.1491* 0.1286 0.1651* 0.3179* 0.4112* 0.2921* 0.1725 0.2612 0.4132 
SFA 
SPE 0.8226* 0.9873* 0.8887* 0.8610* 0.8625* 0.8591* 0.7805* 0.7454* 0.6917* 0.6425* 0.6594* 
SFA 
APE 0.5628* 0.6941* 0.6856* 0.5749* 0.4597* 0.4062* 0.5173* 0.4466* 0.4507* 0.4333* 0.6586* 
DEA 
PE 0.4923* 0.4335* 0.3973* 0.2769* 0.1678* 0.1950* 0.1939* 0.1214 0.2138 0.1741 0.0838 
NDEA 
PE 0.3929* 0.3252* 0.3596* 0.3236* 0.4038* 0.2751* 0.2247* 0.2771* 0.1691 0.2313 0.3873 
Notes: Following Bauer et al. (1998) each cell represents mean of correlations of k-year-apart efficiencies for one single 
efficiency technique within 12-year time period, where for each k, figure reported in each cell is average of correlations between 
efficiencies. For example, for 4-year apart correlations, there are 8 different correlations to be averaged, that are 2000 with 2004, 
2001 with 2005, 2002 with 2006, …, 2007 with 2011. * denotes that all correlations in that were averaged in each cell of k-year-
apart were significant at 5% significance level. 
6.5.5 Efficiency and Accounting-based Performance Measures 
Regulators, bankers and financial analysts utilise non-frontier measures as part of 
evaluations and assessments on banks’ performances. Therefore, Bauer et al. (1998) state 
that, if the frontier efficiency scores are correlated with some standard financial ratio of 
performance, the policymakers could be more confident that the efficiencies are in line with 
accounting-based performance measures and not simply artificial measures derived from 
specific assumptions on which the efficiency measures are based. The final consistency test 
employed to examine the consistency conditions between SFA and DEA is by comparing 
the efficiency scores with financial performance indicators.  
As mentioned earlier, regulators, bank managers and analysts commonly draw on financial 
performance indicators for their decision-making (Fiorentino et al., 2006). These financial 
indicators are usually extracted from accounting information and are fairly standard. 
Therefore, this examination is expected to give confidence to policymakers in providing 
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industry conclusions (Bauer et al., 1998). Return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
total cost over total revenue ratio (TC/TR), cost-income-ratio (CIR) and staff expenditure 
over total asset ratio (S/TA) are widely used in evaluating firms’ performance. These 
financial performance indicators are normally used to compare firms with their peers or 
industry averages (Bauer et al., 1998). For this consistency testing, results from frontier 
efficiency and financial ratios are not expected to be perfectly correlated, because financial 
performance indicators do not take into account input prices or output mix in their 
assumptions (Bauer et al., 1998) (see Chapter 2). The first two ratios (i.e. ROA and ROE) 
are generally used to evaluate the profitability of banks; commonly, a higher value of these 
ratios indicates efficiency in utilising assets and equity. These two ratios are expected to 
exhibit a positive relationship with cost- and profit-efficiency. The second group of ratios 
relates to expenditure and measures costs according to total revenue and non-interest 
income plus net interest income. Lower ratios of TC/TR and CIR denote sound management 
of expenditure based on income received. Hence, these ratios are expected to be negatively 
correlated to cost- and profit-efficiency. Finally, the ratio of staff cost over total assets is 
used to assess manpower expenses, in which a small ratio suggests cost savings (Bauer et al., 
1998). 
Table 6.14 reports the correlations of cost efficiency of DEA and SFA models with the 
financial performance indicators selected for this consistency examination. From the results, 
the correlations between frontier efficiency estimates and financial indicators are relatively 
low. This finding is consistent with the findings of Bauer et al. (1998) and Fiorentino et al. 
(2006): the correlation is generally greater between cost efficiency scores and expenses 
related financial ratios (TC/TR and CIR) compared with the correlations of cost efficiency 
scores and profit related financial ratios (ROA and ROE). The direction is consistent for 
cost efficiency measures against financial ratios, except for S/TA. The relationship between 
cost efficiency scores and S/TA is positive, suggesting that greater expenses incurred on 
staff could generate higher cost efficiency scores.  
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Table ‎6.14 Correlations between Frontier Cost Efficiencies and Non-Frontier 
Performance Measures 
 SFA CE DEA CE NDEA CE 
ROA 0.0148 0.0868 0.2017* 
ROE 0.1068* 0.0839 0.2015* 
TC/TR -0.1620* -0.0856 -0.2725* 
CIR -0.2548* -0.0782 -0.1982* 
S/TA 0.0429 0.0652 0.0149 
Notes: * denotes the rank-order correlation is significant at 5% significance level. ROA refers to return on 
assets, ROE refers to return on equities, TC/TR refers to total cost over total revenue ratio, CIR refers to 
cost-to-income ratio and S/TA refers to staff expenses over total assets ratio. 
For profit efficiency scores, Table 6.15 shows the correlations between financial 
performance indicators and the frontier PE scores of SFA, DEA and NDEA models. Similar 
to the observation made to the cost efficiency consistency examination, the correlation of 
the profit efficiency is greater with the profit related financial ratios (ROA and ROE) when 
compared to expenses related financial ratios (CIR and TC/TR). The direction of the 
correlations between profit efficiency scores and financial performance measures is 
consistent, as expected. For example, the correlations of profit efficiency scores display 
positive correlations with profit related financial ratios (ROA and ROE) and negative 
correlations with expenditure related financial ratios (TC/TR and CIR). However, SFA 
model demonstrates a higher correlation compared to DEA models, indicating that taking 
the effect of heterogeneity (i.e. control and environmental variables) into the specification of 
profit efficiency produces greater consistency with financial performance indicators. 
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Table ‎6.15 Correlations between Frontier Profit Efficiencies and Non-Frontier 
Performance Measures 
 SFA SPE SFA APE DEA PE NDEA PE 
ROA 0.1476* 0.2545* 0.0822 0.2683* 
ROE 0.3969* 0.3286* 0.1588* 0.2107* 
TC/TR -0.0031 -0.0938 -0.0868 -0.2085* 
CIR -0.0210 -0.0450 -0.0872 -0.1733* 
S/TA 0.1502* 0.1707* -0.0212 -0.1092* 
Notes: * denotes the rank-order correlation is significant at 5% significance level. ROA refers to return on 
assets, ROE refers to return on equities, TC/TR refers to total cost over total revenue ratio, CIR refers to 
cost-to-income ratio and S/TA refers to staff expenses over total assets ratio. 
As a summary, despite low correlations between frontier efficiency scores and the 
accounting-based performance ratios, the direction of the relationship has been moderately 
consistent. Thus, the use of frontier efficiency and financial performance indicators gives 
some confidence that the frontier models are useful measures of actual accomplishment and 
not simply artificial products of the assumptions of the efficiency approach and can be of 
use for interested parties in making decisions (e.g. policymakers, bank managers and 
analysts).  
As mentioned previously, efficiency assessment is one of many important actions for 
financial regulators and management alike when making decisions. Great care must be taken 
when choosing an assessment technique(s) from parametric (i.e. SFA) and nonparametric 
(i.e. DEA and NDEA) frontier efficiency methods. In this section, two nonparametric DEA 
methods (i.e. DEA and NDEA) were employed for consistency testing with the preferred 
parametric SFA models (Resti, 1997). Following Bauer et al. (1998), a set of consistency 
tests were conducted to compare the outcome of different methods. Consistent with the 
previous empirical literature, in most cases, the findings indicate low to moderate 
consistency across different methods. The results generated from this examination were in 
accordance with Bauer et al. (1998) where not all consistency conditions were relatively 
high. The differences between efficiency scores generated from different methods can be 
explained mainly from the inherited advantages and disadvantages of the methodologies 
mentioned earlier. From the five consistency conditions, low consistencies are shown in 
rank-order correlations of different methods and identification of best- and worst-
performing banks (consistency condition test 2 and 3); and moderate consistencies in the 
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comparable means, stability over time and comparison against financial performance 
indicators (consistency condition test 1, 4 and 5). These results are similar to previous 
studies (Bauer et al., 1998). However, it is important for regulators and other interested 
parties to treat the results for Malaysian banks cautiously; they seem to be sensitive to 
methods selected for frontier estimation, in which the use of multiple frontier methods for 
consistency checking is recommended.  
6.6 Characteristics of Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks 
In this section, the characteristics and profile of the banks are analysed from several 
additional perspectives. The regulators may be interested in looking into the characteristics 
of banks in relation to the common rating system used by supervisory authorities. The 
CAMEL rating system is widely used by various financial supervisory authorities and was 
introduced by the Federal Reserve. There are many new bank rating systems such as, 
ARROWS (Advanced, Risk-Responsive Operating Framework), PAIRS and SOARS 
(Probability and Impact Rating System and Supervisory Oversight and Response System), 
RBSF (Risk-based Supervisory Framework), employed by respective banking regulators 
(e.g. the Financial Services Authority (UK), Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (Canada)). Despite various bank rating 
systems being introduced, the CAMEL rating system is still a useful indicator to understand 
the financial profiles of banks. Apart from banks’ rating systems, different perspectives such 
as, ownership structure, bank specialisation and size are also employed to analyse the 
efficiency of Malaysian banks.
182
  
6.6.1 The CAMEL Rating system 
This system is employed by many supervisory authorities around the world. CAMEL rating 
is based on five aspects that make up the acronym CAMEL. C stands for capital adequacy, 
                                                 
182
 In this section, the cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency were employed to analyse the differences 
in CAMEL ratings, ownership structure, bank specialisation and size. The use of alternative profit efficiency 
would be seen to best reflect the market structure of Malaysian banks and the effect of financial liberalisation 
over the period of 2000-2011. 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results: Analysis and Discussion 
 
312 
 
A denotes asset quality, M for management, E is for earnings and L is liquidity. Banks are 
rated by supervisors using the composite CAMEL from 1 to 5 where 1 is satisfactory and 5 
being unsatisfactory (DeYoung, 1998). CAMEL is employed as a decision-making tool by 
authorities to determine the level of supervision required on banks. BNM used to adopt 
CAMELS (where S represents sensitivity to interest rate), but changed to RBSF in 2006 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2006b). 
There are no standardised financial indicators employed for the specific aspects of acronyms 
(Gasbarro et al., 2002). Table 6.16 displays the common financial ratios that are utilised for 
CAMEL by supervisory authorities around the world. 
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Table ‎6.16 Descriptions of CAMEL Rating System 
Factors indicator Financial ratios Descriptions 
Capital 
adequacy 
Capital ratio   Capital / Loans Capital adequacy shows how much capital is used 
to finance loans and advances according the Basel 
accord but without the risk weights being 
assigned to loans. There is still argument at what 
is the optimal capital required but higher capital 
ratio denotes lower risk (Saurina. 2004). 
Asset Quality  Non-
Performing 
Loans (NPL)  
ratio  
Non-Performing 
Loans / Total  
loans 
Asset quality indicates the level of non-perfoming 
loans over total loans (Ansari, 2006). A higher 
NPL ratio reflects higher risk. 
Management Cost-to-
Income ratio 
(CIR) and  
TC/TR ratio 
Cost / Income 
and 
Total Cost/ Total 
Revenue Ratio 
This aspect of assessment usually involves 
qualitative examination relating to strategic and 
operational management of the banks. However, 
the nearest financial ratio being used to measure 
management effectiveness is the CIR and TC/TR 
ratio. A lower ratio denotes sound management of 
expenditure based on the income received. 
Earnings Return on 
Assets 
(ROA) and 
Return on 
Equity 
(ROE) 
Profit / Total 
Assets and  
Profit / Capital 
Widely used by various parties in assessing 
profitability of firms (Tian and Zeitun, 2007). A 
higher ratio indicates stronger earnings for banks 
and has lower risks. 
Liquidity Loans / 
Deposit 
(L/D) ratio 
and  Deposit 
mix  
Loans / Deposit 
And 
Customers’ 
deposits / Total 
Deposits and 
inter-bank 
deposits 
A highly important aspect of banks which was 
abundantly discussed during the global credit 
crisis and led to the introduction of Basel III. The 
L/D ratio indicates how much of deposits are used 
to finance loans. A lower L/D ratio implies higher 
liquidity. On the other hand, the deposit mix 
measures the level of dependence of banks on 
customer deposit rather than purchased funds. A 
higher deposit mix shows the ability of banks in 
relying on deposit rather than purchased funds 
and in return implies lower risk (Kashyap et al., 
2002) 
For the analysis of banks’ characteristics using the CAMEL ratings system, Spong et al. 
(1995)’s study is referred to and followed. Banks’ efficiency scores (both SFA cost- and 
profit-efficiency) are ranked and clustered into four quartiles. Similar to the Bauer et al. 
(1998) study, the first quartile represents the best performing banks, the fourth quartile the 
worst. Once these banks have been identified, they are then matched based on CAMEL’s 
ratings.  
Table 6.17 displays the result of the financial indicators profile of the most and least cost 
and profit efficient banks. First, the result on capital adequacy (C for capital adequacy) 
displays an average capital ratio of 10.4%.  Both cost and profit efficiencies show a higher 
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capital ratio for worst quartile efficiency scores, registering 12.1% and 10.9% respectively. 
On the other hand, the capital ratio for best-practice banks’ efficiency was low, at 9.4% and 
8.9% respectively. It is normally anticipated that low risk banks will exhibit a greater capital 
ratio. However, in the case of Malaysia, these worst-performing banks hold more capital 
than the best-performing banks. The worst-practice banks are deemed riskier and therefore 
hold higher capital to maintain the confidence of shareholders, investors and regulators. 
Also, the worst-practice banks are generally subjected to closer monitoring by the banking 
supervisors from BNM; and due to their risky profile these banks are normally instructed by 
regulators to hold larger amounts of capital to absorb future potential losses (Awdeh et al., 
2011).   
Second, for asset quality (A for asset quality), mixed findings are observed for cost- and 
profit-efficiency. The worst-practice banks for cost efficiency exhibit a lower NPL ratio 
(6.4%) compared to the best (8.9%). The higher asset quality (i.e. lower NPL ratio) achieved 
by the former group is at the expense of higher operation costs, as exhibited by higher CIR 
(86.3%) and TC/TR (80.9%). On the other hand, the profit efficiency results are consistent 
with the asset quality; where the worst practice banks show higher NPL than the best 
practice banks.  
Third, the management related financial ratios show consistent results regarding best and 
worst performance efficiency scores. The best efficiency score banks exhibit low CIR and 
TC/TR for both cost and profit efficiencies.   
Fourth, based on the ROA and ROE (for E, earnings) of cost and profit efficiency scores, 
the worst-practice banks exhibited lower ROA (1.0%) and ROE (9.4%) than best-practice 
banks. This suggests that best-practice banks generate higher-than-average profits. 
Additionally, the earning assets for worst-practice banks for the profit efficiency model 
exhibit higher ratio than best-practice banks at 74.2% and 73.0% respectively.  
Fifth, in terms of liquidity (L for liquidity), worst-practice banks are more liquid than the 
best-practice banks. In other words, the worst-practice banks exhibit lower L/D ratio (i.e. 
higher liquidity) than best-practice banks and are affected with higher expenditure to 
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manage the excess liquidity, as shown by CIR and TC/TR. At the same time; worst-practice 
banks rely fairly highly on interbank deposits (purchased deposits) which may be more 
expensive than retail and wholesale deposits and can affect their overall returns (e.g. ROA 
and ROE). 
In general, from Table 6.17, the best-practice banks for cost- and profit-efficiency exhibit a 
lower level of capital ratio, marginally higher NPL (for cost efficiency only), lower 
operating costs, higher earnings and lower level of liquidity but with more deposits from 
customers. On the other hand, the worst-practice banks are characterised by a higher level of 
capital adequacy, lower NPL (i.e. higher level of asset quality but only for cost efficiency), 
higher operating costs, higher liquidity (i.e. lower L/D ratio), a lower level of earnings and 
more reliance on purchased funds from the interbank market. The result of this analysis may 
imply that BNM could adopt efficiency frontier analysis and compare best- and worst-
practice banks as a tool that supports their decision for the bank rating system.
183
 
 
 
                                                 
183
 A t-test is conducted to examine the differences between the best practice and worst practice banks based 
on CAMEL indicators. From the p-values, significant differences are found in capital ratio, CIR, TC/TR, ROA, 
ROE, L/D ratio and deposit mix. On the other hand there are no statistical differences found in NPL ratio and 
earnings assets. 
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Table ‎6.17 CAMEL indicators for Best and Worst Practice Banks 
 Cost Profit  
 
Best- 
Practice 
Banks 
Worst- 
Practice 
Banks 
Best- 
Practice 
Banks 
Worst- 
Practice 
Banks Average 
Capital Adequacy      
Capital Ratio
1 
9.41% 12.14% 8.87% 10.87% 10.42% 
Asset Quality      
NPL Ratio
2 
8.92% 6.40% 6.14% 6.94% 7.79% 
Management      
CIR
3 
78.99% 86.35% 79.98% 84.97% 80.92% 
TC/TR
4 
64.82% 80.88% 68.25% 75.69% 69.85% 
Earnings      
ROA
5 
1.29% 1.05% 1.39% 0.88% 1.22% 
ROE
6 
14.95% 9.44% 17.46% 8.57% 13.30% 
Earnings Assets
7 
73.05% 73.13% 73.02% 74.21% 73.50% 
Liquidity      
L/D Ratio
8 
68.75% 57.07% 68.30% 59.07% 64.73% 
Deposit Mix
9 
89.30% 84.44% 90.36% 86.99% 87.37% 
Notes: (1) Equity to total assets (2) Non-performing loans to total loans (3) Non-interest expenses/ (non-
interest income + net interest income) (4) Total cost over total revenue (5) Net profit to total assets (6) 
Net profit to total equity (7) Loans + investment + other earnings assets to total assets (8) Loans to 
deposits (9) Customers’ deposits to total deposits. 
6.6.2 Ownership Structure 
Following the analysis of the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ profiles of bank efficiency, this section 
provides the information regarding the differences between foreign and domestic bank 
structures that is useful to regulators and analysts (Spong et al., 1995). This analysis is often 
important in assessing the impact of foreign ownership on banking efficiency, particularly in 
developing countries that are opening up their banking industry to foreign penetration and 
competition (Kasman and Yildrim, 2006). 
Claessens et al. (2001) and Kasman and Yildrim (2006) state that the involvement of foreign 
banks within a country can improve the overall operation of the financial services sector 
through increased competition. At the same time, efficiency can also be improved by 
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stimulating domestic banks to reduce cost, improve technology, increase efficiency and 
intensify diversity (Lensink and Hermes, 2004; Suffian and Habibullah, 2010). The 
participation of foreign banks could also pressure domestic banks to improve quality to 
retain their market share. The presence of foreign banks also provides spill over effects, 
such as the introduction of new financial services, improved bank regulation,
184
 reduced 
government directed lending and an increased quality of human capital (Lansink and 
Hermes, 2004; Isik and Hassan, 2003 ).
185
   
From the earlier discussion (see Section 6.3) and hypothesis 2, foreign banks’ impact is 
positive (1.09) and significant at 1% significance level, implying that foreign banks are less 
cost efficient when compared to domestic banks. Figure 6.6 and Table 6.18 exhibit the 
average cost efficiency scores for both domestic and foreign banks between 2000 and 2011. 
It was observed that the domestic banks are more cost efficient compared to the foreign 
banks, registering average cost efficiency scores of 0.83 and 0.69 respectively. This 
surprising result is different from other studies relating to ownership in 
developing/transition countries (see Batthacharya, Lovell and Sahay, 1997; Hassan and 
Marton, 2003; Isik and Hassan, 2002; Harvylchyk, 2006; Kasman and Yildrim, 2006; 
Matthews and Ismail, 2006). Nevertheless, Mohd Tahir, Abu Bakar and Haron (2008), 
Lensik et al. (2008) and Sufian and Habibullah (2010) also found that domestic banks are 
more cost efficient than foreign banks in developing countries.
186
  
                                                 
184
 The involvement of foreign banks can also lead to better regulation due to the demand for an improved 
regulatory framework from both banks and regulator of home country. 
185
 The foreign banks were always believed to bring in knowledge, technology and greater competition into the 
local banking market (Kasman and Yildrim, 2006). It is also found that the presence of foreign banks can 
result in cost cutting interest, improves efficiency and increase diversity of products and services (Sufian and 
Habibullah, 2010). They were deemed to have different operating strategies, organisation structures, regulatory 
requirements and support from home government (Isik and Hassan, 2003). 
186
 The impact of foreign banks’ entry into a country has been well documented in past literatures, but the 
empirical findings have been inconclusive (Sensarma, 2006; Sufian, 2010). In most developing or transition 
countries, it was noted that the foreign banks are more efficient than the foreign banks (Batthacharya, Lovell 
and Sahay, 1997; Hassan and Marton, 2003). For developing countries, it was observed that domestic banks 
were better than the foreign banks (Mohd Tahir, Abu Bakar and Haron, 2008). Similarly, for developed 
countries like the United States, most studies found that the domestic banks were more efficient than their 
foreign counterparts (De Young and Noelle, 1996; Hasan and Hunter, 1996). Nonetheless, there were also 
studies in developed countries other than the US that found that foreign banks are nearly as efficient as 
domestic banks (Vennet, 1996; Hasan and Lozano-Vivas, 1998). 
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These findings however are supported by Berger et al.’s (2000) hypothesis regarding the 
home field advantage. Foreign banks in this hypothesis are described as having higher costs 
and lower revenues while providing the same financial services. Foreign banks also faced 
the ‘institutional distance’ effect, where the distance between the home and host country can 
cause informational, agency and enforcement cost for foreign banks (Mian, 2006). From a 
different perspective, domestic banks have the advantages of operating in their own home, 
are supported by better information regarding the country’s economy, language, laws, 
politics and different treatment from the regulators (Hymer, 1976). Lensink and Hermes 
(2004) state that the banking industry of developing countries normally has a lower level of 
economic development, which can result in higher operating costs for foreign banks. The 
competitive environment of developing nations is also normally low and dominant domestic 
banks may exercise market power to maximise profit (Lensink and Hermes, 2004; Sturm 
and Williams, 2004). Moreover, developing countries may also implement a defensive 
strategy by creating bigger domestic banks through mergers and acquisitions, creating an 
implicit barrier to entry for foreign banks (Sturm and Williams, 2004). The concentration of 
domestic banks that enjoy economies of scale can also increase the operational cost for 
foreign banks (Williams, 2003). In addition, regulators may also establish policies to inhibit 
the development of foreign banks, such as limiting the branches expansion and prohibiting 
in involving in certain financial services (Williams, 2003).  
In the case of Malaysia, the foreign banks’ cost efficiency was lower than the domestic 
banks due to the gradual liberalisation initiatives implemented via the FSMP. This was seen 
in the first phase of the FSMP, where the focus was on building the capacity of domestic 
institutions and strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework (Bank Negara 
Malaysia, 2001b). During this first phase, Malaysian domestic banks underwent a 
consolidation exercise. A fragmented banking industry was turned into a more concentrated 
banking market and consequently, banks with higher market share enjoyed greater 
competitive advantages during the second- and third-phase of the FSMP. Hence, this 
resulted in higher (cost) disadvantages for foreign banks. This can also be evidenced from 
the discussion in Chapter 4 where BNM delayed the implementation of internet banking for 
foreign banks while allowing domestic banks to proceed. At the same time, the expansion of 
branches for foreign banks was also controlled, requiring approval from BNM. Another 
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point to note is that foreign banks in Malaysia originate from both developed and 
developing nations; therefore, the subset of foreign banks from less developed countries 
may influence the negative net impact on cost efficiency in foreign banks.  
Additionally, for cost efficiency, foreign banks faced higher input prices compared to the 
domestic banks in producing outputs, which resulted in lower cost efficiency compared to 
domestic banks, particularly during the economic downturn in the third phase of the FSMP 
(between 2008 to 2011). This is due to foreign banks having to incur higher costs of funds 
from the interbank market, whereas cheaper consumer deposits were a better source for 
domestic banks. Furthermore, the de-novo foreign banks introduced during the second phase 
of the FSMP may have faced higher input prices from operating and establishment costs.  
Figure ‎6.6 Cost Efficiency Scores of Domestic and Foreign Banks, 2000–2011 
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Table ‎6.18  Cost Efficiency Scores of Domestic and Foreign Banks, 2000–2011  
Year 
Cost Efficiency  – 
Domestic Banks 
Cost Efficiency – 
Foreign Banks 
2000 0.9213 0.8307 
2001 0.9088 0.8140 
2002 0.9011 0.8035 
2003 0.8625 0.7580 
2004 0.8398 0.6855 
2005 0.8404 0.7421 
2006 0.8066 0.6692 
2007 0.8222 0.6951 
2008 0.8031 0.6165 
2009 0.7539 0.6481 
2010 0.7805 0.6282 
2011 0.8208 0.6202 
2000–2003 0.8986 0.8018 
2004–2007 0.8256 0.6979 
2008–2011 0.7885 0.6283 
2000–2011 0.8305 0.6984 
Different results however are observed for profit efficiency. Despite their lower cost 
efficiency, the profit efficiency of foreign banks are only very marginally higher than the 
domestic banks. Table 6.19 shows that the average profit efficiency for Malaysian banks 
between 2000 and 2011 was around 0.93. Whereas, the average profit efficiency for foreign 
banks was only slightly higher than domestic banks at 0.9345 and 0.9323 respectively. As 
shown earlier, based on hypothesis 2 and with reference to Table 6.3, there are no 
statistically significant differences between foreign and domestic banks (based on the t-
value of the dummy variables assigned to foreign banks, which were negative and 
insignificant). This finding would questions the previous findings that the foreign banks 
normally have greater banking knowledge, better operating strategies, strong support from 
the home country’s headquarters, technology and greater competition (Kasman and Yildrim, 
2006; Isik and Hassan, 2003).  
Foreign banks in Malaysia practiced ‘cherry-picking’ behaviour by choosing quality 
customers with niche banking activities that could give higher profits, rather than the ‘mass’ 
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banking activities of the domestic banks (Hassan, 2002). They also have not been strong in 
supporting the government’s priority lending sectors – such as, housing loans for low cost 
housing – in which payment arrears has been high (Isik and Hassan, 2002). Additionally, 
whilst domestic banks were busy building their capacity during the first phase of the FSMP, 
the foreign banks had started to rely on the Central Credit Reference Information System 
(CCRIS) database and used their own credit scoring system in granting loans to customers. 
The use of credit scoring by the foreign banks generally improved their credit portfolio by 
reducing loan delinquency, and at the same time maximising retention of customers by 
cross-selling their products or granting higher credit limits (see Hamilton and Howcroft, 
1995; Capon, 1982). Foreign banks also relied on this risk management tool as a basis for 
pricing their loans
187
 according to borrowers’ risks, when BNM first deregulated the interest 
rate in 2004 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2004)).  
Figure 6.7 displays the trend for the profit efficiency for domestic and foreign banks during 
the years 2000 to 2011. Based on the trends, the domestic and foreign banks demonstrated 
similar directions. There was a decline in profit efficiency for foreign banks in the third 
phase of the FSMP (2008–2011) , suggesting that the foreign banks were more cautious in 
lending when faced with higher costs from inter-bank lending during the global credit crisis 
(foreign banks have greater purchased funds compared to customers’ deposits for their 
source of funds). The foreign banks in Malaysia were also susceptible to the international 
transmission channel, particularly when liquidity was tight in the home country (the effect 
of the global credit crisis) and their headquarters had to pull back liquidity from overseas 
branches, which created shocks in host countries (De Haas and Van Lelyveid, 2006; Kohn, 
2008; Ceterolli and Goldberg, 2010;).   
                                                 
187
 Bochlinger and Leippold (2006) asserted that credit scoring can be used for loan pricing just as much on 
how it detect bad obligor during the application stage. 
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Figure ‎6.7  Profit Efficiency Scores of Domestic and Foreign Banks, 2000–2011  
 
Table ‎6.19  Profit Efficiency Scores of Domestic and Foreign Banks, 2000–2011  
 
Profit Efficiency – 
Domestic Banks 
Profit Efficiency –  
Foreign Banks 
2000 0.9094 0.9045 
2001 0.9282 0.9131 
2002 0.9347 0.9416 
2003 0.9616 0.9635 
2004 0.9379 0.9311 
2005 0.9569 0.9612 
2006 0.9535 0.9843 
2007 0.9793 0.9900 
2008 0.8965 0.9017 
2009 0.9371 0.9478 
2010 0.9597 0.9615 
2011 0.8419 0.8423 
2000–2003 0.9334 0.9303 
2004–2007 0.9586 0.9671 
2008–2011 0.9317 0.9133 
2000–2011 0.9323 0.9345 
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6.6.3 Bank Specialisation 
There are two types of banks analysed in this study: conventional and Islamic. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the investment banks were removed from this research due to 
significant differences in business operations and structures, and financial services offered 
to customers. Analysis by bank specialisation is necessary to provide policy feedbacks to 
the regulator. Theoretically, Islamic banking differs significantly to conventional 
banking.
188
 However, in practice, the Islamic banks have been actively imitating their 
conventional counterparts while still following shariah principles. That is, products 
developed by Islamic banks resemble those in conventional banks (Beck, Kunt and 
Merrouche, 2012, Chong and Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010). Figure 6.8 and Table 6.20 report the 
cost efficiency scores for both conventional and Islamic banks for the years 2000 to 2011. 
The average cost efficiency scores for conventional banks is marginally higher than Islamic 
banks at 0.77 and 0.75, respectively. The trend was consistent with the bank type control 
variable which recorded a positive coefficient and significant at 10% level. This finding was 
also consistent with Saaid et al. (2003), Kamarudin, Safa and Mohamad (2008), Mokhtar, 
Abdullah and AlHabshi (2006), Batchelor and Wadud (2003), Srairi (2010) and Hassan 
(2005), who reported that Islamic banks had lower cost efficiency compared to conventional 
banks.  
Based on the trends of cost efficiency of both types of bank, Islamic banks were more 
efficient in the first phase of the FSMP and declined as the timeline moved into the second 
and third phases of the FSMP. The greater efficiency during the first phase of the FSMP was 
due to higher market power in relation to Islamic financial products. During this period, 
there were only two Islamic full-fledged banks, which demonstrated their strength by 
exercising market power. They further demonstrated lower cost efficiency compared to 
conventional banks at the end of the second phase of the FSMP, with the introduction of 
new foreign full-fledged Islamic banks. The lower average cost efficiency scores for Islamic 
banks were influenced by higher costs incurred by these de-novo banks (new foreign 
                                                 
188
 In Islamic banking, the banks do not practice interest on financing (riba), require goods and services as 
underlying transactions, avoid speculation and prohibit financing illicit activities (Beck, Kunt and Merrouche, 
2012). 
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Islamic banks) coupled with intense competition in the Malaysian banking scenario. In the 
case of Malaysia, Islamic banks face higher prices of funds and labour. These greater input 
prices for Islamic banks can be explained by the complex structure of Islamic products 
(following shariah principles) which can lead to a higher cost of funds. Islamic banks also 
require a more specialised workforce, which contributes to a greater cost of labour (Archer 
and Abdel Karim, 2002; Kamarudin, Safa and Mohamad, 2008). Additionally, with the 
nascent stage of implementation of Islamic banks compared to conventional banks, the 
regulations to support Islamic banks in Malaysia was also at its infancy stage, which could 
also result in a playing field that is not levelled between Islamic and conventional banks 
(Mokhtar, Abdullah and AlHabsi, 2006; Hassan, 2005).
189
  
Nevertheless, the difference in the average cost efficiency scores was small; at some point, 
Islamic banks achieved higher cost efficiency than conventional banks. For example, during 
the second phase of the FSMP (2004-2007), new foreign Islamic banks and Islamic bank 
subsidiaries were introduced in 2005–06. With this measure, Islamic banking assets and 
liabilities, via Islamic banking scheme (IBS) in the conventional banks, were separated. 
Despite being separated into different entities, these Islamic bank subsidiaries enjoyed 
savings from cost-sharing activities with their more established parent banks, and therefore 
experienced lower operational costs.  
                                                 
189
 This is consistent with Srairi (2010), who mentions that, due to their nascent age, Islamic banks did not 
have the economies of scale of the conventional banks, and were not ready to compete in the banking industry. 
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Figure ‎6.8  Cost Efficiency Scores for Conventional and Islamic Banks, 2000–2011  
 
Table ‎6.20  Cost Efficiency Scores for Conventional and Islamic Banks, 2000–2011  
Year 
Cost Efficiency – 
Conventional Banks 
Cost Efficiency – 
Islamic Banks 
2000 0.8672 0.9720 
2001 0.8525 0.9674 
2002 0.8421 0.9642 
2003 0.8085 0.8296 
2004 0.7531 0.8338 
2005 0.7873 0.8215 
2006 0.7404 0.7596 
2007 0.7503 0.8002 
2008 0.6974 0.7292 
2009 0.7047 0.6992 
2010 0.7073 0.7052 
2011 0.7055 0.7339 
2000–2003 0.8428 0.9333 
2004–2007 0.7581 0.7929 
2008–2011 0.7037 0.7166 
2000–2011 0.7692 0.7545 
With regards to profit efficiency, Figure 6.9 and Table 6.21 exhibit the profit efficiency for 
Islamic and conventional banks from 2000 to 2011. From Table 6.21, the average profit 
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efficiency of Islamic banks is lower than conventional banks at 0.83 and 0.96 respectively. 
The result is consistent with Hassan (2005) and Srairi (2010), who reported that Islamic 
banks are less profit efficient compared to conventional banks, due to size, under-developed 
Islamic banking regulation and overutilization of inputs in producing a given level of 
outputs (Srairi, 2010; Archer and Abdul Karem, 2002; Mokhtar et al., 2006). For example, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, the Islamic banks were smaller in size and unable to compete 
with larger conventional banks. The Islamic banks also demonstrated higher input prices, 
with lower outputs and lower average ROA and ROE compared to conventional banks. This 
may suggest that Islamic banks have difficulty sourcing cheaper funds from customers’ 
deposits and interbank funds, due to their adherence to strict shariah principles, as well as 
producing income from financing (loans) which could also be set off against various 
transaction costs, such as ‘buying and selling’ documentations while approving financing to 
customers (Mokhtar et al., 2006). 
Figure ‎6.9  Profit Efficiency Scores for Conventional and Islamic Banks, 2000–2011  
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Table ‎6.21 Profit Efficiency Scores for Conventional and Islamic Banks, 2000–2011  
Year 
Profit Efficiency – 
Conventional Banks 
Profit Efficiency – 
Islamic Banks 
2000 0.9291 0.6625 
2001 0.9376 0.7170 
2002 0.9576 0.7240 
2003 0.9740 0.8372 
2004 0.9511 0.7418 
2005 0.9730 0.8514 
2006 0.9890 0.8991 
2007 0.9946 0.9586 
2008 0.9733 0.7825 
2009 0.9835 0.8819 
2010 0.9892 0.9185 
2011 0.9563 0.6900 
2000–2003 0.9493 0.7352 
2004–2007 0.9766 0.9028 
2008–2011 0.9760 0.8188 
2000–2011 0.9672 0.8313 
6.6.4 Bank Size 
From previous literature regarding banking efficiency, larger banks generally have a number 
of advantages compared to smaller banks. The analysis on the relationship between size and 
bank efficiency provides imperative information for policymakers, as well as bank 
managers, to evaluate the optimal scale required for the operation of the banks. The larger 
banks normally have several advantages over smaller banks; such as, product diversity, 
larger outreach networks, greater technology, superior managerial performance, better cost 
control, higher profitability and greater economies of scale and scope (i.e. from both growth 
and joint production) (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991; Casu and Girardone, 2002; Tsionas et 
al., 2003). Nevertheless, the larger banks are complex to manage and can result in lower 
efficiency (Delis and Papanikalou, 2009). 
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Table 6.22 reports the cost efficiency scores of Malaysian banks according to different bank 
sizes
190
 and indicates that the largest bank group (more than MYR 160.0 billion asset size) 
has the highest cost efficiency compared to smaller banks (e.g. banks with less than MYR 
40.0 billion of asset). However, smaller banks, with asset size in the region of MYR20.0 
billion to MYR39.9 billion, show higher average cost efficiency than of those between 
MYR40.0 billion to MYR80.0 billion. In the Malaysian banking industry, this may indicate 
that smaller banks could also be more cost efficient than large banks. This can also be 
evidenced from the coefficient of bank size (  ) in Table 6.1, which is positive at 2.45 and 
significant at 1% significance level. According to Akhigbe and McNulty (2003), in 
situations where the banking industry faces financial liberalisation, large banks were found 
to be less efficient than small banks. This could be attributed to large banks being required 
to invest in major restructuring and cost-cutting initiatives more than small banks. During 
the first phase of the FSMP (2000–2003), the domestic banks faced a consolidation exercise 
in which the new larger entities incurred greater costs compared to the smaller banks (see 
Chapter 4) (Suffian, 2004; Bonin et al., 2005). These new consolidated banks were publicly 
traded; and with diverse ownership come greater agency costs, which could lead to lower 
cost efficiency scores (Kwan, 2006).  
Moreover, large banks normally have considerable market power, in which Berger and 
Hannan (1998) state that there are several reasons that can justify why larger banks 
demonstrate lower cost efficiency. First, banks could charge higher prices in excess of 
competitive level where managers do not have incentives to work as hard to keep costs 
under control and enjoy the ‘quiet life’. Second, with greater market power, managers are 
allowed to pursue objectives other than profit maximisation. Third, managers may devote 
resources to maintaining market power, which raises costs, which subsequently reduces cost 
efficiency (Berger and Hannan, 1998) (see also Chapter 2). 
 
 
                                                 
190
 In order to further investigate the relationship between cost- and profit-efficiency and bank size, banks are 
sub-divided into five classifications in terms of their total asset size. 
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Table ‎6.22  Cost Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks According to Asset Size, 2000-
2011 
 
Table 6.23 displays the profit efficiency of Malaysian banks according to asset size. With 
regards to profit efficiency, large banks are found to be more profit efficient than small 
banks. This is in line with the negative coefficients (-9.9) for variable asset size (  ) shown 
in Table 6.3. Larger banks generally demonstrate higher profit efficiency due to superior 
managerial performance, higher profitability, and greater market power from economies of 
scale and/or scope (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991; Casu and Girardone, 2002; Tsionas et al., 
2003).  
Large banks generally possess sizeable market power, which allows them to enjoy greater 
profits, creating an incentive for them to behave prudently. As a result, this behaviour could 
lead to banks engaging in less risky activities with lower monitoring and operating costs 
(Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991). Furthermore, banks with market power face less pressure to 
increase the quality of banking services, which consequently reduces their operating costs 
with increasing profits (Berger, 2003). Large banks also use more efficient technology and 
Year 
1.0-19.9 
MYR 
Billions 
20.0-39.9 
MYR 
Billions 
40.0-79.9 
MYR  
Billions 
80.0-159.9 
MYR  
Billions 
>160.0   
MYR  
Billions 
Average 
Cost 
Efficiency  
2000 0.8518 0.9385 0.9434 0.9013  0.8760 
2001 0.8297 0.8826 0.9611 0.9425  0.8614 
2002 0.7836 0.9258 0.9315 0.8515  0.8523 
2003 0.7284 0.8657 0.9186 0.8873  0.8103 
2004 0.6414 0.8557 0.8942 0.9021  0.7596 
2005 0.7165 0.8546 0.8643 0.8452  0.7913 
2006 0.7057 0.7207 0.8117 0.8602 0.8692 0.7450 
2007 0.7393 0.7963 0.7268 0.8360 0.9324 0.7648 
2008 0.6867 0.7431 0.6771 0.8143 0.8950 0.7098 
2009 0.6920 0.7168 0.6877 0.7742 0.7587 0.7025 
2010 0.6678 0.7628 0.7112 0.8024 0.8112 0.7065 
2011 0.6536 0.7398 0.7759 0.7200 0.9058 0.7177 
Average 0.7228 0.8260 0.7811 0.8305 0.8651 0.7655 
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employ specialised staff for specialised functions to increase operational efficiency 
(Molyneux and Iqbal, 2005). Greater technology changes, such as advances in information-
processing technology, could help improve the profit efficiency of large banks. With 
technology, larger banks could also enhance their monitoring of deposit and loan accounts, 
obtain ‘hard’ information about potential customers and improve the management of large 
branch networks that could increase their level of profit efficiency (Petersen and Rajan, 
1995; Berger, 2003; Gilbert and Wheelock, 2013).  
Table ‎6.23 Profit Efficiency Scores of Malaysian Banks According to Asset Size, 2000-
2011 
Year 
1.0-19.9 
MYR 
Billions 
20.0-39.9 
MYR 
Billions 
40.0-79.9 
MYR  
Billions 
80.0-159.9 
MYR  
Billions 
>160.0   
MYR  
Billions 
Average 
Profit 
Efficiency  
2000 0.8839 0.9599 0.9814 0.9882  0.9069 
2001 0.8874 0.9691 0.9779 0.9894  0.9206 
2002 0.8974 0.9753 0.9839 0.9923  0.9381 
2003 0.9331 0.9853 0.9916 0.9956  0.9626 
2004 0.8875 0.9738 0.9851 0.9875  0.9344 
2005 0.9247 0.9867 0.9900 0.9939  0.9590 
2006 0.9413 0.9941 0.9943 0.9974 0.9983 0.9673 
2007 0.9722 0.9945 0.9975 0.9987 0.9988 0.9841 
2008 0.8391 0.9676 0.9859 0.9932 0.9939 0.8991 
2009 0.9091 0.9535 0.9915 0.9958 0.9964 0.9423 
2010 0.9377 0.9721 0.9947 0.9972 0.9980 0.9605 
2011 0.7489 0.8477 0.9412 0.9825 0.9897 0.8421 
Average 0.8941 0.9686 0.9838 0.9926 0.9951 0.9334 
6.7 Scale Economies and Technological Change 
6.7.1 Scale Economies 
Economies of scale are closely related to banks’ optimal behaviour to select the output 
levels corresponding to the minimum cost of a unit of output. The economies of scale of an 
industry may also have regulatory implications, particularly regarding banks’ mergers and 
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acquisitions, and antitrust enforcement. Chapter 5 discussed measurements of scale, 
stipulating that the measurement of economies of scale (SE) is computed by cost elasticity 
by differentiating the cost function with respect to outputs. The level of scale economies 
from the estimated stochastic frontier indicates whether a bank that had minimised cost of 
producing outputs could lower its costs by producing an alternative level of outputs (Mester, 
1996). That is, the measurement of SE can be measured by the partial derivative of the 
estimated cost function, with respect to the outputs as follows: 
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(5.15) 
where SE is scale economies,       is the log of total cost and       is the log of outputs. 
The measurement of SE refers to the value of point estimates of the scale elasticites, which 
are estimated using the average value of outputs, input prices and control variables such as 
capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity and time, together with the coefficient of the 
estimated parameters from the preferred cost function (Mester, 1996; Altunbas et al., 2001). 
From this estimation, a scale efficient bank will generate constant returns to scale (SE=1). 
On the other hand, banks are considered scale inefficient if they are operating at increasing 
or decreasing returns to scale (SE<1 or SE>1). 
Table 6.24 suggests that the average scale economies between 2000 and 2011 are about 
10.3%. This is shown by the overall average scale economies estimates for Malaysian banks 
(2000–2011) that is less than 1 (i.e. 0.89), which suggests that economies of scale were 
present in the Malaysian banking industry. These economies of scale are more common for 
the banks with asset size of less than MYR40.0 billion, which ranges from 1.0% to 37.1%. 
This shows that an increase of 100% of outputs could result in total increase in cost between 
62.9% and 99.0%, implying that small banks can potentially save operating costs by 
extending their production scale. That is, an equal proportionate rise in all outputs leads to a 
less than proportionate rise in total costs. For large category banks (banks with assets over 
MYR 80.0 billion), the values of scale economies are more than one. These large banks face 
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diseconomies of scale ranging from 1.0% to 30.6%. Hence, an increase of 100% in the level 
of outputs could increase the total costs by 101.0% to 130.6%, respectively. This result 
suggests that big banks experience diseconomies of scale and could reduce their average 
cost and gain efficiency by decreasing their scale of operations. The scale economies for 
banks with assets of MYR 20.0 billion and 80.0 billion are close to one, which implies that 
the optimal bank size is in the range of MYR 20.0 billion to MYR 80.0 billion as they 
exhibit constant return to scale. Generally, table 6.24 shows that, as the asset size increases 
the returns of scale demonstrate a pattern from increasing, to constant and to decreasing, in 
which the average cost curve displays a U-shape, with medium-sized banks being more 
scale efficient than very small or very large banks. This finding regarding Malaysian banks 
is consistent with previous studies performed by Altunbas et al. (2000) and Altunbas et al. 
(2001) on Japanese and European banking system. 
Table ‎6.24 Scale Economies for Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
Year 
1.0–19.9 
MYR 
Billion 
20.0–39.9 
MYR 
Billion 
40.0–79.9 
MYR  
Billion 
80.0–159.9 
MYR  
Billion 
>160.0   
MYR  
Billion Average 
2000 0.8600* 0.9457* 1.1875 1.2854  0.9193 
2001 0.8687* 0.9830* 1.1191* 1.5457  0.9500 
2002 0.7875* 1.0542* 1.1420* 1.2394*  0.9395 
2003 0.6864* 0.9897* 1.0880* 1.2096*  0.8722 
2004 0.6774* 1.0718* 1.0561* 1.3074*  0.9001 
2005 0.6296* 1.1145* 1.1316* 1.3260*  0.9090 
2006 0.6386* 1.1327* 1.0705* 1.2697* 1.3854 0.8915 
2007 0.6660* 1.0639* 0.9602* 1.0053* 1.1818* 0.8423 
2008 0.8108* 0.9858* 0.9963* 1.1476* 1.0747* 0.8997 
2009 0.7598* 0.9033* 0.9671* 1.1242* 1.1651* 0.8656 
2010 0.7505* 0.9542* 1.0616* 1.2243* 1.2794* 0.8966 
2011 0.7390* 0.9336* 1.0141* 1.0894* 1.3065* 0.9005 
Average 0.7473* 1.0219* 1.0403* 1.2103* 1.2256* 0.8968 
Notes: The scale economies measure is      /      and the estimates are evaluated at the mean of the 
data rather than mean estimate of scale economies calculated at each observation. * denotes the scale 
economies estimates are statistically different from 1 at 5% level for a 2-tailed test. 
Figure 6.10 shows the trend of the scale economies of Malaysian banks from 2000 to 2011. 
It is observed that the Malaysian banks were experiencing economies of scale and the 
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average scale economies exhibit an upward trend (increasing economies of scale), 
particularly for the later years of the sample. This upward trend in later years may imply that 
Malaysian banks tend to achieve optimal operating efficiency (constant returns of scale) by 
gradually making changes in their scale of production. Looking at the trend, during the early 
years of the sample (i.e. 2000, 2001 and 2003) higher levels of scale efficiency is evident, 
reflecting the consolidation of domestic banks. This consolidation initiative has increased 
the size of individual domestic banks, which consequently expanded their scale of 
production. In this case, the Malaysian banks enjoyed the scale economies derived from the 
diversification of risk gained from a larger portfolio of loans and a larger base of deposits. 
Thus, this diversification allows new larger domestic banks to manage risks with relatively 
fewer resources. That is, a larger scale of operations could improve a bank’s risk-return 
trade-off (Hughes and Mester, 2011).  
Figure ‎6.10 Trends of Scale Economies for Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 
As mentioned in Evanoff and Israilevich (1995), scale efficiency should not be confused 
with scale elasticity. These are two different concepts because they measure different things.  
Scale elasticity can be measured as the proportionate change in cost associated with a 
proportionate change in outputs. On the other hand, scale efficiency refers to the 
measurement of the average production cost at the observed operation scale compared to 
what is obtainable at the optimal scale size. Therefore, one should not get confused with a 
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scale elastic measure near one as this does not necessarily indicate small-scale inefficiency, 
nor does a large difference imply substantial scale inefficiency (Evanoff and Israilevich, 
1995). The scale inefficiency (SI) is measured as the proportion changes in the operating 
cost of the banks on constant returns to scale to the operating cost on economies of scale, 
which can be written as (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1995): 
 
       
   
        
 
   
(6.1) 
where SI is the scale inefficiency, s and F denotes the second derivative and first derivative 
of equation 5.15. Hence, the scale inefficiency is a function of first and second derivatives 
of the cost function. 
Table 6.25 exhibit the scale efficiencies of SFA and DEA for Malaysian banks from 2000 to 
2011. The scale efficiency using DEA can be computed from the cost efficiency scores of 
the constant returns to scale (CRS) to corresponding cost efficiency scores derived from cost 
efficiency of variable returns to scale (VRS) (SCALE= CRS/VRS, see Chapter 5 for details). 
The average scale efficiencies of SFA and DEA for Malaysian banks are 0.96 and 0.90, 
respectively. From the results, it is noted that the difference between scale inefficiency and 
scale economies is just a few percentage of each other, which is consistent with Berger et al. 
(1993, 1994) and Evanoff and Israilevich (1991). However, there are several issues relating 
to the measurement of scale efficiency (see Berger and Humphrey, 1994). For instance, the 
scale economies are normally measured using data of all the banks in the sample instead of 
using data on the most efficient banks on the production possibilities frontier, which could 
confound scale effects with differences in cost efficiency. Additionally, in comparison to 
scale economies (which is the ratio of marginal cost to average cost along a ray that holds 
outputs mix constant), scale efficiency accounts for the full difference in ray average cost 
between the point of evaluation and the scale efficient point (the bottom of U shaped 
average cost function), which might be far from the point of evaluation (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1994).    
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Table ‎6.25 Scale Efficiency for Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
 SFA Scale Efficiency DEA Scale Efficiency 
2000 0.9762 0.9234 
2001 0.9669 0.9285 
2002 0.9680 0.9148 
2003 0.9586 0.9076 
2004 0.9588 0.8880 
2005 0.9627 0.8970 
2006 0.9387 0.8982 
2007 0.9398 0.8787 
2008 0.9284 0.9086 
2009 0.9729 0.8878 
2010 0.9632 0.9147 
2011 0.9728 0.9101 
average 0.9587 0.9043 
6.7.2 Technological Change 
A time trend is employed to control for changes in technology of Malaysian banks over the 
time period under study. The time variable is a ‘catch-all’ variable that is used to capture the 
technological effects, which is particularly important in the continuously changing business 
environment where bank technology may be different from time to time (Altunbas et al., 
1999; Isik and Hassan, 2002). The time variable is also used to demonstrate that banks learn 
by performing organisational changes by efficiently utilising their inputs, outputs as well as 
other environmental factors (Altunbas et al., 1999). Therefore, technological change can be 
estimated by a ratio of changes in total cost to a change in technology, as shown from the 
measurement of partial derivative of the estimated cost function, with respect to the time 
trend (equation 5.29). This can be mathematically written as (Altunbas et al., 1999): 
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(6.2) 
where       is the changes of log of total cost and     denotes the changes in log 
technology. Table 6.26 reports the measurement of technological progress that exhibit the 
possible contribution of technical advances that could reduce the average costs for 
Malaysian banks between 2000 and 2011. For the case of Malaysian banks, Table 6.26 
indicates that technological change could reduce annual production costs by approximately 
11.3%. The technological change increased in the early years (2001 to 2003) during the 
introduction of internet banking to Malaysian domestic banks. Technological change also 
experienced a similar trend toward the end of the period of this study (2007–2011), mainly 
driven by heavy technology investment in Malaysian banks to improve their risk 
management practices and complying with the requirement of Basel II. For this, banks 
invested in various information technologies related tools, such as data warehouse and 
business intelligence solutions, to capture data, building new scoring models, enhance data 
quality, and improve new reporting structures. 
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Table ‎6.26 Technological Change of Malaysian Banks, 2000–2011 
Year Technological Change 
2000 -0.0640 
2001 -0.0602 
2002 -0.0786 
2003 -0.1035 
2004 -0.1365 
2005 -0.1175 
2006 -0.0957 
2007 -0.0738 
2008 -0.1029 
2009 -0.1569 
2010 -0.1723 
2011 -0.1411 
Average -0.1125 
According to Altunbas et al. (1999), the technological change can be decomposed into pure 
technical change, scale augmenting technical change and non-neutral technical change. The 
pure technical change (         ) relates to time in equation 6.3. It accounts for the 
reduction in total costs over a period of time that may be influenced by technological 
changes. The scale augmenting technical change (∑       
 
   ) that relates to outputs from 
equation 6.3, account for reduction in cost due to efficient scale of production. The non-
neutral technical change (∑      
  
  
     ) is related to prices in equation 6.3, and considers 
the reduction in total costs to input prices (Baltagi and Griffin, 1998; Kasman and Kirbas, 
2006).  
From Table 6.27, the main source of technological change for Malaysian banks between 
2000 and 2011 is pure technical change, at around 10.3%. This is particularly true as shown 
from the increasing trend of pure technological trend from 2000 to 2011, in which the 
improvement in technological change may have come about after the consolidation exercise 
of Malaysian domestic banks during the first phase of FSMP (2000-2003), where merged 
banks could take full advantage of new technologies by investing in cutting-edge 
technology and management systems (Khrishnasamy et al., 2003). The evidence could be 
seen from the enhanced network of delivery channels and branches throughout the country 
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after the consolidation exercise where these banks also offer a full range of banking services 
over the internet (Abdul Majid et al., 2010; Suffian, 2011). The higher pure technological 
change exhibited at the end of the study period may also imply the effects of new 
competition from foreign banks, and banks’ compliance behaviour towards implementation 
of Basel II that require further enhancement in technological investments.  
Table ‎6.27 Decomposition of Technical Changes 
Year 
Technological 
Change 
Pure 
Technological 
change 
Scale 
Augmentation 
Change 
Non-Neutral 
Tech Change 
2000 -0.0640 -0.0695 -0.0203 0.0258 
2001 -0.0602 -0.0827 -0.0137 0.0362 
2002 -0.0786 -0.0904 -0.0137 0.0255 
2003 -0.1035 -0.0959 -0.0246 0.0171 
2004 -0.1365 -0.1002 -0.0324 -0.0039 
2005 -0.1175 -0.1036 -0.0385 0.0246 
2006 -0.0957 -0.1066 -0.0474 0.0583 
2007 -0.0738 -0.1091 -0.0514 0.0867 
2008 -0.1029 -0.1114 -0.0413 0.0498 
2009 -0.1569 -0.1134 -0.0472 0.0036 
2010 -0.1723 -0.1152 -0.0389 -0.0182 
2011 -0.1411 -0.1168 -0.0347 0.0104 
Average -0.1125 -0.1031 -0.0351 0.0258 
6.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the cost- and profit-efficiency levels of Malaysian banks during 
the implementation of a ten-year financial liberalisation programme via its Financial Sector 
Master Plan (FSMP) from 2000 to 2011. The efficiency scores are generated from SFA, 
DEA and NDEA models. Following Resti (1997) and Bauer et al. (1998), SFA was used as 
the main methodology to measure the level of efficiency of Malaysian banks, and DEA and 
NDEA models were employed to test for consistency purposes. The results of the preferred 
SFA models show that the average cost efficiency is at 76.5% for the years 2000–2011. On 
the other hand, the standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency exhibit average scores of 
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62.2% and 93.3%, respectively. Looking at the trend of the first phase of FSMP (2000–
2003), the cost- and standard profit-efficiency were trending downward, mainly due to the 
impact of post-consolidation of domestic banks. During this period, consolidated banks 
were expected to incur higher costs, relating to merger and acquisition activities, such as 
rationalisation of branches, staff redundancy compensation and branding. Conversely, the 
alternative profit efficiency scores were on an increasing trend, suggesting that the effect of 
consolidation of domestic banks had resulted in increasing market power by these banks.  
In the second phase of the FSMP (2004–2007), the cost- and profit-efficiency scores 
dropped marginally in 2004 due to the adjustments that the banks have to make upon the 
introduction of new interest rate framework (NIRF) by BNM, who liberalised the interest 
rate to the market players. Subsequently, the efficiency scores for all three economic 
efficiencies (i.e. cost-, standard profit- and alternative profit-efficiency) displayed 
marginally higher degree of efficiency scores in 2005, which suggests that deregulation of 
interest rates could result in higher efficiency. Nevertheless, as further liberalisation 
initiatives take place, which was the introduction of new foreign players, both cost- and 
standard profit-efficiency were trending downwards as these new banks’ efficiency scores 
could affect the net impact of these efficiency scores. However, the alternative profit 
efficiency has increased steadily, indicating a stronger presence of imperfect competition 
(i.e. oligopoly market structure).  
As the timeline moved to the third phase of FSMP (2008–2011), Malaysia was also affected 
by the impact of the global credit crisis. There were large influx of funds flowing into the 
country from Europe and US searching for higher yields in mid-2007. These large inflows 
affected the stability of liquidity, as seen in 2008, when banks in Europe and the US 
deleveraged, leading to high withdrawal of funds and volatility in the liquidity of Malaysian 
banks. As a result, average efficiency scores were trending downward. In general, the results 
of efficiency scores indicate alternative profit efficiency appears to be greater than cost-and 
standard profit-efficiency. This may imply that, in a more liberalised environment, banks 
have been more innovative and have offered a variety of products and services to customers, 
intending to maximise banks’ revenue. In doing so, banks were affected by higher costs, but 
at the same time increased revenue in higher proportion (Berger and Mester, 2003). 
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Concurrently, banks may have incurred higher costs to capture more market share, which 
consequently resulted in banks facing more inherent risks (Vivas, 1997). Hence, banks with 
a greater market share have higher market power in pricing their products and services, as 
reflected by the higher scores of alternative profit efficiency.  
In this chapter, several hypotheses developed in Chapters 4 and 5 have been tested. In terms 
of ownership, domestic banks were found to be more cost efficient than foreign banks, but 
were no better than foreign banks with regards to profit efficiency (hypothesis 2). This could 
be potentially attributed to various restrictions made by BNM on foreign banks to protect 
the domestic banks. However, the very marginally higher profit efficiencies may suggest 
that foreign banks practice ‘cherry-picking’, choosing quality customers with niche banking 
activities that could give higher profits, rather than the ‘mass’ banking activities of the 
domestic banks (Hassan, 2002).  
In terms of specialisation, Islamic banks were more cost efficient than conventional banks, 
but were no better in terms of profit efficiency (hypothesis 3). This could be likely 
explained by BNM initiatives to increase the prominence of Islamic banks through the 
introduction of Islamic banks’ subsidiaries (which formerly operated as IBS, in a dual 
banking scheme) during the second phase of FSMP (2004–2007). Despite this initiative, 
these new Islamic banking subsidiaries still rely on their associated conventional banks 
within their respective groups. Hence, these new Islamic banks’ subsidiaries enjoy cost 
savings from the cost-sharing activities, which largely have to be borne by their parents or 
associated conventional banks. On the other hand, the lower profit efficiency of Islamic 
banks can be attributed to their shorter establishment age on the Malaysian banking scene 
compared to conventional banks, strict shariah rules in terms of what businesses can be 
conducted, limited product and services diversity, and unknown shariah ‘jargon’ that cannot 
be easily understood by customers (Kamaruddin et al, 2008; Abdul Majid et al., 2011).  
With regards to size, large banks are less cost efficient but more profit efficient compared to 
small banks (hypothesis 4). This could be likely explained from the need of large banks to 
invest in major restructuring and cost-cutting activities more than smaller banks, particularly 
in the period where banks were facing financial liberalisation (Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003). 
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In addition, most of these large banks are publicly traded; and with diverse ownership 
comes greater agency costs, which could lead to lower cost efficiency (Kwan, 2006). At the 
same time, this result may also support the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis (Hicks, 1935) due to 
significant market power by larger banks, where managers may not have the incentives to 
work as hard to keep costs under control and enjoying ‘quiet life’ (Berger and Hannan, 
1998). The large banks were more profit efficient than their smaller rivals because they 
enjoy sizeable market power, which could result in banks facing less pressure to increase the 
quality of banking services, subsequently reducing operating costs to maximise profits. 
Larger banks also benefitted from the greater technology changes (e.g. advances in 
information-processing technology), which could improve their profitability. They also 
enjoy extensive branch networks and have better opportunities to get new customers.  
In terms of market structure under the traditional SCP hypothesis, it was observed that a 
higher concentration exhibits lower cost efficiency, but higher profit efficiency (hypothesis 
6a). The effect of higher concentration was largely driven by the consolidation of domestic 
banks in the first phase of the FSMP, which consequently resulted in lower cost efficiency 
due to higher costs incurred during the post-consolidation period. On the other hand, banks 
with a larger market share were found to generate higher cost efficiency (hypothesis 6b), 
supporting the RMP hypothesis under which banks with a large market share, and well-
differentiated products, exert more market power to achieve greater performance (Shepherd, 
1982).  
In term of banks’ inherent risks (hypotheses 7–9), for capital adequacy, there was no 
significant relationship between capital and cost efficiency but higher capital adequacy 
exhibits  higher profits (hypothesis 7). This is particularly true for banks with a larger 
margin of safety and greater ability to absorb potential risks. Hence, a bank with a strong 
capital level normally enjoys reliable access to sufficient funds on favourable terms (Berger, 
1995). For asset quality, higher asset quality (NPL ratio) exhibits lower costs and lower 
profits (hypothesis 8). The direction of the coefficient in the estimation of parameters 
supports hypothesis 8 because NPLs increase costs and reduce profit, but the t-ratios are 
insignificant. In terms of liquidity, higher liquidity exhibits lower costs, but higher profits 
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(hypothesis 9). This, therefore, indicates that banks that are more liquid require higher 
expenses and resources to manage excess liquidity and work harder to maximise profits.  
This chapter has also reported and compared empirical results from different methodologies 
between parametric and nonparametric models. Following Bauer et al. (1998)’s five 
multilevel consistency tests, the results to some extent are consistent with past empirical 
literature, which in most cases indicate low and moderate compatibility across different 
methods (Bauer et al., 1998). The differences between efficiency scores obtained from 
different approaches are attributed mainly to the inherent advantages and disadvantages 
discussed earlier (Dong et al., 2014). From the five consistency conditions, low 
consistencies are shown in rank-order correlations of different methods and identification of 
best- and worst-practice banks (consistency condition test 2 and 3). On the other hand, there 
were moderate consistencies in the comparable means, stability over time and comparison 
against financial performance indicators (consistency condition test 1, 4 and 5). From these 
results, it is important for regulators and other interested parties to cautiously treat the 
results on Malaysian banks that seem to be sensitive to the methods selected for frontier 
estimation. Hence, the use of multiple frontier methods for consistency checking is 
recommended. In this chapter, the main characteristics of Malaysian banks, using attributes 
such as CAMEL, ownership structure, specialisation and size, were analysed and discussed. 
From the CAMEL rating system, based on the best-practice and worst-practice banks, the 
financial indicator used for CAMEL acronyms were consistent with the cost- and profit-
efficiency scores.  
Additionally, this chapter explores whether scale economies exist for the Malaysian banking 
industry, using both SFA and DEA models. In general, small banks face economies of scale, 
large banks display diseconomies of scale and medium-sized banks appear to be most scale 
efficient. Hence, the average cost curve display a U-shape, with medium-sized banks being 
more scale efficient than very small or very large banks. In term of scale efficiency, the 
result exhibits small difference of less than 5.0% between scale inefficiency and scale 
economies, which is consistent with Berger et al. (1993, 1994) and Evanoff and Israilevich 
(1991). 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results: Analysis and Discussion 
 
343 
 
Finally, this chapter has examined the technological change of Malaysian banks. The 
contribution of technology towards Malaysian banks was positive and reduced real annual 
production costs by approximately 11.3%. In terms of composition, the main source of 
technological change for Malaysian banks during the period under study (2000–2011) was 
majorly influenced by pure technical change, at 10.3%, instead of scale augmentation with a 
change of 3.5%. This implies that Malaysian banks have taken full advantage of new 
technological investments, influenced by various regulatory initiatives implemented by 
BNM, such as implementation of Basel II, which requires further enhancement of 
technological investment in data management and the implementation of internet banking. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings 
This chapter provides the conclusions and policy implications of this research, as well as 
limitations and suggestions for future research. The conclusions are reached after taking into 
account the results and discussion of the findings in previous chapters. This thesis examines 
the impact of gradual financial liberalisation via the FSMP (a ten-year liberalisation 
programme introduced in 2001) in the level of efficiency of Malaysian banks. Prior to the 
Asian financial crisis, the banking system in Malaysia was fragmented, with 33 domestic 
banking institutions. Banks at that time had a low capital level and were unable to face the 
macro pressures coming from economic vulnerabilities. In addition, the banks also over-
relied on corporations for financing; less attention was given to SMEs and retail consumers, 
causing gaps in access to financing and increased concentration on banks’ credit portfolios.  
Before the Asian crisis, banks were found to have low risk management and corporate 
governance, resulting in a high level of fragility. Furthermore, the market conditions were 
very rigid, where prescriptive rules-based regulation and supervision was implemented in 
the financial sector. The pricing mechanism of banking products and services was also rigid, 
which did not encourage competition among financial players. These conditions made 
Malaysian banks more vulnerable to macroeconomic distress and the inability to withstand 
these pressures during the Asian financial crisis. A major response by the Malaysian 
government to these pressures has been a substantial consolidation measure, resulting in a 
reduction in the total number of banks to 10 domestic banking groups. At the same time, the 
FSMP was introduced to strengthen and further liberalise the Malaysian banking industry 
following the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98. 
The implementation of the FSMP changed the financial landscape of the banking industry. 
Within the FSMP period, Malaysia witnessed a series of financial liberalisation measures, 
including; liberalisation of interest rate to market players, introduction of new foreign banks 
(both Islamic and conventional banks), branch liberalisation by allowing foreign banks to 
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increase their branches, de-pegging of Malaysian Ringgit to US Dollars, simplified product 
approval process, lifting of wage moratorium, and allowing of outsourcing of banks’ non-
core activities. With these initiatives, excessive government intervention in banks’ 
operations was reduced.  
Apart from investigating the impact of financial liberalisation on the Malaysian banking 
industry, this thesis seeks to test various contextual issues that influenced the level of 
efficiency of banks, such as the risk appetite of banks, ownership structure, specialisation, 
and market structure and control. To test these variables, this research employs parametric 
model’s SFA and data of all Malaysian banks for the years 2000–2011. This research also 
employs three distinct economic efficiency concepts (cost-, standard profit- and alternative 
profit efficiency), using a number of different measurement methods, including translog 
functional forms and 1-stage analysis to a single data set. By performing 1-stage analysis, 
variables relating to internal bank-specific characteristics (e.g. credit risk, capital adequacy 
risk, liquidity risk, ownership, specialisation, bank size), macro-economic environment (e.g. 
liberalisation periods and the global credit crisis) and market structure (e.g. the market 
concentration and market share) were used to test the effect of hetereogeneity. These control 
and environmental variables interact with input and output variables of cost-, standard 
profit- and alternative profit-efficiency functions, allowing efficiency scores to account for 
the differences between banks and explain what these differences mean to the costs and and 
profits, and inefficiency (ui) of Malaysian banks. Hence, various hypotheses were developed 
from the introduction of control and environmental variables. At the same time, a different 
set of combinations of control and environmental variables were tested in several stages to 
determine the best-fitting model (i.e. preferred models). Consequently, the preferred models 
from respective cost- and profit-efficiency models were employed to estimate the cost- and 
profit-efficiency scores.  
Following Resti (1997) and Bauer et al. (1998), this research also estimates efficiency 
scores from nonparametric traditional DEA and new DEA (Tone, 2002) models to test the 
consistency between parametric and nonparametric approaches. Despite the differences 
between parametric and nonparametric approaches- attributed mainly to the inherent 
advantages and disadvantages (Dong et al., 2014)- five consistency condition tests were 
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performed. It was found that low consistencies were shown in rank–order correlations of 
different methods and identification of best- and worst-practice banks (consistency 
condition test 2 and 3) and moderate consistencies in the comparable means, stability over 
time and comparison against financial performance indicators (consistency condition test 1, 
4 and 5).
191
 Therefore, it is important for regulators, and other interested parties, to treat the 
results on Malaysian banks cautiously; they seem to be sensitive to the methods selected for 
frontier estimation. Hence, the use of multiple frontier methods for consistency checking is 
recommended.  
Also studied, was the impact of financial liberalisation on the cost- and profit-efficiency of 
the banks. The average cost, standard profit- and alternative profit-inefficiency, for the years 
2000–2011, were 23.5%, 37.8% and 6.7% respectively. This research found that the cost- 
and profit-inefficiencies in Malaysian banks are substantial, where inefficient banks being 
approximately 20.0% to 40.0% less cost- and profit-efficient when compared to best-
practice banks. Therefore, in order to produce the same level of outputs of the best-practice 
banks, these inefficient banks should improve their cost and profits by approximately 20.0% 
and 40.0%, respectively. The results stemming from cost efficiency scores appear to be 
greater than standard profit efficiency scores, but lower than alternative profit efficiency. 
The differences between cost- and profit-efficiency indicate that a cost efficient bank may 
not necessarily be profit efficient. Moreover, the higher alternative profit efficiency 
compared to standard profit efficiency implies imperfect competition. Despite various 
initiatives introduced to improve the degree of competition in the market (e.g. liberalising 
controlled interest rates regime, allowing foreign banks to increase branches) and reduce 
market concentration (e.g. introducing new foreign banks), these measures have yet to show 
any improvements due to their nascent or growing stages of implementation, particularly 
during the post-consolidation period of domestic banks.  
In general, the results of efficiency scores indicate that alternative profit efficiency appears 
to be greater than cost efficiency. This implies that the Malaysian banks are more efficient 
                                                 
191
 This result is similar to Bauer et al. (1998), who found mixed evidence and were unable to draw a policy 
conclusion based on the six consistency conditions proposed. For the first three conditions, they found that 
parametric and nonparametric approaches were not mutually consistent. However, a possible consistency is 
found in the final three conditions. 
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in generating profits than controlling costs. In a more liberalised environment, banks are 
equipped with control over their own interest rate pricing on loans and deposits, and become 
more innovative, offering a variety of products and services to customers to maximise 
profits. In doing so, banks were affected by higher costs, but at the same time increased 
higher proportion of revenue, (Berger and Mester, 2003). However, banks may have 
incurred higher costs to capture higher market share (Vivas, 1997). Hence, banks with 
greater market share would have higher market power in pricing their products and services, 
but faced less pressure to reduce costs (Srairi, 2010).  
From the observation of trends in the first phase of the FSMP (2000–2003), this thesis found 
that cost- and standard profit-efficiency were trending downward, mainly due to the impact 
of post-consolidation of domestic banks. During this period, consolidated banks were 
expected to incur higher costs relating to merger and acquisition activities, such as 
rationalisation of branches, staff redundancy compensation and branding. Conversely, the 
alternative profit efficiency scores were on an increasing trend, suggesting that the effect of 
consolidation of domestic banks had resulted in greater market power by domestic banks.  
In the second phase of the FSMP (2004–2007), the cost- and profit-efficiency scores 
declined marginally in 2004 due to adjustments that the banks had to make upon the 
introduction of the new interest rate framework (NIRF) by BNM, who liberalised the 
interest rate to the market players. However, cost and profit efficiencies were slightly higher 
in 2005, suggesting that deregulation of interest rates could result in higher efficiency. As 
further liberalisation initiatives took place in 2006, cost- and standard profit-efficiency 
declined with the introduction of Islamic foreign banks. These new banks had low 
efficiency scores, as they were ‘green’ in the market, which affected the net impact of the 
overall cost- and profit-efficiency scores. However, the alternative profit efficiency has 
increased steadily, indicating stronger presence of market power despite new competitive 
pressures.  
In the third phase of the FSMP (2008–2011), Malaysia was also affected by the global credit 
crisis. In mid-2007, a large influx of funds flowed into the country from Europe and the US, 
searching for higher yields. These large inflows affected the stability in liquidity as reflected 
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in 2008 where banks in Europe and the US were deleveraging, leading to high withdrawals 
of funds and volatility in the liquidity of Malaysian banks. At the same time, BNM reduced 
the policy interest rates (i.e. the OPR) to stabilise the economy. As a result, the average 
efficiency scores were trending downward, mainly driven by banks allocating more 
resources to managing excess liquidity, as well as adjusting their input and output prices 
according to changes in policy interest rates and demand for credit.   
Based on the additional research questions posed earlier in Chapter 1; coupled with 
hypotheses developed in Chapters 4 and 5, this research found mixed findings regarding the 
cost- and profit-efficiency of Malaysian banks. First, higher capital adequacy level has no 
impact on cost but exhibits higher profits. This is particularly true for banks with larger 
margin of safety and has greater ability to absorb potential risks. Hence, a bank with a 
strong capital level normally enjoys reliable access to sufficient sources of funds on 
favourable terms (Berger, 1995). In terms of asset quality, higher level of NPLs exhibits 
lower profits but has no impact to costs. Additionally, the higher the banks’ liquidity was, 
the higher their profits, but with no impact on costs. As evidenced in 2007, the liquidity of 
Malaysian banks increased due to large inflows of foreign funds. Malaysian banks probably 
earned more income from conversion of excess funds into short term assets.  
Second, domestic banks were found to be more cost efficient than foreign banks, but foreign 
banks were slightly better than domestic banks with regards to profit efficiency. This could 
be potentially attributed to various restrictions made by BNM on foreign banks to protect 
the domestic banks. However, the marginally higher profit efficiencies could be attributed to 
the foreign banks’ practicing ‘cherry-picking’ – choosing quality customers with niche 
banking activities that could give higher profits – rather than following the ‘mass’ banking 
activities of the domestic banks (Hassan, 2002).  
Third, Islamic banks were more cost efficient than conventional banks, but were no better in 
terms of profit efficiency. This can be likely explained from the effect of Islamic banking 
subsidiaries enjoying cost savings from cost sharing activities, which largely had been borne 
by their parents or associated conventional banks. On the other hand, the lower profit 
efficiency of Islamic banks was attributed to their shorter establishment age, strict shariah 
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rules on business activities, limited diversity in products, and obscure shariah ‘jargon’, 
which could not be easily understood by customers (Kamaruddin et al, 2008; Abdul Majid 
et al., 2011).  
Fourth, large banks are less cost efficient, but more profit efficient, compared to small banks. 
During the period of liberalisation, the large banks have to invest in more major 
restructuring and cost-cutting activities than the smaller banks (Akhigbe and McNulty, 
2003). In addition, these large banks are publicly traded; and with diverse ownership come 
with greater agency costs, which could lead to lower cost efficiency (Kwan, 2006). Also, 
due to significant market power by these larger banks, their managers might not have had 
the incentives to work at keeping costs under control and instead, enjoyed the ‘quiet life’ 
(Berger and Hannan, 1998). The large banks were more profit efficient than their smaller 
counterparts, because they enjoy sizeable market power, which could result in less pressure 
to increase the quality of banking services, reducing the overall operating costs to maximise 
profits. Larger banks in Malaysia also benefitted from the greater technology changes (e.g. 
advances in information-processing technology). 
Fifth, a higher market concentration in the Malaysian banking industry exhibits in lower 
cost efficiency, but higher profit efficiency. The effects of higher concentration were largely 
driven by the consolidation of domestic banks in the first phase of the FSMP, which 
consequently resulted in lower cost efficiency, due to the higher costs of the post-
consolidation period. On the other hand, banks with larger market share were found to 
generate higher profit efficiency, where banks with large market share and well-
differentiated products exert more market power to maximise profits (Shepherd, 1982).  
In terms of the characteristics of Malaysian banks, the CAMEL rating system showed that  
both best- and worst-practice banks were mostly consistent with the cost- and profit-
efficiency scores. Apart from having lower capital, best-practice banks had slightly more 
NPLs and less liquidity, lower operating costs, higher earnings and less dependence on 
purchased funds. On the other hand, the worst-practice banks appear to have lower NPLs 
and higher capital (due to regulator’s interventions to maintain public confidence). Higher 
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operating costs were incurred by these banks, owing to greater resources in managing 
potential delinquent loans and excess liquidity.  
This research also found that scale economies were prevalent across the Malaysian banking 
industry. Small banks face economies of scale, large banks display diseconomies of scale 
and medium-sized banks appear to be most scale efficient. Hence, the average cost curve 
displays a U-shape, with medium-sized banks being more scale efficient than very small or 
very large banks. In addition, from the result of technological change, the research found 
that the contribution of technology towards Malaysian banks was positive and could reduce 
the real annual production cost by approximately 11.3%. In terms of composition, the main 
source of technological change for Malaysian banks during the period under study (2000–
2011) is majorly influenced by pure technical change, at 10.3%, instead of scale 
augmentation change, at 3.5%. This implies that the banks took full advantage of new 
technological investment, influenced by various regulatory initiatives implemented by BNM 
such as, Basel II in 2008, which requires further enhancement in technological investments 
for data management and implementation of internet banking in 2001. 
7.2 Policy Implications 
The objective of this research was to examine the impact of financial liberalisation on the 
efficiency of Malaysian banks. Understanding the impact of financial liberalisation on the 
Malaysian banking industry is of great interest to policymakers, bankers, analysts and 
economists. Such an understanding would provide some explanation of what has happened 
to these banks following the implementation of financial liberalisation via the FSMP in 
2001. Generally, the implementation of financial liberalisation through various deregulation 
measures such as, deregulation of interest rates and removing entry barriers to foreign banks 
should increase the efficiency of banks. However, this has not been the case. The effect of 
banking consolidation during the first phase of the FSMP had a significant impact on market 
concentration in the Malaysian banking industry, and this appears to have led to imperfect 
competition. Although the market competition situation has improved, through the 
introduction of foreign Islamic banks and foreign conventional banks, the gradual 
liberalisations introduced in the second (2004-2007) and third phases (2008-2011) of the 
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FSMP have yet to realise their potential and are still at a nascent stage. Therefore, BNM 
ought to accelerate their liberalisation initiatives to ensure adequate competitive pressures 
on large domestic banks. Probably, greater participation of foreign ownership through 
equity can be exploited as a catalyst for more efficiency. Besides equity participation, 
foreign banks should be allowed to set up more branches (than what has been permitted by 
BNM) all over the country, especially in rural and suburban areas. 
The market concentration has increased since the consolidation of domestic banks during 
the first phase of the FSMP (2000-2003). With more domestic banks merging in 2005 and 
2010, these domestic banks have increased in size, changing the structure of the banking 
market. Thus, BNM should monitor the impact of these large banks in the market. A small 
number of large domestic banks could lead to collusive strategies, anti-competitive 
behaviour; and hence, can result in greater risks towards public welfare. Furthermore, 
market power may lead to lower efficiency in large banks, with managers enjoying the 
‘quiet life’, and earning higher interest rates on loans and deposits. Despite the introduction 
of the Competition Act, 2012, BNM should play a more active role in monitoring the 
competitive conditions of the banking industry. 
Additionally, this research has investigated the determinants (i.e. control and environmental 
variables) of banking inefficiency. Inefficient banks in Malaysia could be characterised as 
having high operating costs, low earnings and high dependence on purchased funds. 
Knowing this, the regulator can design appropriate policies with the aim of improving the 
operations and performance of inefficient banks. This research found consistent results 
against the widely-used CAMEL ratings and the efficiency scores derived from frontier 
measurements. Therefore, frontier measurement was found to be one of the most useful 
measurement tools which could be adopted by BNM to support policy decisions towards the 
Malaysian banking Industry. 
 With regard to technology, pure technological change was found to be the main contributor, 
apart from managerial improvement in efficiency. Technological improvements can shift the 
production function, assuming other factors remain the same. Therefore, the regulators 
might provide further incentives or relax some policies relating to technnological innovation. 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
 
352 
 
With this, banks are expected to be able to reduce their operating costs over a period of time 
and create greater access for customers (e.g. internet banking). Nonetheless, these initiatives 
should not compromise prudential regulation.  
7.3 Limitations of Present Research and Future Research 
In this research, the parametric SFA model was employed as the main approach to measure 
the efficiency of Malaysian banks; and nonparametric DEA models were used to test the 
consistency of efficiency scores derived from SFA. As discussed earlier in previous chapters, 
different methodologies of frontier measurement could result in different efficiency scores, 
due to their inherent advantages and disadvantages. This research only employs three types 
of efficiency measurement: SFA, DEA and NDEA. For benchmarking purposes, a 
combination of different methodologies (e.g. comparison of SFA with thick frontier analysis 
(TFA) and distribution free analysis (DFA); and between DEA and free disposal hull (FDH)) 
could give a better picture regarding inefficiency estimates of Malaysian banks. Nonetheless, 
regarding the inefficiency assumptions of SFA, this study employed a half-normal model, 
instead of gamma distribution, exponential and truncated-normal assumptions, which could 
result in different inefficiency estimates. A comparison of the results derived using these 
different inefficiency assumptions would provide stronger support to our findings. Therefore, 
in future, this research could be extended by employing the methods and techniques 
mentioned above. 
In addition, different variables used as measurements of efficiency could derive different 
inefficiency estimates as well. For instance, off balance sheet items may also influence the 
operating costs and profitability of banks. However, due to data not available, this research 
does not include off balance sheet items. Similarly, data for the number of employees and 
the risk weighted capital ratio (RWCR) are also unavailable. Therefore, a complete study 
that included these data might result in different inefficiency estimates. Additionally, while 
the multiproduct nature of banks is widely recognised, it is not always possible to include all 
items or dimensions of a bank’s output in model specifications. Thus, for this research, an 
intermediation approach was utilised, but a concurrent production approach could also be 
used for comparison purposes. 
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Prior to the introduction of Islamic banks’ subsidiaries, conventional banks in Malaysia also 
offered Islamic banking products that were managed under a separate window via IBS. 
Since the data of Islamic windows and conventional banks are not separated, the efficiency 
of these banks was estimated as conventional banks until the disaggregation of Islamic 
windows into legally incorporated Islamic bank subsidiaries. This limitation warrants 
careful judgement regarding overall Malaysian Islamic banking’s assets and liabilities, 
particularly for conventional banks with IBS during first (2000-2003) and second phase 
(2004-2007) of the FSMP.  
Another shortcoming of the present research may relate to the sample size, which was only 
confined to Malaysian banks. Therefore, the research could be extended to a number of 
Southeast Asian countries (SEA; e.g. Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Brunei and Thailand) and banking sector efficiency across those countries. This would be an 
interesting analysis, especially as most SEA countries were affected by the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–98 and different paths were taken by each country in terms of macro-
economic policy frameworks, with some relying on the reform programmes of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic recovery. However, the lack of public 
data from these countries makes it difficult to perform such research. 
An additional limitation to this research may relate to the time considered for the empirical 
analysis. Although the whole period of the FSMP was covered -which involved a variety of 
transformations and liberalisation initiatives- these initiatives did not have an immediate 
effect on the Malaysian banking industry. Therefore, it would be interesting to carry out the 
same research beyond 2011, to particularly see the impact of competition by the newly 
introduced foreign banks in the late second and third phases of the FSMP.  
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